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Baroness Anelay of St Johns: I thank my noble friend Lord Renfrew for introducing a more wide-ranging aspect to the amendment and for making a vital point. I pay tribute to his professional expertise and the expertise that he has exercised as a member of the Palmer committee, if I can so refer to it. I am grateful to the Minister for putting his explanation so clearly on the record. I shall consider it carefully before Report stage to see whether I need to elicit further information on Report.
I am grateful to the Minister for referring to objects that could be considered as cultural objects that will be covered by the Bill only if it is thought that the relevant consequences definition applies to them and they fall within that category. One of the underlying questions that I have been trying to sort out in my mind is what parts of the Bill are specially designed to catch only cultural objects—if we can define a cultural object—as opposed to which parts of the Bill relate to all other
matters, such as military objects, and which may, by design or default, trap within those definitions cultural objects that would sit uncomfortably within them.We are getting to a helpful stage. The Government are making it clear which genuine cultural objects, which will not be adapted for military use, would not fall within those export controls that we on this side of the House feel should not be applied to them. So we are moving to a very helpful outcome on the matter. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Baroness Miller of Hendon moved Amendment No. 6:
- Page 2, line 16, at end insert "; or
The noble Baroness said: In moving Amendment No. 6, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 8 and 10. The amendments affect Clause 2 which relates to the transfer of technology which Members of the Committee agree is an essential ingredient in the control of exports of arms and similar materials. The group of amendments seeks to make practical and necessary improvements to Clause 2 as at present drafted.
I deal first with Amendment No. 6. Clause 2(2) defines the geographic means of transferring technology. It gives four methods. Subsection 2(a) is from within to outside the United Kingdom; Subsection 2(b) is from outside to outside; Subsection 2(c) is between persons in the UK; and 2(d) is from outside to inside. But this list leaves one glaring omission. It overlooks the greatest advance in methods of communication since the invention of the radio; what is loosely called "the Internet".
I am sure that I do not have to remind your Lordships of instances where information about making terrorist weapons, including low tech "dirty" atomic bombs, have been posted on the Internet by malicious persons in pursuit of a variety of agendas. Information may be posted on web sites and the author may claim that he is not communicating it to anyone.
In any case, it is impossible, or, at the very least difficult, to say whether anyone who picks it up is inside or outside the United Kingdom, so under which subsection would a prosecution be framed? Although there is a means of determining the number of "hits" on a site, it would be extremely difficult for Customs and Excise to prove that anyone actually picked it up at all.
Why should we make it difficult for the enforcement authorities to prove whether anyone has received the transfer of technology? It should be the act of placing the information in a medium where it can be picked up by anyone, anywhere in the world which should be the offence.
The "intranet" is the communication of data on web sites within one internal network, such as the PVND system that many of us use within this building. "Extranet" is the means of assessing that internal network by authorised persons from outside the building, which we are also supposed to be able to do; but, only with enormous difficulty in my own case.
Possibly, and the Minister may tell us, Internet, intranet and extranet may all be caught by one or other of the present four paragraphs. However, the essential ingredient of subsection (2) is that it relates to transfer from a person to another person. The amendment covers the transfer of technology in a totally disembodied way from one computer to another.
Subsection (6) refers to a transfer "by any means". That, too, may be seen to cover electronic transfer or even mental telepathy. In other words, even if the problem is covered, the amendment, by specifically spelling out electronic transfer, closes a possible loophole for ingenious lawyers to attempt to exploit. It is belt and braces, if I may put it that way.
I turn to Amendment No. 8 which modifies the restriction on the transfer of technology within a company or group. At the moment the wording of the clause not only prevents the transfer of technology between connected companies—between, say, a United Kingdom company and its overseas subsidiary—but also even under subsection (2)(c) between one UK company and its United Kingdom subsidiary. No less important is the transfer of information between, say, two research establishments, two universities engaged on the same project or even two companies engaged on a joint manufacturing project, any of which may be called a group.
Without some modification of the shotgun effect of this clause, a whole swathe of ordinary activities will require licensing, with consequential cost, delay and possible loss of business. For a Government who claim to be intent on the removal of red tape, I found the arguments which were advanced against this amendment in the other place unconvincing. I trust that the Government, having had three months to consider the matter, might consider accepting the amendment.
Finally, I come to Amendment No. 10. It is a probing amendment which I may have to pursue at a later stage, obviously depending on the answer that the Minister is able to give. Like my honourable friend the Member for Salisbury, I really do not understand the extent of this subsection. Stripping out the intermediate words, subsection (6) reads,
What we do not want to see is a provision which means whatever the Government, or, more likely an official in the enforcement authority, decides that it means. If the Government's intention is to ensure that the industrial or commercial activities or any other activity are not defined by the word "whatsoever", and if the Government mean activities which may be within the ambit of paragraphs 2, 3, or 4(2) of the table, then why do they not specifically say so and give up this sweeping piece of drafting? I was tempted to propose that amendment myself. However, I thought that I would give the Government a real opportunity to convince me that I was wrong.
If the Minister is going to invite me to withdraw the amendment, I trust that he will undertake to produce some serious and more specific re-drafting before the next stage. I beg to move.
Lord Burnham: I rise to support my noble friend, and in particular what she said about Amendment No. 8; although I would say to her that I believe that the matter of cricket bats falls more under the cultural part rather than the defence part of the Bill.
This legislation takes little or no account of the globalisation of the defence industry and of the increasingly multi-national character of defence companies. As my noble friend said, the provisions of the Bill do not recognise the commercial realities of the defence industry. Many such companies have research and development sections and manufacturing units in different countries. It would severely handicap the United Kingdom's defence industry if international companies such as BAe Systems were forced to apply for export licences every time they wanted to transfer data between facilities in different countries. The Government must consider the possibility, which the amendment would provide, of granting global licences valid for entire projects, or some way to ensure that the new regulations do not adversely affect UK competitiveness.
Lord Judd: Further to that observation, there is another dimension to the amendment that requires consideration. With the internationalisation of the
We are obviously not discussing more responsible industry in the defence sphere, but in legislation we must deal with those who are less responsible—they are the whole problem—and the damage that they can do. From that standpoint, I hope that my noble friend the Minister will feel able to stand firm.
( ) by a United Kingdom person onto internet, intranet or extranet, or similar information sharing equipment, whereby the technology may be downloaded outside the United Kingdom."
"'technology' means information . . . capable of use in connection with . . . an activity of any other kind whatsoever".
My honourable friend suggested, rather picturesquely, that it could include pencil sharpeners, garlic presses and cricket bats. I should not have thought of those
examples, but there they are. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State dismissed his fears by saying,
"I assure the hon. Member . . . that controls may be imposed on classes of technology only when their export or transfer from the UK could threaten one or more of the consequences in the schedule".—[Official Report, Commons Standing Committee B, 16/10/01; col. 92.]
The Minister said that the need for this exceedingly wide clause was to cover new and, as yet, uninvented technologies. The clause is therefore intended to give the Government yet another blank cheque, covering unforeseen events and uninvented technologies. My honourable friend withdrew his amendment before the Committee of the other place, saying that he had a feeling that it would re-emerge before your Lordships. He was right. Cricket bats may indeed have a dual use, one of which could be as a weapon. But I am not in the business of speculating precisely what technologies may be caught by this exceedingly wide clause.
5.45 p.m.
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