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Lord Mitchell: Thank you very much.
Baroness Park of Monmouth: My Lords, other noble Lords have spoken far better than I could do about the strictly military problems of overstretch; of the long lines of communication, especially in view of the emerging difficulties over access for our troops through Pakistan; of whether the troops will have the right equipment when they need it and whether the sad lesson of the Gulf War veterans has been learnt so that the right preventive health measures are applied this time.
There is also the vital issue of enough money for training now and not in the distant future. I expect, too, that most of us, while accepting that we have a long history of effective and friendly co-operation with
the Americans, are a little uneasy about some issues of command and control, especially in such a high technology-dominated conflict.On overstretch, I wish to ask one question which is relevant to but not about Afghanistan. That is the prospect of rival claims on our limited military power where the immediate political dividend rather than our direct defence interest is in question. We are, I believe, being pressed by our European allies to support their proposal to launch the new rapid reaction force on its first military adventure at the very time when we are rightly committing a significant military force as a firm and effective ally of the United States in Afghanistan and in the fight against terrorism, which is itself a threat to the United Kingdom.
The EU, however, is pushing for a new military force in Macedonia to succeed the NATO presence later this year. Because we are separating two hostile groups, this would be at the higher end of the Petersburg tasks at a time when the force could not possibly be described as ready in terms of capabilities and would require NATO assets. It is reported that NATO is not prepared to provide these, particularly given the continuing problems with both Turkey and Greece.
Whatever the political dividend (and firm support for NATO would also carry that) I hope that we can be assured that, given the glaring capability gap and our other major commitments, Her Majesty's Government will listen to the military argument against British participation should the proposal be pressed further by the European leaders.
I have a different concern: the environment in which our troops will be fighting in Afghanistan and the implications of asymmetric warfare and of what are now called information operations. As several noble Lords have said, our troops will not be fighting a clearly defined enemy, a rival national army. It will not be like the Falklands or the Gulf War. It will be much more like fighting the Communists in Malaysia—a long war of attrition that we won only when General Templer devised a way to protect people in the villages.
The international stability force was specifically asked for and is doing a splendid job, as are the troops undertaking mine clearing at Kabul airport. But Operation Veritas is different. In principle, the Afghans recognise the need for stability and, in principle, their powerful neighbours, Pakistan and Iran, shared the view that, as Mr Brahimi has said:
- "the international community should help the Afghans to find a political solution on their own, because only such a home-grown solution would be credible, legitimate and sustainable".
At the Bonn conference, all the warring parties agreed on an emergency Loya Jirgah by June this year to set up a transitional authority to rule the country until a constitutional Loya Jirgah can meet 18 months after that, at the end of 2003 or even in 2004. Meanwhile, however, the whole structure, so far as it exists at all, is fragile. Pathans, once supporters of the Taliban, and their rivals, the Northern Alliance of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras, all have their local factions, all still armed, and Al'Qaeda sleepers, as well as those who continue to fight, will be among them.
The participants in the Bonn conference, who were not necessarily plenipotentiaries anyway, declared that they were,
- "conscious that some time may be required for the new Afghan security and armed forces to be fully constituted and functioning".
A member of the former Indian civil service who served on the north-west frontier once said of the Afghans that they did not in the least want us to "civilise" them and so do not expect that that rejection of foreigners has changed. As General Sir Mike Jackson once told the Defence Select Committee, speaking of operations in Kosovo:
- "You are actually operating amongst people's perceptions, people's attitudes. That is your operational arena, not a piece of ground with a conventional enemy".
If anyone can do the job, they can, but the stress will be proportionately greater than in a series of short, sharp engagements in battle. Hence it is extremely important that they, their families and the public know, if possible, for how long that commitment is to last, and what is their required target. The timescale set out hopefully in Bonn can mean only that internal war between the factions, especially in the absence of a central government, could continue at least until 2004. That must mean rotation of troops, given the harsh conditions and the demands of asymmetrical guerrilla warfare. It will also demand more, not less, training and plenty of that vital commodity, good intelligence. We may indeed not be able to set a term. We have a moving target, and a most difficult one, but in that case we must sustain the full support that the troops need for as long as it is needed.
The Northern Alliance has its own agenda; so too, no doubt, do the Russians. We and the Americans went there to eliminate Al'Qaeda, or at least to deprive it of its base, and only incidentally to end a harsh regime. As the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, said, like the IRA, which was able to continue its guerrilla war from a friendly base in Ireland, those terrorists can either melt into the villages or withdraw covertly to Pakistan, whether Pakistan likes it or not, over a long frontier to regroup and, as one soldier recently said, simply commute to war. Excellent as human intelligence usually is, the conditions make it difficult to obtain in timely fashion so that the troops may be warned of the incursions.
Our troops will be fighting a new kind of war, which could last for years. It is essential that defence should be given the highest budgetary priority. The troops
must not be fobbed off with inadequate equipment, and they must be properly rotated. One of the prime causes of the failure to retain good soldiers in recent years is the number of unaccompanied tours that most of the forces now serve, during which troops never see their family. Above all, the troops must know that they are at least as important to the country as good railways and good education.High morale is one of the best smart weapons that we can offer our troops; exacting a compulsory annual saving of 3 per cent on an already overstretched and inadequate budget, so that even vital training exercises must be cut, is not. We are at war: someone must tell the Chancellor.
9.26 p.m.
The Earl of Sandwich: My Lords, in the past two decades, Afghanistan has seen human suffering and endurance on a scale that none of us can imagine. Its people, although used to deprivation, have reason to expect the help that has been denied them for so long.
The successful US-led military campaign that drove out the Taliban last year has not brought peace but it has given the country a breathing space. Food security, as has been said, has been greatly improved. Many displaced Afghani families have returned home from Pakistan and Iran, and the aid agencies have been able to resume their development and relief programmes. It is difficult to estimate the number of people who are still in need in the conflict zones. About 700,000 are known to be vulnerable, as they are without shelter or regular access to food and live in areas beyond the reach of the UN agencies.
As my noble friend Lord Hannay of Chiswick said, famine has been averted, but some people in remote mountain villages have had no supplies for months and are still waiting. Poverty, especially the lack of food and drinking water, has continued to cause malnutrition and ill health. There are not enough blankets or clothes for the displaced. The Afghan Government's capacity even to meet the basic needs of children and the elderly is weak or virtually non-existent. That means that the country will need international aid for some time to come.
The ISAF has been an outstanding example of international co-operation. It has brought stability and security to the capital city and the roads outside, although not to other parts of the country. That was pointed out in detail a month ago by members of the Select Committee on International Development in another place. The noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, referred to that.
According to some reports, insecurity outside Kabul is not declining but increasing. There are still restrictions on the travel of agency staff. Although the areas surrounding the major Northern Alliance-controlled towns, such as Mazar-i Sharif and Herat, are relatively safe, travel south of Kandahar and east towards Jalalabad is undertaken only at great risk. As in Bosnia, aid agencies must operate in dangerous conditions. They pass through checkpoints controlled by the different warlords; their vehicles are sometimes
the target of bandit attacks or shootings. One aid worker told me this week that the neutrality that should guarantee the safety of NGOs is almost impossible to achieve. He said that effectively they had to be friends with no one.In those conditions, which are in some respects arguably worse in some areas than under the Taliban, neither the peacekeeping troops nor the coalition forces have played—or perhaps can play—any useful part. The continuing battle with the so-called Al'Qaeda remnants has not brought stability to those areas, rather the contrary. My noble friend Lord Hannay of Chiswick mentioned the frailty of the interim authority. The hostilities between rival Pashtun factions inevitably divide the population and create local suspicion of all outside forces, whether they are aid staff or military.
