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Lord Hylton: In support of what was said by the noble Lord, Lord McNally, it seems to me that there is some danger in connection, for example, with plants such as Sellafield and the long drawn-out controversy over MOX fuel. All have aroused fears, apprehensions and arguments in neighbouring countries, such as the Republic of Ireland. They may therefore be said to have international implications for us. In that context, I hope that there will be no suppression of reasonable and peaceful information.
Lord Donaldson of Lymington: I came across the answer to the noble Lord's question while browsing
through the Bill. The expression Xa United Kingdom person" struck me, as it struck the noble Lord, as extraordinary. I am sure that the Minister is now being told where it appears. If one looked outside the clause where I met it, one would discover that one got there by steps; namely, that a United Kingdom person was defined as a British national and so forth. One has to lift one's eyes a little to see where the strange expression came from.
Lord Sainsbury of Turville: The noble Lord, Lord McNally, questioned the justification for the clause. Perhaps I may deal with his concerns. There clearly is a balance to be drawn between the protection of sensitive information and people's legitimate comments and queries about the nuclear industry.
There is a need to strengthen the law in order to ensure full protection for sensitive information on the security of nuclear sites and nuclear material. While companies are required to protect that information under the nuclear security regulatory regime, those obligations apply only to companies and not to individuals.
It is important to ensure that there are fully effective sanctions against individuals. The consequences of illegitimate disclosure of sensitive information on the security of nuclear sites and material could be highly damaging and this strengthening of the law is essential.
Perhaps I may deal with the area of most sensitivity to organisations such as Greenpeace; namely, the consideration of the impact of the clause on the disclosure of information relating to the transport of nuclear material. This is one of its major concerns. To ensure the security of nuclear material in the course of transport it is essential to protect detailed information on routes, time schedules and the nature of the material being transported until the movements begin so that no forewarning is provided to potential attackers. Furthermore, the recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency—the relevant United Nations body—on the physical protection of nuclear material, which underpins the UK nuclear security regulatory system, include this requirement. The clause would prohibit only the intentional or reckless disclosure of information which could prejudice security and provides essential protection of nuclear material in the course of transport.
I make two further points. First, an offence would be committed only if there was a deliberate or reckless disclosure of information that could prejudice security. Whether an offence has been committed will depend on the facts of the case which will be for the courts to assess. Secondly, a great deal of information on nuclear transport has no implications for security. Information collected through observation from public places is essentially public information and is very unlikely to be able to prejudice security. The same applies to disclosure of information that is already in the public domain. Dissemination of that kind of information is highly unlikely to fall within this offence. I hope that that explanation satisfies the noble Lord's concern.
There have been comments during the debate about whether particular measures are necessary to fight terrorism. I believe that after the events of September 11th most people in this country do not want advance notice to be given on the movement of nuclear material around the country and the reckless disclosure of such information should be discouraged. It is on that basis that this clause is put forward.
A question was asked about what XUnited Kingdom person" means. That is defined in Clause 82(2):
- XIn this Part 'United Kingdom person' means a United Kingdom national, a Scottish partnership or a body incorporated under the law of any part of the United Kingdom".
Lord Sainsbury of Turville: In subsection (3) it is provided:
- XFor this purpose a United Kingdom national is an individual who is—
- (a) a British citizen, a British Dependent Territories citizen, a British National (Overseas) or British Overseas citizen;
- (b) a person who under the British Nationality Act 1981 . . . is a British subject; or
- (c) a British protected person within the meaning of that Act".
Lord Donaldson of Lymington: Do not citizens of Northern Ireland carry British passports?
Lord Hylton: Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom.
Lord Sainsbury of Turville: A British citizen in this context would include someone from Northern Ireland.
Lord Dixon-Smith: We shall consider whether an amendment is required to include people who are normally resident in the United Kingdom but are not UK citizens.
Lord Sainsbury of Turville: I shall check whether the explanation that I have given is correct. If not, I shall write to the noble Lord and correct the mistake.
