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Lord King of Bridgwater: My Lords, before the noble Baroness moves on from discussing ISAF, it has been widely reported that, aside from the additional contribution of troops for which Turkey is looking, it is also seeking a substantial financial contribution to its costs. The United Kingdom is being invited to contribute a significant amount to those costs. Can the noble Baroness confirm whether that is the case? If so, presumably it will come out of the contingency reserve.
Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: My Lords, I believe that that is under discussion at the moment. My right honourable friend said in the media yesterday that discussions are being held because Turkey will have to consider how it will pay for the deployment. Whether that contribution will come from the contingency reserve I expect will be, as is always the case, a matter for protracted discussion between government departments. However, I am sure that the noble Lord's intervention on the matter will be noted in the appropriate quarters.
The deployment of 45 Commando Group to Afghanistan is entirely consistent with our campaign objectives that I highlighted at the beginning of my address. Since the military campaign began, we have made clear our determination to act to prevent Osama bin Laden and Al'Qaeda from posing a continuing terrorist threat. That is why British forces have been involved in operations on the ground in Afghanistan for some months now.
As the Secretary of State for Defence emphasised in another place last Wednesday, we have also made clear that the military advice is that rooting out the remaining elements of Al'Qaeda will take time. This has been a constant theme of our statements since the early days of the military deployment. Contrary to what many commentators have been reporting, the Government have never said that this was going to be a quick fix. Indeed, I recall making the point about how long this would take on the second Statement we made following the dreadful events of September 11th. Certainly, while Al'Qaeda ceased to exist as a coherent
force some months ago and the Taliban regime has long since been removed from power, there are still pockets of resistance.As the recent US-led Operation Anaconda has demonstrated, elements of Al'Qaeda and the Taliban regime remain in Afghanistan, hidden away in the remoter areas of the country. We must deal with these. The threat of attack from these groups and individuals remains high. If we do not deal with them, they would threaten all that the Afghan people and their supporters in the international community have achieved so far. They would certainly work to retain Afghanistan as a base for training and organising terrorism. And, left to regroup, there is no doubt that Al'Qaeda and its supporters would continue to pose a direct threat to states outside Afghanistan, including to the United Kingdom.
That is why we are deploying 45 Commando Group with the clear mission to assist the United States troops to search out and defeat the remaining elements of Al'Qaeda and Taliban terrorists. It is simply continuing the work that we began last October. In no sense is this "mission creep". In such situations, everyone always wants to know the details of the mission. But let me be clear that we are not going to describe exactly what is to happen next, as to do so puts knowledge and information into the hands of those opposed to us who would jeopardise the safety of our troops. We would simply put into the hands of potential adversaries that which they must not have.
Estimates have been made as to the length of the deployment: of the order of three months. Nonetheless, we must be clear that military action in difficult terrain against a determined enemy is dependent on many unknown factors. Our exit strategy is simple: we will leave when the task is completed.
Equally important is the need to have a clear chain of command. The 3 Commando Brigade headquarters will be based at Bagram airport, alongside the United States operational command of Operation Enduring Freedom under Major General Hagenbeck, Commanding General, 10th Mountain Division. 45 Commando Group command and control is entirely separate to that of ISAF, and is integrated in the United States command system, for active operations in the country. 45 Commando has a long history of operating and training alongside US forces—including in northern Iraq and Kosovo. Furthermore, there is full operational interoperability of communications available, as it has been throughout our operations in Afghanistan.
Let me be clear as well on the availability of close air support for British forces. We must recognise that complete air supremacy is available in Afghanistan. Therefore at any time during the conflict the marines will be able to call upon a formidable array of air support. The expert military advice is that there is no need to augment coalition air power with our own strike aircraft in support of this particular deployment. The Royal Marines possess highly skilled forward air controllers who train regularly with United States forces.
Finally, the situation that our forces find themselves in Afghanistan is one with distinct roles: security assistance by ISAF and war-fighting by 45 Commando is by no means unique. Other nations which have contributed troops to ISAF are in exactly the same situation: Denmark, France, Germany and Norway have all sent ground forces to participate in Operation Anaconda, while other elements of their armed forces remain in Kabul under General McColl.
The decision to deploy 45 Commando Group to Afghanistan underlines our determination to continue the action against terrorism and to assist with Afghanistan's reintegration into the world community as a responsible and valued member. It is not a decision that has been taken lightly and is one that has been taken in the full knowledge of the dangers inherent in the mission. I am sure that all Members of the House will wish to join me in wishing our forces every success in the difficult job that they are undertaking and in sending a message of support to members of all three of the armed services and their families. I beg to move.
Moved, That this House takes note of developments in Afghanistan and the fight against global terrorism.—(Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean.)
7.36 p.m.
Lord Howell of Guildford: My Lords, noble Lords will be extremely grateful to the noble Baroness for enabling us to hold this debate on developments in Afghanistan and also on the wider scene of the campaign against global terrorism. We understand that her duties require the noble Baroness to fly away tonight. We wish her a safe journey.
I should like to make absolutely clear at the outset that on this side we offer our total support for the Royal Marines in their unenviable and tough task, and for the deployment of 45 Commando Group into the rugged, cold and mountainous terrain of Afghanistan. It is an inhospitable and pitiless part of the world. However, they are marvellously equipped and well-trained forces and we join the noble Baroness in sending them good wishes in fulfilling their task.
Therefore, in raising certain policy issues tonight, and indeed in holding this debate, and the debate pressed for and secured by my colleagues in another place, never let it be said by anyone, and certainly not by anyone in the Armed Forces, that while they are risking their lives, back over here the politicians are differing and divided on deployment and operational purposes. We are not. We are absolutely with them and we send them our warmest support and good wishes.
Nevertheless, here at home some lessons must be learnt and certain questions have arisen. I believe that there are two lessons which in particular I wish to address. First, we have learnt, perhaps to some people's surprise, that Al'Qaeda and the Taliban forces are by no means defeated. Secondly, the way in which the Government reach crucial decisions—and there will be more decisions to take since this is a continuing, long-lasting and expanding war against
terrorism that will operate in a number of countries, not only Afghanistan—seems a little sudden and disturbing. I want to elaborate on that in a moment because both in the nation's interests and in the war against global terrorism, in the future we shall need to see these things running a little more smoothly.I shall deal first with the question of Al'Qaeda not yet being defeated. I have listened to the assurances of the noble Baroness and it is right to note that she has been saying certain things all along. Because of that, anything that I have to say by way of criticism, will she please duck since it is not aimed at her; rather it is aimed at others who are not in this place. I do not think that they have given quite such a clear impression.
On 9th January, the Prime Minister said:
- "The Taliban is defeated and Al'Qaeda scattered".
- "Having defeated the Taliban, the international community faces new imperatives".
These seem to be somewhat premature statements which underline the dangers of instant authorship. I am not sure that they are entirely consistent with the view that the Government have been warning all along that Al'Qaeda is not defeated and that there are pockets of resistance—probably very deep pockets—which will continue to cause considerable difficulties and challenges, as they already have to the American forces who have been trying to tackle them and as they will, in very strong form, to our brave troops who are already arriving at Bagram.
