| Previous Section | Back to Table of Contents | Lords Hansard Home Page |
Lord Renton: The Minister mentioned that the Terrorism Act 2000 provides a precedent for the jurisdiction of magistrates' courts. But this Bill has been introduced in quite different and much more serious circumstances than those which arose before the introduction of the Terrorism Act 2000—and, incidentally, from the point of view applying the law, much more complex circumstances than those which arose before that Act. In view of what has happened since 11th September, surely we should look at this matter with fresh minds.
Lord Rooker: We are looking at this matter with fresh minds. Obviously there are substantial changes. For example, cash can be collected from anywhere in
the country; we are not as confined as we are under the terrorism legislation. In some ways, that adds weight to the fact that the quicker we can get a case to court the better. Therefore, meeting the 48-hour deadline is important. Values have also changed.However, I do not want to go into the overall aspects of Clause 1 stand part. We are seeking to build on existing procedures; we are not seeking to invent the wheel. We have a well-tried and tested system, which has been operating in magistrates' courts since 1991, and there is no evidence of any problems in that respect. We know that there will be problems following September 11th, hence the Bill.
On the narrow issue of which court should deal with these issues, we have no problems with the system we are using at the moment. It is a well tried and tested system and I ask the Committee to put its faith in the lay magistrates of this country.
Lord Thomas of Gresford: I thought I had brought evidence with me by quoting directly from the recommendations of the Runciman report. But now that we know where we are, I shall go back to the report and find out on what those recommendations were based. I am sure that the Runciman committee, which inquired into the working of the Act, went into the matter with a great deal of thoroughness. It came to the conclusion that the magistrates' court was not a satisfactory venue for drug confiscation orders.
As the noble Viscount said, the machinery and the issues involved in the first schedule to the Bill—the tracing and earmarking of property and so on—are complicated. Magistrates, particularly lay magistrates, are in no way suited to deciding legal issues of that kind. Presumably they would have to do it on the advice of the clerk to the magistrates' court, and that is not on. I hope that the Minister will look again at this particular problem.
Lord Elton: The Minister told the Committee that we have no examples of what has gone wrong under the Terrorism Act 2000. We should wait until the next stage to hear the evidence of what has gone right under that Act. It has not been running very long and it would not be fair to ask the Minister how many cases involving substantial amounts of money have been heard.
In his reply, the Minister said that there would be a need for expedition—I presume it was his reply to me—because of the need to confirm or otherwise the first detention order within 48 hours. I may have misheard or I may misunderstand the law, but I thought detention orders referred to people rather than to cash. Perhaps he can explain the context of his reply.
Lord Rooker: It is a question of what happens to the money after the civil proceedings. At the moment, there seems to be an obsession with the word Xdetention", but I am dealing with what happens to the money after it is forfeited. After 48 hours the money has to go into an interest-bearing account—procedures will be set in train after that period, after
the money has been collected—which is obviously right and proper. The money may be collected wrongly and therefore there must be set procedures. That is why there is a need for speed.There has been one case so far under the Terrorism Act. However, I do not rest my case on the Act. I rest my case on the fact that the procedure has been working for many years under the drug trafficking legislation.
3.30 p.m.
Lord Campbell-Savours: Perhaps I may ask my noble friend a question, without wishing to press him too hard. I understand that under subsection (7) the appeal procedure is to the Crown Court. I am not a lawyer, but is there any evidence to suggest that there would be a higher incidence of appeal to the Crown Court in the event that the first stage were to a magistrates' court—in so far as people might feel that the judgment made in the first instance was not correct?
Lord Rooker: I am dealing with an amendment to Clause 1. I cannot see a subsection (7) in Clause 1. I shall have to take advice in order to respond to my noble friend at some other time.
Lord Swinfen: The noble Lord's reference is fine. It is to Paragraph 7 of Schedule 1, which is affected by this clause.
Lord Rooker: I accept that. But the reason the amendments are grouped is so that we can have an ordered debate. We shall have a fairly extensive debate on Schedule 1 when we come to the third group of amendments, which includes Amendments 5 to 15 and 17 to 22. I shall be happy to deal with my noble friend's point at that time.
