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Civil Service Act
3.7 p.m.
Lord Holme of Cheltenham rose to call attention to the case for a Civil Service Act clarifying the respective responsibilities of Ministers, political advisers and civil servants; and to move for Papers.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, some of your Lordships may be wondering what is the point of holding this debate when the Government are committed to imminent legislation. It is precisely because that assumption is a little over-optimistic that the debate is timely.
Last November, Sir Richard Wilson told the Public Administration Committee in another place that consultation on a Civil Service Act would start in the New Year. Two months ago, on 26th February, the Cabinet Office again promised that consultation on a Civil Service Act would start shortly. Subsequently, an issues paper was promised, hot on the heels of the significant speech made by Sir Richard at the end of March calling for an Act as outgoing Cabinet Secretary.
It is now 1st May, and there is no sign of government-initiated consultation on the issues. So perhaps the Minister and the Government will take this debate as a little bit of do-it-yourself consultation—an attempt to kick start what appears to be a rather tardy process within Westminster and Whitehall. I am also conscious that this is one of those precious second Chamber moments that we have from time to time when the Minister responsible is here to respond. I very much welcome that.
I also thank so many noble Lords with such a wealth of relevant and distinguished experience for putting their names down to speak this afternoon. I can only say how sorry I am that each of them has so little time in which to speak. I shall try to conclude my remarks in less than the 15 minutes allotted, to leave a few seconds each for those noble Lords who have more to say than they can say in four minutes. Unlike the great majority of them, I am an innocent abroad, in the sense that I have been neither a Minister, a civil servant nor a special adviser. Whether that makes for objectivity or naivety, we shall have to see, but I must declare an interest as chairman of the Hansard Society, which has a long-standing commitment to the value of our democratic institutions and to the need to ensure that our governance is refined and improved where necessary.
I begin with three questions. First, why should we need a Civil Service Act? Secondly, given that we do, what might be the nature of such an Act? Thirdly, when will the Government honour their promise to propose a Bill?
I shall start by saying that, despite the feverish efforts of the press and the unstinting determination of the Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions to do his best to help, I doubt that Whitehall is or was in chaos, to use Sir Richard's word. There was a bit of effing and blinding and a lot of embarrassment, but I do not think that there was chaos. Those of us who want an Act do not see it as another piece of short-term crisis management; we probably have too much of that sort of legislation before us already. There is no crisis in the Civil Service. This country has a Civil Service that is notable for its good sense, its good ethos and its good advice and is, rightly, the envy of many other countries.
There are, however, legitimate anxieties, not least on the part of the civil servants themselves, as the service adjusts to the massively raised expectations of governments and citizens. There are new, intensified pressures on the Civil Service to deliver. The senior Civil Service can no longer be properly described as being administrative, with all the calm, static virtues that that implies. The Senior Civil Service is now managerial and is concerned with allocating resources and increasing productivity to achieve objectives, often in relatively short time-scales. That is a more dynamic model than the one with which we all grew up. That has happened in the context of the endemic partisanship of our public culture. Excessive politicisation is creeping in everywhere.
We have had impatient Ministers in Conservative and Labour governments driven by an even more impatient No. 10 and committing themselves—overcommitting themselves—to specific public service targets. They want deliverables, and they want them fast. The temptation for Ministers—and often for senior civil servants—is to micro-manage. That is wrong and should be resisted—indeed, it often is. A change from policy generation to strategic leadership is necessary and is probably only half-realised, as the new Cabinet Secretary, Sir Andrew Turnbull, made apparent in an interview with The Times this morning.
The impatience to achieve leads to the use of other tools. Special and expert advisers are recruited. Consultants—some thinly disguised as Members of your Lordships' House—are taken on. There are internal reporting systems that drive performance. There is an emphasis on news control and spin in a bid to win the space, make the changes and get the credit. There is a certain can-do attitude to the cutting of corners and, on occasion, a deplorable crossing of the boundaries between national and party interest. It is too easy to create a culture in Whitehall in which achievers and believers are pushed ahead, and cooler heads are pushed aside. Prime Ministers notoriously favour those who bring them solutions.
The first reason why we need a Civil Service Act is to make sure that, in the face of the pressures and amid a torrent of understandable change, the well-established virtues of impartiality—or objectivity, as the Committee on Standards in Public Life prefers to call it—political neutrality, promotion by merit and not through patronage and ethical or professional standards of behaviour are not swept away. Rather, they should be entrenched throughout Whitehall and the executive agencies, with a proper process for dealing with any fall from grace. We need a fixed point of reference in a fast-changing world.
