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The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Rooker): My Lords, I am reluctant to intervene because I want noble Lords to make their speeches. However, I make it clear, for the avoidance of doubt later on, that when we introduce the extradition Bill later this year, we intend to make it explicit in our domestic law that we would not surrender an individual under a European arrest warrant in a conviction in absentia case without a guarantee of a retrial with the defendant having full rights of defence.
Lord Scott of Foscote: My Lords, I am much obliged to the Minister for that very comforting reassurance. I do not see how that is entirely consistent with the terms of the framework decision. However, if we pass legislation of the sort that the Minister described, and if someone proposed that we had not honoured the framework decision, we should, I have no doubt, meet that situation head on.
There is a further problem that I wish to draw to the attention of noble Lords and which I invite the Minister to reconsider. The expressed purpose of a European arrest warrant is declared in Article 1 to be to obtain the extradition of the named person,
- "for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence".
In that regard, too, the Government have made it clear, in evidence given to Sub-Committee E, that it is not their intention that the European arrest warrant should be available to be used to extradite a believed offender in order to interrogate him and build up a case that is sufficient for trial. But under continental procedures, the dividing line between investigation of a crime and the point at which there is enough material for a prosecution is not always easy to draw. The investigation will be under the control of an investigating magistrate—a judicial figure. It is
presumably he who authorised the issue of the arrest warrant. There seems to me to be a risk that the extradition of a suspected offender will be sought in order that the investigating magistrate may complete his investigation by interrogating, or authorising the interrogation of, the suspect, rather than for the purpose of a prosecution in respect of which he already has sufficient material to start. There is no machinery proposed for monitoring what happens to the accused in that respect after he arrives in the extraditing member state. It seems to me of some interest that the only other European member state that, like us, has an adversarial criminal justice system, as opposed to an inquisitorial one—that is, Ireland—has made a formal statement, in December, to qualify its agreement to the proposed framework directive. The statement made by Ireland is as follows:
- "Ireland shall, in the implementation into domestic legislation of this framework decision, provide that the European Arrest Warrant shall only be executed for the purpose of bringing that person to trial or for the purpose of executing a custodial sentence or detention order".
That mirrors the purposes expressed in Article 1. It seems to me that if such a statement is necessary or desirable in the case of Ireland, it would be for us, too. I would welcome the Minister's reaction to the need for us to make a similar statement.
There are other problems in relation to the proposed framework decision, but I have mentioned those that seem to me to be the most pressing.
The principle underlying the framework decision is that of trust between member states—trust in their respective criminal justice systems. I understand that. There are certainly a number of member states in respect of which trust in their criminal justice systems would have no qualifications and would always be present. No doubt all member states, present and future, will have criminal justice systems which we in this country can trust at least most of the time. But the proposition must be that we can trust all the criminal justice systems of all the member states all the time in order to be content with the extradition proposals envisaged in the European arrest warrant without any further qualification.
The consequences for both the citizens and the non-citizens of this country may be serious. They are entitled to expect protection by our courts and under our laws. We should deprive them of that only if we are completely confident that they no longer need that protection. I beg to move.
Moved, That this House takes note of the Report of the European Union Committee on the European Arrest Warrant (16th Report, HL Paper 89).—(Lord Scott of Foscote.)
8.31 p.m.
Lord Lamont of Lerwick: My Lords, it is, as always, a pleasure to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, who has in this debate, as in others, on the arrest warrant illuminated the issues with great authority and clarity. I am not a lawyer and previously have been apprehensive about intervening in debates on this
subject but I have somehow been drawn into them successively. I justify that to myself partly on the grounds that the incomprehensions of a non-lawyer may in themselves be illuminating to the lawyers and, secondly, also that possibly the subject is too important to be left entirely to the lawyers alone.I believe that it is very good that we are having this debate. It is, in a sense, more important than many of the other reports that we receive from EU Select Committees because we are discussing very directly legislation which is about to happen and which affects each and every citizen profoundly. Perhaps I may say that I am slightly surprised that, in the first instance, the Government resisted having this debate. Earlier, when we began to examine the arrest warrant and when matters were presented before the Select Committee, more and more issues which had not been anticipated or identified by the Government kept emerging.
Then, in addition, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, said, came the announcement by the Home Secretary in February this year that the British Government were intending the European arrest warrant to be operational in early 2003. If that is to happen, there will be very little opportunity for us to discuss the legislation which presumably will come forward in the autumn—that is, the legislation which fills in so many of the details and definitions of the different offences listed Article 2.
