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Baroness Andrews: No, the Bill does not prevent that happening. It simply provides that during that six-week period the relevant agency will look at what is in the best interests of the child for that period. It may be that he will be placed with a foster parent or in a care home on a temporary basis.
Earl Howe: I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, for that helpful intervention. I also thank all Members of the Committee who have spoken in this useful debate, particularly the Minister for her gentle reply to me. She fully understands the motivation behind the amendment.
I have my doubts about the extent of the expertise present in some, if not many, local authorities to deal with the concerns of mothers who wish to have their very young children adopted, perhaps even before the baby is born. There is a need for a service for women with unplanned pregnancies. The fact is that some women do not want to have the baby they are expecting, nor do they want to have an abortion. Baby adoptions run currently at around 200 a year from care. Most of those entries into care and adoptions will not have been planned properly or very well at all. There is very little social work expertise left in this field and it is very difficult for women to get help while they are pregnant.
I think back particularly to an extraordinarily interesting meeting that the All Party Group on Adoption, of which I am a member, had last November when we heard from an organisation called ASIST—Adoption Support in Society Today. The representative of the organisation explained its role. It is a voluntary, independent adoption support group formed in 1993. It runs a telephone helpline and it became a registered charity last year. Its aims are to make people aware of adoption as an acceptable choice and as a successful alternative for a mother and child. Although ASIST is a very small organisation based in Somerset, calls come in from all around the country and, indeed, sometimes even from abroad. Most of the callers said that they knew nothing about the way adoption works or who to turn to for assistance in answering their questions. Those who tried to seek advice from midwives, medical social workers or GPs invariably found that those people did not know the answers, even to basic questions such as: "What happens if I decide to have my baby adopted?".
Others reported a negative response of the kind that said: "It is very early days, you will change your mind by the time the baby is born". Many mothers may indeed change their minds but, at the time of the inquiry the response they received was probably a euphemism for, "I don't know the answer", or perhaps even indicated a judgmental attitude, which, I am sorry to say, is common to a number of healthcare and social work professionals who simply do not agree with the idea of adoption at all. It was stated to us that they knew of social services departments which
claimed that baby adoption was not part of their ethos, and there were others who said that there was not really a call for that kind of service, despite it being a statutory obligation to provide it.The number of babies being adopted from care was stated to be 200 under the age of one and 1,600 between the ages of one and four during the year 2000. That suggested to us that social workers and other professionals are over-optimistic about the ability of teenagers or other single mothers to parent. Had they been properly counselled and received support and encouragement in their decision, some infants might have been prevented from being in the care system at all. So it was against that kind of background that the amendment was tabled.
I do not believe that it cuts across Clause 51(3) because it does not refer to an adoption order. The second subsection, at least, refers to a placement order. The first subsection, of course, refers to adoption but with the consent process built in. I understand where in that context Clause 51(3) cuts in, but I do not believe that what the noble Baroness said dealt with the issue, for example, of foundling children. Furthermore, although she referred to interim care orders, she did not fully take on board the fact that local authorities already have the power to come into a mother's hospital bedroom and take babies away at birth. They do so only for very good reason, where there is a perceived risk of significant harm, but the device of obtaining an interim care order or an emergency protection order is there.
The point I sought to make in my earlier remarks was that putting a baby in that position and then shunting the baby from pillar to post thereafter is a deeply unsatisfactory process. Why not recognise that there are rare cases where babies need to be protected from harm and try to create stability from day one?
A possible amendment to my amendment in subsection (2) might be to say that the procedure I suggest could take place only with the leave of the court, or something like that. However, I shall give the matter some further thought. I should like to conclude by thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Thomas, the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, and the noble Baroness, Lady Gould, for their helpful remarks earlier on in the debate. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendments Nos. 53A to 54C not moved.]
5.45 p.m.
Baroness Thomas of Walliswood moved Amendment No. 55:
- Page 14, line 15, at end insert "and every effort has been made to inform each parent or guardian or other persons holding parental responsibility"
The noble Baroness said: I rise to move this amendment, the meaning of which is self-evident, conscious of the fact that the Minister made some reference to this matter in reply to an earlier group of
amendments. I would like to make sure that we are satisfied that every parent, guardian or other person holding parental responsibility is searched for and contacted.This is perhaps a little beside the point, but I learned something recently which everybody else in this room may already know; namely, that in some families of African origin, but not all of them, the responsibility for the family goes down the mother's line; in others, it goes down the father's line. In many cases in such families, the natural person to take over the care of a child, if the mother's care fails, is the grandmother. My noble friend has referred previously to the importance of grandmothers.
I realise that that is slightly beyond the point, but there is a tradition in some communities as regards who holds subsidiary parental responsibility, as it were. There is a real meaning to those words, at least in some communities, although perhaps not in all. I beg to move.