The second, related reason for an Act is less well understood. Indeed, it merited only one short sentence in Sir Richard's lecture. By passing such an Act, we shall ensure that the ultimate accountability of the Civil Service for propriety and process is to Parliament, not to the executive. That is a constitutional development of the first importance. The Hansard Society Commission on Scrutiny, chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Newton of Braintree, said that Parliament should be the "apex of accountability". So, alongside a Minister's responsibility for the performance of his or her department, such an Act would create a parallel and clear accountability for the way in which the Civil Service carries out its important functions. That accountability would be to Parliament.
There seems to be widespread recognition of the desirability of such an Act. It formed part of the Government's manifesto commitment; it appeared in the manifesto of the Liberal Democrats; and many Conservatives and commentators are in favour. The First Division Association is also in favour. Of course, such a move was originally recommended by Northcote-Trevelyan in 1853, a prospect scuppered, not least—I must admit—by Lord John Russell, the
Liberal Prime Minister. I am sorry that my noble friend Lord Russell, his descendant, is not in his place. Be that as it may, the Liberal Democrats are now fully committed to such an Act.What sort of Act should it be? Like Northcote-Trevelyan, I think that it should be short. The description that they used was "a few clauses". It should create accountability to Parliament via the Civil Service Commission in respect of compliance by Ministers, civil servants and various sorts of advisers with their respective codes of conduct. The codes should be refreshed and refined with the help of the Committee on Standards in Public Life and agreed by Parliament separately. The Civil Service Commission should report to Parliament annually on the state of the service, and civil servants should have easier access to the commission if they believe that there have been infringements of the codes. The commission, either at the request of Parliament or on a discretionary basis if it has substantial grounds to believe that a code has been breached, should have powers to investigate and report. The cultural and career barriers to whistle-blowing must be demolished.
It would clearly establish the proper gearing with Parliament if there were a matching committee here—preferably consisting of Members of both Houses—to consider and initiate reports by the commission. The Public Administration Committee, which has done such valuable work under its chairman, Dr Tony Wright, might provide the right basis for that. I must say that I miss the marvellous work that the old Royal Institute of Public Administration used to do; I am sure that other noble Lords feel the same. We miss RIPA when considering such issues.
My focus in introducing the debate is on getting structure and systems of accountability right, so I shall confine myself to mentioning only two areas of current controversy only. First, we should stop demonising political advisers. No doubt, some are more special than others, and, certainly, some are more expert. However, any government need help and will look for it. I am not inclined towards setting an arbitrary quota to fix the number of such advisers, although, as a matter of political judgment, a bit of restraint, particularly on the part of No. 10, would not go amiss. The line should be drawn in a different place and should not be crossed. If advisers are seen as suitable for an executive role, they should become civil servants—albeit temporarily. They should not otherwise be permitted to issue instructions to civil servants. It is one thing for a chief executive of a company to call in McKinsey—that often happens—but it would be extraordinary for him to put consultants in executive control of his management, unless he hired one or more of them for his management team.
Secondly, there is the apparent misuse of public service advertising for party advantage, an issue that has not been sufficiently discussed. Between 1999-2000 and 2000-01—election year—public service advertising went up by 69 per cent, peaking at an all-time record in March, in the immediate run-up to the election. So far, so circumstantial—but now we also
find that the chief executive of the Central Office of Information has been on a direct reporting line to Mr Alastair Campbell since February. Important conventions relating to public service advertising are being breached. In suggesting that that matter should also be part of the code, I invite the Minister to comment on that worrying situation in particular when he responds.That brings me to my final questions. When shall we have the consultation document? When shall we have the Bill before us in Parliament? Sir Andrew, the new Cabinet Secretary, thinks that, as we have waited 150 years already, there is no particular hurry. That is not the manifesto pledge made by the Government. I trust that the Minister will have something positive to say to us about that. It has become one of the issues on which the Government's credibility depends. Procrastination does not look good in matters of standards. When the Government drag their feet on clear manifesto commitments to bring forward legislation, the Minister might remind himself that the Tobacco Advertising and Promotion Bill has shown that this House and these Benches are capable of finding another way forward. I hope that we shall not have to. I beg to move for Papers.
3.20 p.m.
