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Lord Rooker: I remember looking at this matter during Second Reading. The budget and the resources for the independent police complaints commission will be approximately three times the size of the budget for the existing Police Complaints Authority. It is a substantial amount of extra resources going into this area.
Schedule 2 [The Independent Police Complaints Commission]:
Viscount Bridgeman moved Amendment No. 137A:
- Page 81, line 37, leave out sub-paragraph (2).
The noble Viscount said: This is a probing amendment. The terms as to the remuneration of members should be determined at the time of their appointment. The Secretary of State should have no power to make extra payments on termination over and above the initially agreed entitlement. The arrangements between the Secretary of State and the commission should be seen as totally transparent. I beg to move.
Lord Bassam of Brighton: My response is going to be very brief and I hope that it will reassure the noble Viscount. This is a standard provision in the setting up of a non-departmental public body. It is almost identical to those used in establishing the Police
Information Technology Organisation (PITO) under the Police Act 1997 and also the Central Police Training and Development Agency under the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001. We believe that it is appropriate for the Home Secretary to be able to direct the new IPCC to make payments to departing chairmen, deputy chairmen or members where appropriate. That has been a long-established principle. Provision has been made for it in the current legislation which governs the Police Complaints Authority. It is a continuation provision to re-establish something which already exists. There is nothing new, fancy or elaborate about it. There are no whistles or bells attached to it. It is a bog-standard job.
Lord Renton: It may be that the Government have a number of special circumstances in mind which could vary considerably. It would be very helpful to know something of the special circumstances which might arise, even if only one example is given.
Lord Bassam of Brighton: I confess that I do not have an example in my head at this moment. If the noble Lord would give us time I am sure that we shall be able to provide him with a special circumstance that might seem appropriate, to use the language of the briefing. It would perhaps be extenuating circumstances where a person has had to leave the commission rapidly for some reason. There is an element of flexibility. It is there and I suspect that the provision has been used quite sparingly.
Viscount Bridgeman: I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, for his explanation of the procedure. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Viscount Bridgeman moved Amendment No. 138:
- Page 82, line 3, leave out "Subject to sub-paragraphs (3) and (5),"
The noble Viscount said: This amendment is concerned again with the independence of the commission and freedom from political interference. In order to preserve its independence it is important that the commission should appoint its staff without interference from the Home Secretary. I did hear the Minister's reply to the intervention of my noble friend Lord Dixon-Smith. Nevertheless, the right to have a say in the commission's choice of chief executive ensures that the Home Secretary can mould the commission in his own image, which is an unacceptable infringement of the commission's independence.
I ask Members of the Committee to recall the theme running through the debate on Clause 5. This legislation must be successor-proof and in this case proof against a tendency towards political interference by a future Home Secretary. I beg to move.
Lord Dholakia: I support this amendment. Although it is not directly relevant, perhaps I may declare an interest. At one time I worked as a member
of the Police Complaints Authority. What I am not quite sure about is why the Home Secretary requires a power to approve the appointment of a chief executive? More importantly, why is it necessary for him to appoint the first chief executive of this independent police complaints authority? The word "independent" does not necessarily fit if the Home Secretary is going to interfere in the appointment. I do not know of a statutory commission where that has been possible. Can the Minister give some indication as to why the Home Secretary is so interested in this particular matter?
Lord Renton: Under this Bill and various other statutes, the Home Secretary is given a very wide range of detailed powers. How he is expected to have the knowledge, and sometimes the expertise, necessary to exercise those powers is a bit of a puzzle to me. I do not see why the commission itself, which will have to operate with the co- operation of the chief executive, should not appoint the chief executive without the need to seek the approval of the Secretary of State.
Lord Tope: I also support this amendment. I imagine that it is very probable that the commission would wish to have a chief executive, but if it is independent it should surely be its choice as to how it wishes to operate. I can understand, when the commission is yet to be established, that it may be for the Secretary of State to appoint the person to act as chief executive, but why should not that be someone appointed as an interim measure until the commission is established and able to determine, first, whether it wants a chief executive, which I hope it would, and, secondly, who that chief executive should be?
