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Noble Lords: Hear, hear!

5.33 p.m.

Lord King of Bridgwater: My Lords, it is a great privilege to follow the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, in his tribute to Lord Carver, whom he certainly knew much better than I. However, I recall that he had an original and questioning mind and that when I was Secretary of State a shiver used to go through the Ministry of Defence every time that it was known that Lord Carver was about to speak in the House of Lords. He made a significant contribution to your Lordships' House.

As an aside to my remarks, our debates on Afghanistan should be required reading for anyone considering reform of your Lordships' House. Having come so recently from another place, I cannot fail continually to be impressed by the quality and authority of the contributions made in these debates, as in so many others. We have among your Lordships so many people with outstanding experience in the field. If I may congratulate the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Guthrie of Craigiebank, on his maiden speech—I did not know that we were not allowed to do so—I must say that having been, as I continually told Chiefs of the Defence Staff and others, by an accident of

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National Service, commissioned earlier than several of those most senior in rank in the Ministry of Defence, I am delighted to see young officers making such progress and joining your Lordships' House.

As the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Guthrie of Craigiebank, recognised, the value of our multi-national training programmes is seen to particular advantage at present. The authority and contribution that he has brought to our relationship with Pakistan at a critical moment may owe something to that background. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, may remember that on one occasion our relationship with Turkey in Operation Provide Comfort was enormously helped by the joint membership of the Royal College of Defence Studies of the British and Turkish officers concerned.

I was also delighted that the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Guthrie of Craigiebank, echoed something that I said in my maiden speech about the importance of the BBC World Service. In whichever country we find ourselves, we discover that it has huge listening figures in the area. I was certainly not aware before of what a high listening audience the BBC World Service has in Afghanistan, which can only be helpful.

Your Lordships have now had the privilege of listening in rapid sequence to the words of authority of three former Chiefs of the Defence Staff, and I am about to be followed by another. They have all, with the authority that they bring to the subject, echoed the words from the recent Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies lecture by the current Chief of the Defence Staff about serious concern about funding and the number of concurrent operations in which our forces now find themselves. In his chilling words,


    "Something will have to give".

I may be seen as the guilty man behind Options for Change. I listened to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, on the subject of defence review—as we never dreamt of calling it—but that was a specific and direct response to the ending of the Cold War. It was led by the then Vice-Chief of Defence Staff, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Vincent of Coleshill, assisted by the now Permanent Secretary of the Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions, Sir Richard Mottram. I always believed that that move was from one state to a new state—an end of Cold War state, as it were—but not a moment on a continuous path downwards. I believed that it was essential that we kept reserves, some tolerance and sufficient capacity for what the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Guthrie of Craigiebank, precisely described as the next problem and threat to arise.

There is an awful thing about defence reviews—especially the most recent one, which claimed, if I may make a tiny party political point, that it would be better than any other because it would be foreign policy-led and, presumably, intelligence-guided. We know that our current problem stems from something that intelligence did not identify. Once again, as was the case in the Falklands and with the invasion of Kuwait, intelligence failed to give us the guidance that we needed. Yet again, the Ministry of Defence was told

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that it must do something and find the resources to take the necessary action. Each case proved unexpected. While I strongly believe in our being, in a phrase that the Prime Minister now echoes, a force for good in the world, the world is a more dangerous and unstable place than it was during the Cold War. If we are to achieve that admirable objective, we cannot do so without the necessary resources to make our contribution.

If I may, I shall now briefly consider the current situation. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, referred to this debate as an interim debate on the situation in Afghanistan. That must surely be correct. Objective one is to bring Osama bin Laden and Al'Quaeda to justice. We may be pretty close to achieving that; but we do not know just how close. But objective two is to prevent Al'Quaeda posing a continuing terrorist threat.

Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, the Chief of the Defence Staff, said that we ought to focus on the enemy, rather than on the ground taken. When we focus on the enemy, which is Al'Quaeda and its cells around the world, none of your Lordships will be in any doubt that its current capability is well distributed and resourced. It is a dedicated and autonomous terrorist force. When I say that it is well distributed, I mean that in a global sense. If it is true that 70,000 people passed through its training camps before the world awoke to the scale of the threat and took action, where are they now? We know that they were in places which the intelligence and security forces had not sufficiently anticipated. Even with the increased activity of the security agencies, we cannot be confident that we know where they all are. The chilling phrase used by Admiral Sir Michael Boyce was that they are "quite capable" of further atrocities comparable with those carried out on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon.

The rapid success in achieving objective one and the progress towards objective two may have dented the middle and longer-term capability of Al'Qaeda. We hope that that will prevent any further training taking place in Afghanistan. We also hope that the severity of the action being taken against Afghanistan is making other countries and governments think hard about whether they are keen to welcome Al'Qaeda into their territories. The Yemen, Syria and the Sudan are areas where Al'Qaeda might possibly have sought to establish an alternative base.

I turn to further action that might be taken. I have not yet mentioned Iraq, but there is a distinction between cases where terrorist organisations are perhaps being harboured by a state and cases where our suspicion is that the state itself is the terrorist organisation. We have to give careful consideration to that distinction.

Your Lordships will have noted a disturbing theme which has emerged. My noble friend Lord Howell thought that it might have been exaggerated by some commentators. It is that there is a divergence of view between the United States and the United Kingdom. That would be extremely worrying. Clearly, while

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there is evidence that the United States does not want to become engaged in nation building—the chilling phrase used was "Super powers do not do dishes"—the reality is that the coalition must stick together.

I am told that the British favour not merely the military approach but seek to win hearts and minds, too. They want to seek to establish an enduring relationship. The right reverend Prelate said that justice may have been achieved and retribution may now begin. I, too, believe in the importance of the hearts and minds programme. If we see a long-haul situation, if we see the need to sustain the campaign against terrorism from wherever it may come, it is critical to carry public opinion with us. Perhaps I may remind your Lordships of a nasty shiver which went around at the scenes in Mazar-i Sharif when it was thought that some of the methods used fell some way below the traditions of the Geneva Convention and other rules of warfare in which one might expect British forces to be involved.

I turn to the outcome of British involvement and pay tribute to our Armed Forces and the regiment of which the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Guthrie, has the privilege to be colonel. If the bravery and outstanding service of our forces are seen to be followed by the kind of outrages and terror we have despised in the former Taliban government, that will be extremely damaging to future campaigns against terrorism in other areas. The hearts-and-minds approach, better government, good administration and trying to improve the lot of the people may be seen in some United States quarters as slightly eccentric British post-colonial hang-ups, but I believe that they are critical if we are to sustain an effective campaign against terrorism.

Although I bow to the greater authority of those noble Lords who have spoken, in particular the former Chiefs of the Defence Staff, I wonder what we are going to do with the force which we are to send out there. Is it to be a British command unit which will organise everyone else and bring in Muslim forces and others which can be better deployed in the country? Is it to provide close protection for the British office in Kabul and members of the administration? Is it to be a major multi-national stabilisation force?

The noble and gallant Lords, Lord Bramall and Lord Inge, spoke of Afghans not wanting to see an occupation force moving in and the difficulties associated with that. I recall visiting our training force in Namibia and seeing the South West African Territorial Force and SWAPO; former enemies which had been trained together under a British training instructor. As regards Afghanistan, the problem about nation building is whether there is even a nation to build. Is it unrealistic to believe that if one tried to build stability in that troubled land, the formation of a national, embryo army which could benefit from the training we have provided elsewhere, could be one of the contributions we could make to whatever elements of nation building will follow? The initial efforts have proved to be an outstanding success but so much more now needs to be done.

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5.46 p.m.

Lord Craig of Radley: My Lords, in order to abide by the Companion, I have already congratulated my noble and gallant friend Lord Guthrie of Craigiebank on a fine and thoughtful speech. He is a most welcome addition to these Benches.

