Judgments - Magill v. Porter Magill v. Weeks

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    138. Subsection (3) permitted an appeal against the auditor's certificate to be made to the court. Subsection (4) applied where a certificate requiring payment of more than £2000 had been made, or upheld, and disqualified the individual concerned from being a member of any local authority for a period of five years. And subsection (5) required payment of the certified sum to be made within fourteen days of the certificate becoming final.

    139. The purpose of a section 20 certificate was compensatory, not penal. Its purpose was not to punish the wrongdoer but to require the quantified loss caused to the local authority by the "wilful misconduct" to be made good. There was no element of discretion. If the officer or member had been guilty of "wilful misconduct" as a result of which loss had been incurred it was the duty of the auditor to issue a section 20 certificate specifying the amount of the loss. Of course, it will not be every case of political corruption, or other misconduct, in local government that will lead to financial loss to the local authority concerned. But many will do so and, in those cases, the powers and duties of auditors under section 20 of the 1982 Act (and under section 19 as well, although nothing turns on that section in this case) constituted, in my opinion, powerful and valuable protection to the public.

    140. Section 20 of the 1982 Act was replaced by section 18 of the 1998 Act which was to the same effect. But section 18 of the 1998 Act has been repealed by the Local Government Act 2000 and not replaced. The 2000 Act also substantially re-cast the investigation and report provisions that had been contained first in the 1982 Act and then in the 1998 Act. The institutional protection provided by statute against political corruption and other misconduct by members of local authorities is now confined to the investigation, report and publicity for which the 2000 Act and an amended version of section 17 of the 1998 Act (formerly section 19 of the 1982 Act) make provision. There is now no statutory provision directed to restitution or compensation for loss caused by any wrongdoing that the investigation and report may have exposed. Certificates such as those issued against and challenged by Dame Shirley Porter and Mr David Weeks in the present case cannot now be issued. Local authorities that want to recover from delinquent councillors the loss caused by the delinquency must now do so by means of legal remedies available under the general law. However, section 20 of the 1982 Act was in force at the time the events material to this case took place and the propriety of the auditor's certificates against Dame Shirley and Mr Weeks must be tested on that footing.

    141. My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft the opinion on this appeal of my noble and learned friend, Lord Bingham of Cornhill. As Lord Bingham has observed, the facts that have given rise to the appeal are set out at some length in the judgments of the Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal. Lord Bingham has highlighted some of the key events. I gratefully adopt and need not repeat those highlights.

    142. The factual findings made by the auditor, Mr John Magill, and by the Divisional Court against Dame Shirley Porter and Mr David Weeks were findings that justify being described as findings of political corruption. Dame Shirley and Mr Weeks, having appealed unsuccessfully to the Divisional Court, appealed successfully to the Court of Appeal. Mr Magill has appealed to this House. For the purposes of this appeal the parties have prepared a statement of agreed facts and issues. The contents of the statement were agreed by Mr Howell QC on behalf of Mr Magill, by Mr McMullen QC on behalf of Dame Shirley and by Mr Cakebread of counsel on behalf of Mr Weeks. The contents of the statement, in my opinion, endorse the essential findings of the auditor and of the Divisional Court regarding the conduct of Dame Shirley and Mr Weeks and justify the description of that conduct as political corruption. Thus:

      (1)  As a consequence of local government elections in May 1986 reducing the Conservative majority from 26 to 4, Dame Shirley, the leader of the Conservatives on the Westminster Council, was determined that a greater majority should be achieved at the 1990 elections (paragraphs 9 and 10 of the statement).

      (2)  Eight marginal wards, the "key wards", were identified. The intention of Dame Shirley and Mr Weeks was to reduce the number of Labour voters and increase the number of Conservative voters in these key wards. The target was an overall increase of 2,200 Conservative supporters in these wards (paragraphs 13 to 15).

      (3)  This increase was to be brought about by selling council-owned residential properties in the eight key wards when they became vacant. It was believed that owner-occupiers were more likely to vote Conservative than were council tenants (paragraphs 16 and 28).

