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Lord Morris of Manchester: I am a signatory to these important amendments and warmly congratulate my noble friend Lord Bragg on having tabled them.
Regrettably, I was unable to attend the debate on the Bill's Second Reading, a lapse noted with kindliness in speeches from both sides of your Lordships' House. Without knowing why I was not here, the noble Lord, Lord Addington, said that he was sure I would soon be joining the fray. In fact I was on, as it were, sabbatical leave on Capitol Hill, having been co-opted by the US House of Representatives on to a congressional committee of inquiry into the still undiagnosed illnesses of many thousands of now severely disabled veterans of the Gulf War.
My good and noble friend Lord Ashley referred at Second Reading to my having introduced 33 years ago, as a Private Member's Bill, what became the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970. My noble friend himself had a distinguished role in that enactment and will recall the care with which we worked to ensure that the Act's definition of disability embraced people with learning disabilities and mental health problems just as explicitly as it did people with physical and sensory disabilities. Indeed, such was our concern that, in Section 28 of the Act, a duty was imposed on Ministers to act to remove any misunderstanding that might arise on this crucially important aspect of the legislation.
The Act that these three amendments seek to improve—the Disability Discrimination Act 1995—is often described as a lineal descendant of the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act; but, as my noble friend Lord Bragg has made clear, that claim is marred by the DDA's badly flawed definition of disability.
Of course, no fault lies with the Disability Rights Commission. It will see, as clearly as the supporters of these amendments, that for a statutory agency created to end discrimination against disabled people to be made to discriminate between one group of disabled people and another is both palpably wrong and patently absurd. That diminishes and demeans the Disability Rights Commission and the law as it stands needs amending.
How can it credibly be said that people afflicted by schizophrenia are not disabled? And who can say that it would "open the floodgates" to afford them the protection of the DRC? Speaking as a serial floodgate saboteur for over three decades now, I would not include the carrying of these amendments in that class of parliamentary activity.
I conclude with just one further point. In a country where 70 per cent of recorded suicides are among people with serious mental health problems, to lag behind other countries in protecting them from discrimination is a disturbing indictment of the way we live now. Yet a recent comparative survey of the disability discrimination laws of 11 countries shows that our Disability Discrimination Act is the most disadvantageous for people with mental health problems.
I hope very much to see these amendments approved and again I congratulate my noble friend Lord Bragg on his humane initiative in tabling them.
Baroness Wilkins: I speak in strong support of the amendments, which cover the concerns I raised on Second Reading. The current definition of disability in the DDA provides inadequate protection for those with mental health problems—in particular, as my noble friend Lord Bragg pointed out, people with depression, eating disorders and schizophrenia. My noble friend has covered matters so ably and comprehensively that I have little to add. I hope that the amendments will receive the Minister's support and that my noble friend Lord Ashley of Stoke will accept them as part of his Bill.
Baroness Darcy de Knayth: I give very warm support to the amendments, to which I have added my name. The severity of the discrimination was brought home to me most strongly when David Grayson, who was the chairman of the National Disability Council—the predecessor of the DRC—told the All-Party Disability Group that some people left gaps in their CV unexplained, preferring that an employer should assume that they had been in prison rather than revealing that they had been in hospital with a mental illness.
8.45 p.m.
Lord Astor of Hever: As I said on Second Reading, we on these Benches have a great deal of sympathy with the objectives of the amendments for people who suffer genuine mental illness. The noble Lord, Lord Bragg, spoke to the amendments with great ability.
The amendments would extend the coverage of specific listed conditions. Is it the aspiration of the noble Lord, Lord Ashley, should his Private Member's Bill fail, that all conditions deemed to constitute disability should be written directly on the face of any legislation that the Government bring forward? I understand that the Disability Rights Commission is currently considering revisions to the definition of disability to be published in October. Clearly, that will be too late for this Bill.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Hollis of Heigham): I rise only because of the comments of my noble friend Lady Wilkins, who asked whether the amendments would attract the Minister's support. None of the amendments will attract either the Minister's support or the Minister's failure to support. They are not amendments to the Minister's Bill. As I tried to make clear on Second Reading, my position is to keep a watching brief. If I can be helpful in giving information-based responses to particular questions, I am very happy to do so, but the origin of the Bill is my noble friend Lord Ashley and it is for him to decide how he wishes to respond to the views of my noble friend.
I have a couple of points to make to clarify the position, but I am neither endorsing nor failing to endorse any of the amendments. I shall probably not even seek to contribute on many of them. I shall intervene only if I think that I may be able to take the discussion forward.
The reason for the original terminology on clinically recognised illnesses is to prevent diagnoses of conditions that we have never heard of before, such as when two Californian psychiatrists diagnose fame addiction as a reason for a star going in for recurrent shoplifting. The aim was to winnow out the self-described, which has no serious impact.
On the second point, my noble friend may be brigading together two issues that we try to keep separate—the difference between disability, which is a long-term issue, and illness, which is not. In that sense, someone who suffers from mental health problems is not treated in any way differently under existing legislation from someone who has a stroke or a heart attack. I accept that it may be arguable that the long-term consequences of a short-term mental health illness may have discriminatory effects in a way that a short-term physical illness may not. However, the reason for the current provision is that we are trying to distinguish between illness and long-term disability that results in continued impairment.
It is worth emphasising that the DDA already covers 8.5 million people.
Lord Addington: Will the noble Baroness give way?
Baroness Hollis of Heigham: Perhaps the noble Lord would like to come in after me. I am not replying for anybody. I am simply adding some comments.
Lord Addington: I have a question for the Minister.
Baroness Hollis of Heigham: The Minister is not answering. It is for the noble Lord, Lord Ashley, to answer questions, if I may say so.
I do not expect any government to seek to bring within the scope of the legislation not just the 8.5 million who are currently covered by the DDA, but anybody who has ever suffered an illness for any sustained period. That would involve a very large swathe of the population.
It may be worth correcting a misunderstanding over how the DDA deals with mental health. On Second Reading, my noble friend Lord Bragg said that mental health does not fit readily into the list of respects into which effects on normal day-to-day activities fall into the DDA and that any substantial effect as required under the definition must be in one of those respects. I am sure that he recalls making that argument. That means that a person with a mental health problem could not rely on there being a cumulative substantial adverse effect across a number of limited respects in Schedule 1 to the DDA, such as mobility or ability to concentrate, learn or understand.
I am not arguing the merits or demerits of the amendments; I am simply seeking to be helpful to the Committee on points of clarification. The Act does not limit the effects of the impairment to only one of those respects. Where an impairment does not have a substantial adverse effect on a person in one of the respects listed, the effects of more than one can be taken together to result in a substantial effect in carrying out normal day-to-day activities.
Lord Addington: I am sorry to put the Minister in this position. I appreciate that she is trying to prevent balls going out of court, as opposed to answering questions. It seems that the Disability Rights Commission believes that it is best-qualified to deal with discrimination against people with mental illness. Would not expansion there make sense?
Baroness Hollis of Heigham: It is already the case that the DRC can review the situation.
Lord Astor of Hever: Can the Minister put us all out of our agony? If the Bill fails, will the Government come forward at an early stage with a disability Bill to tie up all the loose ends that will no doubt be debated later tonight?
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