Those who rush to say that it is all over—that the Al'Qaeda and the Taliban are finished—have forgotten an important maxim; that is, that in a guerrilla or unorthodox war, the terrorist wins if he does not lose. By contrast, a conventional army—and in the natural course of events we have to mount conventional armies or, at any rate, armies based on conventional structures—loses if it does not win decisively. I do not wish to make any comparison with the past difficulties in Vietnam, but the lesson gradually learnt in Vietnam was that one could not search for or achieve the goal of victory by conducting operations in the pattern of past conventional wars.
It is absolutely crucial to understand the point that one does not finish with a terrorist operation merely by imposing on it the outward trappings of defeat. The infection continues, the battles continue, the pockets fester, the terrorists live to fight another day and survive rather than being wiped out.
We have heard Ministers say—indeed, the noble Baroness said it today—that 45 Commando will return when the task is complete; when the commanding officers judge that the job has been done. When will that be? How will we know when to declare victory? How will we know that the matter is dealt with and in hand? The more realistic and more candid viewpoint that we should be hearing from the
Government is that these matters will be very hard to call an end to; that there will be great difficulty in establishing whether the fire of terrorism has been put out, if it ever can be put out.When he speaks later, my noble friend Lord Vivian will address operational questions with his usual skill, particularly the question of air cover, to which the noble Baroness referred, and to what extent relying on American air cover—which I totally accept is complete—is an entirely satisfactory pattern. We hope that it is—we are grateful for the reassurances that it is—but the matter needs probing. These issues will inevitably cause problems in the very difficult terrain in which the troops will be operating.
However, leaving that aside, the plain fact is that by April of this year the United Kingdom will have more troops on the ground in Afghanistan than the United States. We are left with an uneasy feeling that Operation Anaconda and Operation Veritas could become a war without a clear end; without a moment when it can be declared, "It is all right. We can stop now and bring the boys home". We have that worry and we seek reassurance on that aspect of our operations in Afghanistan.
Let me turn now to the International Security Assistance Force, on which the noble Baroness has given the House some useful information. The question that hangs in the air there too is: when will our obligations end? It was supposed to be the end of April. Last week, Ministers in another place were telling us that Turkey was just about to come to the point of agreement on taking over ISAF. I have listened in vain and scanned the newspapers since then, but I have not seen any sign of an agreement. I have seen a sign of the proposed bill, a matter rightly raised by my noble friend Lord King. Apparently 300 million US dollars is required from somewhere—possibly from the pockets of British and American taxpayers—for Turkey to consider this matter.
But, even if that has been discussed, the general point of principle that command of ISAF will be taken over by Turkey at the end of April has not been established. Indeed, it is now being conceded by Ministers that ISAF will remain under British command for a number of further months. Until when we do not know.
This is against a background with two worrying aspects. First, it is possible—again we would welcome reassurance that it is unlikely—that ISAF armed forces could be confused with operational forces by an enemy that may not have clear information and by terrorists, and thus become a soft target. That is one danger. The second danger we can see developing all the time. The internal situation in Afghanistan is not yet completely stable; the warlords are at each other; and the country is divided by languages and by divisions which have been there for decades, if not centuries.
There is also the question of how the king fits into this story. It may be that he will get back in time—his return has been delayed—and the Loya Jirgah will go
ahead as planned. I hope it will. But what role have we taken in encouraging the king to play this obviously vital part? My impression is that United Kingdom officialdom has somewhat ignored the king and not given him the primacy and importance which, despite his great age, he clearly has in these matters. We should like to know more about that.As I mentioned earlier, another point has arisen over the past few days; that is, how did we get to where we are and how were the decisions made? To an outsider—and, of course, on this side of the House we are outside the inner processes of decision making—it looks as though the decision to deploy came in a back-to-front way. First, there was the week-end authorisation following an extremely urgent request from the Americans; then there was the action and the Statement; and then, in the middle of last week, there was the parliamentary debate which was secured after pressure from my honourable friends and colleagues in another place. It was not offered by the Government. It must be noted—I think this was a major mistake—that the Prime Minister was not able to attend that debate on the biggest deployment of troops since the Gulf War. One should think of the effect that it will have on their families. It is quite wrong that the Prime Minister was away attending to other matters. I gather it was to discuss foxhunting.
Of course the executive has the authority to act. In opposition, one always likes to put on a little pressure of the kind that Parliament must decide before the Government act, but I concede that real life is not like that. The executive has the authority to authorise deployments, but we must at least be assured—Parliament does not govern but it monitors those who do govern—that these decisions are taken by our system of collective Cabinet government by which all Ministers are bound. Can the Minister reassure the House that, although apparently there was not time for broader debate and discussion in Parliament before the decision was made, the Cabinet was formally and properly consulted over the weekend and that Secretaries of State were assembled and consulted in the proper constitutional way?
In my experience at the time of the Falklands expedition, that is what happened. Every Cabinet Minister round the table was asked for their opinion on whether the expeditionary force to the Falklands should proceed. Of course, there was also an inner Cabinet, but that is what happened. Did that also happen in this case? Or did the Prime Minister consult the full Cabinet on this significant and important deployment? We should like a reassurance that the proper procedures were observed.
I raise these matters because, in a way, they have implications for the next phase in the campaign against global terrorism and how decisions on that will be taken. We know that Al'Qaeda is a world-wide operation, and that it probably has access to chemical and biological weapons. Although we are not sure of the full picture, we know that these may have been supplied by the one man who used them in 1988; namely, Saddam Hussein. People are now asking: if
the next phase of the campaign is to be against Iraq, what is the proof of his involvement in terrorist activity?We must all ask, as I suspect the noble Baroness and other Ministers are asking: how much proof do people want? I believe that it is agreed between all parties that a dossier of information, like the previous dossier on Al'Qaeda and Afghanistan, would be extremely valuable. But some people are going further and saying that we must have a justification in the form of some action. I hope that that is not the view of Church leaders and others, but it seems to be implying that, until something terrible happens—another "9/11"—we cannot have any justification for mobilising attempts to get rid of Saddam Hussein. That would be a very wrong way of thinking. It would be the height of folly. Every expression of that kind increases the danger for all of us and increases the confidence of the monster in Baghdad.
We need also to establish what was briefly discussed at Question Time today; namely, whether additional UN cover is needed for any actions against Iraq. The UN Charter says that self-defence is allowed against armed attack. The trouble is that, in an age of terrorism and the assault on the World Trade Centre, that kind of language does not fit the need.
There is a long and arduous set of operations ahead. The Ministry of Defence has rightly put out a document, the "new chapter", warning us that a new sequence, a new approach against terrorism, will be needed: prevent, deter, coerce, disrupt, destroy. On this side of the House, we do not ask for operational details, but we do need to be reassured that realism prevails. We need the Government to spell out, frankly and candidly—possibly more candidly than they have hitherto—the nature of the enormous dangers ahead and the sacrifices that everyone will have to make to face up to them.
7.52 p.m.
Baroness Williams of Crosby: My Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for staying behind to open the debate, for which we are all extremely grateful. I wish her not only a safe journey but a successful outcome to the policy discussions when she gets there. I only hope that she will find a few minutes to plunge into the "wine dark sea" and enjoy it before she has to return to yet another set of debates in this House.
Perhaps I may add to the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford. It is clear that the nature of the request from the United States for a particular group of British soldiers is itself an astonishing tribute to their international reputation—one which I believe they will carry on their banners, as they rightly should, as they enter an extraordinarily difficult phase of what has been an extraordinarily difficult war.