The arrest warrant is presented by the Government as a pragmatic development and logical progression whereby Europe will become an area of freedom, security and justice. In the words of the Home Office press release:
- "We are sweeping away outdated, inefficient extradition procedures".
Unfortunately, these proposals have been received in a number of different countries with strictly modified rapture. Mr Tremonti, the highly respected Italian Finance Minister, said of the European arrest warrant:
- "It is a sign that, when it comes to drawing up laws, we are going back to the pre-Enlightenment age".
I should also be grateful if he could tell us precisely what the position is in relation to Austria and Italy. I understand that, although Austria is signing up to it, surprise, surprise, one looks at the small print and that country has a derogation until it can amend its constitution because its constitution forbids the extradition of nationals. I have also heard that the surrender of the Italian Government to the concept of the European arrest warrant after initial resistance is perhaps not all that it appears to be because the
Italians, too, may have to alter their constitution. I believe it is important that we know that so that we are aware of the likelihood of all the countries ratifying.Of course, it is true that five countries have agreed to the early operation of the European arrest warrant. But, as Stephen Jakobi of Fair Trials Abroad caustically remarked:
- "With the exception of Greece, those constitute a roll call of countries that have the most problems in providing basic rights to people who have been arrested".
Very fundamental issues are raised in relation to the arrest warrant. A few weeks ago in this country, an Algerian who had been a pilot taking lessons in the United States was the subject of an extradition request from the United States authorities. The courts in this country delayed his extradition pending receipt of evidence to justify his extradition. In the end, that evidence was not provided and the courts let the Algerian go free. I took tremendous pride in the fact that the courts could make that decision despite all the pressure after 11th September. Despite all the demands that terrorists be brought to justice as quickly as possible, I took pride in the fact that, where there was no evidence, a man should go free. Of course, had that occurred several years hence and had that been a request for extradition under the European arrest warrant, the British courts would not have been able to leave that man free in this country.
One tidying up in the present draft which I welcome, and which I believe is different from earlier drafts, is in Article 4(7). That paragraph says that the state can refuse to extradite if the offence has been committed on its own territory. Therefore, I believe and assume that that takes care of the case that I raised earlier which so delighted the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, but horrified me. It concerned the Editor of the Sun possibly being extraditable for what he might write in his newspaper here. I should be grateful if the Minister would confirm that my understanding is entirely right in that regard.
None the less, what is proposed is a gigantic step forward. I consider that it carries great risks and one is tempted to wonder whether it is entirely wise. Of course, I am all in favour of extraditing criminals, and I am all in favour of criminals elsewhere being extradited back to this country. But what also matters are the rights of the accused.
What I find so extraordinary about this document—we have pages and pages of it—is that the rights of the accused get precious little mention. The Home Office talks about outdated and inefficient extradition procedures. But the rights of the accused are not outdated; they are something for which we must have regard. There is a passing reference to the right of the accused to have the charges against him translated.
I welcome the fact that paragraph 10 of the preamble refers to the possibility that a person will not be removed to the requesting state for extradition if it is unlikely that he will receive a fair trial there. I do not know how much the declaration in the preamble is worth—possibly not very much. However, I believe
that much more needs to be guaranteed with regard to the rights of the accused, legal representation, interpretation at all stages of the legal procedures, interpretation for witnesses and the right to bail.There is then the question of whether there should be Europe-wide statutory limits relating to the conduct of proceedings. It was John Mortimer, QC, a supporter of New Labour, who wrote in a newspaper:
- "Would you care to be arrested on the say-so of a Greek or Spanish judge and be pushed off with no case having been made against you to face trial under a foreign system in another country?".
It was that fear which led the distinguished lawyer, the SNP Member of the European Parliament, Sir Neil MacCormick, to suggest that there should be a Europe-wide provision for an end limit to detention similar to the longstanding 110-day provision in Scottish law. But that got nowhere with the European Parliament. It is all very well to say that ultimately there is a right of appeal to Strasbourg, but that could take a long time, possibly years. It seems to me that there should also be a provision for an avenue of national appeal where someone fears that his or her removal will not be fairly judged.
The lack of clarity and certainty in the framework decision, as put forward, is particularly regrettable. The main example is precisely Article 2 where we now have a positive list of so-called offences where double criminality does not apply. As everyone understands, that is not so much a list of offences but a list of types of offences. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, said, fraud and swindling have different connotations in different jurisdictions. One might say the same also for motor vehicle crime. What on earth does that mean? Even the term "murder" is open to different interpretations, including in certain countries abortion and euthanasia.