Lord Campbell of Alloway: I support the amendment, save, of course, for the reasons I gave about other persons holding parental responsibility. But it is obviously an important addition to have in the statute that every effort should be made in this regard. I think that that is a constructive amendment.
Lord Astor of Hever: I agree with what my noble friend Lord Campbell of Alloway has said.
Baroness Andrews: I fully appreciate the intention behind the amendment, which we touched on in an earlier debate. The amendment aims to ensure that the court cannot make a placement order unless every effort has been made to notify the parents and everyone else with parental responsibility. The arrangements for notification are set out in Clause 136, which provides that the court rules must require certain persons to be notified of the date and place where the placement order application will be heard and of the fact that unless the person wishes or the court requires, the person need not attend. That is clear.
The people who have to be notified are those whose consent is needed for the making of the placement order, in so far as they can be found. Under the Bill, the people whose consent is required are first, the natural parents who have parental responsibility. Under the Children Act 1989, mothers have automatic parental responsibility, as do married fathers. Unmarried fathers can acquire parental responsibility either by marrying the mother of their child, or, under Clause 4 of the Bill, by agreement with the mother or by a court order. Under Clause 108 of the Bill they will also acquire parental responsibility automatically where they jointly register the birth with the mother.
Secondly, as we said previously, any guardian of the child. That means a guardian who may be appointed under Section 5 of the Children Act to act in the event of the parent's death. Once the Bill becomes law, this will also include a special guardian. Those are the only
people who can consent to the adoption of the child, as we have said, or to a placement order or to an adoption order.Other people may have parental responsibility, and indeed it is possible for parental responsibility to be shared. But, as we said earlier, it would not be appropriate for those people who are not the parents of the child or the guardians to consent to adoption or to a placement order.
The sharing of responsibility comes into play, for example through a care order where a local authority has parental responsibility. But under the current legislation a local authority cannot give legal consent to the adoption, nor would it be appropriate for it to do so. The same argument that we reiterated earlier holds where the child is under a residence order made in favour of someone other than a parent.
Clause 136—and this comes to the point which was made by the noble Baroness, Lady Thomas—provides that if none of the persons whose consent is required can be found, then any relative prescribed in the court rules who can be found should be notified instead. "Relative" is defined in Clause 139, and means in relation to a child, their grandparents, brothers, sisters, aunts and uncles, whether by full blood, half blood or by marriage. Those are the people who formally should receive notice of the placement order hearing.
The question has been raised as regards the position where the parents are separated, or one cannot be found. The agency needs the consent of all parents with parental responsibilities to placement for adoption. If one or other of them cannot be found, the agency will have to take all reasonable steps to find the other parent. Where it cannot find the other parent, the agency will have to consider seriously if it is still in the best interests of the child to be adopted. Those would be the sorts of cases where the agency would seek the guidance of the court. If we have a situation where one or neither parent can be found, there is obviously a serious issue to be resolved on behalf of the child.
I want to reassure the Committee that that is not the end of the story. I anticipate that the concern may be to ensure that other individuals holding parental responsibility—people who are significant in terms of the child, as we discussed earlier—are also properly involved in the adoption process. It is certainly our intention that they should be. When an adoption agency is considering whether a child ought to be placed for adoption, and therefore whether it should apply for a placement order, it will be bound by the duties set out in Clause 1. That includes, in Clause 1(4)(f), considering the child's relationship with any relatives, and with any others who may be of significance to the child.
The agency has to consider the wishes and feelings of these people, and their ability to care for the child and offer him a stable and secure home. That is part of the process of care and identification that occurs before the issue of placement order or adoption is even considered. The process will be set out in the adoption
agency regulations and in the guidance. In that respect it will follow the Adoption Agency Regulations 1983 which already set out that as part of the consideration the agency must establish whether there are any holders of parental responsibility under Section 4 of the Children Act.In considering the placement order, the court will have access to the agency report on the recommended placement, which will in future, as the current Schedule 2 report does, cover the child's relationship with his family and others of significance to him, and report on any alternatives to adoption considered. The court will also be bound by the duties under Clause 1(4)(f)in a similar manner to the agency, and will have to consider the child's relationship with his relatives and anyone else of significance to him. The court also has to consider, under Clause 1(6), all the alternatives to adoption.
I hope I have reassured the Committee that, while we do not consider that there needs to be formal notification given to all those with parental responsibility for the reasons given, we are clear that the views and wishes of all those with a significant relationship with the child must be considered by the court and by adoption agencies well before any court proceedings take place.
To reiterate the point about unmarried fathers, under the 1983 adoption agency regulations the local authority must make reasonable efforts to contact the unmarried father if it thinks it is in the child's best interest. We will place a similar requirement on agencies in the new regulations to be bound by good practice in that respect.
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