Perhaps I may say in passing that I wish that the Government had managed at least privately to consult Opposition leaders in the two Houses before the deployment of troops was announced. I understood from American reports that the Pentagon seems to
have known about the possibility of the deployment a couple of days before it was announced in Parliament. Had such discussions taken place, we might have warned against the exuberance of No. 10 in suggesting that there was an advanced biological weapons laboratory in a cave in Afghanistan—a statement which has now had to be broadly taken back in the light of the American dismissal of that particular report.I am in complete agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, on one question. I completely exonerate, as he did, our own Minister—whose sensitivity and knowledge would prevent her from falling into such a trap. However, there have been a number of reports in the newspapers, both in this country and in the United States, to suggest that something close to complete victory was very near in Afghanistan. I have always felt that to be a dangerous approach to take on any issue of terrorism.
It is not merely that there are disturbing signs of the ability of the Al'Qaeda network, and even of some Taliban fighters, to regroup and reassert themselves in many remote parts, particularly of eastern Afghanistan. It is also becoming clear that in the troubled eastern provinces—the Pashtun provinces—of Afghanistan, they have the same advantage as obtained for a long time in relation to the IRA; namely, the ability to disappear into a neighbouring country, which officially, and indeed formally, was deeply opposed to terrorism—that is undoubtedly the case with the Government of Pakistan, as it always was with the Government of the Republic of Ireland—but where there was a certain public response, at least in some periods of the war against terrorism, which made it easy for terrorists simply to disappear into the background of that neighbouring country.
If we are honest, we have to remark on the troubling fact that, in the Pashtun provinces, many of whose tribes cross a border which is not very well protected, there is a real problem in regard to the ability of terrorist groups to disappear, then to reappear, to regroup, and then to cross back into the country. We should be less than honest if we did not recognise that as a complicating factor in the attempt to stamp out terrorism in Afghanistan.
It is clear, as the Minister has said on more than one occasion, that this is likely to be a long, hard war, even in Afghanistan itself. It is certainly not yet over. It is certainly likely to demand a commitment and perseverance which we cannot possibly try to dismiss. It is wiser for all of those engaged in the battle against terrorism to recognise that this is a profound and long battle, and one in which attacking the roots as well as the symptoms is of first importance.
That leads me to say a word or two about the roots. On these Benches, we perceive the work of ISAF, the security force in Afghanistan, to be inescapably bound up with the military response. The one without the other could lead to our winning the war and losing the peace. It is that danger which profoundly troubles many of us.
ISAF is still, as far as one can tell, on a pretty uncertain base. The Minister said nothing to suggest that that statement is false. The mandate under which ISAF serves lasts until June. It has already been indicated that Mr Brahimi, on behalf of the United Nations, will seek an extension of the mandate. I was glad that the Minister did not in any way doubt that there would be a probable attempt to extend the mandate, or that in effect it would be unlikely that the British leadership position could be passed over as soon as next month.
There have been many questions about the Turks, who have expressed their willingness in certain circumstances and under certain conditions to take over the leadership. But as the noble Lord, Lord King, has indicated, it is clear that the Turks have not yet completed—this has now gone on for several days—their own negotiation as to the conditions on which they would be willing to take over.
The latest report suggests that the United States would be willing to put up as much as £180 million; but of that sum, £160 million would be listed under the heading of financial and economic help to Turkey, and only £20 million as a contribution towards the 300 million dollars caught up in the maintenance of ISAF over the necessary period. To say the least, that is somewhat unsatisfactory. ISAF is as important as the military deployment; it is at least of equal importance. Therefore, it is essential for the United States, the United Kingdom and other members of the coalition to perceive the way to maintain that force; and—dare I say it?—we all know that the extent of the force is wholly inadequate. It extends only to Kabul. It is clear that in other parts of the country the warlords are already beginning to reassert themselves.
The most frightening outcome of a war in which thousands of men and women have lost their lives in trying to defeat terrorism would be a situation in which Afghanistan returned to forms of civil war, which we know well breed terrorism. The Taliban came in on the back of the last civil war in Afghanistan and could easily come in on the back of the next.
I have one or two questions about ISAF. First, how far is it serving alongside some elements of the Northern Alliance? I told the Minister earlier that I would raise the question of General Fahim's activities in Kabul. He is continuing to patrol—and, indeed, to control—areas of the capital. Outside the capital the situation is even more troubling, as warlords begin to reassert their control over what had been their traditional tribal areas, as happened recently in Khost. It is disturbing, but not surprising, that Klaus Peter Klaiber, the European Union envoy to Afghanistan, said only recently that the rebuilding aid that was intended to be financed by the European Union will, in large part, not be made available until some form of stability and peace obtains in Afghanistan far outside the capital. It is still difficult to see how that situation will be reached.
I have one other comment about ISAF. I am troubled by the American attitude, which appears to be increasingly that the United States does the
fighting—for which it is unquestionably extremely well equipped—with a few exceptions, such as the request for 45 Commando, and the rest of the coalition does the clearing up. That is not a happy or attractive division of responsibility. It is very important that the United States remains committed to ISAF and that it is seen to be so and says that it is so, even though its secondment of troops to ISAF is more limited than that of the United Kingdom or some of the other countries within the structure. In that context, I should like ISAF to be within the broad envelope of NATO, because that would give it credibility that it may not always have.My noble friend Lord Roper will address some of the issues of overstretch, which have to be very much on our minds because of the heavy demands already being made on British forces. At a time when the United States defence budget equals the budget of the next 15 largest countries in the world—I shall repeat that because it is so amazing; it equals the budget of the next 15 largest countries in the world—the United States is in a position to call the quits, if you like, in a way that nobody else is.
That brings me to my final point. The noble Lord, Lord Howell, mentioned the possibility of the widening of the war. That is a point at which he and I part company to a considerable extent. The Liberal Democrats believe that any issue of widening the war must be subject to discussion and broad agreement within the coalition. In that context, we cannot avoid mentioning the response that Vice-President Cheney received on his visit around the Middle East, which began with him making clear that he believed that Iraq was the single greatest threat that should concern the coalition and ended with his recognition that the Middle East was far more central to the concerns of many members of the coalition than was Iraq.
It is undoubtedly true that so great is the power of the United States, particularly its military power, that it might be able to put huge pressure on those governments to declare themselves in favour of an extension of the war. However, what frightens me—and I think that this frightens many of us—is that eventually persuading, pressurising or otherwise pushing the governments of the Arab states into saying that they would be willing to go along with an extension of the war is not synonymous with carrying the streets and souks of the Arab people, where it is troubling to see the steady rise in support for opposition to the United States and her activities and the rising level of support for the Palestinian intifada.
In conclusion, the Liberal Democrats believe that it would be politically wise to seek a United Nations resolution before any widening of the war might take place. We believe that the first priority must go to completing the war in Afghanistan before any extension is seriously considered. Finally, we believe strongly that it is of crucial importance to maintain the coalition, not least because the war against terrorism may go on for many years to come. The coalition can be maintained only by listening to it, taking note of what it has to say and shaping policies along lines that
will attract a consensus among countries that concern themselves with opposition to terrorism and care about the principle of a free and democratic society.8.6 p.m.