Lord Sheldon: My Lords, I welcome the debate introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Holme, even though I have only four minutes. There has always been a strong concept of service by those seeking to join the Civil Service. That was especially true in the post-war years. There had been a number of men and women who had served their country well and looked to the planning of the post-war society in which they would play a leading role. That idealism resulted in much of the ensuing work of restoring and repairing our country.
That attitude was a consequence of the great Northcote-Trevelyan reforms of the previous century. The report was momentous. The reforms which followed have been the bedrock of our administration and produced the professional non-party-political Civil Service which we have had the privilege to enjoy. They were the greatest development of public service in modern times. The standard set by the Civil Service filtered down into local government, into the professions and even to some extent into industry. That was a development which, looking back, must make us proud that it was in our country that we were able to devise a system of administration which was high-minded, ethical and practical, which actually worked, and which delivered what was promised.
A century later it fell to the Fulton committee, on which I had the privilege to serve, to put forward a number of reforms which, though substantial, did not change the ethos of the service, and the important changes in the relationship with government were accomplished with no great difficulty. It has been the expanding role of the special adviser which has brought the questioning of the relationship between Ministers and civil servants to a position it has not
occupied since the 1960s. The Fulton committee recommended the use of specialist advisers— experts with political views.In 1974, six months before I went to the Treasury, I took on the responsibility of the Civil Service Department. There I had the responsibility of agreeing the salaries of certain specialist advisers; Nikki Kaldor, Tommy Balogh, Brian Abel-Smith and some others. Some of them were inherited from the Labour Party opposition. There were others whose qualifications were difficult to discover and, with justification, they were awarded modest remuneration.
In evidence to the Public Administration Committee in November last year, Sir Richard Wilson gave an account of his early experience. He said:
- "I found myself at a much more junior level than I am now in a situation where special advisers were, as it were, giving me instructions and I found myself in quite difficult positions as a result of that. I think this question of how far special advisers in practice can tell or ask civil servants to do things is an issue which has existed for quite a long time as a grey area but has now become a matter of public concern and controversy".
We have now reached the stage where the problem of special advisers needs urgently to be addressed. The notion of spin has always been a part of government—putting a good gloss on policies. It has always been part of any administration. What we have seen more recently are some special advisers who have accorded the practice a level of priority which has been in danger of transgressing the boundaries between spin and deceit. The departure of a number of information officers was in itself a serious signal. In the language of our time, they gave out information, rarely with spin even though, frequently, with a touch of gloss. We need to reaffirm the standards of service which we used to see and have come to expect.
Ever since the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms there have been from time to time anxious voices raised about the changing role of government and the Civil Service. This is another of those occasions. This time, I believe, it is more serious. A major task for the new head of the Civil Service, Sir Andrew Turnbull, is to accept the case for the specialist advisers who bring skills and expertise. However, the paramount need above everything else is to retain the standards of the Civil Service we have had the privilege to acquire.
3.25 p.m.
Lord Howell of Guildford: My Lords, I welcome the debate. It is always a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Sheldon. However, as regards being a Minister in the Civil Service Department, I preceded him, rather than followed him, by some four years. I therefore became—although at a junior level—the first Minister of the Civil Service in modern British history.
In those days, the reform tasks of the Civil Service were clear enough. They were to implement the recommendations of the Fulton committee, in which the noble Lord played a distinguished part, and to bring in outside entrants. They are the same changes for which Sir Andrew Turnbull is calling in today's press. Things move rather slowly in Whitehall as that was 30 years ago. There was also the small matter of indexing Civil Service pensions, which seemed to interest and pre-occupy the Civil Service Department to a considerable degree.
We on the political side had our own agenda which we embodied in the phrase "the new style of government". That had two elements to it. The first was that we needed to redefine the outputs and objectives of a great deal of government work in Whitehall so that the organisation behind the achieving and delivering of public services was more efficient. If necessary, we needed to bring in the private sector—that was the dawn of the privatisation idea. The second was that those who were managerially in charge of achieving those objectives would be properly accountable to Parliament via Select Committees, which in those days did not exist in their present form, rather than being lost in the general miasma of ministerial and departmental accountability which we and the public deemed to be extremely weak.
Like today's reformers, we believed that we could clarify the roles between the Ministers, who looked after policy and party-political matters, civil servants, who were supposed to be concerned with administration and impartial advice, and special advisers, most of whom in those days were paid by the political parties and not by the Government and who would be able, it was argued, to help civil servants. That was our high-minded aim.