The introduction of additional troops from the UK will of course be welcome, not only to the US, who requested them, but to all Afghans who wish to see Al'Qaeda routed and the roads made safe. However, these troops are not there to help local people. Instead of air strikes with defined objectives, there will be a long-term anti-terrorist campaign in the mountains, as the noble Lord, Lord Howell, and many others have said—with uncertain results. Such a prolongation of the civil war is therefore unlikely to command support from or contribute to the welfare of the population.
The situation in Kabul is different. ISAF has been very well received by the international community. Some excellent reconstruction work is going on, from police training and the civil service to rehabilitation of roads, buildings and services. The UN agencies, as the noble Baroness described, have made great strides in education and women's participation. Our own DfID has just published figures for mine clearance, showing that over £3 million has gone from us to the United Nations and NGOs like Halo Trust and the Mines Advisory Group in Afghanistan alone.
The public here can hardly appreciate the dangers constantly facing the staff of these organisations, trying to restore something close to normal life. In addition, the de-miners now have to cope with thousands of unexploded bomblets dropped from US aircraft.
In previous campaigns in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor there have been examples of successful involvement of the military in humanitarian work; for example, in the building of emergency shelters for refugees in Macedonia. This might suggest a more active role for peacekeepers in the protection of aid convoys and humanitarian projects in Afghanistan. However, as has been said, there are grave risks in associating aid workers and peacekeeping troops too closely in Afghanistan, especially when those troops are from countries still engaged in armed conflict inside the country.
The NGO Forum in Kabul, which is represented here by the British Agencies Afghanistan Group, issued a statement earlier this month that confusion is being created in the minds of civilians by some armed coalition soldiers who apparently have been taking
part in civil operations but dressing and behaving like the staff of aid agencies. Ministers will be aware that local and international NGOs feel that their independence and impartiality will be seriously compromised unless a clear distinction is made. This is an issue about which the NGOs feel very strongly and any reassurance the Minister can give tonight will be welcome.On the issue of civilian casualties during the war against the Taliban/Al'Qaeda, I have still not received a comprehensive reply from the Government after five months. The noble Lord knows from a conversation we have had that I received two belated Written Answers from the MoD on 12th March which express regret for casualties but still do not acknowledge the reports from reliable sources of the significant numbers of civilian casualties.
For example, a report from UNOCHA, which is the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, on 11th March suggested that the numbers killed after 7th October could have been more than 1,000 and as high as 1,500 people. This is a figure which comes close to one-third of the numbers lost on September 11th. While I make absolutely no direct comparison between these figures, which are unrelated, they do nevertheless suggest that the war has not been as tidy an operation as is generally understood in this country. While damage to infrastructure is to some extent compensated by reconstruction, there is no current US plan to reimburse any of the families who are victims—perhaps the Minister will confirm this—families who have suffered losses, or even to acknowledge that such losses have occurred.
If the anti-terrorism campaign involving our troops in one form or another is to be seen not just as a reaction to the events of September 11th but as part of a long-term programme to benefit the people of Afghanistan, it is essential that we demonstrate the actual benefits on the ground. On the one hand, we must provide the unambiguous security which the civilians need to return to normal life, while on the other hand we must not contribute further to the devastation of war through any violent acts against the population. More than that, we have to show that we are on the side of ordinary people in the campaign against terrorism.
There are many issues that concern Afghanis which go beyond the civil war in Afghanistan itself. For example, the ability of the United States to make any real difference to the Middle East peace process is seriously in question, despite the hopes expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Mitchell, and the noble Lord, Lord Eden, whom I have known for a long time. Our associations with Israel through trade and family ties place us, in Arab eyes, firmly in the US-Israel camp, so that not only in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also throughout the Middle East, in Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia, people are watching to learn our true motivation in prolonging and extending the fight against Al'Qaeda and the Taliban, and perhaps even against Iraq.
I personally welcome the arrival of the first of the 1,700 Marines in Bagram in preparation for the next phase of the campaign, so long as the fears of my noble and gallant friend Lord Craig about expenditure can be allayed. Having years ago driven through Afghanistan and having recently re-read King—of the Khyber Rifles, which I am sure noble Lords will know, I am well aware of the considerable problems of logistics and intelligence soldiers will have to face, even with the most up-to-date equipment. Recent news clips of the US special forces peering anxiously into rock crevices did not give viewers much confidence during Operation Anaconda. The Karzai administration will be relieved that a much more highly experienced force is to strengthen the Americans. It is comforting to learn that they are also to have air support.
However, there is another dimension, as the noble Lord, Lord King, pointed out. We have to remember that the coalition against terrorism must go well beyond the destruction of the remnants of Al'Qaeda into a hearts and minds campaign in Afghanistan and Pakistan. That means clear political and diplomatic objectives to ensure the widest possible coalition, as my noble friend Lord Hannay said so well. We must show the countries attending the Arab summit this week, our friends and allies, that we are not simply picking off terrorists but that we are concerned with sustainable development, justice and human rights in all the countries in which terrorism, for one reason or other, continues to thrive.
9.38 p.m.
Lord Rogan: My Lords, I am conscious of the fact that I am not a military man and, indeed, that I have no military experience. As such I am very aware that there are many noble and gallant Lords who are much better equipped to speak in this debate than I. However, I have decided to speak today for those very reasons. The ongoing shrinkage of our Armed Forces has meant that fewer and fewer people in the United Kingdom have regular and direct contact with the military. It is worrying how civil society is beginning to view our Armed Forces. This evening I hope to be able to raise some of the concerns currently being felt by them.
As I said in your Lordships' House last week, I support the Government's decision to order the additional deployment of troops in Afghanistan. Such decisions are never easy, but in this case I believe that the Government have done the right thing. As I also said last week, I was fortunate enough recently to spend time with 45 Commando, Royal Marines, while they were on exercise in Oman. I was very impressed with what I saw. I have no doubt that they will succeed in any task laid before them.
I have always been of the view that once our troops have been sent into battle it is morally incumbent upon us all to back them. Things are difficult enough for those brave men and women without them being made to feel that their own nation is not behind their actions. However, we can only believe ourselves to be offering
effective support if we also ask probing questions of the Government—questions which, I am sure, will be running through the minds of some of our troops, and their families, as they prepare to make their journey into theatre.One question that has cropped up time and time again in relation to this deployment is: how long will it last? Also, has a coherent exit strategy been formulated? Yesterday, we were treated to a procession of Cabinet Ministers appearing on our television screens to provide their views on these and other matters related to the deployment. Their words did little to reassure me.
Speaking on one such programme, the Foreign Secretary, Mr Straw, said of the deployment that,
- "You cannot say for certain how long it's going to last".