Much has already been said today and in previous debates about the situation in Afghanistan. I propose to confine myself to the role which air power has been playing in this campaign and to touch on three particular issues which spring from that experience. As happened in Kosovo 18 months ago, a principal aspect of the strategy in Afghanistan has been to rely heavily on the offensive contribution of air power.

In Afghanistan, it began with the use of Tomahawk and conventional bombing to establish that first essential of any serious military operation; air superiority. Even at the outset, the Taliban threat to air operations was not that significant. I recall that during the previous debate I reminded your Lordships that the achievement of air superiority was but a step on the road to realising the coalition objectives and not an end in itself.

At that time, we were anticipating that the next stage would be the insertion of a considerable ground force. British and United States army units had been placed on shortened notice to move. The situation on the ground, and the contribution to it from the Northern Alliance, however, was not clear.

I was concerned about the problems which our own ground forces might face, though I thought it right not to comment beforehand, particularly as I was not privy to all the intelligence information available. However, our principal objective remained and it was very clear: to eliminate the Al'Qaeda and to get Osama bin Laden. First it was necessary to defeat the Taliban.

In the event, the decision, which I strongly endorsed, was to continue to rely on the use of air power, assisted by small independently operating teams on the ground. Even the most cursory study of the terrain—and one had to bear in mind the onset of winter—suggested that there were likely to be serious logistic and other problems. Inserting and sustaining ground forces over a period of weeks or months in a very unstable country, particularly if they were involved in offensive operations, was quite a task. The mix of factions on the move within Afghanistan then could further add to the difficulties of telling friend from foe.

So I was relieved when it became clear that the intention was to continue to rely heavily on air power. That was a very sound decision and reflects the increasing value now being obtained by the use of air power. Ever since the bombing began, and particularly in recent days, the weight of attack on first the Taliban and subsequently on Al'Qaeda has been immense.

There is a temptation to measure air power's contribution by the number of sorties and the weight of bombs which have been raining down from B-52s, F-18s and other aircraft flown from United States naval carriers or even from the continental USA. These statistics are, of course, very impressive. They are, too, a measure of the collective efforts of very large

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numbers of individuals and units, working together on planning and operational staffs, on airfields and on ships, as well as in the air, to achieve a massive and sustained level of operations. That reflects the depth of professional training and the most meticulous preparations for operations. It points, too, to the levels of performance of aircraft and weapons which are now required and the need to provide adequate numbers of them.

Planning and implementing operations on this scale is a major undertaking. All who have participated are to be congratulated on their efforts. Altogether, we have seen a most professional and skilful employment of air power, one which terrorist supporters in other parts of the world should note.

But it is not right to measure success solely by the number of sorties flown or the weight of ordnance delivered. Achieving the military objectives apart, we need to consider how often the right targets have been struck, how often they have been missed.

In war, as in training, there will be missed targets and thus some wasted effort. Training is essential if such mistakes are to be minimised. Cutting back on training is a grave mistake. It increases the chance of ghastly errors in war, which could very adversely undermine public support. We make cuts far too often, as a short term economy measure, in the training of our Armed Forces. Bombs that miss sometimes do dreadful damage to non-military targets and kill or maim children and non-combatants. Such horrific incidents understandably get considerable critical media coverage.

But there is more to it than that. Noble Lords should take it as read that great efforts are taken to avoid such tragedies—not only because of their adverse impact on public support for any campaign but also because bombs which go astray do not destroy the target and further sorties will have to be mounted to deal with it. Bombs will go astray, even the latest smartest guided weapons, and for a variety of reasons. There is a tendency for some critics to argue that even if a single bomb misses, something has gone wrong and that it is a poor show.

