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Lord Hooson: My Lords, as a member of the Select Committee, I have only one question for the Minister. As I understood him, he said that the Government have taken outside advice. Was the advice legal or technical? Before we have a debate in this House on the subject, will he identify from whom that advice came?
Lord Bach: My Lords, I can tell the noble Lord that the advice was from outside government and that it was both technicalfrom Boeingand legal. I shall have to consider carefully whether to tell the noble Lord at this stage who supplied that legal advice. He and the House can take it from me that it was from an extremely distinguished Queen's Counsel.
I take this opportunityI have not done so previouslyto thank the noble Lord and all the others who played their part in the committee for the
incredibly long hours and the huge amount of work that they put in on this very vexed subject. Although the Select Committee will be unhappyif not worseat our conclusions, the Government are genuinely grateful for what they did.
Lord Burnham: My Lords, I find
Lord Williams of Mostyn: My Lords, very briefly, it is the turn of the Cross Benches.
Lord Ackner: My Lords, I forbear making any comment on the report. I confine myself to simple questions. First, the Minister accepts, I understand, that the air marshals had only very limited authority to find the airmen guilty. That was because the relevant words are "absolutely no doubt whatsoever". My central questions are these. Nowhere in their judgments did the air marshals recognise that vital limitation on the lawful exercise of that power. If the Minister does not agree, perhaps he will identify where it is so stated. Finally, nowhere in their judgment did the air marshals expressly or impliedly claim that they had "absolutely no doubt whatsoever" that the deceased airmenor one of themwere guilty of negligence. If the Minister does not agree, will he please identify what was the relevant statement in this regard?
Lord Bach: My Lords, of course the standard was very high indeed, but it was, as I said earlier, achievable. Indeed, it had been achieved on previous occasions. I am afraid that I do not have immediately available before me the answers to the questions of the noble and learned Lord, and I shall not waste the House's time looking them up. I promise to write to him in very short order.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Lord Whitty): My Lords, with the leave of the House, I shall now repeat a Statement made in another place by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. I begin by pointing out that, in parts, the Statement differs from the text available in the Printed Paper Office, largely as regards quotations, although the substance remains. The Statement is as follows:
"Foot and mouth disease is a devastating and highly infectious animal disease, feared and loathed across the world because of its impact and virulence. In Britain alone, the experiences of the 1967 outbreak are a remembered nightmare in many rural communities. But what hit us in February 2001 was, as Dr Anderson notes, due to a,
'rare set of circumstances [which] had already determined that this would be one of the worst epidemics of FMD the modern world has ever seen. Numbers alone cannot capture the sense of what unfolded. The great epidemic of 2001 left an indelible mark on communities, businesses and people from all walks of life'.
"Separately, in his comment and observations he draws on the views and evidence put before him. Here, there is certainly scope for different interpretationeven for disagreement. However, he asks in his introduction whether, as a first step,
'DEFRA [can] simply ... admit that government made mistakes during its handling of the crisis and that all involved are determined to learn from these mistakes'.
"But if we are to learn the lessons from those dreadful months, we need most to consider whether, while, as I say, there are bound to have been mistakes, there were structural defects.
"Dr Anderson identifies what he regards as mistakes of strategy. I think it is right to say that many, if not all of these, we as government already acknowledge. Where there may be room for disagreement is on the question of how much of that was evident only, or at least primarily, with hindsight. As Dr Anderson himself says in the report on the issue of an immediate national ban on animal movements:
'Even today the State Veterinary Service believes it would not have had the justification or the support immediately to introduce widespread restrictions'.
'The disease could have been present at Burnside Farm for weeks, but it went unreported, despite the requirement of farmers to report suspected cases of notifiable diseases'.
"Both reports also highlight the importance of contingency planning. Dr Anderson examines the pre-existing contingency plan, which was followed, but he demonstrates that, although meeting the international standards then expectedthe European Commission judged the UK's readiness for disease outbreak as among the best in Europewe can see with hindsight its deficiencies. But that is an admission that I make with hindsight. The European Commission is on record as having said recently:
'It cannot be reasonably expected from any Member State to design a contingency plan for the event of an epidemic causing more outbreaks within months than the 10 years' estimate for the whole Community'.