- "for as long as their military leaders judge that they can do an effective job".
Mr Hoon said something else yesterday which troubled me. When asked about the future he said:
- "If it is necessary for us to deploy further forces, if the military advice says that it is something that should happen, then obviously we will do that".
While I have the utmost respect for all those in command of the allied forces in Afghanistan, I am more than a little uncomfortable with the idea of our Government giving another nation a blank cheque to use British forces in any way, and for as long as it wants.
My anxiety increased yesterday when I read a newspaper report that the MoD had warned the Prime Minister to expect 80 casualties as a result of this deployment, including 20 deaths. This information puts the gravity of the situation very sharply into perspective. We have been warned for some time of the likelihood of our forces taking casualties. However, in these days of precision warfare, an understandable level of complacency has crept into too many minds. But casualties are what we must unfortunately prepare for as precision warfare is not what this deployment is all about. It is, in all probability, about hand-to-hand fighting. Such a scenario makes for unfortunate outcomes and, inevitably, casualties. I hope very much that the Government—and, of course, the general public—are ready for this.
Of great relevance to the matter we are debating is the state of our Armed Forces in general, particularly with regard to their overall strength and, of course, their financing. I am sure that I am not alone in being alarmed at some of the information that has leaked out to the media in recent weeks about the shortfalls in our Armed Forces. For example, the Army is supposedly currently estimated to be short of more than 6,000 soldiers. I understand that across all three services the deficit is more than 9,000. These statistics are said to be the result of a lack of suitable recruits and of the difficulty of retaining trained personnel, who opt to leave the services earlier than expected. This trend is deeply worrying.
Of similar concern is the apparent lack of funding being made available by the Treasury to the Ministry of Defence. Reports have estimated the current under-funding of the defence budget to be in the region of some £500 million. It is said that, as a result, the Army is being forced to slice its garrison in Kosovo by some 75 per cent. It is also seeking to withdraw its troops from Bosnia. Furthermore, we have heard reports that the MoD has been forced to borrow hundreds of millions of pounds from next year's budget to stave off more trimming. That is hardly the perfect backdrop against which to send our troops into battle in Afghanistan.
In conclusion, following the events of 11th September, the Government committed the United Kingdom to playing its full part in the so-called war against global terror. I fully support that decision—as did almost all, if not all, of your Lordships. However, while our troops are now being prepared to play an even greater role in that war, the Government continue to seek to find a way to grant an amnesty for terrorists on the run from the security forces in Northern Ireland. What difference is there between these men and the equally evil men associated with Al'Qaeda and the Taliban? I see no difference. I am sure that your Lordships see no difference. I therefore urge the Government to think again on this most serious of matters, lest they wish to risk incurring your Lordships' wrath.
9.48 p.m.
Lord Hardy of Wath: My Lords, at this stage of the debate—and a very interesting one it has been—one is tempted to follow a number of points that have already been raised. I mention in particular the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, to which I listened with great interest. I hope my noble friend will ensure that Her Majesty's Government take note of the suggestions that he made. I was particularly pleased by the reference he made to the need to maintain international interest.
That reminded me of an interview during my trip with the Foreign Secretary to Namibia in the late 1970s. A journalist asked: "Do you think you are wasting your time here?". I said, "No". I was then asked: "Where would you be if you were not here?". I said, "Probably, since it is a Saturday morning, doing my surgery". The next question was: "Do you think your constituents like you being here instead of at the
surgery?". I said, "I should hope so. My constituency contains a very important part of the British engineering steel industry. To make steel, we need to add tungsten, vanadium, molybdenum, manganese, and a whole variety of metals because we are a trading nation".There is another reason why we should be interested. I read in the press yesterday that the United Kingdom received more telephone calls from Mr bin Laden than anyone else. That is not surprising, given the international nature of British life and business. But if we are to be a prosperous state, we have to be internationally minded—and, if we are, we have to accept that the terrorism experience of 11th September and before then requires the United Kingdom and any other right-thinking state to be fully involved in the effort to counter it; indeed, to make sure that no state is prepared to host it ever again. Some of us have expressed regret over a long time about the capacity of some of our partner states to maintain adequate defence capacity. I hope that they are learning that lesson more clearly today.
Terrorism is a symptom as well as a condition that we find unacceptable. The symptom is serious and has to be rooted out. Any young Muslim who requires motivation about injustice in the world can easily have his attention turned to Israel. I am not anti-Semitic. I recognise that the Israeli state must exist and that it should have adequate international guarantees. However, I find it difficult when land for peace is spurned and when the conditions cause young Palestinian extremists to act in stupid, violent and horrifying ways, commanding a stupid, horrifying response from Mr Sharon. For America and Sharon then to demand that Arafat should control the young Palestinians is asking far too much. I hope that sooner or later the Americans—who perhaps have now begun to regret the support that they gave to terrorism across the Irish Sea—will realise that they have to take a more mature and vigorous approach to resolving the Palestinian-Israeli problem, because if they do not do so, it merely provides fertile sustenance to the cause of terror and more symptoms will raise their heads.
However, our debate is about Afghanistan. I am sure that the quality of our troops to be engaged in the mountains of Afghanistan will be very high. The contribution of the paratroops and other units involved in peacekeeping and society engendering activities in Afghanistan to date has been most commendable. However, they cannot be there for ever. They will have to be replaced. I am sure that the Turkish army, which is a formidable organisation, will provide adequate leadership when it replaces our own. However, we have to try to ensure that the quality of forces that go from other countries is adequate. It has not always been so in former Yugoslavia.
Our troops are of high quality. While I am delighted that there is cross-party and across the board support and high regard for our military forces serving in Afghanistan, I detected the odd note of criticism of the Government's provision and record. I have been interested in defence for a long time. I recall the Falklands War. I was among the Members of
Parliament who expressed opposition to the removal of HMS "Endurance", which sent a clear signal to Mr Galtieri. If he had been sensible enough to wait for a few weeks until a few more Royal Navy ships had been decommissioned or sold off, the adventure to the Falklands would have been greatly in peril.I also recall the Gulf War. I attended a gathering addressed by the American general who commanded the coalition forces in the Gulf. He told us that the one essential contribution that he needed from the United Kingdom was the Tornado bomber, using the JP23 airfield denial weapon. That was regarded as essential, because Iraq had 600-odd combat aircraft. If they had been flown with resolution at the beginning of the Gulf War, a great deal of damage could have been done.
However, the Ministry of Defence then realised that the Tornados had been designed for Germany and not for the Gulf and could not fly without the addition of a capacitator. I have no idea what a capacitator is. I understand that the Ministry of Defence was advised that there would probably be a 15-week delay in delivery and a cost of £15,000 per capacitator. At that time, the Government were eager to privatise. They did not seem keen on the argument that the services should be intelligent customers.
I went to RAF Sealand and met a man called Wilkinson and his five friends. They gave up their free time that weekend and made the capacitators for £108 each. The Tornados were able to fly to the Gulf, and the Iraqi air force got the message and flew off to Iraq.