Lord Craig of Radley: My Lords, I too welcome this opportunity to take stock of the situation in Afghanistan. As 45 Commando, Royal Marines, prepare to go into the mountains there, I join in wishing them well. Their experience of training in difficult terrain will stand them in good stead, although even they will find the high altitudes a tough and breath-taking experience.
I expect that the task they face is clearer to them than it is to those of us who rely on the media and the briefings and public comments by government Ministers and spokesmen. The Government's original immediate objectives, broadly stated by the Foreign Secretary soon after the attacks in the United States, were to bring Osama bin Laden and other Al'Qaeda leaders to justice, to prevent Al'Qaeda posing a continuing terrorist threat and to persuade and, if necessary, force the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to help to achieve those objectives.
The Taliban as a government are no more, but from what has been said about the role of 45 Commando, it appears that the opposition in the Shah-i-Kot mountains consists of remnants of Taliban and Al'Qaeda. They are,
- "a series of small pockets of resistance".—[Official Report, Commons, 20/3/02; col. 341.],
As always in conflict, we must look ahead to the next stages. It is not yet clear what is to happen next in Afghanistan. The matrix of mountain caverns and remote areas along the 900-mile border with Pakistan will not be easy to police and guard. More likely it will be impossible. If the opposition decides to melt away over the borders, are we going to be allowed in principle to go after them? It is unrealistic to expect that all opposition will be killed or captured. We should do well to remember that the operations that we are now engaging in are not the classic confrontation of standing forces and nation states. We are facing more of an insurgency-type threat—one that will not rely on fixed bases, will choose its own targets, will be absolutely ruthless, will take no prisoners except perhaps as hostages and will not stand to fight it out against a superior force. The battles in the Afghan mountains are being fought by tribesmen who know their ground well and who are natural fighters, as our troops more than a century ago and more recently the Soviets learnt to their cost.
All our experience of insurgency-type activity teaches us that until there is a successful and accurate flow of intelligence, the terrorists will have the upper hand more often than not. We have learned, too, even in territory that is familiar to us—such as in Northern Ireland or previously in Borneo or Malaya—that it takes a long time to develop the flow of good intelligence and reliably to assess the raw information which may be collected. How much more difficult it will be to get that right in Afghanistan, where for the past 30 years one form of instability has been heaped upon another and our knowledge of the terrain and the reliability of the various factions is not that well developed.
I noted that Mr Hoon has repeated that the commitment of 45 Commando and the supporting units was taken,
- "following a formal request from the United States".—[Official Report, Commons, 20/03/02; col. 344.]
Experience with political gestures is that they have a relatively short shelf life. Before long, if there is still conflict, further gestures are called for. I hope and believe that the Government will have taken that on board. There seems to be every likelihood that, as the Chief of the Defence Staff said, we are in for the long haul. The Minister has reminded us of that fact again today. So we must expect a series of further calls to participate in the on-going operations. That brings me to the other point that I should like to make.
The United States Government, once they had determined to take the fight to the terrorists, and recognising that that would be a long and demanding task, were quick to announce that they would be massively increasing their defence and related budgets. It really served to underline their commitment. I do not have any feel for what additional expenditures the United States has already made, but even if it is still only small, the message that came across was loud and clear.
I contrast that with the posture of Her Majesty's Government. We have had many fine expressions of resolve and determination from Secretaries of State and from the Prime Minister himself, and I believe that they are totally sincere and committed to playing as decisive a part as possible in this long-running campaign. But when we look to the substance of what has been happening in recent weeks in the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence, a rather bleaker picture unfolds. I shall list but a few of the real cuts, not enhancements, in our front-line posture.
One such cut is the disbandment of 5 Tornado Air Defence Squadron. The decision to withdraw the Sea Harrier FA2s from service by 2006 and changes to the planned Joint Force Harriers will lead to both the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force losing one squadron. The fleet's air defence capability will be much reduced. The loss of half a dozen warships in the Falklands conflict, when air defences were overstretched, was a bitter lesson which seems to have been forgotten. Indeed, there must be some doubt as to whether the Fleet Air Arm will be able to sustain itself until the new carriers are available for it. The Hercules Reserve Squadron, No 57, which until now has been the operational conversion unit in peacetime, is also to disappear. Moreover, we have read a variety of articles about the lack of funds to support troop training in Canada and to keep HMS "Fearless" going. I could go on.
In peacetime one expects budgets to be tight and economies sought to contain expenditure. Indeed, throughout all my time in the Cold War, when we strove to provide a deterrent posture but would never seriously have been able to sustain conventional operations for more than a very few days, the arguments were well understood and accepted. Today, the whole scene has changed. The Strategic Defence Review, even without its new chapter, envisages expeditionary operations. However, as the cuts and other factors I have mentioned indicated, that vision is seriously under-resourced.
We are mounting a whole variety of expeditionary activities. We are occasionally at war. We are fighting and firing off ordnance. We are at risk of considerable operational losses, and we are supporting activity—sometimes at many times the normal peacetime rates for which we have budgeted—in many different parts of the world. Moreover, each and every one of these deployments and commitments has a massively long back-up of personnel and logistics support. Indeed, there can be a tendency to overlook what all this entails. It is not just the cost of the support units which now have to be bolstered by the compulsory call-up of reservists. There is a need for additional spares in the pipeline to ensure that the front line has what it needs when it is needed. We rightly concern ourselves about the lives of the troops and other service men and women who we expect to fight for us. However, we must not put them in the way of danger only for them to find that their ability to fight is curtailed, or worse, because batteries for their radios or fuses for their weapons or whatever are not to hand.
I was horrified to read in the new chapter of the Strategic Defence Review discussion paper that the Government are taking credit for announcing,
- "a significant additional investment of £100 million to meet urgent operational requirements".
The real point is that if we are to commit forces to operations way beyond those that are described as peace keeping or training, in which we could lose considerable amounts of equipment, let alone lives, it is no longer reasonable to think that we can pare everything to the bone but somehow by means of an urgent investment make good what has been lost. The battle will not wait for factories to turn out the new kit. More likely, we shall have to give up what we are trying to do or see casualties mount because our troops are unable to defend themselves properly. It is high time, if the Government wish to be a global player with our Armed Forces, to change the ways in which we used to budget and finance the forces, and to be much more ready to provide the resources needed in all theatres and in the home base from which our forces are committed. Unless we do that and more realistically fund our defence strategy and postures, or cut our commitments, we shall enter into the last-chance saloon and a military disaster may overtake us.
8.18 p.m.
Lord Desai: My Lords, I join other noble Lords in wishing our troops good luck and safe return. I also agree with the noble Lord, Lord Howell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, that it is a tribute to the quality of our fighting forces that they have been invited at very short notice to join operations in the part of Afghanistan where fighting continues.
I have some problems, however, with the way in which people have started to criticise the decision. Although I do not know the constitutional basis of the decision, I see it as a continuation of previous decisions. When we committed ourselves to fighting the war against terrorism, and specifically when we committed ourselves to fighting in Afghanistan, first we sent troops to fight and then we joined the ISAF. Now, we are taking this action. I do not see the stark break that other noble Lords see in this major event, for which we need special conventions.
The noble Lord, Lord Howell, gave the analogy of the Falklands War. I would rather compare this situation to the Gulf War. As the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, reminded the House, the United States has requested additional troops on two or three occasions. Unless my memory fails me, I do not believe that there was a special Cabinet session, or consultation or a debate on that matter.