      (4)  The Director of Housing advised in May 1986 and again in March 1987 that if all council properties in the eight key wards were designated for selling, the council would not be able to meet its statutory housing obligations (paragraphs 18 and 29).

      (5)  Nonetheless, at a meeting on 24 March 1987, attended by Dame Shirley and Mr Weeks, it was decided to sell annually 250 properties in the eight key wards (paragraph 35).

      (6)  On 5 May 1987 Mr Sullivan QC met council officials in consultation. He was informed that the majority (Conservative) group wished to target sales in marginal wards for electoral advantage. He advised that this would not be lawful, that the designation of properties for sale had to be done for proper reasons and that, in identifying the properties to be sold, the same criteria had to be applied across the whole city (paragraph 40).

      (7)  The critical paragraph in the agreed statement of facts is paragraph 42. It reads:

    "On the evening of 5 May 1987, the chairmen's group agreed to target designated sales city-wide in order to produce the agreed number of designated sales in marginal wards. The group decided to adopt the course … of increasing the number of designated sales so as to be able to achieve the policy objective of 250 sales per annum in the marginal wards."

    143. That was the policy eventually carried into effect via the housing committee decision on 8 July 1987 (paragraph 58 of the statement). It led to the sale of 618 council properties (some were let on long leases for substantial premiums). It is clear that the policy was adopted by the chairmen's group, led by Dame Shirley and Mr Weeks, and was thereafter promoted by Dame Shirley and Mr Weeks, as well as by others, not in order to achieve sales city-wide but in order to achieve 250 sales per annum in the eight key wards. And those sales were for the purpose of replacing probable Labour voters by probable Conservative voters. The city-wide policy was no more than a cloak to give apparent legality to the sales in the eight key wards which leading counsel had rightly warned would be unlawful unless part of a city-wide policy adopted for a proper reason. The sales of the 618 properties involved the exercise of local government powers to sell council properties (see section 32, Housing Act 1985) not for the purpose for which those powers were granted but in order to increase the number of Conservative voters in marginal wards. It has not been in dispute before your Lordships that this purpose for selling is an unlawful purpose.

    144. In the Court of Appeal Kennedy LJ commented on the political reality that many government decisions, whether at local government level or in central government, are taken with an eye to the electoral effect they may have. He said:

    "Some of the submissions advanced on behalf of the auditor have been framed in such a way as to suggest that any councillor who allows the possibility of electoral advantage even to cross his mind before he decides upon a course of action is guilty of misconduct. In local, as in national, politics many if not most decisions carry an electoral tag, and all politicians are aware of it." ([2000] 2 WLR 1420, 1444)."

The Lord Justice was, of course, correct. But there is all the difference in the world between a policy adopted for naked political advantage but spuriously justified by reference to a purpose which, had it been the true purpose, would have been legitimate, and a policy adopted for a legitimate purpose and seen to carry with it significant political advantage. The agreed statement of facts places the policy adopted by the chairmen's group on 5 May 1987 fairly and squarely in the former category.

    145. My Lords, there are three issues which arise on this appeal on which I wish to comment. The first is whether Dame Shirley and Mr Weeks were, for section 20 purposes, guilty of wilful misconduct. The second is whether, if they were, that misconduct was causative of loss to the council. The third is how such loss should be quantified. But, my Lords, the backcloth to each of these issues is that Dame Shirley and Mr Weeks stand convicted of political corruption. They stand so convicted on the basis of facts which are not now in dispute.

Wilful misconduct

    146. It has been submitted on behalf of Dame Shirley and Mr Weeks that whether or not their conduct in promoting the policy of designated sales in the eight key wards was misconduct, it lacked the quality of being "wilful". This, it is said, is because, relying on advice which they believed had been given by Mr Sullivan QC, they did not realise that the policy was unlawful. In Lloyd v McMahon [1987] AC 625 Woolf LJ said that misconduct "would only be wilful if the councillors were doing something which they knew to be wrong or about which they were recklessly indifferent as to whether it was wrong or not" (p 674). It has been common ground before your Lordships that this is the correct test.