The government of 1991 may have been sailing closer to the wind than the current Government. When the Government took office, we had to survive several years of attack and derision because of the policy that led to SDR. That policy has been extremely successful, and one hopes that the new chapter also will be relevant and successful. We have heard about inadequacies, but, in 1997, the Government inherited not only a rifle that everyone said was unsatisfactory, but the Bowman military communications system, which would have been a tragedy if it were not a farce. Since 1997, we have seen the Eurofighter going ahead and the lease of the C-17—which is a most impressive aircraft. The noble Baroness, Lady Strange, was with us the other day when we visited that cavernous form of transport. Furthermore, the Tornado, the Jaguar and the Harrier have all been upgraded, and a commitment has been made to JSF. There are new weapons for the air force and new ships for the navy.
There is a military recruitment problem, but it has arisen when unemployment levels are low and recruitment is much more difficult. Indeed, employment levels are higher now than they were when there was a similar problem 15, 10 and even five years ago. The problems in infantry recruitment have to be dealt with. We must also ensure that there are enough pilots. However, it is rather a disgrace that some of those proclaiming themselves to be British and running aeroplanes which sometimes have the flag of our nation on them spend their time poaching pilots because they have not taken the trouble to invest in training themselves. The same goes for those who seek
to poach professionals in, for example, the Royal Corps of Signals. It might be crude to say so, but I do not think that anyone who poaches like that should ever be on the Honours List or given tickets for the garden party. I think that a little social disapproval should be used to encourage them to mend their ways, rather than for people to heap odium upon the heads of the Government.There are problems. As noble Lords have said, our troops will be fighting at 20,000 feet. I hope that they will have a very considerable period to ensure that they are acclimatised. I was glad to have the assurance that there will be proper communications and that our troops will work very closely with the Americans. That is not only good but essential. We do not want any more friendly fire casualties. A few weeks ago, I saw the "Panorama" programme about the Parachute Regiment's conditions in Kabul. They were far from being rich in creature comforts. If those conditions continue, perhaps we should spend a little more to improve conditions for the marines when they come back for a break from their mountain fighting.
I am not criticising the meals that they are receiving. The other day, with one or two other noble Lords, I had a field-meal cooked by Gurkhas which was absolutely delicious. Many hotels and restaurants in London would charge a great deal for that type of food and people would be daft enough to pay it. It was a very enjoyable meal. I hope that the marines and the paras and those who will replace them have at least the variety that was enjoyed by the chief of staff when he called there and a mobile kitchen was flown in. I am not sure that the chief of staff himself requested that; I met him and hold him in high regard. However, we have to ensure that the troops are properly prepared and conditioned, and that their conditions on breaks from fighting are reassuring and provide them with the comforts they need.
We are entitled to go, and I think that we are morally obliged to go. It would be foolish for people to argue that a time limit should be imposed. However, they may do so because, as noble Lords may recall, time limits were demanded and imposed on last year's Macedonian venture. People said that it was ridiculous to send our troops to Macedonia, but they went. They are very good people. We were told, although it was derided, that they would do the job in 30 or 31 days and it was done in 30 or 31 days. A civil war, which was a real risk, was prevented at the cost of one life, a former constituent of mine. One life was a difficult price to pay to ensure that peace was given a chance.
Some lives may be lost in Afghanistan, but one hopes not. If lives are lost, Afghanistan may be given a chance. At the same time we have to ensure that there is an understanding that the Afghan problem is part of an international one and that an international effort is required.
10 p.m.
Lord Marlesford: My Lords, I suspect we all agree that the United States holds the key to what happens in the coming months and years. As the noble Baroness,
Lady Williams of Crosby, pointed out, the United States has virtually a world monopoly on military power. Of itself, that is not enough. The war against terrorism is not like other wars. Yes, it has a military dimension, but that dimension is merely a part of the struggle. It is important that we should understand, as far as possible, how the Americans are thinking.Since 9/11, I have had three opportunities to visit the United States. In October I went to New York and Minneapolis; in January I went to San Francisco; and in February I went to southern California. I admit that primarily the people to whom I spoke were from the financial world, which is a limited section of the American community, although an articulate and well-informed one.
My first conclusion was that for all its hideous scale, 9/11 was far more traumatic for the United States than terrorism has become for Europe. In a sense, we have almost become desensitised to it. Terrorism to us is like being mugged or burgled. It has been taking place for 30 years or so. To the Americans it was like the members of their families being individually raped. Yet in Europe terrorism continues, which illustrates how difficult it is to solve the problem once and for all. How many would have believed that the Red Brigade, of which we have heard little for some while—perhaps since it reached its peak in 1978 when they killed the Italian Prime Minister, Moro—would re-emerge, as it did only last week, when it killed an unfortunate professor.
The Americans are totally united and determined to fight terrorism without concession. There is also a new readiness in the United States to accept casualties, whereas previously that was not the case. I heard from a number of people that they are convinced that they will be subjected to another major attack this year, probably a biological attack. I heard a great deal about the means of making such an attack: by smallpox, which is described as the Lion King of infectious diseases; by anthrax, a tablespoonful of which, properly distributed, will kill tens of millions of people; by botulism; and by other products.
The tragic irony is that we all thought that smallpox had been eliminated in 1976. It now turns out that in the dying days of the Soviet Union the smallpox virus was being produced by the tens of metric tonnes—probably unknown to the Gorbachev government. There is some evidence that the first information they received about what was happening was from western intelligence sources. In a terrifying way, it was a state within a state.
To emphasise how seriously the Americans take that threat, I can tell those noble Lords who do not know already—I did not know until recently—that the United States Government have ordered 280 million doses of anti-smallpox vaccine to be delivered by the middle of next year; and they hope that it will arrive in time.
A second point which disturbed me deeply was their complete determination to take out Saddam Hussein by any means. I would have no problem with taking him out. It is not a moral problem for me. But how to
do that? As we read widely in the press, they are seriously planning a full frontal attack probably involving at least 200,000 troops. That is not "do-able". In that form, it would be deeply counter-productive. At the same time, I found it depressing that they did not appear to be willing to drain the reservoirs of hatred from which terrorism has emerged. The most obvious of those reservoirs is the Israeli-Palestinian area. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Mitchell, and others that a dramatic and radical solution is needed; that Israel must withdraw to its 1967 frontiers. But as part of that equation, there must be a complete international guarantee of the state of Israel and the state of the new Palestine about which the American Administration is beginning to talk. Equally, I have heard Americans saying that to use their undoubted power to impose a solution on Israel would be a betrayal of Israel. That is a frightening and chilling thought.Perhaps I may speak about Afghanistan. I was proud but not surprised that our military help has been requested to form the tip of the spear to fight the remaining elements of the terrorist organisations in Afghanistan. But I want to focus on the cost of those military operations and how they should be funded. Perhaps I may remind noble Lords that the total cost of the Gulf War was something like £2.5 billion. Of that, some £2 billion was collected from the states which benefited from our action. We are not fighting in Afghanistan for our own advantage. It is no part of some imperial legacy, heritage or memory. We are part of a coalition. I was deeply concerned and disturbed to hear the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, describe some of the down-sizing and reduction of capability which at this moment is taking place among our military forces. Fortunately, those matters have a long lead time and plans can be put on hold, which may become necessary. However, we need to take a new approach to the funding of these kinds of operations and at least emphasise that they are not national but international operations being carried out by the world in order to retain civilisation.