We must be realistic. The war will go on for a long time and it will not be an easy war to fight—no war is easy. Public opinion, which is not friendly towards what we are doing, has flip-flopped. This war started less than six months ago, and people said, "This will be so difficult; we shall be fighting through the winter; lots of people will die; there will be starvation; and we shall have many losses". That did not happen. One part of the war was fought relatively quickly. As many noble Lords have pointed out, that has not meant that the war is over. The ground war phase is over and it has now moved to a guerrilla phase.
I do not believe the analogy of Vietnam is correct. The crucial difference is that the people of North Vietnam liked their government, and the people of
South Vietnam did not like theirs, therefore the American approach did not have good global support. That is not the case in Afghanistan. We have the support of the Northern Alliance; we have achieved a situation in which a government is in power; the Taliban, as a government, has been destroyed; and, without appearing to be too optimistic, that phase of the war was successfully fought. We are now in another phase of the war and we have to adapt to the conditions.When will the war end? It is difficult to say when a guerrilla war will end. Sometimes guerrilla wars appear to go on forever. I am not an expert on such matters, but the guerrilla warfare fought by Che Guevara in Bolivia was a guerrilla war fought by an outstanding guerrilla warrior. That Bolivian war, which also took place in mountainous conditions, came to an end. It is possible that a time will come when, for two or three months, our troops are not attacked. Then we could pass the baton to the local Afghan troops and retire.
A crucial point in that respect is that we have to secure two kinds of co-operation. First we must be quite sure that the local warlords, however much they fight among themselves, do not use their intelligence to harm our troops, especially those fighting in the mountains. How can we secure their co-operation? Whether or not they agree with Mr Karzai and after all we have done for them, they should be on our side, or at least not fighting against us. Will the warlords help us rather than fight us?
The role of Pakistan is crucial. Pakistan is a haven to which the guerrillas can escape. In Pakistan more people are being recruited by the guerrillas; and Pakistan holds so much intelligence and support that our troops could use to capture those who may be escaping. In all those respects I believe that we should provide Pakistan with an important role and give it support.
There will be deaths. We must be prepared for casualties from such an operation. We should be up front about it and ensure that proper care is taken of the families of soldiers who are to risk life and limb. Also we should not spin that story. We have gone to Afghanistan for a good reason but lives will be lost. Those lives will appear valueless if we do not support the objective for which our troops are fighting.
8.26 p.m.
Lord King of Bridgwater: My Lords, I support the Government in the decision they have taken on the need to continue the campaign against Al'Qaeda and the Taliban. I certainly recognise that this is a campaign in which there may well be casualties, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Desai. No one should under-rate the seriousness of the decision that the Government have taken, for which they seek the support of this House, the other place and the country.
- "If hopes were dupes, fears may be liars".
I was struck by the analogy that the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, drew with Ireland and Northern Ireland. I learned something about Pakistan: that there is a large area that appears to be outside the control of any government. With her well known modesty, she referred to it as a somewhat less well guarded frontier. My understanding is that the control is practically non-existent. Most of the tribes are quite unaware of where the frontier lies. That is a wonderful resource for any terrorist organisation.
It appears to me that it is essential to sustain the present government during this period and military support will be needed for that purpose. In a wider sense, it is vital to sustain the credibility of the action that is being taken by the United States and by the coalition. If it were seen to fail, there would be serious consequences around the world. My noble friend Lord Howell, in an excellent contribution, put the matter extremely well in saying that terrorists win if they do not lose. I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Desai, asked how we will know when we have won. That will be a real challenge.
While I support the Government, I recognise that the situation is not going according to plan. The Government cannot necessarily be criticised for that because we are dealing with extremely difficult issues. The least surprising announcement ever made is that Mr Brahimi has asked for an extension for ISAF. I do not believe that anyone thought that a cut-off point of the end of June had any credibility whatever. I make a small prediction that Mr Brahimi's extension will, in due course, be subject to a further extension as the problems continue. I hope that the Minister can reassure me on that matter. I understand that for very good reasons his colleague, the noble Baroness, Lady Symons, has had to leave, but she presented a cheerful approach to the situation in Afghanistan.
I understand that the situation in Kabul is far from easy at present and is extremely worrying. Clearly if we move to the situation which the noble Lord, Lord Desai, regarded as a logical progression rather than a major move forward, it is contrary to my understanding about military doctrine. One does not muddle up peacekeeping and war fighting. The reality—my noble friend Lord Howell referred to it—is that those to whom we are opposed, those whom we are trying to kill in the mountains by destroying terrorist hideouts, will have friends and allies around the cities. We have heard of terrorist incidents and attempted incidents in those areas. The softest targets will be the same nationalities seen in their peacekeeping role. Steps will have to be taken to ensure greater protection for those involved in the peacekeeping rather than the war fighting role.
Clearly, this is not the Battle of Waterloo in which people form fixed squares and fight to the last man. The classic guerrilla activity is now being adopted, as
would be expected. The challenge in dealing with that is very real. Yet it is vital that an impetus is maintained. If it is thought that the coalition is not working, that is the most vivid recruiting signal to many disaffected people who are very sympathetic to Al'Qaeda and likely to flock to join the banner. I do not know whether the Government have any intelligence—I doubt whether we have—as to how many recruits are coming to join in the activities of Al'Qaeda and the Taliban. We have reports of some. I have no idea how valid the reports are and how great the numbers.In the current situation, my first demand on the Government, the coalition and the United States is that there is need now for a most sustained hearts-and-minds campaign about our objectives internally in Afghanistan and externally around the world, about why we are there, and the actions that we take. Reference has been made to the Gulf War by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley. The challenge is to maintain the respectability of our activities, with the risk of the accident of the ill-guided bomb, of civilian casualties, and of outrages which can be exploited by the opposition and could do enormous damage and gain yet more recruits for Al'Qaeda and the Taliban. That is an essential element in the support for our marine commandos and others involved in the military campaign, both war fighting and peacekeeping.
As part of the hearts-and-minds campaign, there is need for the advertisement of the early and continuing evidence of the merits of peace. That needs to be continually repeated and hammered out. The Minister referred to the village fete, with kite flying, markets, souks and the other signs of life returning to normality. All that is good but it needs propagating and continual advertisement to persuade people that this is the better way. Maximum support for the coalition and for the United Nations approach is important. There have been increasing signs of the United States losing patience with some of its allies and some members of the coalition.
The noble Baroness, Lady Williams, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, referred to the massive scale of the military capability of the United States. I add one statistic. I refer to the total sum of the 15 other countries. I believe that I am right in saying that the increase in the defence budget announced by President Bush as a result of the present situation is larger than the total UK defence budget. I may be corrected, but the figure shows the scale.