    147. It is said that, in reliance on Mr England's note of what Mr Sullivan QC had said in consultation on 5 May 1987, Dame Shirley and Mr Weeks thought that it would be lawful for them to achieve their purpose of designating properties for sale in the eight key wards in order to achieve annual sales of 250 properties in those wards provided that there were similar designations of properties for sale city-wide. Mr England's note reads, so far as material, as follows:

    "Counsel advises that designated estates should be identified in marginal and non-marginal wards in order to protect the council. The group will, therefore, need to decide whether the 250 target applies across the city or whether in fact 250 sales in marginal wards are required in which case following counsel's advice, somewhere in the region of 300-350 properties will need to be sold across the city."

    148. But Dame Shirley and Mr Weeks knew that a policy adopted for the purpose of electoral advantage in the key wards would be unlawful. And nothing in Mr England's note of what Mr Sullivan QC had said, or indeed in what Mr Sullivan had actually said, indicated that the adoption of the city-wide policy in order to achieve the unlawful electoral purpose in the eight key wards would be any less unlawful than the adoption for that purpose of a policy in respect of the eight key wards alone. As Lord Bingham has noted in paragraph 39 of his opinion, Mr Sullivan was never asked the critical question, namely, whether the designated sales policy would become lawful if, with the same objective, the designated sales policy were extended city-wide. I agree with Lord Bingham that no reason for doubting the clear findings, adverse to Dame Shirley and Mr Weeks, of the auditor and the Divisional Court has been shown.


    149. Dame Shirley and Mr Weeks rely on the housing committee's decision of 8 July 1987 as breaking the chain of causation. The designated sales policy was implemented because the housing committee had resolved to adopt it. If the housing committee had not so resolved, the policy would not have been implemented. Neither Dame Shirley nor Mr Weeks was a member of the housing committee. Neither of them was present at the 8 July meeting. Mr McMullen submitted that a city-wide designated sales policy was a policy capable of being a lawful one. So it was. He submitted that the housing committee resolution that adopted the policy was capable of being a lawful resolution. I agree. He submitted that if a majority of members of the committee voted in favour of the resolution for reasons that were lawful, then the resolution would have been lawful, notwithstanding that misconduct on the part of the leader of the council and her deputy had attended the formulation and promotion of the policy adopted by the resolution. Again, I agree.

    150. It was argued on behalf of Mr Magill that even if the resolution were a lawful one, nonetheless the misconduct of Dame Shirley and Mr Weeks was not spent and could still be regarded, for section 20 purposes, as having "caused the loss". But for their misconduct, the designated sales policy would not have been formulated and placed before the housing committee for approval. I agree that, applying a "but for" test, it could be said that their misconduct had caused the loss. But I do not think that that is enough. If the housing committee resolution was a lawful one, then it was lawful for it to be implemented by the council. Its implementation was within the statutory powers of the council. This is not a case in which the council lacked power to carry out the property sales contemplated by the policy.

    151. So, if the improper electoral advantage in the eight key wards, the purpose of the designated sales policy, had been made plain at the housing committee meeting and had been repudiated by a majority of those present who had then voted in favour of the policy for unimpeachable reasons, it would have been plain that the misconduct had become spent even if, without the misconduct, the policy would never have found its way to the committee. I find it difficult to follow why the case would be different if, without an explicit disclosure and repudiation of the policy, a lawful resolution adopting the policy were passed. I accept that a corrupt principal can attain his unlawful object via the medium of an innocent agent (see Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378 at 385), but I do not think a local authority committee can be treated as merely an agent for the leader of the council, no matter how influential he or she may be. I am, therefore, disposed to agree with Mr McMullen, and to disagree with the Divisional Court (see 96 LGR, 157, 181), that if the Housing Committee resolution could be shown to have been a lawful resolution, the causative effect of Dame Shirley's and Mr Weeks' misconduct would, for section 20 purposes, be spent.