Finally, the Minister went to great lengths a moment ago to assure us, with total sincerity, about the absolute independence of the commission. How can we be reassured that a commission is really and truly independent if probably the most important appointment that it makes in its chief executive, the person for running the body, is subject to the approval of the Secretary of State? How can that possibly be consistent with being truly independent as the Minister assures us?
Lord Bassam of Brighton: I am impressed that there is a determination in the Committee that we should have a truly independent police complaints commission. That is absolutely right and none of us here today want to see anything other than that. It is good that there is a political consensus for it. But we need to be realistic and reflect on how similar bodies are established.
The argument runs like this. As with Amendment No. 133, these provisions are pretty much standard for the setting up of non-departmental public bodies. I am sure that there are Members of the Committee who are very familiar with this and more so than I, with the establishing of the Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO). Very similar provisions were set up under the Police Act 1997 and the Central Police Training and Development Agency, which was set up
under the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, and, my noble friend Lord Rooker advises me, very similar procedures were followed in the setting up of the Food Standards Agency; and I do not believe anyone would argue that that is not a genuinely independent body that feels free to criticise the Government whenever it is right and appropriate so to do. It is a genuinely independent body, established with very similar procedures, which has provided exactly the measure of credible independence that we expected it to deliver.It will be essential for the Secretary of State to appoint the first chief executive of IPCC. That person will need to be in place well before the IPCC has been formally set up, to take forward its establishment and set in place all its operating procedures, which otherwise would have to be done by the Home Office. In the light of the argument about genuine independence, I shall leave the question of whether the Committee would regard that as desirable. We think that it would be a much less satisfactory way of proceeding.
We also believe that it would be appropriate for the Home Secretary, who has a role in overseeing the operation of the IPCC and the police complaints system as a whole, to have the power of approval—but it is only a power of approval—over subsequent and future chief executives and over the terms and conditions of their appointments. After all, the Home Secretary is ultimately accountable to Parliament. We believe that it would be an important safeguard of the Government's ability to supervise a public body most effectively, so that, importantly—criticism is often made that we seek to undermine the role, importance and significance of Parliament—Parliament itself can hold the Government properly to account for the performance of the IPCC, which surely can be done only through the Home Secretary. However, if the Secretary of State has the power of approval with regard to the chief executive, it would be appropriate for the appointment of IPCC staff to be delegated to the chief executive or his or her senior officials. The Secretary of State need only have the power of approval, therefore, over the terms and conditions of the appointment of those members of staff.
We are therefore 100 per cent in favour of the notion of full independence. We see this as a practical and reasonable measure to take in terms of setting up the IPCC. In relation to the subsequent appointment of chief executives, the Home Secretary retains only a right of approval. The Home Secretary represents the golden thread of accountability running through the whole system. I can understand some of the scepticism about the genuine independence of the IPCC raised by this issue. However, there are many examples, of which I have given three, of how the same standard approach to the creation of genuinely independent, non-departmental public bodies has worked perfectly adequately in the past.
In those circumstances, I hope that noble Lords are reasonably assured by my comments and will feel able to withdraw and reconsider the amendments, which, I
willingly concede, are inspired by a genuine need to create an independent police complaints supervisory body.7.15 p.m.
Lord Tope: I am even less reassured than I was before the Minister stood up. I am not sure that it is fair to compare PITO and the training authority with something called the independent police complaints commission. The noble Lord, Lord Condon, spoke very eloquently about the vital importance of the new independent police complaints commission being perceived to be independent. I therefore cannot see any justification for the Home Secretary retaining the right to approve—and therefore, by definition, to veto— the appointment of the chief executive. I do not understand why the Home Secretary cannot be prepared to leave that to the wisdom of the commission and its members.
I well understand the position concerning the first appointment. On the first day of Committee I declared my membership of both the new Greater London Authority and the new Metropolitan Police Authority, both of which bodies were established with interim chief executives—or, in the rather quaint world of police authorities, an interim clerk— appointed, of course, by the Government because no one else was in a position to do it. But both of those authorities, when established, were able and trusted by the Government to make their own appointments without the approval or disapproval of not only the Secretary of State but even of the Mayor. Why are the Government not willing to extend the same trust to the body that they, as fully as we, accept has to be seen to be independent?
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