On the military challenges, we have moved from phase one—the air campaign with high-level bombing and unmanned vehicles with their amazing technology. In the end there were bound to be troops on the ground. That becomes much more dangerous and more challenging. We know that the Taliban and Al'Qaeda said that they were looking forward to that. If they could survive the onslaught from the sky, they would get people down on what they saw as their level playing field. It is a real challenge. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, referred to high altitude. Some of the territory in which the forces will work may
be almost outside the ceiling of some of the helicopters and other support. I am not sure whether that is true. But Bagram at 7,000 feet forms a kind of low base. If the forces are up in some of the high mountains there is the challenge of acclimatisation. I see that two of my former constituents who are marine commandos in 45 Commando are moving from the shore level of Minehead in Somerset. They will find themselves in the high altitude of Afghanistan. That will surely be a challenge in terms of resources, numbers available and the ability to rotate and replace. There will have to be a significant period of acclimatisation at high altitudes before the troops become available for high mountain activity. That is an extra challenge that they face.I do not know what intelligence we have about whether there are small pockets or many large and well-equipped pockets of forces and the scale of new recruits. In asking our forces to undertake these challenges, it is our duty to provide them with the best possible intelligence. I hope that the Minister will be able to give guidance on these points. Everyone in this House has great pride in our forces. We know that they will not let us down. If they have not been trained at the altitudes they will have to face in Afghanistan, albeit they have mountain training, they will be very challenged. They must not be exploited. I always feel that it is easy for Ministers—I could sometimes be accused—to pray in aid the quality of our forces and their ready availability for any charge that we as Ministers lay upon them. But they are not supermen. They must not be expected to undertake unreasonable and challenging tasks. They must be given every possible support in undertaking this work.
It will not be easy for them. It is an exceptionally difficult deployment. I am not clear whether we shall now work in a coalition with Afghan forces or whether NATO forces will undertake the charges on their own with Afghan forces in some support role. There are obvious benefits if we can work with local Afghan forces. But it is clear that the culture of those Afghan forces is not the same as what one might call the western armies. There has already been reference to the role of the war lords and their sometimes different objectives. That is a particularly challenging problem they have to face.
Military action in Afghanistan may not be the end of the threat of terrorism that the world faces but it is an important first step. Perhaps I may say a word about what the next steps may be. It is clear that what I considered the premature discussion of an involvement with Iraq has faded somewhat into the background as the difficulties that we face in Afghanistan have become more apparent. I am not sure that the Americans at this stage entirely share that view. Some of us had the pleasure of meeting the Vice President, Dick Cheney, on his repeat tour. Noble Lords will recall that before the Gulf War, after the invasion of Kuwait, he made the same tour round the countries of the Gulf. I have no doubt that the welcome he received, although polite and courteous, was not quite as forthcoming as it had been after the invasion of Kuwait 10 or 11 years ago in terms of the readiness of the countries to respond. We therefore
need to ensure that if we are to move on, we move from secure achievement, and we need to be sure that in Afghanistan we have an established government in a secure situation, on which we can then build the continuing fight against terrorism.I welcome today's debate. The Government are entitled to ask for our support. I certainly give mine. I accept, as was said in another place, that in giving our support we take a measure of responsibility for the decisions that the Government have taken. But that means that we are taking the Government's decisions on trust. I believe that in return we are entitled to expect from the Government the fullest possible information on the progress of this campaign, its successes, its setbacks, if any. If we give that support and take that measure of responsibility, we are entitled to feel that we are being properly informed at all times.
8.41 p.m.
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: My Lords, it is surely right that this House should yet again debate developments in Afghanistan and the fight against global terrorism. Indeed, it is probably too long since we last did so. It is too easy to take one's eye off the ball and allow the rush of events, the fads of the media circus, to prescribe the daily agenda, causing one to overlook all the unfinished business both in Afghanistan and in the wider war against terrorism.
Last week's Statement about the decision to send the Royal Marines to Afghanistan was probably a wake-up call, a reminder that the images of a rapid and relatively casualty-free victory were too good to be true. If we allowed Afghanistan to drift away into the margins of our political consciousness, it could well return and bite us again, as it previously did.
However, resisting complacency does not mean for one moment that we should not dwell on some of the things that have gone right: first, a military campaign that led to the speedy overthrow of the Taliban and the destruction of Al'Qaeda's Afghan network of training camps and safe havens, and that at a relatively low cost in lives; secondly, a massive famine averted.
It is now difficult to remember the estimates of mass starvation with which we were bombarded last autumn. Sometimes we were even told that it was all the fault of those taking the action following 11th September. If that action had not been taken, if the Taliban had continued to rule in Afghanistan, many more people would have died of starvation than actually did. Thirdly, the freeing of a whole people from oppression and from discrimination against women which had characterised the role of the Taliban. It is difficult not to feel joy and some pride in the images of children—including, for the first time, girls—returning to schools in Kabul, refurbished with British aid and protected by British peacekeepers. Fourthly, the marshalling of a great coalition—not just a military coalition but a coalition of peacekeepers and aid donors, in which we, our European partners and the UN have played a worthy role under US leadership.
The list of unfinished tasks remains much longer than the list of accomplishments, and the precariousness of what has already been achieved is not in doubt. The threat from the Taliban and from the remnants of Al'Qaeda is clearly real and far more difficult to cope with than when they were holding fixed and easily-identifiable positions. Afghanistan remains dominated by warlords whose past record leaves no room for believing that they will now work together for the common good just because we ask them to do so. The economy hardly exists and will not for several years be able, unassisted, to support the structure of a state. There is no tradition of democracy on which to fall back. If it is to exist at all, it will have to be built from the ground up. The bad habit of Afghanistan's neighbours meddling in its affairs may temporarily have been stilled, but it has certainly not been banished.
Therefore, the task for the United Nations and the coalition is massive. If we do not give the United Nations sustained political support or provide the resources needed to do the job, that task cannot in any way be successfully accomplished.
One of the top priorities must surely be to continue the work of political reconstruction that began with the Bonn Conference and the successful constitution of a provisional government. As the Minister reminded us, Loya Jirgah is only a few months away, and it is crucial that it should lead to a more solidly-based, more representative and more legitimate government. Only if the Afghans themselves take on the task of reconstructing their country will it work. Afghanistan is not a country in which outsiders can for long call the tune without taking risks themselves and without undermining the credibility of those they support. That, surely, is one lesson of history that we should not forget.
So far, the involvement of the Pashtun in the work of government has been less wholehearted and less widespread than is necessary, if lasting stability is to be achieved. Afghanistan cannot be successfully ruled by a non-Pashtun government, nor by one that has only a token Pashtun involvement or lacks the support of the Pashtun tribes. The building up of the Pashtun dimension of the government is a major task for the months ahead.
Another, less immediate but no less pressing, task is to lay the foundations for an end to the meddling of Afghanistan's neighbours in its affairs and, reciprocally, for an end to Afghanistan's meddling in their affairs. Such meddling has been endemic for generations—indeed for centuries—and it has brought nothing but strife, instability and suffering to Afghanistan and its neighbours. What is needed is an international convention with the full mandatory backing of the UN Security Council and its permanent members, which would commit Afghanistan's neighbours to the policy and practice of non-intervention and which would similarly commit Afghanistan, thus recognising the Durand Line as its border with Pakistan and forswearing any reversion to the ill-fated Pashtunistan venture of earlier years.
Would it not make sense for Britain to give a lead in championing such a convention? I should like to hear the Minister's reaction to that suggestion.If one looks more widely at the war on terrorism, it is only honest to admit that some of the sharp focus, the burning sense of urgency and the unity of purpose, which was so evident in the early months after 11th September, have been lost. The first signs of divided counsels have made their appearance. On one side of the Atlantic, rather strident voices are raised, questioning why international co-operation is needed at all, why one should pay attention to the views of others, why anything is needed beyond the strength of America's formidable right arm. In my opinion, those are short-sighted views, which ignore the fact that the war against terrorism is not simply a military operation, in which victory is sure to go to the militarily stronger and better equipped side. It is a war whose civilian dimensions, denying havens to terrorists, denying them access to finance and weapons, pooling police work, intelligence and other matters, require the active and willing co-operation of the widest possible international coalition. That is one view on one side of the Atlantic.