The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, was absolutely right when he said that we should focus particularly on the United Nations as the authority that probably has more support and credibility than any other single organisation in the world. Article 51 of the UN, which is quoted endlessly, provides that nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations. We should make the fullest use of the legitimacy given by resolutions of the Security Council. As I have emphasised many times previously, one of the great assets of this country is that it is one of the five veto members of the Security Council. Let us hope that that will continue indefinitely.
Let us remember that there are many examples of the importance of having a reserve capability in order to undertake warfare. An obvious example from my childhood days, which as children we all read about, is Montgomery at Alamein. The new theatre operations
were hugely successful, largely because he insisted that first there should be the fullest back-up necessary to sustain the operations.I hope that the Minister will be able to reassure us about the sustainability of what we are being asked and have agreed to do in Afghanistan and perhaps will also tell us a little about how and by whom it is to be paid for.
10.12 p.m.
Baroness Strange: My Lords, I apologise for speaking in the gap. Having been unable to attend the briefing of my noble friend the Minister last week, I had decided not to speak. However, in church yesterday, Palm Sunday, we prayed for 45 Commando, whose headquarters is at Arbroath and of whose mess my husband is an honorary member. I therefore felt that I had to voice a word of support and encouragement. Unfortunately, my plane from Dundee this morning was 20 minutes late and, alas, the speakers' list had already closed. That is why I now speak briefly and with many apologies.
At present, as far as I know, some of 45 Commando are stuck on HMS "Ocean", the helicopter carrier with six 105 millimetre guns, off the coast of Pakistan. There could be difficulties in landing such a force in Pakistan. However, one Tristar of logistics flew into Kabul yesterday. Only a fortnight ago some members of the defence study group talked to the pilots and engineers of 219 Squadron, who run the Tristars from Brize Norton. It therefore felt somewhat personal.
What worries me is the open-ended nature of the commitment. My noble friend the Minister mentioned a period of three months. Yesterday the right honourable Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, said "not very long", and comparisons have been made between Sierra Leone and Vietnam. But how long is "not very long" or a piece of string? The right honourable Geoff Hoon, the Secretary of State for Defence, is less optimistic. There has been talk of Al'Qaeda and the Taliban regrouping and a pitched battle. There has been talk of possible casualties. Of course, any military commitment is dangerous; so is crossing the road between buses; so even is walking down the pavement at speed—I came a cropper last week.
Here I have to declare an interest. As president of the War Widows Association of Great Britain, I love all my ladies. But I do not want there to be any more. On the front page of one of the papers this morning was a beautiful picture of a golden dog with a pink nose sitting among daffodils. It reminded me strongly of a picture we had of an old basset hound of ours called Comfort. I gave it to Mother McKee, a nun who taught my daughter, because she said it reminded her of Our Lady's dog. I asked, "Did Our Lady have a dog?" She replied, "Probably not, but if she had it would have been like Comfort".
The dog today is a dog of war called Tiger, and he has been brought safely home from an old wine factory in Kabul. Our thoughts and prayers are with our forces in Afghanistan and I am hoping that soon—and by "soon" I mean a very short piece of string indeed—they too will be coming home.
10.16 p.m.
Lord Roper: My Lords, this has been a valuable debate, even if it is ending at a later hour than some of us, and indeed some of those awaiting the next debate, anticipated.
The concept of a "loyal Opposition" becomes very relevant at a moment like this. On the one hand on these Benches we accept the commitment to provide forces to complete the defeat of the Taliban and Al'Qaeda in Afghanistan. We share the Prime Minister's view expressed at the beginning of the campaign that we are not going to walk away from Afghanistan. We also accept the view that 45 Commando Royal Marines are superbly well qualified for that task. They are trained for Arctic and mountain warfare, and those of us who have seen the training of 3 Commando brigade in Norway know how impressive they are.
But as a loyal Opposition, when we are accepting the Government's legitimate decision to put our excellent Armed Forces into harm's way, we have a responsibility to ask questions about the conditions of that deployment, as was said by the noble Lord, Lord Rogan, earlier this evening. I have six questions that I should like to leave with the Minister for his reply.
First, I read with interest the views which the Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral Boyce, made in his lecture just before Christmas. I should like to quote two sentences, but the whole of those remarks bear reading. He said:
- "Whatever the choices we make, and for whatever reason, we must ensure that those decisions maintain our freedom of strategic choice; but we will have to decide soon whether we make a commitment to a broader campaign (widening the war), or make a longer term commitment to Afghanistan. Recent military success must be capitalised upon, so it is not a question of whether we will trap our hand in the mangle, but of which mangle we trap it in".
I take any remarks by the Chief of Defence Staff on this sort of matter extremely seriously. But how do Admiral Boyce's very relevant comments fit into the current decisions and indeed the future decisions of which we heard recently and our longer-term strategy?
My second question is: how are these forces going to get into Afghanistan? Questions were asked at the end of last week about access via Pakistan. Of course there was the arrival of flights directly into Kabul yesterday. But can the Minister tell us about the current position and negotiations which the Government are having with the Pakistani Government? Or at least can he assure us that he will inform the House as soon as he has information on that matter?
Thirdly, what is to happen when the troops do get in? I accept the constraints of the Minister who opened this debate about the House not seeking detailed operational information. But can we be given any information about the range of actions in which our
forces are likely to take part? The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, referred to that in his remarks. How far should we judge from the recent example of the United States' Operation Anaconda? It was not, judging from some of the reports that I have read, a totally unqualified success. There seemed to have been problems with Humint—referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Park—and the assessment of the local political situation.Those are both areas in which, historically, the United Kingdom has had a comparative advantage, as long as we ensure that our forces have the requisite intelligence support, to which reference has been made. The real problems of asymmetric warfare, to which the noble Baroness referred, are particularly acute in this situation. We want some assurance that they are being taken into account by the Government.
Fourthly, there is the question of the command arrangements, to which a number of noble Lords have referred. We benefit from the fact that we have had a substantial presence in the US central command in Tampa and we are involved in the discussions and thinking about the operation as a whole in Afghanistan. On the ground we are working to an American command structure, based in Bagram under Major General Hagenbeck, as are the Canadians and other substantial suppliers. We will not automatically have the safeguards that would exist under a NATO system. We remember the useful way—of course it was an exceptional situation—in which the so-called red card was used by General Mike Jackson when he was uncertain about the decisions of DSACEUR, General Wes Clark, in Kosovo. Is there a need for some sort of parallel arrangement in Afghanistan? Will Brigadier Lane have a card comparable to the one that General Jackson had? I do not necessarily expect a public reply from the Minister on this point, but trust that he will note our concern.
More serious, however, and a number of noble Lords have referred to this, are relations with the United States and the other external forces and the relationship with the various local Afghan allies. The noble Lord, Lord King, referred to this issue in his remarks. We have seen the problems that the United States have had with such local allies. It is important to understand how it fits into the command structure to operate in the area where 45 Commando will be. Will 45 Commando have direct relations with such local warlords, or will there only be direct links between the warlords and the American headquarters in Bagram? It is an important and serious matter to which we need answers.