The brief message that I have for your Lordships from that period, although it was long ago, is that the attempt to spend too much time defining too precisely the boundaries between the different groups does not in the end work. I know the theory—we heard it in the opening speech of the noble Lord, Lord Holme—that the Civil Service is supposed to be impartial and objective and that a Minister is supposed to inject party politics and so forth with the help of the special adviser. That is the theory and it is also the belief of the Committee on Standards in Public Life. Its latest publication is full of such assertions.
In practice, that is not the way it worked or works today. Perhaps we can learn a little from our mistakes of the past and pass them on to the would-be reformers who are drawing up new legislation. The truth is that able civil servants are to some degree partisan and want to see the Government's purposes achieved. Of course, they may not want to see them achieved, which would not involve impartial advice but a policy stance. That is bringing policy views into the carrying out of public purposes.
Therefore, it is a myth to believe that it can always be said that all civil servants are impartial and objective. It would make life impossible for Ministers if they always were. Similarly, it is also a myth to imply
that all Ministers are so riddled with party bias and so tainted by being connected with parties that they are incapable of objective thought. An appalling heresy has crept into today's debate; that is, that anyone who has anything to do with any political party is incapable of independent or objective advice and thought. If one looks at Ministers in the present Government and in previous governments, one sees that that is an absurd distortion of the reality.There is a grey area, as Sir Richard Wilson has told us, where common sense and integrity must operate and where rigid rules cannot be laid down. It may, alas, be necessary to have a Civil Service Act which brings the structure and organisation under parliamentary authority. After the notorious Order in Council of 3rd May 1997 the public and Parliament will no longer accept the business of rule by decree in the matter of the Civil Service. That has been abused and therefore will now have to be ended. In effect, that was the second point made by Sir Richard Wilson in his speech.
A Civil Service Act which seeks to define too clearly the role between Ministers, civil servants and special advisers will come unstuck and will be to the detriment of good government. That, at least, is the message and the lesson that we can learn from the past. I hope that it will not have to be re-learnt this time.
3.30 p.m.
Lord Butler of Brockwell: My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Lord, Lord Holme of Cheltenham, for providing the House with an opportunity to hold this debate. It is a well-known phenomenon for retired civil servants to show a surprising enthusiasm for things like freedom of information, for which they showed no great warmth while they were in the public service. Certainly when I was in the Civil Service, I was not in the vanguard of those arguing for a Civil Service Act.
I recall giving evidence to a committee of the other place under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Radice. For the reasons which have just been outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Howell, I argued that the Civil Service was better served in meeting the requirements of governments with the flexibility of the Civil Service Order in Council. Why, then, when a non-political Civil Service has survived for almost 150 years on the basis of the Royal Prerogative and the Civil Service Order in Council, is legislation now needed to provide for it?
In my view, the reason does not lie in the ill intentions of either this or any other government. It lies in the changing context in which government is conducted. That has introduced requirements which have become, I think, dangerous to the concept of a non-political Civil Service. I shall cite one example. Governments have of course become more media driven. Today Ministers need not only expert advisers, they also need expert advisers on the art of presentation, and they do not fall comfortably within the proper role of the Civil Service. In my view, that kind of thing is best undertaken by political appointees. Since Ministers have both a governmental
and a party political role, the two have to work together. In my experience, people inside the system are very well aware of the borderline between the Civil Service and party political roles and they observe it.But I shall not deny that in some cases the borderline is crossed, and we live in a sceptical age. What may seem perfectly proper within the system does not always seem so to those outside, in particular to the opposition parties, on whom the continuance of a non-political Civil Service greatly depends. It is time for the distinctions to be clarified and set out in a form which the main political parties and Parliament understand and are comfortable with.
To that end, some changes in the present arrangements could usefully be made. I have in mind three in particular. First, I believe that the time has come to make a distinction between "political" special advisers and "expert" special advisers and to fund them differently.
Secondly, while "political" special advisers should not be debarred from representing the views of their Ministers to the media, this role should be kept separate from departmental press offices, which should be staffed by civil servants operating in a factual and objective way, steering clear of party political debate.
Thirdly, when people with known or declared political loyalties apply for and are appointed to Civil Service posts, I believe that the Civil Service Commission should have a formal obligation to ensure a nil obstat from the opposition parties. Informal arrangements have been reached in the past, but I think that it would be advantageous to put it on to a more formal basis.