On this side of the Atlantic, partly in response to those same strident voices, doubts have emerged about the next stage of the war against terrorism, about the unilateral trend of US leadership. Yet, if one thinks about it, the challenge that we all faced last December has not gone away; nor has it diminished, except in a very temporary way; nor has it been superseded by some other, greater threat. Now that we know more about the scope of Al'Qaeda's ambitions and its world-wide network and better understand how difficult it is, in an age of globalisation, to counter its activities effectively, we need to be more united and more determined, not less so.
On no issue have divided counsels been more evident than over the handling of Iraq. On none, therefore, is it more necessary to close ranks and to try to find a policy response which maximises the pressure of the international community on a regime with whom no one from one side of the political spectrum to the other, no one from one region of the world to another, has the slightest sympathy.
Saddam Hussein's Iraq has broken a whole range of international obligations in relation to the elimination of its programmes for acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Whether or not he was in some way linked to Al'Qaeda or to the events of last September remains obscure; but it is in any case not the whole story about his involvement with terrorism. What has Saddam Hussein been doing since 1991 to fulfil the obligation under the ceasefire resolution that he should avoid support of any kind for terrorism or terrorist acts? What has he done since last September to implement the provisions of Security Council Resolution 1373 which laid the foundations of the campaign against terrorism?
All those are pressing and legitimate matters which need to be put to the Iraqi regime without more delay, and to which its response will be a determining factor
in future developments. That is why I urge the Government to work with our partners in the Security Council to bring forward a new resolution which would at the same time require Iraq to re- admit UN weapons inspectors and to fulfil their obligations in the war against terrorism. It would also ensure that the sanctions regime was reshaped so as to bear down more effectively on Iraq's weapons programmes and military ambitions and less harshly on its long-suffering people. One would hope that a resolution of that nature could unite the international community, not divide it, as does the present debate about early military action against Iraq.I should like to end a little closer to home. It has been suggested that the Prime Minister and the Government should be spending less time and effort on those overseas challenges; that in some way Britain is overreaching and overestimating its role in world affairs; that we should be giving absolute priority to our many pressing domestic challenges. I do not agree. Much of the comment seems to me shot through with traces of isolationism and little Englandism. It overlooks the fact that if middle-ranking powers such as Britain, which have global interests and global responsibilities, opt out, then we really will be in a uni-polar world with the United States calling all the shots and the gap between them and their principal European allies, both in capability and in policy, steadily widening.
I believe that that would not be in our interest, nor in that of Europe, nor, for that matter, in that of the United States. So I welcome the lead the Government have given in the war against terrorism both in Afghanistan and more widely, and I would encourage them to continue to do so.
8.52 p.m.
Lord Eden of Winton: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, speaks with great authority based on his long experience. I hope that I may be able to pick up on one or two of his points during my remarks.
It is just over six months since the horrendous events of 11th September. I am sure that all noble Lords will recollect the feelings that most people had in the days immediately following that tragic happening. I can remember how fearful we were. Whenever a plane flew overhead people almost instinctively looked up to see what it was. They were anxious about going to the top of tall buildings. There was a general nervousness and unease prevailing throughout, particularly in the City.
All that has gone. We have moved away from those events and even now, perhaps encouraged by the spring sunshine beginning to emerge, people are feeling lighter-hearted and at ease. But they would be wiser to take note of the decisions that have just been taken by the Government committing further troops to Afghanistan, and to ask themselves why this has to be so. As the noble Lord, Lord Desai, said, this is part of a continuing story. What we heard announced in relation to the Commando going to Afghanistan is an instalment. Many further announcements will follow.
However, one thing on which I hope there is unity in this House is that we all owe a great debt of gratitude to the United States of America. It is quite remarkable the way in which the people of America, with their leaders, naturally, responded with such resilience, unity, determination and clarity of purpose. Now that we are focusing on the wider picture of international or global terrorism, it may be more difficult to accept some of the decisions which need to be taken. It was easier to accept a response against Al'Qaeda and the Taliban in one country. But our attention—certainly that of the United States of America—is looking further afield to other countries.
Just across the border from Afghanistan is Pakistan. My noble friend Lord King mentioned the nature of the terrain with which we are all only too familiar. Like others I have been there, and I know how the mountainous region and tribal affinities straddle the frontier. There is no clear dividing line. People move from one side to the other and always have done. Pakistan is now the unwilling host to a large number of former Taliban and Al'Qaeda members.
I ask the Minister—I do not seek an immediate answer—what support we are giving to Pakistan in their effort to control the activities of their own pro-Taliban elements? Many people in Pakistan, not least those who are being "educated" in the madrasahs, are in fact being fed ruthless propaganda in which the United States of America is featured as the enemy and we are classified with them.
Many of those countries—Pakistan is no exception—have a high proportion of young people. Two-and-a-half weeks ago I was lucky enough to be in the Gulf area and I visited Iran. They are a most delightful people; the nicest people one could wish to meet. One point I wish to make is that when we condemn states for their perceived or known activities inimical to our interests, we should recognise that we are attacking the rulers and not the people. The people of Iran are wholly delightful and want only one thing—to live a more open, freer life. They want to enjoy some of the things that we take for granted in the West. Many of those things are denied to them by the oppressive, almost tyrannical regime of the mullahs and ayatollahs.
Iran is not alone in having a government that is intent on supporting terrorist activities. It is an active financier of terrorist groups in Palestine, as is Syria, and from time to time, inadvertently, Saudi Arabia. I know that Saudi Arabia sends considerable funds to Palestine. I hope that it will assist Palestine to try to gain control over the terrorist groups inside Palestine. Iran, Syria and others, pursue a programme of building up substantial capability in missile technology and development. I am referring to Scud-type operations and other weapons of that kind. Much of the technology comes from North Korea, which is a troublesome, rogue state. It is the cause of potential problems in Iran, Syria and, indeed, in Libya, where it supplies the equipment, know-how and technology for the forward development of missile technology. What is the purpose?
These countries were identified by President Bush in his State of the Union Address in January. He has been criticised for some of the words that he used—"the axis of evil", for example. That the rulers of those countries are evil there can be little doubt. They would certainly seem to be evil in intent if they are seeking access to weapons of mass destruction, such as Iraq has undoubtedly been doing.
The mistake was to group those countries together. Each country has its own agenda. They are not like-minded people; they have different objectives. Therefore, they need to be tackled independently and individually. The countries of the Gulf and the Arab countries generally are coming together in a conference in Beirut. It was of great value that Crown Prince Abdullah put forward his proposition on a possible solution to the Arab-Israel dispute. It may not meet all the requirements but it forms a useful basis on which to develop further discussions and negotiations. It is encouraging coming from that source as the country has the influence and the resources to help bring about a settlement—at least to influence its fellow Arab countries.