Clause 80, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 81 [Prohibition of disclosures of uranium enrichment technology]:
Lord McNally moved Amendment No. 148:
- Page 40, line 41, leave out paragraph (a).
The noble Lord said: We seek to leave out paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of Clause 81. Again, this is related to the continuing national debate as regards the future of the nuclear industry.
Subsection (1)(a) refers to the Xenrichment of uranium". Greenpeace has stated that highly enriched uranium can be used in nuclear weapons. However, enriched uranium, covered in this clause, is the material used in the normal nuclear fuel employed in power stations. If subsection (1)(a) remains unamended, it would be impossible to discuss the process by which nuclear fuel is made, where it is made, or possibly the potential problems of using it.In tabling the amendment, we seek to establish whether subsection (1)(a) constitutes a form of Xgagging clause" on any legitimate discussion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. I beg to move.
Lord Sainsbury of Turville: With regard to Amendment No. 148, perhaps I may explain briefly the purpose of Clause 81. It provides the power to make regulations prohibiting the disclosure of uranium enrichment technology and to set out exceptions to the prohibitions. The clause is necessary because this technology is highly attractive to proliferators. While it is used in the civil nuclear industry to enrich uranium for use in fuel for power generation, it can be easily adapted for use in developing nuclear weapons.
The case for rigorously protecting the technology is therefore self-evident. Companies in the civil nuclear industry are already required to apply stringent controls under the civil nuclear security regulatory regime, but those requirements will not apply to individuals. We propose to make regulations to fill that gap.
However, when we draw up the regulations we shall ensure that we balance robust protection of this technology with the need not to prevent its communication in legitimate circumstances and the regulations will provide for appropriate defences. They will be subject to public consultation and, most important, they will require the consent of both Houses under the affirmative resolution procedure.
I hope that, with those assurances, the noble Lord will be willing to withdraw Amendment No. 148, which would rob the clause of most of its effect.
Lord McNally: We seem to have decoupled Amendment No. 148 from Amendment No. 149 in the groupings list. However, I am happy to withdraw Amendment No. 148.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 148A not moved.]
Clause 82 [Part 8: supplementary]:
[Amendment No. 149 not moved.]
[Amendment No. 149A not moved.]
Clause 84 [Trespass on aerodrome: penalty]:
Lord Hylton moved Amendment No. 150:
- Page 42, line 34, leave out X3" and insert X2"
The noble Lord said: The amendment provides an opportunity for me to ask the Minister whether he considers that the same considerations should apply to fines as to imprisonment. I beg to move.
9.45 p.m.
The Minister of State, Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions (Lord Falconer of Thoroton): The question went beyond me. Do I take the same provisions to apply to fines as to imprisonment? The reason we are increasing the level of fines from what it was prior to the passing of the Act to what is proposed in the Bill is that we do not think a level 1 fine adequately conveys the concerns that we have on the issue; it would not be proportionate to the offence; and it would be unlikely to act as a deterrent.
Trespassing on an aerodrome would involve a deliberate attempt to circumvent access controls and has safety and security implications. The proposed penalty of level 3 on the standard scale, currently #1,000—which is the effect of the change in the law proposed in the Bill—reflects the view that the offence is not as serious as unauthorised access in a restricted zone or on an aircraft, both of which attract a level 5 fine, currently #5,000.
The level 3 fine contained in the Bill would, we believe, be proportionate to the offence and the aim that it seeks to realise, the prevention of possible terrorism. It would act as a deterrent and would be consistent with the penalty for similar offences under Article 122 of the Air Navigation Order 2000—for example, endangering the safety of an aircraft, person or property, and drunkenness on board an aircraft.
I am not sure whether that answers the noble Lord's question, but it explains why we are increasing the fine from level 1 to level 3 for the specified offence. I hope that I have adequately answered the question. But if not, if the noble Lord asks a slightly longer question I shall try again.
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