"Dr Anderson makes some trenchant criticisms to which I shall return, but he also deals comprehensively with the myriad conspiracy theories in circulation then and since. He does not
"we found no evidence to support such a suggestion".
"Dr Anderson calls for a mechanism to assess potential domestic civil threats and steps to improve our capacity to handle an emergency of national proportions. We have set up the Civil Contingencies Secretariat in the Cabinet Office, reporting to a Cabinet Committee chaired by my right honourable friend the Home Secretary, which is intended to do just that through horizon scanning, an assessment of capability and through work with departments facing disruptive challenges on how to prevent or manage crises. He also identifies the need to establish 'trigger points', where issues move to a new phase of crisis handling. Again, we agree.
"Also, both reports make important recommendations about how the Government should improve their ability to respond effectively in the event of a disease outbreak. Again, I can say that we support the thrust of these recommendations, especially where they relate to the need for high-quality management information systems.
"The Army is praised, rightly, for the role it played in helping to deal with the enormous logistical challengeone it has identified as of larger dimensions logistically than the Gulf War. It did, indeed, do a remarkable job. I believe that, had we had better information systems in place, it would have been called into action earlier. But, as Dr Anderson demonstrates, that is not so in the context, as is so often claimed, of the Northumberland report, but when disposal options were failing to keep pace with slaughter.
"In addition, knowing what we now know, we would, on any future occasion, work on the presumption that a national ban on livestock movements would apply when the first FMD case was confirmed. But, because of the early silent spread of the disease in this outbreak, it is important not to assume that it would ever have been easy to check. Dr Anderson himself said that,
'even a perfectly implemented cull of infected premises within 24 hours of discovery would not, on its own, have controlled that epidemic until the disease itself had reduced the density of susceptible farms to such an extent that the epidemic ended naturally'.
"Both inquiries have called for a strategic approach to animal health and disease control policies, and endorsed the call in the report of the Policy Commission on Food and Farming, chaired by Sir Don Curry, for a comprehensive animal health strategy. My department will be opening discussions with industry and other interests on the content and coverage of such a strategy in the near future. It would need to deal with the protection of public health, animal disease prevention control, surveillance, animal identification, animal welfare and emergency preparedness.
"One other key issue which draws much comment is the contentious issue of vaccination, on which both inquiries made recommendations. There are two specific recommendations which we can immediately accept: that, as in 2001, we should ensure that the option of emergency vaccination forms part of any future strategy for the control of foot and mouth disease; and that any emergency vaccination policy should in future not be 'vaccinate to kill' but 'vaccinate to live'. But that does not require action from Government alone. It requires acceptance that meat and meat products from vaccinated animals enter the food chain normally.
"Quite rightly, the inquiry reports address most of their recommendations to Government. But they both also recognise that the farming industry shares responsibility for minimising disease risks. Dr Anderson concludes that the Government can do only so much to prevent a recurrence of the disease. The farming industry has a crucial role to play, particularly with regard to biosecurity.
"This reminder is particularly pertinent after last month's foot and mouth disease scare in the Midlands. It is not enough for Government to have the right approach or proper rules to mitigate disease risk. Everyone in the industry must follow those rules and they must be properly enforced. In that recent episode, existing pig identification rules were not followed. Had the tests confirmed the disease, the effort to track down the source of the infection would have been severely hampered. This episode strengthens our resolve to continue to work with the livestock industry to establish better livestock identification.
"But both this episode and the report lend weight to the call by Sir Don Curry's Policy Commission for Farm Assurance Schemes, owned and operated by the industry itself, to reward good farm management practice in biosecurity and other areas. The Government endorse this principle.
"While the Government will give full consideration to all the lessons in the two reports, there are two areas in which we can and will move
"Secondly, the Government need to take an early decision on the animal movement rules to apply from the late summer, and in particular on the 20-day standstill. We will consult quickly with industry stakeholders in the next week or two, in the light of what the two reports say, on interim rules to apply from late August.
"This is a serious report into an outbreak of foot and mouth disease which was devastating for many parts of our country. I want to make one more quote from Dr Anderson. He said:
'Even had everything been done perfectly by all those concerned to tackle the disease, the country would have had a major epidemic with massive consequences. Second, many farmers, local people and government officials made heroic efforts to fight the disease and limits its effects. Through their efforts it was finally overcome and eradicated after 221 days, one day less than the epidemic in 1967-68'.