Another country that needs to be influenced in the same direction is Israel. Its excessive retribution and response policy to suicide bombing is not helping to foster a solution. This has been going on for a long time and has not solved the problem at all. Nor does it solve the problem by continuing to build settlements on Arab-held land. It would be better if those settlements were withdrawn and a more moderate response shown. Israel should remind itself of the second part of the Balfour declaration of 1917 which, while favouring the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, went on to say,
- "it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine".
We are engaged in a long and sustained campaign against global terrorism. In answer to a question earlier today, the noble Baroness, Lady Symons, said that Her Majesty's Government are prioritising measures—whatever that means—to address three types of situation: first, measures to prevent terrorists operating in areas where states lack the resources or skills to confront them; secondly, measures against states that promote and condone terrorism as a tool of foreign policy; and, thirdly, measures against sources of terrorist finance. When he replies, I hope that the Minister can put flesh on those bones and explain what those words mean. How, for example, are we going to act against states which promote and condone terrorism as a tool of foreign policy? That must include Iran, Syria, Libya and Iraq, and probably includes North Korea. What is meant by the Government now
"prioritising measures" to act in that respect? If the noble Lord can help, then we will know the nature of the next stage of the fight against terrorism.I end by supporting very strongly what the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, said earlier on; namely, that here we are committing forces with reduced resources. I would hope that we have a Statement soon indicating that the Government are pledging additional resources to back up our military commitment, both with improved equipment and with improved intelligence.
9.9 p.m.
Lord Mitchell: My Lords, six months ago and in the shadow of 11th September, your Lordships were also discussing events in Afghanistan. Then the mood was very different. The fires in New York and Washington were still blazing. The death toll was uncertain. Stock markets had crashed. The world was in turmoil. There was much talk then that life would never be the same again.
President Bush rose to the occasion and found an eloquence and a sense of purpose that few of us thought he possessed. Our own Prime Minister seized the historic significance of the moment and pledged Britain's total support of the United States. Mr Blair said that we would stand shoulder to shoulder with America; and we have done so.
But there has been a darker side to all of this. First, we saw the famed Islamic street celebrating America's come-uppance. Since then, and to this day, opinion polls in Islamic lands have shown that over 60 per cent of Arabs believe that the atrocities of September 11th were perpetrated not by Al'Qaeda but by the Mossad, the Israeli secret service.
Here in Europe, and often sotto voce, there were those who said that America had it coming. Even in our own midst there was the sickening gloating from some that the "Great Satan" had been brought to its knees. Who can forget our own shame when the US ambassador was reduced to tears on BBC television when the anti-American rent-a-mob set upon him in the immediate aftermath of the September tragedy?
I recall the defeatism that was at large among much of the media and certain politicians, even within your Lordships' House. I remember what they said: that there was no proof; that America is trigger-happy and obsessed by bin Laden; that wars cannot be won in Afghanistan; and, worst of all, that we were bound to lose.
We heard similar arguments before we took action in Kosovo and Bosnia. Yet who can deny that those lands are happier now that Milosevic has gone? We heard the same before the Gulf War, but who can deny that Kuwait is a better country with its independence restored? We heard the same during the 40 years of the Cold War, but who can deny that the former communist states are beginning to enjoy freedom and prosperity? Before my lifetime the world heard the
same in the late 1930s, but who would dare deny that the world became a better place after the defeat of the Third Reich?I simply fail to understand those people who cannot see a tyrant when he stares them in the face. They believe that all one has to do is to be nice to the bin Ladens, the Milosovics, the Saddams, the Stalins or the Hitlers of this world and that sweet reason will prevail. Appeasement is a one-way street.
In the Gulf War we set ourselves one target—to free Kuwait. We should have set another—to get rid of Saddam Hussein. Today we are paying the price. If tomorrow morning on the "Today" programme the announcer were to say, "Reports are coming in that Iraq has successfully tested a nuclear weapon", would your Lordships be "very surprised", "slightly surprised" or "not at all surprised"? Speaking for myself, I should be not at all surprised. I fully expect it.
Then what? We can all be certain that our friend in Baghdad has not expended so much effort to acquire nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction simply for passive defence. If one builds a bicycle, one does not use it to weigh butter.
This is the man who gassed 20,000 of his own people. This is the man who declared war on Iran and Kuwait. This is the man of super gun fame. This is the man who even now pays 10,000 dollars as a special bonus to the families of every successful Palestinian suicide bomber on his or her heinous journey to eternity. This man is pure evil and wishes us more than ill; he wishes us dead. On the basis of his past behaviour and what our intelligence service is probably telling us, we must take pre-emptive action. If we do not, then his scientists will continue to build those weapons, which he will undoubtedly use against us.
There remains one further reason why action against Saddam is to be considered. There is a link between Saddam and bin Laden that many seek to deny. There is little doubt that in April 2001 a meeting took place in Prague between Mohamed Atta, the leading Al'Qaeda hijacker, and Ahmed al-Ani, the Israeli consul in Prague who was Saddam's intelligence case officer there. Atta had flown 7,000 miles from Florida to Prague and back again for a one-day meeting, the third time he had visited Prague that year. Not quite a smoking gun, but evidence enough to suggest more than a casual connection.
Finally, let me turn to the Israeli-Palestinian situation. Noble Lords may know that I am a supporter of Israel but no friend of its present Prime Minister. In my view, he is a man who employs the subtlety of a bulldozer. The tragedy is that Mr Arafat, too, is devoid of any policy that envisages compromise. He is a man whose whole life has been the promotion of terrorism and who even now, in the twilight of his years, refuses to countenance any outcome other than total victory. Two old men, cursed by their personal history, without an initiative between them.
This coming Wednesday is the Jewish festival of Pesach, the Passover. The celebration of the exodus from Egypt of the children of Israel; the 10 plagues; the crossing of the Red Sea; the giving of the Torah by God to the Jewish people and the founding of the biblical state of Israel.
Moses went to Pharaoh and said, "Thus sayeth the Lord, let My people go so that they may worship Me". It was the original cry for freedom of an enslaved people, a cry that has echoed throughout the ages. No Jew should read this story as we do and not draw the parallel with today's Palestinians and their yearning for a state of their own.
On the very same day of Passover, the Arab League will be holding their summit in Beirut. There, the Saudi, Prince Abdullah, is expected to announce a ground-breaking initiative: that all 22 Arab states, acting in concert, will offer Israel total and secure peace as well as full recognition and a normalisation of relations. I say "normalisation" and not just normal relations. In return, Israel will agree to withdraw to the borders that existed on 6th June 1967. This is not a new offer, but coming from the Saudis at this crucial time it is of major significance. The Israelis will be suspicious, the Palestinians will sense a sell-out, but it is the only game in town and it can be made to work.
Every year for 3,000 years the Jews have recited the Passover service around the family table. The final four words of that service are "Next year in Jerusalem". That has always been the dream of the Jewish people. Today, they are in Jerusalem but they have no peace. That is ironic, when the Hebrew for Jerusalem is "Yerushalayim", literally translated as "The City of Peace". After all this suffering perhaps the time has come for Israelis and Palestinians to share that family table and to turn the city of war into the city of peace for ever.
9.17 p.m.
Baroness Park of Monmouth: My Lords, might I say to the noble Lord, Lord Mitchell, that I believe he meant to say that the meeting was with the Iraqi attaché in Prague. He said the Israeli. I believe that the noble Lord would wish to have that corrected in Hansard. I thought I would mention it now.
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