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Lord Rea: The noble Lord, Lord Joffe, and the right reverend Prelate have eloquently said everything that I wanted to say. However, I ask my noble friend whether the Government intend only to apply extra-territorial controls on arms brokering to embargoed countries and to the three categories of weapons that

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he mentioned. Having listened to two noble Lords who have just spoken, will he seriously reconsider expanding the range of weapons which are to be covered by the controls?

Baroness Miller of Hendon: I shall be brief. The noble Lord, Lord Razzall, explained clearly and carefully why he thought there was a need for this amendment. I believe that Members of the Committee around the Chamber have all supported it in one way or another. Given that the Government stated in their previous manifesto their intention of prohibiting illegal brokering, will the noble Lord explain one simple thing to me? When the Government drafted this Bill, why did they think that in subsection (8) of Clause 4 the word "may" was sufficient? Why did they not include the word "shall"?

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: Some people scoff at the Government's policy of moral foreign commitments and policies. I do not think that we on these Benches do and I do not think that any speaker tonight is apt to do that. Rather, the mood of the Committee as expressed in this mini-debate is clearly that the Government should stick to their guns and practise what they preach. If I may say so, the lead given by—

Lord Razzall: Not in this debate.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: I beg your pardon. If I may say so, the lead given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer as regards relief of debt in the third world is precisely the kind of initiative that we should like to see paralleled by an amendment to this part of the Bill. Of course, it will be said that this will shackle our arms industry in a way that may give advantage to its competitors. That, indeed, may be the case, although I suspect that that will be far, far less the case than some may think. It would be interesting to hear the Minister say what view the Government take of that argument.

I go further and say that there are occasions when one ought to sacrifice something in the way of trade to higher issues. This country has a very particular history in relation to the developing world and, in particular, to the continent of Africa. We have heard from two noble Lords who probably know better than anyone in the country—I refer to the noble Lords, Lord Joffe and Lord Judd—the devastation that is wreaked in Africa in particular but also in many other places by the appalling trafficking in arms. Although little of that may be traced back to us, we should by every means possible prevent it. I do not see, therefore, why the Government are reluctant to apply their own criteria—not two of their six criteria, but six of their six criteria—to this very particular form of trade.

7.15 p.m.

Lord Judd: I hope that I may add one word to what the noble Lord has just said. If there is a price tag attached to this, against that price tag is not only the

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ethical and humanitarian arguments, but the cost over and over again to Britain and the international community of dealing with the consequences.

Lord Hylton: I support the amendment. I just hope that it is strong enough and goes into sufficient detail to achieve the purposes which every single Member of the Committee who has spoken on it wants to achieve. I raised this matter at Second Reading, both as regards brokering in general and where it takes place, but although I had given notice I received no reply whatever. As regards extra-territorial jurisdiction, the deterrent effect of such jurisdiction does not lie in the number of cases that may be brought but rather in the knowledge that where the evidence is available there will certainly be prosecution.

Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville: I apologise to the Minister and to the Committee because when we were discussing Amendment No. 14 I did not look up the definition in the Bill of a 'United Kingdom person', which the Minister helpfully read out. As I have a supplementary question flowing from that, I shall read it out again. Subsection (1) of Clause 10 states:


    "'United Kingdom person' means a United Kingdom national, a Scottish partnership or a body incorporated under the law of any part of the United Kingdom".

There is also a supplementary definition of a United Kingdom national. I have a reason for asking the question. Although I did not ask it when we discussed Clause 3, this amendment happily gives me the opportunity to ask it under Clause 4. Like many others in the kingdom, I have periodically in the course of the past three or four months read about the sheikhs who are supposed in some way or other to have links with the Al'Qaeda network to which the noble Lord, Lord Judd, referred a moment ago. If that particular category of person does not fall under the definition that has been read out, do the offences which we discussed in Clauses 3 and 4 apply to a non-United Kingdom person resident in the United Kingdom if he is the person who is controlling the person abroad? If that does not apply under this legislation, is there separate terrorism legislation under which it applies? If I misunderstand the category and the definition, I shall be delighted to be enlightened and I shall sleep more soundly tonight.

Lord Sainsbury of Turville: I shall deal with that point first. I shall get advice, but as I understand it, the point is being made that if, for example, a sheikh operates in London controlling someone in some foreign country to commit some act, the matter would turn on whether any part of that act takes place in the United Kingdom. I cannot see that the legislation could conceivably cover the case of a non-United Kingdom person directing someone who is not a United Kingdom person outside the United Kingdom, unless the instructions or the activities take place in the UK. So if that was not the case, the sheikh operating in Saudi Arabia would be caught if he gave some instructions to a person. I hope I have understood the

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question that was asked. However, if the action takes place in the UK, it is caught by the measure which covers brokering within the United Kingdom.