We have the famous case of xenophobia. Like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, I have been wondering about that. In Foyles the other day I came across a whole series of books called The Xenophobe's Guide to the Belgians, The Xenophobe's Guide to the French and the xenophobe's guide to this and that country. They were light-hearted books, but will they be entirely legal from now on? I know that when the legislation is put forward there will be attempts to refine what those offences are. But how shall we ensure when we examine this legislation that the way the offences are defined corresponds with how they are defined in other countries?
However, the greatest uncertainty is with the treatment of the concept of speciality. It is speciality that prevents a person from being extradited for one crime and subsequently charged for another. The concept also prevents someone being re-extradited from one country to a third country. It is a necessary protection for people against a system where
magistrates may be both the prosecutor and the investigator. As I understood it, at one point the Government were denying that speciality was being set aside. The report clearly states that it is.The Law Society says that the document allows for the abolition of the speciality rule. Article 22(1) allows member states to opt out of speciality for a whole range of offences, provided there has been a declaration of prior consent. The Law Society has called that "a worrying development". The Law Society, no less, said:
- "There is a risk that a person will be transferred on a charge which is then used as a holding charge to allow for the investigation and the bringing of charges for other offences for which the person would not have been arrested".
As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, pointed out, there is no mechanism for the requested state to monitor the proceedings once extradition has taken place.
I have a detailed point I wish to raise with the Minister which relates to speciality. I refer to the letter which Mr Bob Ainsworth, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, wrote to the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon, and which is quoted on page 10 of the Select Committee report. The paragraph dealing with speciality states that:
- "The UK has . . . indicated that, within the structure of this agreement, we would not intend . . . to apply the dual criminality test to requests made to us, even where it is required of us. We therefore do not expect speciality to be applied for the prosecution of fugitives within the EU".
As regards double criminality, what is also regrettably uncertain is that abolition seems to take place in different countries in different ways. It can be done with the positive list for crimes that carry a minimum sentence of three years, a positive list for crimes that carry a minimum sentence of one year, or for all offences—not just those in Article 2.2—carrying a minimum sentence of one year. So, as I understand it, there will be different ways in which double criminality is abolished in different jurisdictions.
Surely, as Justice has recommended, it would be better if there was no possibility of an opt-out of the double criminality beyond the 32 offences listed in Article 2.2. That would prevent extradition warrants
being issued in relation to controversial issues such as abortion, euthanasia, freedom of expression or vexed issues such as blasphemy.The central issue behind the warrant is one which is difficult to deal with, and I was pleased that it was touched on by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott. I refer to the question of whether we have sufficient mutual trust in the judicial systems of other member states to justify what has been proposed with the safeguards as they are at present. I am rather pessimistic about that.
Let us consider, first, applicant countries to the European Union. The other day I was in a country which is an applicant for membership of the EU. While I was there a person was arrested and charged with undermining the state because he had released on the Internet details of the Prime Minister's houses. I do not want to go into more detail than that. In many eastern European and central European countries the integrity of the system is highly questionable, to put it mildly. It is naive to think that, having signed the European Convention on Human Rights, that deals with that and naive to think that that will change quickly.
Even with existing members of the European Union one has some anxieties. To quote what Mr Chirac said about French judges or magistrates might not be regarded as convincing. However, Mr Strauss-Kahn, the respected Finance Minister, said:
- "In our system [France] you are presumed innocent until declared guilty. The reality is that you are seen as guilty from the moment the judicial system is interested in you".
Stephen Jakobi again in Fair Trials Abroad stated that,
- "Spain, France, Portugal and Belgium are notorious for holding people without evidence in the hope that some evidence may turn up".
The Law Society in measured words said that the,
- "Law Society believes the presumption of mutual standards of recognition and compliance with the ECHR is too strongly accepted at the European level".
8.51 p.m.