I believe that it would be useful if these and other aspects were enshrined in Civil Service legislation. We should not expect such legislation to avoid all future difficulties over the roles of civil servants and special advisers. But in the long term it would achieve something that is more important: it would offer an opportunity to define the distinction between Civil Service and party political functions in a way that the main political parties and Parliament would understand and have confidence in. It would make it more unlikely that a future government would doubt the political impartiality of the Civil Service they inherit and thus it would help to maintain something which, in my view, is an asset to British government and which we sould seek to retain and foster; that is, a permanent, impartial and non-political Civil Service.
3.35 p.m.
Lord Radice: My Lords, as a new Member, I have been told this is one of those House of Lords debates which are always extremely impressive. I can see that this is definitely going to be such a debate, with contributions from former Ministers and heads of the Civil Service. Indeed, I believe that one former head of the Civil Service is not going to participate because two former heads are already speaking.
I rise briefly and modestly to support the case for a Civil Service Act. I should say that this is not a new question because many of us have long been in favour of such legislation. As the noble Lord, Lord Butler, pointed out, I was chairman of the sub-committee which reported in favour of such an Act. We also came out in favour of introducing the Civil Service Code. We even prepared a draft code which was accepted by the Conservative government of the day. I should like to pay tribute to the role played by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, in that. As I have said, we also came out in favour of legislation, but the then government did not see the argument in favour of that proposal.
I believe that strong arguments can be put forward in favour of a Civil Service Act. They do not arise primarily because of the recent controversy over special advisers, although of course I accept that there have been rows about them. I accept also that there has been an increase in the numbers of such advisers. However, I can recall that the previous government also had special advisers and there is nothing wrong with that; indeed, I think that they perform an extremely useful role. At the time rows broke out over the role and activities of special advisers. I recall in particular the row over the position of Sir Bernard Ingham. The sub-committee commented on the ensuing controversy in one of its reports, so this argument is nothing new.
However, a short Act is needed in the main because—to echo the words of Sir Richard Wilson in his very effective speech made in March—we need, first, to define what a civil servant is—at the moment there is no definition; secondly, we need to enshrine in law rather than simply in a code the fundamental principles of selection and promotion on the basis of merit; and, thirdly, we need to enshrine the political impartiality of the Civil Service. I also believe that the time has now come to put into law the Civil Service Code. We need to define in law the code for special advisers and we need to examine the role and number of such special advisers.
In summary, we need to do all that was recommended in the Northcote-Trevelyan report. The Civil Service Commission needs to be put on to a statutory basis for the first time. Furthermore, I think that we need to provide a role for the Civil Service Commission in the judgment of grievances and redress for aggrieved civil servants. I take that view because I am not satisfied that the present system works adequately.
Finally, we need to underwrite the role of Parliament and, indeed, of the Select Committees in the Act's supervision.
Perhaps I may conclude by saying the following. The case for a Civil Service Act has been accepted by the Government. That was made clear in the election manifesto. On numerous occasions in the other place and, I believe, in this House, the Government have stated that they are committed to such an Act.
The argument no longer turns on whether one is for it or against it; what really drives the matter is when will the Government fulfil their commitment. Noble
Lords are right to wait with impatience for the consultation paper, which has been promised for a very long time. We are also right to await the legislation. To that end, I believe that the message of our debate this afternoon can be summed up as follows: "It is time to get on with it".3.39 p.m.
Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank: My Lords, I join other noble Lords in thanking my noble friend for bringing these matters before the House. In the 1960s and 1970s, during my own time in government, I would have been rather surprised at the idea of a Civil Service Act. Governments are organic and comprise more than their formal institutions. As the culture of politics changes, a new balance is struck between Ministers, career civil servants and outsiders. Even in the earlier part of the 20th century, as we know from diaries and memoirs, those ubiquitous public servants, Eddie Marsh and Tom Jones, moved in and out at the highest level on a personal and sometimes political basis. More relevant, many outsiders entered Whitehall during the war and some outstanding figures continued into career civil servants.
Other outsiders served Ministers in the Attlee government as irregulars—in effect, special advisers to Herbert Morrison, Cripps and Dalton. There was also the mixed central planning staff under Edwin Plowden, and talented outsiders moved between the economic section of the Treasury and the universities.
The Department of Economic Affairs, the DEA, in which I became a junior Minister in 1964, had a core of career civil servants but many outsiders, some with strong political loyalties. An able political appointee, Robert Neild, became the economic adviser to the Treasury in 1964, causing a fuss; but in 1997 his lineal descendant was given the less controversial title of economic adviser to the Chancellor.
