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Baroness Miller of Hendon: I thank the Minister for his comprehensive answer to the amendments. As far as concerns Amendment No. 6, I shall read the record carefully, but it seems that it has been covered as I would have wanted. I shall make sure of that, as the Minister would expect me to.
With regard to Amendment No. 8, I was pleased to hear the Government say that they did not want to put extra burdens on business and suggest open licensing, where appropriate. Again, I shall look at that response carefully. With regard to Amendment No. 10, I did not, of course, mention garlic presses, bats or whatever. They could never be considered weapons of mass destruction. Under the circumstances, the Minister's answer to Amendment No. 10 is probably good.
I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Baroness Anelay of St Johns moved Amendment No. 7:
- Page 2, line 18, at end insert—
The noble Baroness said: With the leave of the Committee, I shall also speak to Amendments Nos. 9 and 11.
This is a typical probing amendment. One must table amendments that are exactly the opposite of what one hopes to achieve in order simply to elicit a debate. I listened with interest to what the Minister just said about the amendment moved by my noble friend Lady Miller of Hendon. He has already gone a long way to reassure me that the fears that prompted the amendments are unfounded. However, there are certain issues relating to cultural matters that I must discuss today.
In order to close the loophole that the Minister pointed out earlier with regard to electronic communication, the Government have set out a definition not only of transfer controls, but of technology. I tabled the amendments simply to ask the Government whether they anticipated that cultural objects could ever fall within the scope of Clause 2 and, if so, in what way. I hope, of course, that the Minister will assure me that they could not fall within Clause 2.
The Minister has already said that the Bill gives the Government no open-ended power to control technology. He made that point clearly and gave examples of limitations. In a helpful response to the intervention of my noble friend Lord Burnham, the Minister said that there was a second stage at which the Secretary of State, in deciding whether an export licence—or which kind of licence—would be issued, would take into account the reputation and the standing of the person applying for the export licence.
It would seem strange, in normal circumstances, to wonder whether cultural objects could fall within the remit of Clause 2, but it can be argued that not only can technology today produce an object of cultural interest, it can be integral to it. Cultural objects today often reflect our obsession with technology. One need think only of some of the recent Turner exhibits and some of the exhibits at Tate Modern to understand that. The problem is that some of the components of those exhibits are, in themselves, so sophisticated in driving computer software and hardware that they would be, in some cases, capable of adaptation for military use. It is just a question of what level of military use.
That occurred to me as a result of a visit that I made last summer while on a family holiday in the Cheshire area to the Hack Green museum. It is a very small museum that advertises itself as a secret nuclear bunker, which is rather a contradiction in terms. It was until relatively recently, of course, an establishment that would have been used as a regional seat of government in the event of nuclear war. The exhibits demonstrate the uses to which radar was and is put, and there are parts—not necessarily all working parts, although some are—of technical equipment on display. Some exhibits are from as long ago as the Second World War—they even pre-date me—and some more recent, from the Blue Streak era. If such items were sold or loaned overseas, would they fall foul of Clause 2, rather than another part of the Bill? I hope that the Minister will say no.
Does the Minister have any news of the next stage of development reached by Culture Online? Did the Department of Trade and Industry and the
Lord Renfrew of Kaimsthorn: I rise to support my noble friend and to ask the Minister for clarification. I am back on the issue of objects of cultural interest but I am thinking of the history of technology and the sort of materials exhibited in the Science Museum.
It is not clear to me that under existing provisions objects of technological interest which are of relatively recent date are adequately protected. It may be the case, for instance, that an Enigma machine would be; I am not certain about that. But that would now be more than 50 years old. We wish to protect the export of many other objects of technical interest. I am thinking more in the cultural sense than of technology transfer. I am not talking about technology as a new process. My noble friend's amendment deals with objects as well as with processes.
I have with me the categories of cultural objects in the annex to the EC regulations to which reference has been made on which the provisions operating under UK law are based. I do not find any provisions relating clearly to the history of technology. It is not clear how some important developments are protected, for instance, in the field of biochemistry; satellite indications, if we were well developed in the field of satellite work in this country; synthetic textiles where clearly we were and are; or early radio carbon dating apparatus. How are those currently protected?
I am talking in the historical sense. But technology as recent as less than 50 years ago can be of significance. Those are matters which should be protected against automatic and unthinking export as other art work would be. I shall be grateful for advice from the Minister on that issue.
Lord Davies of Oldham: As the noble Baroness indicated, these are probing amendments. I recognise her point on the difficulty of tabling amendments which achieve potentially the exact opposite of the thinking behind them. However, she seems in these amendments to have displayed the absolute antithesis of the Nazi, Goebbels, who, every time he heard the word "culture", would reach for his gun. It seems to me that whenever we consider weapons of mass destruction the noble Baroness searches for culture.
My noble friend has already indicated the objective behind this clause, which is to ensure that we comply with European Union Joint Action of 2000 concerning the control of support which might be provided for programmes creating weapons of mass destruction.
We do not see the way in which technology is used in the context of this clause applying to cultural objects. I recognise the point made by the noble Lord. But technology has a history and we all learn from history. Everything that is utilised today derives from breakthroughs in the past. But he too will recognise that we are able to draw a clear distinction between scientific instruments and illustrations of scientific history of cultural advantage, which we want to ensure belong to the world-wide knowledge of science, and our capacity under this clause to restrict the transfer of technologies which would bring in the possibility of other, potentially hostile, societies developing weapons of mass destruction.
