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Lord Peyton of Yeovil: I agree with my noble friend. I have two very civil amendments in this group, motivated by the same intention. One hopes that the Home Secretary will not reach this point too often, because it is difficult to exaggerate the importance of a chief officer of police and the authority under which they serve.
I hope that the Home Secretary does not get into the habit of ordering people about. That would not generate the trust and mutual respect that are essential in the present very difficult circumstances in which all three parties work.
My amendments are not flippant. Good manners and courtesy can make very awkward situations less uncomfortable and a little easier to handle than under the procedures laid down in Acts of Parliament.
Lord Bradshaw: Amendment No. 304 is also in this group. Clause 30 is one of the most important in the Bill. It goes to the heart of one of the core principles underpinning the constitution of policing in this country, which is the operational independence of the
chief constable. The current proposals would undermine that principle. They require very detailed scrutiny.The Secretary of State already has the power, under Section 42 of the Police Act 1996, to require a police authority to exercise its powers under Section 11 of that Act to call upon the chief constable to retire in the interests of efficiency and effectiveness. They are long-stop powers, or a safety net, for situations in which it is clear that the police authority is not carrying out its responsibilities properly to deal with the unsatisfactory performance of the chief constable and, as a result, policing in the area not being efficient or effective.
The Government propose to extend those powers in the Bill. Of particular concern is the proposal that the Secretary of State should be able to require the police authority to suspend a chief constable. That change is far more substantive than the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, suggested at Second Reading. The existing powers at the point of resignation are entirely different from the proposed new powers of suspension. By its nature, the point at which the Secretary of State would consider whether to call upon the police authority to require a chief constable to resign or retire would come at the end of the process when all the facts had been scrutinised and the issues understood. Yet the ability to suspend a chief constable potentially kicks in right at the outset of the process. Is it right that a Home Secretary should be able to interfere in the management of people at that early stage without any form of consultation, without having been there on the ground and without necessarily having the full background and the full facts?
The Government have stated their intention that this would only be a power of last resort. But such statements can easily be lost in the mists of time. The potential for a future Home Secretary improperly to exert influence through the new power is significant. In today's increasingly media-driven age, where people expect instant responses and actions, the stated purpose of the new power could easily be exceeded or even abused.
This is a serious issue. The principle of the operational independence of a chief constable free from political interference has stood the test of time and we erode it at our peril. The amendment I am discussing seeks to protect that principle by requiring the Secretary of State to consult the relevant police authority and have regard to any representations it may make before exercising the powers. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, will accept the amendment. It does not seek to wreck the Government's intention underpinning the clause, but it provides a proper buffer between the Home Secretary of the day and the potential for direct interference and undue influence on the fate of a chief constable. As I say, it does not frustrate the Government's stated intention. I urge the Minister to think seriously before taking the powers we are discussing.
Lord Condon: I support Amendments Nos. 300A, 301A, 304 and 305. The cumulative effect of Clauses 28
to 32 is probably to make it easier to suspend and remove a chief officer than it is to remove the most inexperienced probationer constable on the grounds of inefficiency or ineffectiveness. That may well be right and in the public interest in the sense that an ineffective and inefficient chief officer can do far more harm than the youngest probationer constable. However, that power to suspend and remove brings with it an obligation at least to adhere to the concepts of natural justice and human rights of the chief officers so affected.Clauses 28 to 32 seek to update and to some extent extend existing powers. In the recent past those existing powers have been shown to be not effective in taking care of the public interest and the reputation of the service. Therefore, I fully acknowledge the need for reform and the need to extend some of the powers. However, I hope that when the Minister responds to the amendments he will give some assurance that the rights of the chief officers affected will be considered when the regulations under Clause 31 are brought into effect. At the moment an act of faith is required to believe that Clause 31 will bring in procedures to ensure that the rights of the affected chief officers are looked after. The amendments currently under consideration would put on the face of the Bill a requirement to consult police authorities and the inspectorate of constabulary to enable other views to be taken into account.
Clearly, it is in the public interest and that of the service that inefficient and ineffective chief officers should be removed from their positions after due process. My only concern is that at the moment that due process is not clear on the face of the Bill; it will probably be contained in the regulations under Clause 31. As I say, I support the amendments that I have mentioned.
5.45 p.m.
