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Lord Carter: My Lords, at a convenient moment after 3.30 p.m. my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton will, with the leave of the House, repeat a Statement which is being made in another place on Heathrow Terminal 5.

European Communities (Amendment) Bill

3.8 p.m.

The Minister for Trade (Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean): My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

Moved, That the House do now again resolve itself into Committee.—(Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly.

[The CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES in the Chair.]

Clause 1 [Incorporation of provisions of the Treaty of Nice]:

Lord Howell of Guildford moved Amendment No. 22:


The noble Lord said: Amendment No. 22, which is grouped with other amendments, concerns Article 207(2) of the treaty establishing the European Community. I hope that that is of guidance and help to those following the details of the debate.

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This is one of a series of amendments, several of which concern the new move as embodied in the Treaty of Nice—and therefore will be brought into our legislation should the Bill be approved—for qualified majority voting for certain key appointments and arrangements in the organisation of the European Union's institutions. In this particular case we are concerned with the appointment of the Secretary-General of the General Secretariat, the High Representative for foreign policy and his deputy in the General Secretariat. Members of the Committee will know that in recent years the General Secretariat has expanded somewhat and now covers a wide range of Union activities over the second and third pillars. The role of High Representative for foreign policy has emerged, and it is filled with considerable prominence and ability by Mr Javier Solana.

We believe—if I may, I shall put reasons before the Committee—that this type of appointment is extremely sensitive and that it is very important that it is handled correctly. We do not consider that it is best settled by the rather crude instrument of qualified majority voting. We do not quite understand why the Government ever signed up to this particular veto abandonment. We say that not only because we consider that vetoes and the ability to cry "stop" are always the most wonderful and best way forward but because, in the matter of appointing such crucial figures in European affairs, we believe that discussion and understanding between the member states is a much healthier way of proceeding than the process of one group of people outvoting another. That is particularly the case as we move into the new pattern of weighting of votes in the Council, which we shall debate later. We do not believe that that is the right way to proceed.

We need to be extremely careful mainly for the following reason. There is always a danger—a number of assertions and quotations, one of which I shall refer to in a moment, reinforce this point—that the High Representative for foreign policy will drift into acting as Foreign Secretary for a putative entity—that is, the European Union as a type of enlarged, replicated nation. Of course, that can be extremely dangerous.

In the present case, I consider the High Representative to be a man of vast ability who has done excellent work. I believe that this type of post works best when the person holding it acts as a skilful honest broker or "putter-forward" of positions between disputants or even potential combatants. The contribution made by Mr Solana in, it is hoped, defusing a Macedonia-type situation is considerable. Therefore, the honest broker role is the right one. However, for a number of reasons, it could be extremely dangerous if the holder of the post, having been voted in by qualified majority voting, believed, as some do, that his was a Foreign Minister role.

First, as I believe we mentioned in earlier debates and as Henry Kissinger observed in recent comments, a Foreign Secretary needs to put forward a foreign policy. In the European case, a foreign policy must be woven together out of the vast complex of the different and diverse viewpoints of the 15 member states. In due

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course, that number may become 25, or perhaps even 28 if all 13—that is, not only the next 10 countries but the three after that—join. Once that position is reached, the matter is non-negotiable. If Americans, Indians, Japanese or Russians arrive and say, "That is a very interesting viewpoint. Ours is slightly different. Can we reach an agreement?", the answer is that the Foreign Secretary's position, if that is the role that has been taken on by the High Representative elected by QMV, becomes impossible. He will say, "This is the given position. I cannot unravel it. You must take it or leave it".

Secondly, the whole concept not merely of a common foreign policy, which is what is usually put forward, but of the pattern evolving into a single foreign policy is dangerous because it raises expectations that every single member of the greatly enlarged Union which lies before us—indeed, even of the present Union—is entitled to a say in evolving the policy which the High Representative is supposed to promote.

Of course, in recent days we have seen the disappointments and difficulties to which that leads. A crisis appears, all types of bilateral alliances and arrangements spring up, often put in place with great subtlety and agility and very rapidly, and, to put the matter crudely, the point is reached where it is not possible to wait for the slowest member of the convoy. Indeed, if one waits too long for the slowest member, the policy never crystallises. No foreign policy emerges, and the type of assistance given recently, for example, by the coalition of members to the United States in forming a coalition to deal with the global attack on terrorism would simply not be forthcoming.

To put it into the vernacular, everyone expects to be invited to the dinner. When they are not, one ends up not with a feeling of unity and brotherhood among the European states, in which I, for one, passionately believe, but a feeling of crossness among certain states that they have been left out and that somehow the big boys are ganging up against the rest. That view was mentioned by Mr Berlusconi and reported in this morning's newspapers. That is not good for the type of Europe that we want to see and for the kind of European unity that some of us have spent half a lifetime trying to work for.