Lord Donaldson of Lymington: My Lords, in view of the opening remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Lamont,
perhaps I should apologise for being a lawyer. But it is a fact that just as bishops are professionally against sin, lawyers are professionally against injustice and perhaps have a wider appreciation of where it might arise than those who are not involved or who have not been involved in the law.I entirely accept the pressing need for a simpler, speedier and more effective extradition system. That is subject to an overriding need for safeguards to ensure the full preservation of the human rights of those who are potentially liable to extradition. That at once raises the question of who is responsible for formulating and enforcing those safeguards. My answer to that is the state within whose borders and subject to whose laws the potential extraditee—if that is the right word—happens to be found. So, from our point of view, when other states seek to extradite people from this country—whether or not they are British subjects because they are all owed a duty by the state and they all incidentally owe duties to the state, but that is beside the point—the responsibility must rest with us.
Furthermore, it is not a duty which can be delegated to other nations. The concept that the production by a requesting state of an indication that someone is alleged to have committed a particular offence without any necessary supporting information does not discharge our obligation to safeguard the rights of people in this country.
We all know that in some countries—indeed some European countries—treaty obligations are, in circumstances in which the interests of the state arise, treated as à la carte menus rather than binding obligations. There would be a risk that in some situations that would impinge upon our duty to protect people within this country. It really is not satisfactory to say, "Well, if there is experience that Ruritania, a member of the EU, is not in fact complying with its obligations, the unfortunate person concerned can of course go to Strasbourg, should he live so long". But it would only be after a large number of cases of that kind had come to the notice of our authorities that under the system proposed they would be entitled to say, "Well, we are not satisfied that Ruritania is a safe country to which to extradite someone".
Still less can we treat the EU itself as an overriding sovereign body within whose borders and subject to whose laws we all live and thus pass responsibilities to it, the suggestion being that the right to freedom of movement—incidentally I do not think that it is a duty to move freely—puts the EU in exactly the same position as this country. If the judiciary sought to move someone from England to Wales there would be no possible objection to that course. One would assume that there was some justification for so doing, but there is no jurisdictional objection. I am not sure whether the same is true of Scotland. Scotland is always a problem on these occasions, so I let that pass.
The plain fact is that the EU is not a state. None of us here is a citizen of the EU; we are citizens of states
which are members of the EU. That is wholly different. The Law Society in a comment said:
- "The principle underlying the changes is that as the member states are part of the EU with its policy of open borders then all residents are effectively EU nationals. As EU nationals the assumption is that there can be no objection to the free movement of criminal suspects/offenders between EU states".
Then there is the question of reciprocity. I was astonished to read in the minutes of evidence that Mr Ainsworth seemed to think that it would be quite all right to extradite people from this country if in similar circumstances we could apply for the extradition of others to this country. That seems to me to be quite astonishing. On page 10 in the left-hand column, he states:
- "Fundamentally we feel there are potentially substantial benefits for British people of lowering the barriers and accepting that with our EU partners, we are not talking about accession states here [EU partners], we are talking about people who are members of the European Union, fully signed up to the ECHR and hopefully increasingly in total compliance with the ECHR".
- "There are substantial benefits in accepting that the system of justice and the implementation of justice should take place in a state within which the crime is alleged to have been committed and not double guessed at by putting a preliminary hearing of substance in front of that return".
In the right-hand column on the same page he is talking about the generic list of offences. He says that,
- "the warrant itself will have to be framed in terms of a specific offence. The offence will have to meet the thresholds and these thresholds will be set against the law in the issuing country. So if a British citizen goes to Germany and breaks the German law in Germany, to the extent it breaches those thresholds he will be extraditable for breaking that law".
- "The benefit is that the same happens in reverse, and that German people will not be able to come to this country and break our laws without suffering rapid return to face justice in our country".
- "Surely with the numbers of people who are now travelling between us, good law-abiding people as well as the criminal elements, that is the kind of protection the British people actually want".
The question of prima facie evidence has been raised. I do not think it necessary in every case, but the Bow Street magistrate ought, in an appropriate case, to be able to seek some degree of reassurance of the evidence. For instance, if identity is challenged, it is
often possible for the Bow Street magistrate to enquire of the requesting state what evidence it has that it has named the right person in the warrant.The Bow Street magistrate should have authority to look into other matters. It is interesting that Section 11 of the Extradition Act 1989, which is described as a statutory version of habeas corpus—although it does not go to the full length of habeas corpus—provides the following.
- "Without prejudice to any jurisdiction of the High Court apart from this section, the court shall order the applicant's discharge if it appears to the court it relation to the offence, or each of the offences, in respect of which the applicant's return is sought, that—
- (a) by reason of the trivial nature of the offence; or
- (b) by reason of the passage of time since he is alleged to have committed it or to have become unlawfully at large, as the case may be"—
- "it would, having regard to all the circumstances, be unjust or oppressive to return him".