The Royal Air Force was criticised after Kosovo because not every bomb it dropped hit a target. That is uninformed criticism and very wide of the mark. Noble Lords will recall that during the Falklands conflict a Vulcan bomber, operating from Ascension Island, dropped a stick of 21 1,000lb bombs on the airfield at Port Stanley. The direction of attack across the runway was at an angle calculated to give a high probability—there can never be certainty—that one, only one, of the 21 bombs delivered would hole the runway. None of the other 20 bombs would hit the runway, either falling short or overshooting along the line of flight. To achieve the objective it was necessary to drop all bombs in a stick to get the right assurance that one of the 21 would hit and explode on the runway.

To a greater or lesser extent the same principle applies whatever number of unguided, or dumb, bombs are used. Several are dropped to straddle the

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target. Much modern ordnance today incorporates some form of guidance to achieve a higher probability of a successful attack and to reduce the number of bombs that would be required to destroy the target if they were unguided ones. The chances of hitting unintended buildings or individuals are, of course, also much reduced.

But even with smart bombs, not everything will always go right. If one is a good shot and fires at a target at Bisley, not every round will be a centre bull's eye. Even if the aim is rock steady, small variations in the wind or in the charge in the rifle round, for example, will affect the ballistics and reduce consistent accuracy. Flying at several hundred knots, where the altitude, acceleration and attitude of the aircraft at weapon release are all variables, will affect the flight of a round far more than one fired lying still on your stomach. On-board computers should cope with these variables but, like the experience at Bisley, there will be small deviations. The bomb's own guidance system will also have to deal with other variables as it descends towards its target. Of course one does all that one can to get everything working perfectly, but the nature of warfare is that there will be technical as well as human error. Not every bomb that goes astray is due to pilot error.

Other noble Lords will comment on what we should do next. All I would add is that Her Majesty's Government should be very clear what their exit strategy should be for forces that they may commit on the ground.

Finally, there is one other point that I should like to highlight. Those whom we rely on to mount and participate in operations of war are a very special breed of individual. They are, of course, volunteers, but are now—far more than was ever the case during the Cold War—exposed to enemy threats. They are sent on operations and their lives can be at risk.

If they are to achieve what is expected of them, they need to be properly trained and the money for that must be found. They need to be provided with the aircraft, weapons and defensive aids to give them a much better than even chance of defeating their opponents in the air or on the ground. They need a rewarding career structure and consideration for their families and other domestic needs. If they are unlucky and are killed or handicapped by wounds, then they must be adequately taken care of with a pension and benefits that match today's best practice.

Let me name and shame. Recent figures that I have seen indicate that, for the Armed Forces today, the death-in-service benefit payable to the surviving relative is 1.5 times salary compared to four times salary for an MP. There is a proposal to increase the Armed Forces benefit to three times salary in 2004, but that is still well short of the best. There are other comparisons that also indicate that the present, and even the future, proposed pension and benefit schemes for the services are not up to those of other public service groups.

Surely if we are to continue to recruit and retain individuals who perform as well as the Armed Forces do today, we must ensure that they are not

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discouraged by their pension and other benefit prospects. A young man or woman may not have a pension as their top consideration, but it is wrong to disadvantage such people by relying on their lack of interest. We should ensure that when the time comes their service will be properly recognised.

I urge the Government to think again about revamping a pension and benefit system which has been constrained from the outset by a diktat that any changes must be cost neutral. More money is required if the services are not to be shabbily treated. I hope that the Government will show that their admiration for the Armed Forces, often so eloquently expressed, will be matched by deeds in their review of service pensions and benefit schemes—a review which will impact on every soldier, sailor or airman who is on operations supporting Her Majesty's Government's policy in Afghanistan, over Iraq and elsewhere.

6 p.m.

Lord Judd: My Lords, I ought to declare an interest because of my involvement in Oxfam and other humanitarian agencies concerned with the issue we are debating tonight.

Whatever the conventions, I too must say at the outset how good it is to see the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Guthrie, among us. Those noble Lords who, over the years, have had an opportunity to know him personally not only unreservedly admire his military career, but also appreciate his wisdom and great sense of humanity. These will be tremendous assets in what he contributes in the time ahead.