Therefore, the whole question of who fills the role is delicate. It needs to be handled by very careful, friendly debate and discussion in good faith and not by the hammer instrument of saying, "Well, we can't discuss it. We'll have a vote and the people with the most votes win". That is not a healthy approach.

Thirdly, to take another current example, is the question of the posture of the European Union member states in relation to the crucial Israel-Palestine issue. Different member states and, indeed, different parties and groupings inside member states have different views on how pressure should be applied and to which side—that is, Israel or Palestine or both—if we are to reach the dream (I hope that it is more than a dream) or perhaps the attainable goal about which Colin Powell spoke only yesterday of a separate Palestinian state and Israel living side by side in peace.

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If, by having the wrong person in the post, an EU view is allowed to develop that is in any way one-sided, and if it is not possible to articulate and interweave that view with the evolving policies of Washington, in which America is bound to play a vast and key role in this whole issue whether or not the world likes it—personally, I do like it—then we have not created more stability. We have not opened out the past away from the hideous, endless tit-for-tat killing of the Israel-Palestine situation but have raised further barriers and put further obstacles in the way. That, again, I consider to be dangerous.

Fourthly, there is the concern, which I do not believe is only in the mind or can be dismissed, that behind the idea of common foreign policy, a common approach in certain situations or the use of Mr Solana as a skilled broker, is a strong impulse to wrap up all foreign policy into a single approach and put it in the first pillar inside the Community. Mr Romano Prodi, who is an invaluable quarry of quotes, said on 14th November—less than a week ago—that he wanted to see a single European Union foreign policy and he wanted it to be under the Commission. He said,


    "as I have said many times in the past and will say again here today, [Europe] will not succeed in contributing to peace and stability in the world, nor will it be able to fill a political role that matches its economic stature, or indeed be accepted in such a role, unless it is united in its actions".

I believe that that sounds all right in relation to that point. He then goes on to say:


    "This problem will be resolved once and for all only if the necessary adjustments are made and the entire foreign and security policy of the Union is brought inside the Community system".

That is what we are up against and that is what lies behind the concern which some Members of the Committee may consider fanciful but which I do not. The High Representative and Secretary-General of the Secretariat is a person on whose discretion and skill we rely greatly to prevent that coming about. I do not believe that the Government or any sensible and committed European want to see the entire foreign and security policy of the Union brought inside the Community system. We want a Secretary-General and a High Representative who can resist that. Those are reasons why we are doubtful about the proposal and do not understand why the Government signed up to it.

I have yet one more reason in this context; namely, that there exists in certain foreign policy discussion circles the view that one cannot really do anything unless one has an army—one needs a military force in order successfully to project influence in the world. That view might have been valid until about 10 years ago, but I suspect that in the knowledge-based age of information technology it no longer applies and that nations or political entities can project their weight in terms of their contribution to global stability without the military attachment. That has been for many years the view of the Europe-builders—it was the view until recently, when there began to be talk of Europe becoming in some senses a military power. We have been told hitherto that that was not happening and that all that was involved was the minor matter of

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carrying out certain low-intensity, low-profile semi-policing tasks rather than going for a full-blown, fully equipped European army, which would be somehow autonomous from NATO.

I notice that the Secretary of State for Defence has changed his tune. That makes us a little worried about the role of the High Representative. He is reported in this morning's papers as saying that the new force must move quickly, have heavy-lift air transport and go quickly into combat zones; he also referred to mid-air refuelling and radar-jamming devices. That is far from the low-level humanitarian tasks that we were earlier discussing and it makes one feel even more strongly that there is an old-fashioned doctrine at the heart of much of this thinking. That involves saying, "Yes, there must be a European identity and the weight of Europe must be projected in the world. We must have forces to back that up. That is how we can achieve balance against the hegemony of the United States of America". We believe that that is a false perception and the wrong approach. If there is to be reinforcement of America's efforts, it must involve the strengthening of NATO and that must be done in the spirit of partnership not of duplication and it must not involve rival forces or rival foreign policies. We have seen too much of that—for example, delegations went off to Korea to second-guess and to attempt to outwit the Americans in their handling of that situation. Again and again, the spirit has been one of rivalry rather than of partnership.

For all of those reasons—there are many more, and noble Lords may point out those that I have overlooked—the matter of who fills the role is crucial. The matter of how the role is chosen is also crucial and requires great delicacy and a careful approach. The introduction of QMV does not seem to us to be consistent with that approach. I beg to move.


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