Indeed, rights of habeas corpus should always be preserved, but this is the second occasion in 18 months when the Government have shown signs of wanting to do without them. I can understand that from their point of view, but it is most unappealing to anyone interested in justice.
There is also the question of health. As far as I can make out, it would not be open to the Bow Street magistrate, if alerted to the point, to say, "I want a medical examination. This chap is said to have Alzheimer's, in which case, if it is in an advanced state, he is not fit to stand trial. I want to know about that". At present, that will be impossible. Of course, the Irish qualification ought to be made.
I have taken too much time already, so I shall just say in conclusion that the report contains valuable contributions on many potential problems. If the Government do not heed them, they are heading for trouble on the primary legislation. For my part, if they do not heed the report, I hope that I shall find myself in a majority in voting down that legislation or amending it.
9.4 p.m.
Lord Stoddart of Swindon: My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donaldson. He does not need to apologise for being a lawyer. Lawyers, especially of his standing, give great service to this House, another place and the country generally. In any event, they rank in public esteem above journalists and politicians.
I congratulate the Sub-Committee and its chairman, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, on their diligence and tenacity over the European arrest
warrant. There is considerable concern, not only in this House but throughout the country, about exactly what will be the effect of the European arrest warrant on ordinary people. There is also worry about the rush to implement it so quickly. I am glad to hear that that process has been slowed down. It is altogether good that we should take our time over any agreement to such a warrant in the first place.Having listened to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, speak about xenophobia and racism and the European Commission's proposition that we should introduce legislation to define those offences, I am now almost frightened. If such a clause were included in a Bill, I should hope that the House of Commons would not let it pass but that, if it did, this House would certainly not allow it to pass.
It is intolerable that the powers of our courts to resist extradition of British subjects to existing EU countries—and, presumably, to applicant countries, some of which, as the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, noted, have shady human rights backgrounds that would be unacceptable here—are to be severely restricted and the final say of an elected Minister responsible to Parliament removed. Some may think that that is good, but in the matter of removing citizens from this country to another for trial, elected representatives must represent the public. I hope that that proposal can be resisted, even at this stage.
There is no need for a European arrest warrant. There is nothing in it that could not be achieved by bilateral agreement between countries. The delays could certainly be eliminated by such agreements. People in Britain who have been following the issue have yet to be convinced that the European arrest warrant will not put them in danger of being extradited for an offence that was committed not abroad but in this country. We have already heard about newspapers that are published in another country—The Sun, for example. There is no certainty that Mr Yelland, editor of The Sun, would be safe if one of his paper's headlines were to be construed as an offence under that country's laws.
What about someone who writes and publishes in Britain a book or article denying the Holocaust that is then circulated in Germany? Germany, of course, has strict laws about Holocaust denial; it is an offence punishable by a term of three years. They have that offence because they want to assuage their guilt about what happened under the Nazi regime, including the Holocaust and all the other awful things that were done. There is no reason, however, why we should suffer for that as well.
I do not know whether anybody in that category would be safe. I hope that Mr Yelland will read this debate, particularly what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott of Foscote, said about racism and xenophobia. He may want to say a few words about it in his newspaper. I feel sure that he would be at great risk. The presumption of innocence will be turned on its head, as the executing authorities will, under the provisions of the framework agreement, have little option but to hand the suspect over, once the European arrest warrant is presented.
The legislation is being rushed through on the grounds of the need to combat terrorism. The listing of 32 offences in the agreement means that virtually any significant offence will be caught by the agreement. The protection of dual criminality will, as we have heard, be removed.
We have also heard a great deal about habeas corpus. The Government have given assurances, as has Mr Vitorino, the European Commissioner, to the European Parliament on 6th February, during discussion of an amendment to insert a habeas corpus provision into the agreement. Incidentally, the amendment was defeated. Mr Vitorino claimed that habeas corpus was contained in the legal system of every member state: it most certainly is not. It is not, for example, in the legal framework of Greece, where the 12 plane-spotters were incarcerated. They have now, I am glad to say, been brought to trial. Nor does habeas corpus apply in France, as I understand it. It is not absolutely certain whether or not the European Convention on Human Rights provides the protection of habeas corpus—at least, not to me—and we shall have to await experience until there is certainty.