Fifthly, I raise an issue that was raised in another place last week. What will happen if 45 Commando takes prisoners? The Secretary of State in the Commons said that they would be handed over to the United States, but one or two issues need to be clarified. What would be the implications if our forces were to capture UK citizens who happen, quite wrongly, to have been fighting in Afghanistan? Problems could also arise from the differences between ourselves and the United States in the interpretation of both the Geneva conventions and the applicability of
the United Nations International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. I realise that these are complex issues to which the Minister may not be able to reply tonight, but we need answers to what could become a complex situation.Sixthly, I come to an issue that was raised by my noble friend Lady Williams and others on ISAF and the British contribution to that force. To use Admirable Boyce's admirable phrase, are we getting our hands out of that part of the mangle?
What is the latest state of the negotiations with Turkey? The noble Baroness, Lady Symons, made some reference to that issue. When are we likely to get an answer? Should we consider the proposal made by my noble friend Lady Williams that perhaps it would be more important if ISAF were to be taken into some form of NATO structure under a NATO headquarters, which could provide some continuity?
My right honourable friend Menzies Campbell in another place and the noble Lord, Lord King, raised the question of the risk of UK forces undertaking at the same time both security assistance tasks in Kabul and neighbourhood and war-fighting tasks in the remaining parts of Afghanistan. There is a real risk of some parts of the Kabul population finding it difficult to appreciate these different functions, or being provoked to do so, even if that was not their original intention.
The United States has deliberately avoided taking part in ISAF. One of the reasons which has been given is to avoid the confusion of these different roles. Will there be some changes in the operational instructions to the British forces in ISAF? Will they be taking appropriate defensive measures if they are going to be in a more risky environment because of our deployment elsewhere in Afghanistan?
What is the overall strategy for the training of the Afghan defence forces? The Minister, in introducing the debate, talked about the useful contribution that we were already making in Kabul. But we have also heard that the United States is using its forces to train parts of the Afghan army. Surely, if we are to have a proper reform of the security sector as a whole we need to have an overall strategy. We need to see how these things are rooted together. Do we yet have clear information on that?
In conclusion, as the Secretary of State for Defence in his speech last week said, this is the largest British deployment of ground forces since the Gulf War. This is therefore an important stage in the development of the process. We share the support for our forces which has been expressed in all parts of this House. We wish them well in the very difficult tasks that lie before them. But we also support increases in the defence budget, both for the coming year and in the Comprehensive Spending Review which we look forward to hearing from the Government later in the year. On that the arguments of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, were most powerful. We hope that they will be listened to seriously by the Government, especially, as the noble Baroness, Lady Park, said, by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
10.28 p.m.
Lord Vivian: My Lords, I am grateful to the Government for making time available for this debate. I thank the Minister for bringing this debate to our attention today and for covering so many different aspects.
As I have said before, and wish to repeat again, we on these Benches strongly support the action being taken by the Government and continue to declare that we should stand shoulder to shoulder with our American allies. We strongly support the deployment of 45 Commando in Operation Jacana. We support the exemplary contribution that our troops have made in ISAF, even though we have some concerns about that force.
There are three main points of focus that run through this debate. My noble friend Lord Howell has dealt with the theme of the fight against global terrorism. I shall mention that in connection only with one of our military capabilities. The two other themes are the war-fighting role of 45 Commando and the peacekeeping role of the ISAF.
The tragic events in the United States of America on 11th September—some six months ago—are beginning to fade in the general public's mind. The public should be reminded of the fact that the United Kingdom is at risk of attack from international terrorists. There may be sleepers within the country waiting to carry out devastating attacks possibly using weapons of mass destruction. The nation must not wait for this to happen with predictable catastrophic results. We must ensure that the enemy is destroyed now before he has the chance to strike us.
Towards the end of last year the Chief of the Defence Staff stated that we would be in for a long haul. Although the operations have been successful so far, there is still the destruction of Al'Qaeda to be completed. Let it not be misunderstood that it is right that we are in Afghanistan, and there have been considerable successes that we should all be proud of. As has already been said, we are right to continue to try to find and capture bin Laden and Mullah Omar. It was right that we broke up the Al'Qaeda and Taliban integrated structure and destroyed their training camps in Afghanistan. It was right that we stopped Afghanistan from harbouring and giving succour to international terrorism; and it is right that we are now committed to the destruction of the Al'Qaeda and the Taliban groups dispersed in remote mountain areas of various provinces of Afghanistan. Not to have done so would have been a sign of weakness. Now is not the time to be weak, but to show our determination and strength in resolving this problem. If Al'Qaeda is not destroyed it might well encourage other extremists and terrorist groups to engage in further acts of international terrorism.
The common factor in these two themes is the need for sufficient resources. Her Majesty's Government have willed the ends and, as I have said, we wholeheartedly support them in this. However, we cannot have a situation where the Treasury uses its powers to withhold the resources required to carry out
efficiently measures which are the policy of the Government as a whole. There is a real need for a substantial increase in the defence budget and a greater requirement for intelligence resources. It is our responsibility to ensure that our troops have the best and sufficient equipment regardless of cost. In connection with funding and costs, I agree with my noble friend Lord Marlesford. I hope that the Minister will take note of what he said. Furthermore, I hope that the Minister will take note of the excellent contribution from my noble friend Lady Park.We must also ensure that press reporting is accurate and not misleading. I shall enlarge on this subject at the end of these comments. It is also imperative that all our Armed Forces are made aware that we here at home are lock, stock and barrel behind them in all that they doing in Afghanistan and that we shall be watching their endeavours and supporting them throughout the campaign.
I now wish to turn to 45 Commando. The tactical role of 45 Commando will probably be to search, cordon and destroy the enemy. Establishing the cordon will be essential in view of the proximity of the Pakistan border if the enemy are not to slip over it, especially as it is so ill-defined or really not defined at all.
This commando is trained in mountain warfare and to operate in Arctic conditions. It is right that these troops, who are trained for this role, are committed to mountain warfare in Afghanistan. But they will need altitude acclimatisation. This war-fighting role indicates well the fact that we should not become mesmerised by peacekeeping roles and home defence issues only. Three Commando Brigade will come directly under the command of Centcom and under the immediate command of the US 10th Mountain Division. The United Kingdom is, as we have heard, providing some 1,700 troops with 45 Commando for Operation Jacana of which some 800 will be in the front line. Could the Minister say how many troops from the United States of America, Canada, and other countries are fighting in the front line?
I have no concerns about the two chains of command as they are completely separate with areas of operation in completely different places. I do not think that this chain of command will be a top heavy organisation as it will be much easier for 45 Commando to implement their tasks working to their own brigade and brigade commander. It is well understood that the allies have complete air supremacy. But we are also aware that the United States has sufficient tactical air support to give 45 Commando when their forward air controllers call for it. In addition, the Royal Air Force is supplying three Chinook helicopters. But why can it not have its own strike aircraft? From my experience, it really makes a difference to know that one has one's own direct, dedicated air support. The Royal Air Force is providing invaluable assistance in Afghanistan and virtually daily since January has carried out operational support sorties.
