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Earl Peel: My Lords, cannot the Minister see that the reason the devastation was less was because the Scottish authorities dealt with the matter much more efficiently?
Lord Whitty: My Lords, the inquiries will no doubt indicate whether that is true. It is certainly true that the less widespread outbreak was dealt with more rapidly. There may be lessons to be learnt from that.
The noble Lord, Lord Jopling, went on to say that the response was mean of the Government. The taxpayers, who include many people who are not farmers, unlike many speakers in today's debate, have spent £2 billion on eradicating the disease. Frankly, we do not want to spend any more. To regard that as mean seems to me absurd and I do not believe that average taxpayers, rural or urban, would regard payment of full compensation to an infected premise where the farmer himself had partly contributed to the disease entering his stock as reasonable. We are justified, therefore, in considering methods of adjusting compensation in the light of biosecurity performance.
A number of noble Lords said that it—whichever part of the Bill was being referred to—was not scientifically based. We have had the best scientific advice—admittedly not at the beginning of the campaign. Vets, epidemiologists, virologists and other scientists at a high-powered level have been brought together to consider how to control the disease. One of their first conclusions was that we had to meet our targets, and better, for the contiguous cull. We could not have had better scientific advice. We are engaging with the veterinary side as well as others. There is no question of conflict between one group of scientists and practitioners and another. They all point in the same direction.
The noble Lord then said that we were unfair and arrogant. Unfair to whom, my Lords? Are we unfair in coming down on the farmer who has allowed this disease to develop when his neighbour next door has observed fully biosecurity precautions? Are we unfair to those farmers who did not receive compensation during the epidemic but, nevertheless, suffered grievously in terms of their own economic and social perspective? Are we unfair to the rest of the rural community who received no compensation and will not do so in the future; and to society as a whole? In many of the contributions today the question of fairness was seen through a very narrow prism.
Baroness Byford: My Lords, the Minister's comments are a smidgen over the top. I do not mean that rudely; the Minister is a good friend. My noble
friend said rightly that there has been meanness and unfairness. The issue has been debated fully. The unfairness is that nothing stops the imports coming in in the first place. It is not a UK disease; it comes into the country. If the Minister persists on this issue, I shall continue to interrupt him. I recognise—the noble Lord and I agree—that there are some bad farmers. They must be sat on immediately. However, in referring back to meanness and unfairness, the Minister might bear in mind that it is unfair that the disease ever comes into the country in the first place.
Lord Whitty: My Lords, I do not think that it is I who went "over the top" today. However, I turn to what is a perfectly logical exposition of the debate, the issue of imports.
It is true that the most likely origin of the disease—it is by no means proven; although the committee of inquiry may throw some light on it I doubt whether it will ever be able to reveal the whole truth, as was the case in 1967—is from abroad. Illegal imports through commercial transactions and passengers is an important issue. I have some sympathy with noble Lords who have advocated that we should have greater powers in relation to imports. However, to take greater powers on imports does not require new primary legislation. First, it requires alterations at the EU level. As far back as April my predecessor, Joyce Quin, started the ball rolling from the EU, looking at tightening up the substantive controls. Secondly, it requires secondary legislation to alter the powers and resources of the enforcement authorities. With other departments involved, we are engaged in consideration of secondary legislation. But it is not necessary to alter the Animal Health Bill. Indeed, in the Animal Health Act 1981 there is no peg on which to hang import activity. Therefore, we are saying that we will take action on imports but it does not require action within the context of this Bill. Nevertheless, as Elliot Morley indicated, monitoring imports might be relevant because there is a cross-reference with regard to the Animal Health Bill. I may consider amendments in that context at later stages of the Bill.
Apart from the issue of imports—it was a powerful argument—there was concern about the powers to slaughter, appeals and the designation of animals. I deal with those three immediately. On the powers of slaughter, as was rightly identified, the change is to move from proof of exposure to prevention of spread. The noble Lord, Lord Moran, and others suggested that that meant that everything we did previously regarding contiguous culls was illegal. That is not the case. It was identified on veterinary advice that contiguous premises within a three-kilometre circle were exposed. That is a somewhat arbitrary definition of exposure. What is needed is a general rule to prevent the spread of the disease by the use of culling, or by vaccination should we go down that road, by use of the powers provided in this Bill. That may in fact exclude some animals that previously would have been culled because they would no longer be relevant to the spread of the disease, but it might include others where
prevention of the spread would require such animals to be culled. This is a useful change—it is no more than that—and one that will be better informed than the blanket rule of a three-kilometre circle. Furthermore, it will require the direct input of local vets on the local situation.I turn to the question of appeals and the Human Rights Act. The first point to recognise is that, whatever it was called, there was no right of appeal under the 1981 Act. We are not removing any right of appeal. All we seek to do is to remove the process whereby the authority to act is dealt with in the High Court and replace it with an order made by a justice of the peace. That does not affect any representations a farmer may make to the vet to reconsider the judgment to cull or not to cull.
Remaining with the right of appeal, in abstract terms, under the Bill we are not taking away any right of appeal.
Lord Neill of Bladen: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for taking an interruption. I have not spoken so I must declare an interest. My wife and I have a small farming unit in which we keep cattle and sheep.
I wish to ask the Minister a further question on his comments on the Human Rights Act and the convention. The Bill bears on its face a statement from the Minister, no doubt written on advice, that none of the provisions conflicts with the rights granted by the European Convention on Human Rights. Can the Minister reflect on that and, before the Bill returns for further consideration, share with the House any further details with regard to that advice?
In particular, does that advice concentrate on the scenario which has been discussed several times in the course of the debate; that is, of an order being obtained by DEFRA behind the back of a farmer, who does not need to be told that an application has been made to a magistrate? That order confers a right of entry, pursuant to which is an intention to destroy the flock or herd. The official carrying out the order may then require the farmer to assist in that destruction. Under pain of criminal penalty, the farmer is obliged to lend his assistance, whatever the circumstances and possibly at personal risk. We have been told of cases of herds being driven in terror across roads.
Has the Minister's advice focused on the combination of those features: an order is obtained in secret behind a farmer's back, and he is then required to be a party to the cull of his own herd. Is all that said in no way to constitute a violation of any of the provisions of the convention?
Lord Whitty: My Lords, I have to be careful because, as the noble Lord rightly pointed out, I act on advice. However, noble Lords will know that it is the convention that the nature of advice from law officers is not disclosed for obvious reasons. No doubt we shall return to this subject at later stages in our deliberations, when perhaps we shall exchange views on the various points raised by noble Lords relating to
human rights and other equity provisions. However, I am not able to give the noble Lord the undertaking he seeks.The noble Lord has raised the same point put by the noble Viscount, Lord Bledisloe, in relation to a precedent for requiring assistance in certain circumstances. The noble Viscount commented that he had not been able to find a case congruent with the provisions of the Bill before us. I have to say that the only Act I have to hand is the Food Safety Act 1990, which noble Lords will observe was passed by the previous regime. It refers specifically to anyone who,
- "without reasonable cause, fails to give to any person acting in the execution of this Act any assistance or information which that person may reasonably require of him for the performance of his functions under this Act, shall be guilty of an offence".
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, before the Minister ducked the answer to the noble Lord, Lord Neill, he said that, under the Bill, the Government had made no change to the appeal position of farmers. Does he agree that if a farmer appeals now it can cost him a fee of up to 25 per cent of the payment that he receives for his animals as of right?
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