My Lords, that concludes the Statement. I apologise for the fact that the quotations were not in the original version.
Baroness Byford: My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement that was made in another place earlier today and also for the facility of being able to look at the report at MAFF this morning. These three wide-ranging reports confirm that the Government's handling of the foot and mouth disease crisis, particularly at its onset, was, at best, ineptso inept that the outbreak was much deeper and lasted much longer than it perhaps may have done. At this stage, I remind the House of my family's farming interests.
The Royal Society makes a number of recommendations relating to its concern about the lack of research. Will the Minister indicate whether new money will be available for funding research into, for example, alternative methods of disease control, alternative methods of cleansing, and particularly vaccination? Does the Minister envisage the thorough testing and approval of vaccines and the concept of "vaccinate to live"the particularly welcome comment at the end of the reportfor animals to live afterwards and then to cull? Will the Government make use of some of the overseas vaccines that are available?
The Anderson report is scathing about the lack of funding at Pirbright. Do the Government's future contingency plans include an intention to expand the important role of Pirbright in having acceptable vaccines and the testing facilities to which I referred earlier? The question of vaccination arose at all stages as various Statements were made to the House. Noble Lords will want further clarification of that matter in addition to what the Minister has said.
The Northumberland report on 1967-1968 showed that there were 24 almost simultaneous outbreaks at the beginning of that outbreak. Will the Minister indicate why the UK contingency plan this time limited it to a scenario of only 10 farms? I do not understand why it should be lessened. Who made that decision, and why was it made?
On decisions, will the Minister explain it took 25 days before COBRA was called in; why it took nearly 31 days to call in the Army, when in fact the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, who is in her place, and I raised the issue of the Army being called in on 8th March; and also why the scientific group was not established until 35 days after the onset of the disease? Those are disturbing figures. Will the Minister explain why, according to Anderson, scientific decisions were taken outside of COBRA by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Agriculture in the middle of the outbreak?
The Anderson report is also outspoken on the failures of joined-up governmentmembers of various departments did not talk to each otherand the failure of the IT system has also been highlighted. In the Statement that has just been repeated, Anderson said that substantial deficiencies in management systems added to the difficulties.
I turn to the question of meat imports, which I divide into two categories, as does Anderson. Anderson accepts that the disease was not caused by the legal importation of meat, but was much more likely to have been caused by the illegal importation of meat, in respect of which, as noble Lords will know, we have called many times for a tightening up of the rules. Will the Minister therefore say why it has taken almost a year for the Government to put into action some extra contingency plans to stop the import of illegal meat into our country?
Throughout the course of this disease, we have unfortunately experienced a breakdown of trust not only between the farming communities but also the rural communities and the general public. The devastation directly affected farmers. It also affected those farmers who could not move their animals but who were not directly affected themselves. It affected rural business, and particularly tourism. I should therefore like to ask the Minister what proposals the Government have to ensure that whatever plans they put forward appreciate the very close interlink between the health of our livestock and the health of the countryside and rural business and tourism.
I turn to the Animal Health Bill, which we shall debate later this week. I again quote from Anderson:
The Anderson report also shows that in the 1967 to 1968 FMD outbreak, 75 per cent of costs went in compensation to farmers. But in the 2001 outbreak that proportion was only 40 per cent. Can the Minister indicate how the Government will control that 60 per cent of costs in any futureheaven forbidoutbreak? Perhaps he may explain where the 60 per cent has gone?
I do not wish to shoot arrows. The report reflects that mistakes were made. I am grateful that the Statement and the Government accept that. However, we want to learn by those mistakes and to see where we can go.
All the reports reflect inadequate action at the start. Had there been more robust action the disease would not have spread as much. I call on the Minister and the Government to have a full debate when we return early in October. It is impossible in the short space of time left before the recess to do anything like justice to these three important reports. Indeed, it will not surprise the Minister when I say that however good these reports are, we should have had a full public inquiry.
The Government have expressed their regrets for some of the mistakes made and are determined to learn. Indeed, the industry should learn in order to find better ways forward. But I ask that we have regular updating; involvement of the stakeholders; and rehearsals of contingency plans. I understand that on a regular basis a review will be brought before Parliament.