I turn to the main points that have been raised on the amendment. The amendment proposed would impose a legal requirement that any trade controls introduced by the Secretary of State must apply to all acts conducted outside the UK by United Kingdom persons. No exceptions could be made to allow certain trade controls to be territorial in scope. I should make it clear that Clause 4 will allow the Government to impose trade controls extra-territorially. As we made clear, we intend to use that power to introduce controls that apply extra-territorially on trafficking and brokering to any embargoed destinations and on trafficking and brokering in torture equipment and long-range missiles to any destinations.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Joffe, that the reasons for choosing these products is entirely to do with the question of the criteria that you apply to extra-territoriality, one of which is that there is general consensus that these actions are generally deplored. In the case of torture equipment, long-range missiles and sending goods to embargoed destinations, it is reasonable to assume that anyone would be aware that those were the kind of actions which were prohibited. However, as will be clear to everyone, the areas which are covered by the Bill are extremely wide as regards the categories of goods that can be controlled. For example, we are also talking about machine tools which could be used to make weapons of mass destruction or other goods which fall under the category of relevant consequences. We are covering a wide range of goods. It may not be obvious to people that those goods will be covered by the licensing system. We have focused, I believe rightly, on areas which everyone understands need to be controlled.

We do not believe it right for any and every control introduced under Clause 4 to have to apply extra-territorially, as the amendment seeks to provide. I would observe in passing that such a provision would sit uncomfortably within the structure of an enabling Bill. But, more importantly, our view is that it will not always be appropriate to apply controls extra-territorially. The Government intend to introduce controls on trafficking and brokering of equipment on the UK's military list to any destination. For a number of reasons, we do not believe that it would be appropriate to apply those controls to the activities of UK citizens where these are carried out wholly abroad.

As I am sure noble Lords will be aware, it has been the policy of successive British governments to apply extra-territorial jurisdiction only for the most serious internationally condemned offences. We believe that that does apply to trafficking and brokering to embargoed destinations, in torture equipment or in long-range missiles. Here the individual should be fully aware that what they are doing is likely to be illegal unless special permission has been granted in exceptional circumstances. However, the vast majority of trade in military equipment to non-embargoed destinations will consist of legitimate transactions or activities.

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These controls cover a wide range of goods. Most of those goods are not goods which are generally condemned when applying Home Office criteria. To apply extra-territorial controls to such an activity would therefore risk criminalising the involvement of UK nationals settled overseas in a legitimate export of defence or other equipment from their countries of residence. For example, a UK citizen of long-term residence in Switzerland—it could be Australia, Germany or France—could be employed by a local company involved in export of spare parts for military equipment. Even if those exports were carried out in accordance with the local law, and even if the transactions in question would have been granted a licence by the UK had one been applied for, that UK citizen would become a criminal if he did not know that he needed a licence from the UK Government.

A further point is that enforcement of extra-territorial controls is particularly difficult, as the US Government find. Our enforcement effort should be targeted on the activities of greatest concern. In all of this, we need to be mindful of having controls that are proportionate, effective and credible.

Nevertheless, under the new controls on trade in military equipment we shall be able to prosecute offences that take place outside the UK where any part—I stress "any part"—of a particular trafficking and brokering offence was carried out in the UK, even if it were a phone call, fax or e-mail sent from here.

I share the views of the noble Lord, Lord Judd, about the situation in Africa. There is no doubt that many problems arise from what he calls the disease of conflict. Economic growth in those circumstances is almost impossible. But there is no point in introducing impractical controls. The US has found it impractical to have such controls. I hasten to add that that has nothing whatever to do with protecting our defence industry. It is not relevant to that. Almost certainly it is not involved. It is to do with the practicality of trying to control actions which are not recognised by everyone as prohibited.

Finally, we believe—it is the more positive way to approach the issue—that combating unscrupulous arms dealers and illicit arms trafficking effectively requires international co-operation and we have therefore supported steps to achieve this. The Government will continue to press for international embargoes to be imposed on countries in regions of conflict. That is the best way to stop the supply of arms to those regions. We have supported the recently adopted European Union statement of principles on controlling arms brokering. And we take every opportunity to encourage the growing international consensus on the need for controls in this area. For example, both the UN Firearms Protocol adopted in May last year and the conclusions of the UN conference on Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects in July have recognised the need to enhance international co-operation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering.

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This is the way to tackle the problem, not to introduce controls which are impractical to implement. For these reasons, I believe that it would be counterproductive to require that all trade controls introduced under the Bill apply extra-territorially. I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.


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