Those of us who have observed the European scene for a long time know that the European arrest warrant is just another step along the road to a European judicial system. People do not have to believe me; I shall quote what Mr Watson, the rapporteur, said to the European Parliament on 6th February, when it was discussing the European arrest warrant and the amendment on habeas corpus:
- "The European Union may allow itself a few moments of satisfaction. These measures represent a major step forward towards the creation of a European judicial space".
- "I would like to thank the President-in-Office for reminding us that this judicial space did not start on 11 September last year, although it would be churlish not to recognise that the attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September gave a political momentum which allowed us to knock heads together and overcome certain objections".
That is a telling comment about the European arrest warrant and it is yet another ratchet on the road to the creation of a harmonised judicial system and, of course, towards the European superstate so beloved of people like the German Foreign Minister, Herr Fischer, who believes that nation states should be abolished.
I was most struck by the remarks of the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, on 19th November last. He said:
- "I know that we are not completely in a federal state, but we are trying to work together with our partners".—[Official Report, 19/11/01; col. 990.]
- "I know that we are not completely in a federal state"?
I have to tell the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, that this is not about a federal union and he should not misunderstand where we are going. That would be bad enough, but it is really about the creation of a unitary European state; a country called Europe. That is something very different because it is a state controlled from the centre. That is the path along which we are being driven, and the European arrest warrant is just another milestone along that journey. For all those reasons, the warrant should be resisted by all those who treasure individual rights and freedoms and desire democratic self-government through our own tried and tested institutions and want them to continue.
9.17 p.m.
Lord Hunt of Wirral: My Lords, I share the concerns about the European arrest warrant so clearly articulated by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott of Foscote. As I had the privilege of serving under his chairmanship, perhaps I may also add how strongly I and the other members of the committee support his views, so well expressed in an outstandingly good speech today.
Perhaps I may add two points. The first relates to judgments in absentia. I was pleased to hear the Minister repeat the Government's assurance that in their forthcoming extradition Bill they would make explicit that a person will not be surrendered in a conviction in absentia case without the guarantee of a retrial. It was good to hear that. However, I still believe that it is most unsatisfactory that the guarantee of a retrial is not set out in the framework decision. I hope that he will reconsider that point and realise that as a consequence there would be the risk of the creation of different standards of justice across the European Union, which would be most unsatisfactory.
Secondly, as regards fundamental rights, we on the committee feel strongly that the framework decision should not be adopted without being amended to make it clear that a national judge can hear argument that to accede to a request for transfer might lead to an infringement of the ECHR rights, particularly under Articles 5 and 6, of the individual concerned. Further, the judge would be entitled to refuse the request on such grounds. The Law Society brief clearly sets out a number of safeguards that I hope the Minister will accept. There must be provision for accepted standards of procedures and common definitions relating to arrest, bail, legal advice and representation through proceedings, disclosure of evidence, and rights of appeal and retrial where tried in absentia. There must be clarification as to the limits and procedures to arrests in pre-charge and ongoing investigations—particularly in view of the erosion of the specialty rule to safeguard ECHR Article 5 rights.
There must be agreed the early provision of confidential legal advice and assistance, interpreting and translating services—which should be provided at the state's expense. There are no proposals for systems of accountability. There must be national mechanisms for appeal, to prevent the only accountability being through application to Strasbourg.
It must be the positive, explicit and appealable responsibility of each member state's judiciary to satisfy itself that transfer under any mechanism will not breach the individual's human rights—either because of his or her circumstances or because of ECHR breaches within the criminal justice system in the requesting state. I hope that mechanisms such as consular assistance could include a monitoring role of the implementation of agreed procedural safeguards and minimum standards.
We say all that because we want to ensure that the European arrest warrant becomes another important weapon in the fight against crime—not an opportunity to abuse the human rights of individuals under suspicion, then deny them proper protection of their rights.
9.22 p.m.
Lord Pearson of Rannoch: My Lords, I have the temerity to query something said by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donaldson, when he commented that there is no such thing as a European citizen and that the EU is not a state at all. Under the Maastricht Treaty, we did become citizens of the European Union—although perhaps in that vague and confusing way in which European plans are always laid. I trust that the Minister agrees that there is on the stocks a plan for the intergovernmental conference in Brussels in 2004, precisely to give the European Union legal personality.
I have asked that of the Government in Written Questions but have been given the brush-off. For the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donaldson, to be right, it would be helpful if the Minister will give a firm assurance this evening that the British Government will veto any attempt to move towards the granting of legal personality to the European Union.
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