On exit strategy, I agree that we should not withdraw from Operation Jacana until the enemy has been defeated and the task completed, but, as many of your Lordships have said, how will we know when we have won? If that takes longer than six months, who else is mountain trained to replace 45 Commando? I believe that 40 and 42 Commando are, or will be, involved in other operations. We cannot put troops who are not trained for mountain warfare into the mountains at about 13,000 feet, which is where they may well have to operate.
Your Lordships may also be aware that a mountain and Arctic training exercise was cancelled about two years ago due to lack of funds. That brings into question whether the two commandos are up to their appropriate training standards in those roles. Perhaps the Minister would reassure the House on that matter. The fact that 45 Commando has no armour was raised. The area in question is not one in which tanks or even light tanks should be used. Mountainous terrain is an area that armour should avoid at all costs.
Will the Minister reassure the House about the chain of command for 3 Commando Brigade? Will he also tell us why the Royal Air Force is not providing support for tactical air strikes? Who will take over from 45 Commando if the operation should last longer than six months? What have been the reasons for the delay in departure of the advance party of 45 Commando, and have the problems with Pakistan now been resolved? Will the Minister also confirm that 45 Commando, the field hospital, and all the other supporting units are up to strength at war establishment and have not been deployed at peace establishment?
I turn to future developments in ISAF. I remind your Lordships that that has so far been a most successful operation. Our troops have excelled in their difficult tasks, even under provocation. A handover to Turkey as the lead nation for ISAF would be most welcome. As our armed forces are over-committed—as they clearly are—my concern is whether we can really afford to have troops locked up in a peacekeeping role in Afghanistan. Primary warfighting training is being missed out due to peacekeeping. That does not bode well for the future. I am aware that a German multibrigade has taken over from 16 Air Assault Brigade, but will that allow the complete brigade headquarters to withdraw? What other supporting British troops will be left to support the Royal Anglian?
Mr Brahimi has requested that the United Nations mandate be extended for another six months in June—not that there is any surprise in that. However, if that is the case, has another battalion been warned to take over from the Royal Anglian after June, so that it can start its training for the Kabul peacekeeping role now, or is the plan to withdraw from the peacekeeping role after the Royal Anglian completes its operational tour of duty? I agree with my noble friend Lord King that it is unwise to be committed to peacekeeping and war fighting in the same theatre, as the peacekeepers may suffer.
I wonder whether the tasks for ISAF are to be broadened. Is the force to take on tasks outside Kabul? Can the Minister say what any additional tasks would consist of, bearing in mind that we have only one line of communication into the theatre? Our Armed Forces are structured for only two lines of communication; the other one is in the Balkans. It should be noted and understood that taking on a new operation against global terrorism in any other part of the world would necessitate our withdrawal from either the Balkans or Afghanistan.
I am aware that I have asked the Minister several questions. I hope that he will be able to answer them when he winds up the debate, but I am also aware that I am the last speaker on the list and that there is little time for him to obtain the answers, unless they are already in his brief. If that is the case, I should be most grateful if he would write to me, as he has done on many previous occasions, in his usual courteous manner. I am also grateful to him for the briefing that he arranged for some of us today.
Now that we have troops committed to war fighting in Afghanistan, there is a need for the Government to come back to the House and, through Parliament, to the public with adequate and accurate statements and answers to the many questions that will arise. I am still waiting for a reply to a Written Question dated 29th January. The statements and reports should be regular, direct and accurate, not filtered or distorted by the Pentagon or Centcom. They must not be exaggerated or misleading. I am not suggesting that advance plans or any sensitive information be made public, but Parliament owes that to the nation. If the nation is to be kept onside, the reports that I have suggested are essential. We owe that to our troops and to their families, and Parliament will then put matters into their proper perspective.
Finally, I pay tribute to the brave and courageous men and women who serve their country loyally and with the utmost dedication to duty. In particular, today, I pay tribute to those in the Afghanistan theatre. There are 6,000 personnel deployed there. To date, they have been highly successful in all that they have done and have shown their customary professionalism and their usual efficiency. Those of us on these Benches wish everyone in ISAF, the Royal Anglian, 3 Commando brigade and 45 Commando every success and a safe return.
10.43 p.m.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Bach): My Lords, it was last December when we last debated the role of our Armed Forces in Afghanistan. As has been said, much has happened since, as noble Lords will know from the Statement that was made to the House last Monday. That time gap and the great depth of knowledge and experience in the House make it no surprise that this debate has ranged as widely as any other that we have had. I thank noble Lords in all parts of the House for their contributions. I shall try to respond to as many
of the points raised by noble Lords as I can and to expand on some of the matters raised when we debated the Statement last week.I welcome noble Lords' expressions of support for the men and women in our Armed Forces. Last week, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Inge, who, alas, cannot be here tonight, said how important it was for the Armed Forces to feel that the nation was behind them when they were deployed. The noble Lord, Lord Rogan, said that with some force today. I agree with him entirely. However, it is not always enough just to express support in words. The men and women of our Armed Forces matter, and we must give them our full support. That is particularly true when we are sending them, as we are, into battle.
Before I say anything about the decision that was taken a week ago, I must say that I was surprised by the comparison made with the Falklands. The decision last Monday was a serious and sombre decision but it does not compare to decisions taken about the Falklands War. I believe that such comparisons are not helpful. Indeed, they are somewhat surprising coming from where they did in the House this evening.
This is a sombre and serious prospect and we should keep in mind the great dangers that 45 Commando Group may face. The Secretary of State warned last week in the other place that our troops might suffer casualties. That is true. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Rogan, will accept from me that the figures that were bandied around in the press this morning, which he quoted, have no substance at all as coming from the Ministry of Defence. They are meaningless figures and they do not help the argument at all.
Nothing has changed from last week. When we ask this of our forces, the support of Parliament such as noble Lords have shown today, and indeed of the whole country, is all the more important. What matters is the knowledge that we are doing the right thing, and we believe that we are. It seems as though the House also believes that we are.
In another place the Secretary of State made a powerful case for our deployments in Afghanistan. It hangs on the three points that my noble friend Lady Symons mentioned in her opening remarks this afternoon. I want to remind the House briefly of what she said about point two, which was that the action that the international community has taken has been remarkably successful. Afghanistan is indeed a different country, and the decision to deploy considerable military force against the terrorists and their supporters has, we believe, been vindicated.
It is quite clear that Osama bin Laden and his Al'Qaeda network have been dealt an extremely heavy blow, and only remnants of the Taliban, whose support was so crucial to Al'Qaeda, are left. We have defeated a ruling party; no longer do they control the government.
In my view it would be a mistake, therefore, not to acknowledge the success that has already met the coalition response. I believe it an unfair criticism that somehow victory over the Taliban and Al'Qaeda was
claimed. It was said by Government Ministers many months ago that this was a long haul; that this would take years, not months. For selective quotations to be given seems to me to be beneath the level of discussion that we normally enjoy in this House. We all knew that this would be a long haul. Nothing has changed. No one ever claimed anything different.I know that the existence side by side of the two roles—the ISAF and the Operation Jacana forces—has been questioned in another place. Indeed it was touched on here last week. The chains of command—and this relates to one of the questions asked by the noble Lord, Lord Roper—are distinct, reflecting the separate roles of the forces involved. ISAF does not command our combat forces and will not command 45 Commando Group when it deploys. They are wholly separate. Instead, 45 Commando Group will be under the command of the American-led coalition headquarters at Bagram. Headquarters 3 Commando Brigade will be embedded within that headquarters.