    152. There were twelve members of the housing committee. Seven of them voted in favour of the designated sales policy. Five voted against. Of the seven, two of them, Mr Hartley and Dr Dutt, were found guilty of misconduct by the auditor. Each, in the auditor's opinion, "took into account the electoral advantage of the Conservative party and sought to promote it in his voting … ". The auditor issued a section 20 certificate against Mr Hartley but Mr Hartley succeeded on appeal to the Divisional Court. In the view of the Divisional Court he was guilty of misconduct but not of wilful misconduct (see p 199). It follows, however, from the finding of misconduct that Mr Hartley's vote at the housing committee meeting was invalid.

    153. As to Dr Dutt, he took his own life before the auditor made his final findings. The auditor, in his report, said:

    "My provisional findings and views were adverse to Dr Dutt . . . In letters to me Dr Dutt disputed my provisional findings and views. Shortly thereafter, he took his own life. I make no findings of personal liability of Dr Dutt." (para 1903)

    154. Mr McMullen has submitted that Dr Dutt must be treated as exonerated from misconduct. I do not agree. Dr Dutt was exonerated from wilful misconduct, but the provisional findings of misconduct were unchanged. In my opinion Dr Dutt's vote falls into the same state as that of Mr Hartley. It was invalid. As for the other five members of the committee who voted in favour of the resolution, they so voted because the resolution was Conservative party policy. They did not know that the purpose of the resolution was to obtain electoral advantage in the eight key wards. They did not know that that was the reason why the policy had been adopted. They may very well have supposed that the resolution reflected their party's general dislike of social housing and bias in favour of owner occupation. I do not think, in these circumstances, that their votes can be disregarded on the ground that they were invalid. But their votes were insufficient in number to carry the resolution. Five valid votes in favour of the resolution and five against would have produced a tie which, in theory, could have been resolved by the chairman's casting vote. But the chairman was Mr Hartley and any casting vote of his would, for the reasons already discussed, have been an invalid vote.

    155. In my opinion, therefore, the resolution purportedly passed at the housing committee meeting was not a valid resolution, the wilful misconduct of Dame Shirley and Mr Weeks in promoting the policy purportedly adopted by the resolution was not spent and the chain of causation was not broken. In my opinion, their misconduct caused, for section 20 purposes, the 618 sales by the council that produced the loss.

Quantification of the loss

    156. The issue is whether Walker LJ's disagreement with the basis on which the Divisional Court had quantified the loss was correct.

    157. The 618 designated properties were sold with vacant possession. They were sold by the council at a discount against their vacant possession market value. The council had power to sell at a discount. If the sales had been lawful, no complaint about the discount could have been made. The question is whether, the sales being unlawful, the amount of the discount represents an item of loss caused by the wilful misconduct. The rival arguments, as I understand them, are these:

      (1)  The properties were, before being designated for sale and becoming vacant, occupied by council tenants. Their value so tenanted was a good deal less than their value with vacant possession. If, on becoming vacant, they had been re-let to those on the council's waiting list for social housing, their value so re-let would, similarly, have been a good deal less than their value with vacant possession. The amount of the discount at which the properties were sold may be taken, on a rough and ready footing, as representing the difference in value between the properties let as social housing and the properties with vacant possession. So, if the council recover the amount of the discount the council will be in a better financial position than it would have been if the unlawful designated sales policy had never been adopted. This argument, expressed by Robert Walker LJ more lucidly than I have done, was concurred in by Kennedy LJ. It has been espoused by Mr McMullen and Mr Cakebread.