I believe that the Government are to be congratulated on having come before us yet again for this debate. It can be nothing but to the good that they are so open about enabling us to scrutinise activity and to put forward our views.

My noble friend Lady Symons of Vernham Dean reminded us in her opening speech that at the forefront of our minds all the time must be 11th September. That is the essential point to make. Our firm and enduring friendship for the people of the United States demands no less. She also said that we must make sure that such an atrocity will never happen again. In that context I was glad to hear her emphasise the role of the United Nations, not only in what it has done already but in what it may be able to do in the future. I am sure that it would be appropriate at this juncture to pick out the name of Lakhdar Brahimi and to say that he represents all that is best in international service and leadership. He played a remarkable part in enabling the Bonn agreement to be reached and in enabling us to take the first tentative steps on the political way forward.

Tributes are due to a great number of people for the progress so far, especially our own armed services. At the time of Christmas we think not only of them but also of their families. As I have said before in our debates—because I believe it very deeply—a tribute is also due to our own Prime Minister for the critical leadership role he has played in the saga so far.

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We have now to face the issue of winning the peace. I was interested that, in his remarkable maiden speech, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Guthrie, emphasised the long haul. This will have economic and social dimensions. It will not be cheap; it will be very expensive. My noble friend Lady Ramsay of Cartvale also underlined that point. It will involve reconstruction, institution-building and a tremendous educational programme. It will involve the rule of law. We are very apt to preach about the importance of the rule of law, but the rule of law costs money. It costs money to have judges and advocates in place, to run prisons and to look after prisoners and the accused decently.

In that context it will not be good enough simply to say that the rule of law is essential to the future of Afghanistan. If we want the rule of law, we must be prepared to resource it. It will involve the whole approach to governance and the resources needed for it. It will also involve the regional dimensions. The burden will not be simply upon Afghanistan but is already upon adjacent states. We need to make sure that the necessary support goes to them. I hope—I am not ashamed to say it in view of my past and present involvement in the non-governmental world—that in all of this there will be close co-ordination with the non-governmental organisations.

There are also the immediate humanitarian needs. My noble friend stressed that there had been a welcome increase in the amount of humanitarian assistance getting through and in place. Winter is upon the people who have already suffered so grievously, however, and the question is whether there is enough in place for the winter. Are the supplies reaching the country getting through to the displaced, not least those on the Iran border? Are the incredible needs of the camps, both inside and outside Afghanistan, being properly addressed? I hope that my noble friend, when replying to this debate, will be able to give us some precise estimates and answers on these points. I know that my noble friend will forgive me for stressing what I have always stressed: I believe that this involves close co-ordination with the non-governmental community.

My Lords, history will scrutinise this campaign in great detail. We have to be ready for that. If we seek to claim the moral high ground and to present our commitment as the stand of good against evil and as the defence of civilised values, then we shall rightly be judged by those standards.

The questions that inevitably will be asked of us will probably include whether the bombing has been proportionate, discriminate and justified in terms of the stated objectives. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, with all his experience, has just spoken about the complications this issue. How many civilian casualties have there really been and were they unavoidable? What has been the agreed policy on the taking, treatment and protection of prisoners and on the response to offers of surrender? What did happen at the Qala-i-Jangi fortress? Why did it happen and how thoroughly is it being investigated? What is the agreed policy on assassination as a method of pursuing the coalition's objectives? What arrangements have

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been agreed by the coalition on the procedures for trials, for forms of punishment to be applied, and on extradition? Specifically in this context, where do the Government stand on the death penalty? Other questions concern whether the overriding objective is to bring bin Laden and his followers to justice or to bring justice to them. Those objectives are not the same. Is there a determination to demonstrate our commitment to and confidence in the processes of the law? If there is not, have we honestly considered the messages to others? Have policy and action on all these matters and others been tested, and will they always be tested, against our existing commitments to the upholding of human rights? What is the policy of continuing explicit rather than implicit authorisation by the UN for action?