Lord Kingsland: The Minister said that the burden of proof was on the non-government Benches in your Lordships' House to establish a better case for the High Court or the Crown Court than had been established by mere speeches in Committee. But the truth of the matter is that in many cases it is the Government, not the Opposition, the Liberal Democrat Party or the Cross-Benchers, who are in a better position to identify this evidence.
The key to our case is paragraph (c) of Clause 1(1):
- Xis, or represents, property obtained through terrorism".
I should also like to say to the noble Lord that, frankly, I think it much more likely that he will find a High Court judge available within the 48 hours to deal with these complex matters than a magistrate. This matter can now stand over to the Report stage. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendments Nos. 2 and 3 not moved.]
Lord Goodhart moved Amendment No. 4:
- Page 2, line 2, at end insert—
The noble Lord said: I begin by repeating a declaration of interest that I made late last night at Second Reading. I am vice-chairman of the council of Justice, an organisation which has submitted a briefing paper to a number of Members of the House in relation to the Bill. Having made that declaration twice, I hope that I shall be excused if I do not repeat it during future proceedings on the Bill.
The Minister has dealt with Amendments 1 and 16, which deal with an entirely different subject matter from that in Amendment No. 4. He replied briefly to Amendment No. 3, which raises a similar matter, when it was mentioned by my noble friend Lord Mar and Kellie. But because that reply was not wholly satisfactory, and because the Committee should know what Amendment No. 4 is about, I shall deal with it briefly.
Schedule 14 to the Terrorism Act 2000 deals with the exercise of certain powers under that Act by officers of the police, the Customs and the Immigration Service. Those powers include in particular the seizure of cash. Under Schedule 14, the Home Secretary issues a code of practice about the exercise of functions by those officers. The Home Secretary has to lay a draft of the code or revised code before Parliament, and brings it into operation by order. Under Section 123(4) of the Terrorism Act, the order must be approved by affirmative procedure.
Under the Bill, the seizure of terrorist capital provisions in the Terrorist Act are replaced by the provisions in Schedule 1 to the Bill. Schedule 14 to the Terrorism Act is not replaced. It simply applies to the new provisions rather than to the repealed ones.
Clause 1(5) of the Bill provides that the commencement order bringing Schedule 1 into force may make modifications to any code of practice under Schedule 14 to the Terrorism Act that is then in force. These modifications need not just be consequential.
Commencement orders are not normally subject to any form of parliamentary procedure. So we have a curious situation. Amendments to the Schedule 14 code normally require affirmative resolution. When the commencement order is made, the Home Secretary can modify the code without any form of parliamentary control; thereafter, changes revert to the affirmative resolution procedure.
This seems completely illogical. I accept that there must not be a hiatus when there is no code in force. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, of which I am a member, picked up this problem and recommended the negative procedure for the order made under Clause 1(5). This amendment goes somewhat beyond the committee's proposal. It proposes to use the delayed affirmative procedure—that is, the order comes into force immediately, but lapses unless it is approved by both Houses within 40 days. That would be as close as one could get to the affirmative resolution procedure under the order.
If the Government were to indicate their willingness to apply the negative resolution procedure, as recommended by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, I should be happy. But if the code is thought important enough to require the affirmative procedure, it is wrong to allow an occasion when it can be modified with no parliamentary procedure at all.
I accept that, as the Minister has said, he has placed a copy of the draft code in the Library. But some explanation should be given as to why it was not thought appropriate even to go as far as the negative procedure, as was recommended by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. I beg to move.
X(6) An order under subsection (5)—
(a) must be laid before Parliament after being made, and
(b) ceases to have effect at the end of the period of 40 days from the day on which it was made unless before the end of that period the order is approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament (but without that affecting anything done under the order).
(7) In calculating the period of 40 days in subsection (6)(b) no account is to be taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which both Houses are adjourned for more than four days."
Next Section
Back to Table of Contents
Lords Hansard Home Page