It is impossible to pay tribute to all those who worked hard under difficult circumstances and to express sufficiently our sorrow and support for those who were devastated by the outbreak. The noble Lord, at the end of the Statement, referred to the 20-day standstill, which is still in being. As he knows, there is great concern in the industry about that being in effect long-term. Can the noble Lord tell us more about the Government's position on the current 20-day standstill? I thank him for repeating the Statement. I look forward to his being able to assure the House that we shall have a full debate when we return in October.
Lord Greaves: My Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for repeating the Statement and for the courtesy of allowing me to see the report this morning. I associate these Benches with a great deal of what the noble Baroness, Lady Byford, said. I shall attempt not to repeat too much of it.
These three reports are an important stage in getting the farming industry and the countryside back to something like normalor what normal will be in the futureafter the devastation of the foot and mouth outbreak. They also will provide useful background for our discussions in the next few days and after the recess when the Animal Health Bill is in Committee.
The immediate issue raised in the Anderson report is the question of the 20-day standstill, to which the noble Baroness referred. There is a great feeling in the industry that not only would it be devastating to keep a 20-day standstill for a substantial period of time and through the autumn of this year, but that it is also almost unenforceable, placing farmers in a where they would feel the need to break it on a large scale. It is important, therefore, that the Government find a compromise, which is accepted on all sides, which works, and which will do the job we want it to do. So we very much welcome the commitment in the Statement to a speedy review.
There are some interesting statistics in various parts of the report. On page 27, for example, it reveals that the State Veterinary Service has been run down. In 1979 to 1980 it employed 597 vets and in 1995 it employed 300. In that period it was believedunder the then Conservative governmentthat the state ought not to be doing things, that other people could do them and that self-regulation was the way forward. It was also a time when efficiency savings were much in vogue. That is a good example of those two dogmas failing us badly. The reduced MAFF presence in the regions during that period and the cuts in researchnot least at Pirbrightare other examples that should provide us with food for thought for policy in the future. I, too, ask the Government what they are doing to put more resources into those and similar areas.
The two sectors devastated more than any others by foot and mouth were farming and tourism. Tourism throughout the outbreak got a worse deal than farming. At least farmers whose animals were culled got compensation, although many others did not. On page 133 of the report, there are interesting statistics providing the sectoral economic effect of FMD 2001 to 2005. It suggests that for agricultural producers there will be a net loss of £710,000. For tourism, it is £5 billion. That indicates the huge impact on the whole of the varied tourist industry. It is absolutely vital that any future outbreak is not allowed to impact in that way on such an important industry, not just in terms of this country's economy but for the whole way in which the countryside now works.
The report's recommendations seem rather weak in the whole area of tourism and the rural economy in general. However, I very much welcome the statement from the Minister that in a future outbreak they would not be looking to impose any blanket ban on the closure of footpaths. There are all kinds of things which occurred during this outbreak which must never happen again. I cannot say that foot and mouth disease must never happen again. It is impossible to guarantee that. I mean the way that images of funeral pyres were beamed around the world; the way in which large areas of countryside were turned into war zones
where it was living hell, not just for the affected farmers but for many other people; the human misery and tragedy, the suicides that took placeand the many other people who must have been on the brink of suicideand the huge mistakes made right at the beginning in declaring that the countryside was closed.I believe that vaccination and what the Follett report refers to as "preventive vaccination to live" is a fundamental key to the future. It is a fundamental key in getting the trust of farmers as well as the rest of society. The recommendations set out in the Royal Society report are vital. Again I very much welcome the statement by the Government that preventive vaccination to live would form a key part of future strategy. The Follett report points out that the whole area of vaccination needs a great deal more research before it becomes a practical strategy. It suggests a timescale of 18 months. I ask the Government whether this will be an absolute top priority.
The publication of these reports is a turning point. It is a chance to lance the wounds and to start a healing process in the countryside based on developing a consensus for the future. But I believe the Government must go further than merely admitting that mistakes were made. It would help enormously if they could apologise for those mistakes in a fulsome and genuine kind of way, saying that they are sorry for the farmers who suffered; that they are sorry for the tourist industry; sorry for everything else that happened in the countryside last year; and sorry for their contribution to what happened. Have the Government the guts and the sense to face the countryside and say, "Yes, we didn't just make mistakes in hindsight, but we are deeply sorry for them. We want to work with you to stop them happening again".
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