Lord Rooker: I assure the noble Lord, Lord Condon, that it is not intended in any way, shape or form to deny individual citizens their rights. It may be a question of denying their right to the job in question, but, as I say, we have no intention of going down the road of denying individual citizens their rights. If I cannot satisfy the noble Lord with regard to Clause 31 today, I hope that I shall be able to do so by Report stage. This is an important part of the Bill and the noble Lords, Lord Dixon-Smith, Lord Peyton of Yeovil and Lord Bradshaw, were right to comment on it. I do not agree with all the points they made, but it is right that we spend a few moments discussing this crucial part.
Amendments Nos. 300A and 301A would introduce a layer of process serving no purpose. Clause 28 simply adds the option of resignation to that of retirement when the police authority exercises its powers under Sections 9E or 11 of the Police Act 1996. The Secretary of State's role under those sections is that he must consent to the exercise of those powers. The amendments are misplaced in that the Secretary of State's obligations in considering whether or not to consent are in Section 42 as amended by Clause 30. But
assuming the principle behind them is that the Secretary of State should consult the police authority, they are also unnecessary. Action under Sections 9E and 11 is initiated by the police authority which applies to the Secretary of State for consent. By definition, its views are taken into account as the initiating authority.I understand that Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary is not in the business of making representations as such. It does, of course, offer advice to Ministers on policing issues, including efficiency and effectiveness. It is almost inconceivable that Ministers would not seek the advice of HMIC before consenting to the exercise of these powers by the police authority, but "representations" by it would not be appropriate. However, that does not mean that it is excluded from the matter.
Amendments Nos. 303B and 303C would remove the power of the Secretary of State to intervene in order to require action and to substitute a request for action by the police authority. The effect of this part of Clause 30(2) is simply to include in the existing intervention powers the route of resignation as inserted by Clause 28.
The existing intervention powers (under Section 42 of the Police Act 1996) are for use as a last resort where other avenues have failed. At that stage, the need for urgent action would be paramount and the power to make a request—as opposed to direct—would not represent an effective course of action.
I freely admit to the noble Lord, Lord Peyton, that I put a sheaf of notes in the Library on the legislation. However, I cannot remember whether they included the clauses we are discussing. I believe that they concerned another part of the Bill. It is not the easiest thing to follow through the process when one is considering dumping sections and subsections in other pieces of legislation that are cross-referenced in our amendments in the Bill, which is amending legislation. I make that absolutely clear.
The existing intervention power already gives the Home Secretary the power to require departure. The only change introduced in Clause 30(2), which runs from line 13 to line 44—it is a substantial subsection—is to allow the departure to be by resignation as well as by retirement. The amendments would change and seriously weaken existing legislative provision rather than the new legislative provision in the Bill. As such, they would not work in the intended way and would in many ways be wrecking amendments.
Amendments Nos. 304 and 305 relate to matters of procedure—that is not to say that they are not important—which should not be set out on the face of the Act but are properly a matter for secondary legislation. Clause 31, to which the noble Lord, Lord Condon, referred, provides a regulation-making power. Where an officer made representations against intervention by the Secretary of State under Section 42, the requirement for an inquiry would be triggered and the views of all parties would be heard, considered and reported to the Secretary of State.
I freely admit—I may dig myself into a pit by saying this—that in this context I am very much reliant on the powers of the scrutiny committees in this House. Clause 31 clearly contains the regulation-making power for the removal of senior officers. That provision will become Section 42A of the 1996 Act, which is the main legislation. Clause 31(3) states:
- "A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament".
I end as I began. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Condon, that in no way would the Home Secretary, myself or any other member of the Government operate in such a way as to deny the relevant rights to individuals. I hope that that reassures him. Perhaps I may make a further addition to my earlier comments. The regulations must include the right to know the reasons for the decision, the right to make personal representations to the police authority and, if the Secretary of State initiates removal, an inquiry must be set up by an independent person under Section 42. Those requirements all remain. We should secure the rights of ordinary citizens and ensure that we are not oppressive in relation to an individual. These circumstances clearly involve a traumatic time in a person's life; one has to think about the circumstances in which the powers will be used. They may be a traumatic part of the life of a professional person who is reaching the pinnacle of his or her career. Their rights have to be safeguarded to the extent that we can do so in the regulations. Those matters will be included. I hope that that reassures Members of the Committee that the amendments are not really necessary and that we are certainly minded to take account of the rights of the individuals concerned.
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