After a stretch of 13 years in opposition, and then 18, new Ministers were sometimes suspicious about civil servants and civil servants about Ministers, but most grew out of their doubts and became resilient and flexible. However, I am persuaded that there is serious anxiety about the morale of the Civil Service almost as disturbing as in the mid-1980s.
I agree, for example, that there may be a case for capping the number of special advisers, although the main growth has been at No. 10, which raises wider constitutional questions. I agree also that the Byers episode was a mess and that there are important lessons about the management of a department, and not only for Ministers and press and information officers.
I believe that openness between special advisers and senior civil servants, especially with private secretaries of Ministers and permanent secretaries, is essential to the smooth working of government, based on respect and trust.
These and other matters were usefully discussed in the sixth report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life. I welcome its recent Issues and Questions Paper, Defining the Boundaries. But in reviewing a
growing literature about Ministers, civil servants, outsiders and special advisers, I hope that options will be brought into sharper focus taking a historical view.3.43 p.m.
Baroness Prashar: My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Lord, Lord Holme, for introducing the debate. As the First Civil Service Commissioner, I am grateful for the opportunity to contribute to it. I hope that this debate and the wider discussions that will follow the Government's proposed consultation paper on a Civil Service Act will encourage a considered debate and lead to a broad consensus on the framework in which we expect the Civil Service to operate.
I had intended to spend some time outlining the background to our role but, as I have only four minutes, I shall go on to the issues that I wish to raise. In the context of the debate, there are two questions I should like to explore. First, at a time of substantial reform—which I believe is necessary—and when, more than ever, concerns are being expressed about the blurring of boundaries within the executive, is there anything more that needs to be done to support the maintenance of an impartial and competent Civil Service which is equipped to respond to the challenges of today's world, deliver services and serve the best interests of everyone in society? Secondly, does an Order in Council, which is the current means by which the Civil Service is ordered, represent the right legislative vehicle?
First, are the current checks and balances currently in force sufficient to ensure an impartial Civil Service? The role of the Civil Service is clear; it is to serve successive governments with equal loyalty, integrity and deliver the agenda of the government of the day. Yet the point is increasingly being made that because the number of special advisers has increased considerably under the current administration, that in itself must be a sign that the impartiality of the Civil Service is at risk.
I do not see things that way. For me, the key issue is whether there is sufficient clarity about the roles of civil servants in general and about special advisers in particular; and whether there are effective mechanisms in place to monitor and enforce the various codes governing the conduct of special advisers and civil servants.
I believe that special advisers have a valuable role to play. Their place within the government system is now accepted and they are a useful part of the political landscape. Their relationship with permanent officials and Ministers, of course, depends on their personality, expertise and strength. As we know, things do go wrong. If they are given too much power or influence they will undermine the relationship between Ministers and civil servants.
It is in the public interest that the Civil Service itself should remain a main source of innovation, able to command the confidence of Ministers and execute their policies. It is important to get this balance right, otherwise we risk demoralising the Civil Service and making it more difficult to recruit and retain the high
quality individuals needed to deliver public services, now and in the future. Therefore we need clarity about respective roles and arrangements for dealing with situations where boundaries are in danger of being crossed.When special advisers were first appointed they were seen as a source of party political advice for Ministers, a means by which Ministers—and therefore the government of the day—remained connected with their party. But things have moved on, and the code of conduct for special advisers now includes as part of their role,
- "preparing speculative policy papers which can generate long-term policy thinking within the Department, including policies which reflect the political viewpoint of the Minister's party",
- "representing the views of their Minister to the media including a Party viewpoint, where they have been authorised by the Minister to do so".
All this seems to go beyond the role of special advisers as set out in the 1995 Order in Council, which states that their purpose is,
- "only of providing advice to any Minister".
There is also the question of the role of special advisers in the management of other civil servants. The Order in Council is again clear in specifying that, with three notable exceptions, special advisers do not manage other civil servants. Yet I saw an Answer to a Parliamentary Question recently which referred to no civil servants being "directly" managed by special advisers, apart from the three exceptions laid down in the Order in Council.
I am not a civil servant, but my knowledge of their specialist drafting skills over many years makes me wonder whether the incorporation of the word "directly" in the Answer might be a cover for relations between special advisers and civil servants that are closer than the Order in Council intended.
Such lack of clarity over the role and powers of special advisers leads not only to speculation about whether there is increased politicisation of the Civil Service but also confuses the rights and obligations of civil servants under both the Civil Service code and the special advisers code.
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