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Lord Bradshaw: Before the Minister sits down, what system applies to a civilian contractor who employs staff to act, for example, as gaolers? For instance, Group 4, or a company of that kind, supply different staff at different places at different times of the day. If its staff are accused of incivility, can they be taken to
the independent Police Complaints Authority or do we have to rely on the contract with that firm for its own disciplinary proceedings to take over the matter?
Lord Rooker: I think it is the latter procedure. If the staff were not employed by the police authority—as, for example, will be the community safety officers and detention or custody officers, who will be employed directly by the chief constable—they will be outwith the scheme. It would be up to the police authority in one case, or the chief of police in the case of accreditation, to take the necessary steps before awarding a contract or accreditation to satisfy themselves that there is a legitimate and proper complaints system. It would be in their interests not to receive loads of complaints from the public—because they would receive them first—about incivility and rudeness on the part of their contractors. Unless I receive advice to the contrary, that is the position. Otherwise I shall write to the noble Lord.
Viscount Bridgeman: I apologise for not speaking to Amendment No. 156, which stands in the names of my noble friend Lord Dixon-Smith and myself and is in this grouping.
We shall come back to the question of accredited persons at a later stage. At this stage we are concerned that allowing an employer to deal with complaints will be similar to allowing the police to police themselves, a point I made earlier. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendments Nos. 151 to 156 not moved.]
Schedule 3 [Handling of Complaints and Conduct matters etc]:
[Amendment No. 157 not moved.]
Viscount Bridgeman moved Amendment No. 158:
- Page 91, line 39, after "not" insert "(unless it constitutes an admission of a criminal offence punishable on indictment by a maximum term of imprisonment of five years or more)"
The noble Viscount said: This is another probing amendment. It would be unfortunate to say the least if a police officer guilty of misconduct serious enough to deserve imprisonment for a significant term escaped by engineering a local resolution procedure and making a confession that cannot then be used to bring him or her to justice. The amendment seeks to avoid such an outcome by accepting the admission of a crime which can carry a maximum sentence of five years. Admission of more trivial offences will still enjoy the protection of the resolution procedure, so this amendment will not prove an obstacle to the use of that procedure. I beg to move.
Lord Dixon-Smith: Amendment No. 161, which is grouped with Amendments Nos. 157, 158, 159 and 160 is, in a sense, the reciprocal argument to the one produced by my noble friend. It arises as the result of
a case which was drawn to my attention in which about 20 police officers were involved in a raid where it was known that the people being raided were likely to be armed. During the course of the raid, one of the policemen, who was armed, felt that he was about to be shot and, in a snap judgment—and one can understand how these things happen—he shot a man in the shoulder.With so many policemen on the scene, it was unsurprising that the facts were never disputed. Inevitably, the man appeared before the court on a charge of attempted manslaughter. The wheels of justice grind exceeding smooth and they grind exceeding slow. The case was dismissed at the end of last year, the CPS having done everything that it could to put a case together. In the end, the case failed for lack of evidence. That would seem to be that. But the officer involved now finds himself up on a local disciplinary charge for just that event.
That is the kind of double jeopardy of which we ought not to approve. Therefore, I was moved to table this amendment in order to probe the Government's thinking on the matter. It seems to me that if a case goes to the court and either cannot be established sufficiently to satisfy the judge that there is a case to answer or results in acquittal, that ought to be the end of the matter and disciplinary proceedings would seem to be no longer appropriate. I look forward to the Minister's response.
9 p.m.
Lord Elton: My noble friend's amendment excludes very serious criminal offences—a great deal more serious than offences that would render the chairman of the commission unfit to hold that office. I hope that, in replying, the Minister will address the question of exclusion—the extraordinary procedure by which a person making a statement for the purposes of a disciplinary procedure can exempt himself from criminal proceedings at any level of seriousness. I hope that the Minister will address that point and not merely the most serious end of the range.
Lord Rooker: Perhaps I may deal with Amendment No. 158 first.
Currently, about a third of all complaints—about 10,000—are resolved locally. There is substantial and widespread support for this process, and that is why the Government are committed not just to retaining it but to extending its use.
However, local resolution will be available only where the conduct complained about, if proved, would not warrant criminal proceedings. So any admission relating to the matter being subjected to the local resolution process cannot be an admission of any criminal offence, let alone one punishable on indictment by a maximum term of imprisonment of five years or more.
Any admission relating to any matter not being subject to the local resolution process is admissible in any subsequent criminal, civil or disciplinary proceedings anyway. This would include some minor
cases, but it would also include some cases that would warrant disciplinary or even criminal proceedings as local resolution will not normally be available in such cases. It is essential for the appropriate authorities to have the power to investigate complaints about these cases, as otherwise they would not be resolved at all.I accept that Amendments No. 158 and 161 are two sides of the same coin. Amendment No. 161 would make it impossible to take disciplinary action against a member of a force if that person had been acquitted in a criminal case. I cannot comment on the individual case mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, but I can well understand the example given.
Police integrity is vital to public confidence. That a particular criminal offence was not proved in a criminal court does not mean that police misconduct did not take place. An officer might, for example, be acquitted of a particular criminal offence of assault. It might nevertheless be clear that he had acted in a manner likely to bring discredit on the force. It is essential that police misconduct be properly accounted for. Therefore, the option of bringing a matter before a disciplinary hearing is necessary.
The criminal standard of proof is "beyond all reasonable doubt", whereas the standard in a disciplinary hearing is based on the "balance of probabilities". This civil standard of proof was introduced to police disciplinary hearings to bring them into line with other forms of employment.
The evidence that exists in a case may not prove beyond reasonable doubt that a crime took place but it may well prove on the balance of probabilities that misconduct did. The person concerned should not be able to get away with the misconduct. A force member may not be found guilty of a crime in a court but could well be found guilty of breaching the code of conduct in a disciplinary hearing.
If the opposite were the case, the possibility is that the public would not have confidence in the system. It might be argued that the system had been rigged—that someone had been charged with an offence which on the face of it appeared serious but in regard to which there was no chance of a guilty verdict being reached in order to prevent the person being disciplined; so the person would end up being not guilty on both because he or she would never be charged with misconduct.
Although examples such as that given by the noble Lord can be unfortunate for the individuals concerned, any breach of the code of conduct should be dealt with. If it is not dealt with in court, it must be dealt with in the normal process.
Viscount Bridgeman: I am grateful to the Minister for satisfying our concerns on Amendment No. 158. I think that they are the concerns of my noble friend Lord Elton.
Lord Elton: I have a point to raise with the Minister, if I might—this is a sandwich speech!
Viscount Bridgeman: I give way to my noble friend.
Lord Elton: I think I follow the point made by the Minister, but perhaps I may give an illustration. If a
police officer is subject to a disciplinary procedure because he was in a pub instead of on the beat and makes an admission that he was in the pub, and if someone subsequently brings a charge against him for an assault that he could have carried out only had he been on the beat and not in the pub, would his admission be admissible? It is perhaps not the most felicitous example, and I am happy to hear the answer later. I merely want to be certain that the procedure in this provision will not impede procedures in court.
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