I believe that these questions will have to be taken seriously for two reasons. First, because of the ringing moral terms in which we have spelt out our mission. Secondly, because they are central to the battle for hearts and minds.

Around two weeks ago I was standing in a camp for displaced people—a dreadful place—in Znamenskoye, Chechnya. I caught sight of a group of young men in the camp. Their faces were a study. They had been through indiscriminate and disproportionate bombardments; they had seen the abuse of human rights; they were now faced with the grim circumstances of the camp. I wondered what was their stake in the future and in what direction they were beginning to see their futures lead.

We must uphold the finest qualities, as they have evolved, of our own military forces, as well as of those at all levels in our forces who strive to maintain them, as they have done repeatedly in immensely difficult circumstances in Northern Ireland and abroad. I also presume that it is for this very purpose that the international stabilisation force is being considered.

While we have to be decisive, firm and tough, we have to be certain that, as in domestic emergency measures, we never allow ourselves to be provoked into doing precisely what the coldly calculating terrorist leaders want us to do; namely, to indicate that, under pressure, our civilised values could begin to dissolve and be seen as largely rhetoric.

There are other issues which have to be addressed and they have been mentioned in this debate. Conceptually, the Middle East is highly relevant in terms of the issues of justice. There will never be a lasting imposed solution in the Middle East unless the issues of justice are properly addressed, and those are very deeply rooted in history. But there are other issues. Why are so many arms so readily available in the world, and what are we doing responsibly to control them? The Export Control Bill, which is to come before the House next month, is highly relevant to the kinds of situations with which we are now confronted.

During a lifetime working in humanitarian agencies and the rest, I have come to one conclusion. It is that we must not skip over the differences between peacekeeping and peace-making. Both are necessary,

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but peace-making is an infinitely more complicated and demanding task even than peacekeeping. One has to face the complexities of the task. One has to be ready to talk with those with whom it is not always easy to talk. In Britain, I believe that all that has happened in Northern Ireland under successive governments is an illustration of what is necessary if one is seriously to approach the task of making peace.

We hear a great deal of talk nowadays about "pax Americana". There is a difference between enforced order and participatory order. There is a difference between order which is imposed top-down and order which is rooted widely in the community. I listened with interest to Bill Clinton's Dimbleby Lecture on television last night. He spoke movingly and tellingly about the need to redistribute wealth and the advantages of our society throughout the world. However, he did not address one critical question in his interesting lecture. There are quite a number of people in key positions in the United States and around the world who do not always address this question. It is about sharing power. We lament the alienation in the world, but unless we come to terms with the political issue of the sharing of power, we shall not build enduring stability. We may impose order for a while, but the eventual cost may be higher than ever. We have to win that order by the conviction of the broadest cross-section of people in society. That means their participation.

I hate to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Howell. I frequently find myself very much in agreement with him, and I have a high regard for a great deal of the work that he has done in this House and in the other place. However, I believe that some of the wisdom and experience in the European setting is relevant; we ought to encourage it—not in any challenging sense, not in any sense of animosity, but as a way of contributing to what will be the enduring and lasting solution to the situation.

We have an enduring friendship with the American people—I know that I have—based on many experiences. But it must be a mature and honest relationship. I worry that the grandchildren of the present generation of American leaders may say: "But what did you do with our supremacy when you had it? Why did you not throw yourselves into an unprecedented commitment to building viable world institutions instead of trying to run the world yourselves—because you could not do that for ever and it would not last for ever? The task was to build viable global institutions".

The news on ABM defence, on Kyoto, on exclusiveness in regard to Afghanistan and talk of extending the conflict is not altogether promising. In terms of real friendship, it is now that the Government and the Prime Minister—in the sense of the loyalty to their good friends across the Atlantic, which they have established beyond question—have got to speak honestly about these anxieties; to spell out what they believe is the way to a viable future. I think that they do believe that. If we do not do it now, we may never have another opportunity.

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6.14 p.m.