It may be asked why we need to deploy a brigade headquarters if 45 Commando Group is under coalition command. We think that the answer is simple. We need the additional command capability it offers, for it is not simply a matter of the commando group. There are the additional combat support and services support elements, namely 7 Battery, 29 Commando Regiment; 59 Independent Command Squadron, Royal Engineers, and elements of the Commando Logistics Regiment; plus the three Chinook helicopters and crew of 27 Squadron RAF.
The brigade's commander, Brigadier Lane, will act as Commander British Forces for all our personnel serving in Afghanistan, other than the ISAF. Those in ISAF will remain under Major General McColl's command. I do not think that that command structure can be accused of being either top heavy or confused.
I want to stress that the two roles are not contradictory. Other members of the ISAF agree. Denmark, France, Germany and Norway all provided ground forces for Operation Anaconda. French strike aircraft also flew close air support missions. The two roles complement each other, for both are consistent with our objectives as we set them out last October. Both aim to remove the threat offered by international terrorists operating from Afghanistan. Both aim to contribute to restoring Afghanistan as a peaceful and stable country. How could that be achieved if we allowed these terrorists and their supporters to regroup? They would always try to overthrow everything the Afghan people and their friends in the wider world have achieved to rebuild that country. If we allow them to regroup, why have we bothered to take any military action at all? What would have been the point?
The ISAF, of course, is a very obvious demonstration of the international community's commitment to Afghanistan. Various noble Lords have pointed that out during our debate, including the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, and the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich. Noble Lords know that we are committed to act as lead nation until 30th April. We are
negotiating the transfer of that role to Turkey now. I can tell the House that those talks are going well. Beyond that, I do not think that it would be appropriate to speak here and now about the ins and outs of what are, after all, important negotiations between governments. I venture to say to some of those who have tempted me down that path that if they were standing where I am now—indeed, they were doing so not that many years ago—they would say precisely the same.However, I shall say this. Both we and the Turks are committed to getting this right. We both want to make the ISAF as successful for the second phase as it has been in the first. Make no mistake, it has been a success. Turkey wants to know what kind of help and assistance she will receive from her partners, exactly as we did when we were working to set up the force. We have always said that we shall go on contributing forces to the ISAF after 30th April. We never said that we would withdraw all our forces, only that we expect to be able to reduce their numbers, and, indeed, we still do. And with good reason. Today we have around 1,700 troops deployed either with the ISAF or in support of it. Compare that with the 1,800 troops we originally assigned, along with an additional 300—2,100 in all—to repair and operate Kabul international airport. Of course the reduction does not mean that our commitment is any the less; we needed some capabilities to get the force that we do not need now that the force has become established.
The noble Baroness, Lady Williams, asked one or two questions in regard to the ISAF. As far as co-operation with the Northern Alliance is concerned, which responds to a particular question put by the noble Baroness in which she named an individual, the advice I have received is that co-operation with the Afghan police and with the interim authority generally is very close indeed. This was boosted by Hamid Karzai's visit to this country at the end of January, as well as visits by our Foreign and Defence Secretaries to Afghanistan. We are working closely with the interim authority on the first stages of security sector reform. I am delighted to be able to tell the House, and the noble Lord, Lord Roper, in particular, because he asked about this, that early in April the G8 is to hold a conference on the future of security sector reform. I hope that that deals with the point made by the noble Lord.
If we agree that the ISAF is a success in all its forms, and I hope that the House does so, there are many who wish to extend it, even to expand it outside of Kabul and give it new responsibilities. The House will be realistic about this and understand that there is a good possibility that United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 will be renewed to extend the deployment of the ISAF in its current area of responsibility, but I must stress that the security situation outside Kabul is very different from that in the city, as recent events have shown. The ISAF is not configured either for war fighting or peace enforcement. Ultimately, security is the responsibility—it must be—of the Afghans
themselves. We shall look to see how we can help them, particularly through the security sector reform that I have mentioned.A point was raised as to whether bringing 45 Commando into Afghanistan will make it more dangerous for British ISAF troops. We do not believe that it will, but time will tell. British troops have been on the ground in a fighting role for a very long time now—for as long as there have been troops in Afghanistan—and this is a considerable addition to that number. But they have been there and those people in Kabul will know that they have been there, just as they will know that 45 Commando is there. I remind the House that there are tough rules of engagement as far as the ISAF in Kabul is concerned.
My noble friend outlined earlier our campaign objectives. To achieve them requires that we take offensive military action as well as work towards Afghanistan's reconstruction, and we have been involved in that right from the start. Our decision to deploy 45 Commando is simply a part of our wider commitment to defeating international terrorism.
Undeniably, this is a significant part of that commitment. Deploying 1,700 troops and their equipment is no small undertaking. It is another call upon our Armed Forces and our Armed Forces are stretched. We would deny that they are overstretched; we are not even sure what that expression means. We have had this discussion in the House before—no doubt we will have it again—but I must tell your Lordships that more than 400 of the personnel involved were already in theatre and others were held at high readiness in this country against such a need.
Certainly all our Armed Forces are extremely busy, the Royal Marines included. Naturally, we keep all our commitments under review. We know that we have a duty to balance our operational needs with our other tasks, and not least with the needs of our service personnel. Our deployments in Afghanistan are necessary. We believe—as does the House—that this is something we must do. As to overstretch in this particular case, we are confident that this limited deployment can be managed alongside our existing commitments. I have explained how a number of personnel have been kept at high readiness and others in theatre. We believe that this is a realistic, manageable and sustainable development.
I should say to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, that I have been tempted by some of his remarks to make one or two points. I understand the depth of feeling that goes into what he says, but to describe what we are doing as a political gesture does not catch the reason for our actions. Of course we responded quickly. That was not a political gesture but a genuine, practical response to give the help and support requested by our closest friend and stoutest ally. It was not gesture politics. We are talking about real people, real troops, real capability and we are offering real help. The phrase "a political gesture" does not reflect what we are doing.
The noble and gallant Lord asked about pursuit over borders and I shall do my best to answer him. Our actions have been, and will continue to be, part of the
coalition, of which Pakistan is a valued member. We do not believe that there is in the end any hiding place for those engaged in activities of global terrorism. Of course we know the difficulties along that particular border.
The noble and gallant Lord set out a number of matters that had occurred over the past weeks and months at the Ministry of Defence as some kind of proof that the Ministry of Defence was not able to meet its needs. On the other hand, perhaps I may mention one or two things that he did not point out—that is, the list of new projects and capabilities that we are in the middle of procuring for the Armed Forces of this country. I start with two new carriers; I continue with six Type 45 Destroyers; I go on to mention alternative landing strip logistics; two landing platform docks; Skynet 5; Bowman, which at last we are putting right, after many years; personal role radio, which is already in existence; Nimrod; the Eurofighter; Merlin helicopters, including the EH101, which is a success at home and abroad; Trojan and Titan; and, not least, ground-based air defence. So if we are to have one side of the argument, and there is a case to be made, it is only fair that we should have the other.
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