I can assure the noble Baroness that the clause seeks, as my noble friend indicated, to control the technology which, by electronic means or military technology, could assist the development of weapons of war. I can assure the noble Baroness that nothing in the framework of this clause impacts upon the cultural dimension she outlined.
Baroness Anelay of St Johns: I am grateful to the noble Lord for those assurances. I know in the political world it is difficult for politicians to say, "Never". But his final words are perhaps the closest to "never" we will get. For that I am grateful. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendments Nos. 8 to 11 not moved.]
Clause 3 [Technical assistance controls]:
Baroness Miller of Hendon moved Amendment No. 12:
The noble Baroness said: In moving Amendment No. 12, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 59 and 57, which are consequential amendments, and finally to Amendment No. 14.
Clause 3 deals with the export of technical assistance of any description. That is one of the problems with which the Bill is intended to deal. However, two other problems arise with which we should all be concerned. The first is that of giving foreign military assistance, which I defined in Amendment No. 59 from what appears in Clause 10. It does not relate to personal services as a mercenary in some foreign army. That is already governed by the Foreign Enlistment Act under which, I understand, no prosecution has ever taken place despite, for example, the large number of Britons who went to fight in the Spanish Civil War and the large numbers who fought as mercenaries in the Congo and other African
If it is wrong and prohibited, as we all agree, to supply technical assistance in the form of plans and drawings of weapons, aircraft and missiles, computer software and so forth, then it is no less important to prohibit the supply to what we have termed "rogue states" or to rebels against a lawful government in the form of training, supplying personnel, finance and intelligence, procuring equipment and military medical services.
The definition of "foreign military assistance" is fully and comprehensively set out in Amendment No. 59. "Equipment" may already be covered by other provisions in the Bill, but I included it for the sake of completeness. Included in the definition of "foreign military assistance" contained in Amendment No. 59 is a reference to "armed conflict". That is defined in Amendment No. 57. So the phrase is defined in the Bill before it is actually used. I apologise to the Committee for putting the cart before the horse in this way, but that is due to the alphabet since "a" for "armed conflict" comes before "f" for "foreign military assistance".
There is an additional phrase in Amendment No. 12 on which I have not yet touched. I want the Secretary of State to have the power to ban technical assistance for any serious criminal activity anywhere. I have not defined "serious criminal activity" as I am confident that any Secretary of State, prosecutor or judge would be able to recognise it when they saw it. It is anomalous that the Secretary of State will have power to impose technical assistance controls on material to be exported to foreign states but is unable to inhibit the sharing of technology between criminal gangs who now operate across borders and between continents.
Offhand I can suggest that the technology might include recipes for new addictive drugs, methods of conducting computer crime and the manufacture of weapons for use by criminals and terrorists. Doubtless there are many other fields of criminal activity that benefit from the sharing of information between criminals, but even if I could think of any I should not like to be giving ideas to the criminal fraternity. As far as I know, there is no specific statutory provision which deals with that problem. If I am wrong, I am very happy to be corrected.
We do not want to have to rely on the common law crime of conspiracy, especially as conspiracy to commit an offence abroad may not be a crime in Britain. Adding this provision to the Bill will give the Government an extra weapon in the war against international crime and terrorism.
It is well within the purposes of the Bill as defined in the schedule, which, I remind the Committee, includes obligations to the EU, or under any other international obligation, and to protect friendly states and stability in any country. Clearly, international crime has a destabilising effect, wherever it conducts its activities.
Finally, I turn to Amendment No. 14. Clause 3(7) provides extra-territorial jurisdiction over activities covered by the Bill. Given the nature of the Bill and the wrongs it seeks to prevent, I do not believe that there can be any objection to that, except in one respect, which the amendment intends to rectify.
Subsection (7) permits the Secretary of State to impose controls on acts done outside the United Kingdom—which, as I said, is fair enough—under the direction of someone who is, or is acting under the control of, what is called a "United Kingdom person", which is very clearly defined in the Bill. But it applies to the activities of any person—or, as the Bill states, "a person"—without restriction, which means that the Government are seeking jurisdiction over foreigners who have no physical connection with the United Kingdom except that a UK person is giving them instructions. For example, an American subject living and working in the United States, who has never set foot in the United Kingdom but who is working either for a British company or even an American company with a British manager, will find himself caught by the provisions of the subsection.
I should like to remind the Committee of the outrage felt at the so-called Helms-Burton Act passed by the United States Senate, which tried to impose sanctions on United Kingdom trade with Cuba. Certainly we should not seek to impose our laws, however righteous, on foreigners or persons doing acts totally outside our territorial jurisdiction.
I am sure that the Government did not intend any such piece of imperialism. I trust that they will accept this constructive amendment. I beg to move.
"( ) For the avoidance of doubt, the uses to which technology may be put may include its display as part of, or as the whole of, an object of cultural interest."
6.15 p.m.
Page 2, line 35, at end insert "or foreign military assistance or assistance with any serious criminal activity anywhere"
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