Lord Beaumont of Whitley: My Lords, it is my belief and that of the Green Party that this war was not an appropriate reaction to the events of 11th September. It is reinforced by the knowledge that the toll of civilian lives lost on that date is at least matched by the number of civilians killed in Afghanistan. However, that does not stop us being thankful for the success of the operation or feeling proud and having a sense of gratitude towards those who achieved it.

Nevertheless, we should not think that peace has been achieved. The Afghan war, when it finally ceases, will have spawned an escalation in the on-going war over Palestine which has lasted for so much of our lives; and perhaps we are threatened with another one in Somalia, Iraq or wherever. We should never forget that World War II did not become a "world" war until about three years after the invasion of Poland. It is easier to let slip the dogs of war than it is to kennel them.

But this debate is about Afghanistan rather than the wider field and there the damage is appalling. Irrigation systems, orchards, agricultural land and forests have been devastated, increasing the misery caused by a four-year drought. All this, and we have still not captured bin Laden, at least, so far as I know. As for what I understood to be an assurance by the Minister that the events of 11th September could not happen again, it is what Nathaniel Gubbins used to call "the good fairy, Wishful Thinking"—as a large number of speakers have pointed out.

Terrorism will continue. It has not been defeated and will not immediately be defeated. It has been here for a long time and is here, in a way, to stay. It is also fair nonsense—as ex-President Clinton said last night in the Dimbleby Lecture—to say that it is not effective. He spoke about Ireland. Does he really think that the Republic of Ireland would be where it is today if it had not been for a certain amount of terrorism? Kenya—a thriving nation, unlike one or two others in Africa—would not be where it is today were it not for some terrorism. We must face facts. It may be sad, but it is so.

The immediate future of Afghanistan, as noble Lords have said—and it is always a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Judd, in such debates—is one of dealing with short-term refugees and with immense hunger. It is to be hoped that we shall be able, through the non-governmental agencies, to come to the help of the people there and in the surrounding countries. As the noble Lord said, it will not come cheaply but we must not run away from it.

The needs are not merely short term. It is necessary to build a healthy, long-term democracy, and that will not come easily to Afghanistan. The country also needs a healthy agrarian system, which may take 20, 30 or 40 years to build up again. What plans do the Government have for rebuilding the agrarian system, and for re-afforestation, given the immense number of trees that have been destroyed in the bombing, quite apart from those that have died as a result of the drought? These are the areas which are of basic importance to Afghanistan.

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There are other areas almost as important, although they may not seem so. Ben MacIntyre wrote recently in The Times about the need to restore the cultural heritage and, in so doing, to make sure that UNESCO, which at its best is a very fine body, can have an important part to play.

I deplore the war, but I can see that, if we really try, we can bring something to Afghanistan that it has not had for a very long time. The first reading in the communion service yesterday morning for the large number of Christians in different churches in this country was from Isaiah about making the desert blossom as a rose. That is the challenge before us. It is enormous, but it is one that we must take extremely seriously—as seriously as going to war.

6.20 p.m.

Lord Avebury: My Lords, I am sorry to have to disagree with my old friend, the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, but he appreciates insufficiently the evil that the government of the Taliban and the Al'Qaeda movement, which is protected by the Taliban, have brought to the rest of the world. The operation was fully justified. Had we not taken such firm action after 11th September to frustrate the activities of Osama bin Laden, he and his allies may by now have committed further atrocities. Their objective was not simply to destroy the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon; they were intent on destroying the United States and to spread their perverted mutation of Islam around the world by force, contrary to the holy Koran, which says that there must be no compulsion in religion.

If I may say so to my former noble friend, there can be few people naive enough to believe that if the terrorists had been left to themselves, it would have been a long time before they perpetrated further shocking mass murders—and not only in the United States. I am sure that they never intended those crimes to be a one-off. As the noble Lord, Lord King, said, they were capable of mounting further operations. We have seen from the papers that have been discovered in great profusion in the bases captured by opposition forces during military operations that they were preparing and planning such attacks, including one in the City of London using a massive bomb.


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