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Baroness Turner of Camden moved Amendment No. 142:
- Page 37, line 17, after "State" insert ", after consultation with the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service,".
The noble Baroness said: In moving Amendment No. 142, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 143 to 145. We now reach Clause 32, which makes provision for the Secretary of State, in relation to jurisdiction listed in Schedules 3 and 4, which we have just been discussing, by regulations to make provision about the time limit for beginning proceedings in respect of a claim concerning a matter to which a statutory procedure applies. Our amendment stipulates that the Secretary of State should exercise this power after consultation with the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service. This is important because ACAS is the body which has the expertise and experience in this matter. We are dealing with the imposition of time limits and the imposition of time limits within which a claimant may make a claim is a matter of some concern to that individual.
We are suggesting that it would be right to say that the time limit should not be less than three months. The employee concerned may be distraught by what has happened. He or she may need assistance and advice. For a member of a union, that would present no difficulty but many employees covered by this legislation will, as we know, be working in firms where there is no union and they may not at first know where to go for advice.
We have a workforce that is increasingly multi-ethnic. There may be language difficulties and such people tend to be very vulnerable. Although one can say, as a former union official, that everyone ought to belong to a union, nevertheless that is not always realistic. There is a duty upon politicians, in my view, to do what they can to protect vulnerable people. Our amendment provides that as regards the time limit, that should not be less than three months. That is referred to in paragraph 2 of Clause 32. We want "not less than three months" inserted there.
In tabling Amendment No. 145, we believe that there should be provision for the exercise of a discretion by the tribunal to extend the time for
beginning proceedings. That is sensible because, again, the tribunal will have the experience of dealing with such cases and such people. I believe that it can be trusted to exercise discretion in a reasonable way.We believe that these suggestions are sensible. We hope that they are regarded as constructive by the Government. We are intending, as I and my noble friends have stressed throughout our discussion of the Bill, to be as constructive as possible and I hope that the Minister will agree that this is such an amendment. I beg to move.
Baroness Miller of Hendon: To the extent that these two amendments seek to prescribe in the Act itself the time limit for the commencement of proceedings, we certainly sympathise with that idea. However, what we find unacceptable is that the limit should be not less than three months, only because this would entitle the Secretary of State to prescribe any limit of any length—even years and even something outside the normal period prescribed by the statute of limitations for ordinary civil claims. We believe that the limit should be relatively short because of the difficulty of remembering the sequence of events in what would be an intensely personal dispute. I regret, therefore, that we would not support the amendment as it stands. However, if it were to come back in a different form at a later stage, with an upper limit of a reasonably short length, we would certainly be willing to reconsider the matter.
In the last group of amendments, the Minister mentioned that he would listen to his noble friends. Then he said, "or other friends". He did not say he would listen to Members of the Committee. I say that only because, as I said before, I have some diffidence in supporting in case it does some harm to what are clearly very good amendments, or could be very good amendments.
7.15 p.m.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton: Indeed, I was so carried away with the warm and comradely spirits of the Committee that I regarded everybody in the room as friends. I should have said "Members of the Committee". I specifically referred to my real friends over here, in parliamentary terms, but I meant all Members of the Committee.
Perhaps I may deal with the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, and make absolutely clear from the outset that we regard these as constructive suggestions. If and in so far as there is a disagreement, it is not about the principle; it is simply about the drafting issues.
First, there will be a thorough consultation exercise before any regulations are made. Those people who will be consulted will, of course, include ACAS but I do not see any need for consultation with ACAS to be spelt out on the face of the Bill. The regulations will be concerned with the adjustment of time limits in relation to those jurisdictions listed in the Schedules 3 and 4. The aim is to ensure that the parties have a
reasonable time to complete the statutory procedures before a complaint has to be made to an employment tribunal.I can assure the noble Baroness and all Members of the Committee that the time limit for beginning proceedings in respect of a claim to which a statutory procedure applies will not be less than three months.
I would also draw the attention of Members of the Committee to a statement made in the Government's response to the consultation. It said that it is intended to extend the time limits for applying to a tribunal by three months where a claim has been submitted, or where procedures have been started but not completed, within the existing time limits for presenting claims. There will be further extensions of up to two months if both parties want this. All this was reiterated in committee in the other place.
The regulations will also make it clear, picking up the third point made by the noble Baroness, that it will be the tribunals which will exercise the discretion for extending time limits mentioned in subsection (2)(b) of this clause. I thoroughly endorse the point made by the noble Baroness that, of course, the tribunals are particularly well placed to exercise that discretion.
The precise details of the regulations have yet to be worked out but I hope I have said enough to allay concerns of the noble Baroness and other Members of the Committee and that she will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Lord Wedderburn of Charlton: Before my noble and learned friend sits down, did I hear him to say that extensions beyond three months will only be allowed up to two months more?
Lord Falconer of Thoroton: I said that the time limit for beginning proceedings will be not less than three months. It is intended to extend the time limits for applying to a tribunal by three months. Where a claim has been submitted or where proceedings have started but have not been completed within the existing time limits, there will be further extensions of up to two months if both parties want this.
Baroness Turner of Camden: I thank the Minister for his response. I am glad to learn that the principles in the amendment are accepted and that the intention is that this will all appear in regulation. I still believe that it will be very much better if we had something on the face of the Bill, because this has been the standpoint of myself and my noble friends throughout our discussions. However, I am grateful for what has been said. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton: Before the noble Baroness sits down, what I am being told from behind me is that there can be a series of two months' extensions. So you can come back to the tribunal and in the tribunal's discretion it can extend further. That would be in its discretion even when one party is opposed—but only by agreement.
Baroness O'Cathain: Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, does that mean that it could go on and on and on? There would be a huge problem for both the employee and for the employer if something were dragged on ad infinitum.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton: The extension may be granted only with the agreement of both parties and in the exercise of discretion by the tribunal.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendments Nos. 143 to 145 not moved.]
Lord Falconer of Thoroton moved Amendment No. 146:
- Transpose Clause 32 to after Clause 33.
The noble and learned Lord said: This is a technical amendment to swap the order of Clauses 32 and 33. Following our amendments to Clause 33 in the other place, it is clear that the clause should now come before Clause 32. Clause 33 deals with presentation of complaints to tribunals and it makes sense for this to come before Clause 32, which is about consequential changes to time limits for making complaints to tribunals. Further, Clause 32 refers in a consequential way to Schedule 4 but it is Clause 33 that introduces that schedule. I hope that Members of the Committee will feel able to agree to the amendment. I beg to move.
Lord Wedderburn of Charlton: I hope my noble and learned friend will not mind if we go on referring to Clause 33. At Report, any references to Clause 33 will have to be carefully explained, of course, which will take a lot longer. It is a pity that this sort of jiggery-pokery has to go on. I quite see the logic of it, but Clause 33 is Clause 33. It has a bad reputation that will stick with it no matter what number it is given. However, I understand him.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 33 [Complaints about grievances]:
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