      (2)  The alternative argument proceeds like this. The council has a statutory housing obligation and a long list of people who need to be housed. The unlawful sales reduced the council's stock of social housing. In order to replenish its stock and restore the position to what it was before the sales took place, the council would have to purchase properties in the open market. It would have to pay vacant possession prices. Accordingly, the loss it suffered by reason of the misconduct included the discounts at which the properties were sold. This was the approach of the Divisional Count. It was supported by Mr Howell.

    158. The answer to the question as to which approach is the right one does not, in my opinion, depend at all upon the manner in which the properties appeared in the council's accounts. The quantification of loss for section 20 purposes should, in my view, apply the same principles as are applicable to quantification of damages in tort. As a result of the wrongful acts of Dame Shirley and Mr Weeks the council suffered loss. What was that loss? It lost the properties that were sold, but it received the purchase price that was paid for them. Immediately before sale, the properties were vacant. They were sold with vacant possession but the council did not receive a vacant possession price. In my opinion, the discount represented a true loss suffered by the council. Interest on the discounted purchase price since its receipt and interest on the amount of the discount from the date of the sale ought, on the assumption that interest rates more or less reflect rates of inflation in property values, to enable the council to replace the sold housing stock. Thus, to treat the discounts as items of loss seems to me to produce a just result, in line with the intentions underlying section 20.

    159. The problem, as it seems to me, with Robert Walker LJ's approach, is that it attributes no value to the benefit to the council of owning properties which are available to be used for social housing. The sale of the properties deprived the council of that benefit. The council can restore that benefit only by purchasing similar properties in the open market. The value of that benefit can be taken, again on a rough and ready basis, as being equivalent to the discounts.

    160. To allow the council to recover the discounts as items of loss does not, in my opinion, involve any element of double counting. A separate item of loss allowed by the Divisional Court was £4.237m, representing extra costs of housing homeless people which the council had to incur as a result of its own stock of social housing having been depleted by the sales of the 618 properties. Robert Walker LJ thought that to allow the discounts to be recovered as well as the £4.237m would be inconsistent and involve double counting. I do not think so. The £4.237m covered the extra costs of homelessness over the period starting from the date on which the properties, on becoming vacant, were available for re-letting and ending on the date of the auditor's certificate. Thereafter the loss of the 618 properties from the housing stock is covered by the capital sum received (or receivable) by the council (ie the discounted proceeds of sale plus the amount of the discounts) that enables it to replace the sold properties. There is no double counting.

Bias and Unfairness

    161. There was a fourth issue raised by Dame Shirley and Mr Weeks. They submitted that the manner in which the auditor had gone about his task of fact finding was attended by at least the appearance of bias against them and that that feature of the case, coupled with the time it has taken for the case to come to finality, represented such a degree of unfairness as to infringe their right to a fair trial (see article 6, ECHR). These submissions fail, in my opinion, for the reasons given by my noble and learned friend Lord Hope of Craighead. I want to add just one comment on the issue of unfairness

    162. One of the most striking features of the case is the enormous amount that under the auditor's certificates Dame Shirley and Mr Weeks were adjudged liable to pay. The amount, £31m odd, seems enormous not because it does not accurately reflect the loss caused to the council by Dame Shirley's and Mr Weeks' misconduct but because it is so out of line with what most people would regard as a proportionate punishment for their misconduct. There is, I think, an almost instinctive feeling that the requirement that they pay the certified amount is unfair.

    163. This instinctive feeling, however, overlooks the very important fact that the purpose of a section 20 certificate is to compensate the local authority for loss. The purpose is not one of punishment. Nor does the amount to be certified lie in the discretion of the certifying auditor. If wilful misconduct has been proved it is his duty to certify the full amount of the loss thereby caused. The size of the amount so certified can no more represent an article 6 unfairness than can the size of an award of damages for tort or breach of contract. Since, for the reasons given by Lord Hope, there was no procedural unfairness in the proceedings which have culminated in the appeal to this House, there is no further ECHR point that can be taken.


    164. For the reasons given in this opinion in addition to those given by Lord Bingham, with which I am in full agreement, I would allow the appeal and restore the order of the Divisional Court.


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