13th REPORT, SESSION 2000-2001: A COMMUNITY
IMMIGRATION POLICY
Response
INTRODUCTION
The Government welcomes this report which further
develops a mature public debate on the issues surrounding immigration,
and specifically those which arise from the Commission's Communication
on a Community Immigration Policy.
This memorandum responds to each of the Committee's
conclusions individually responding to paragraphs 132 to 173 of
the report.
THE CASE
FOR FACILITATING
LEGAL ECONOMIC
MIGRATION
International migration and globalisation
132. In a free society immigration is
inevitable. It has continued on a large scale despite the so-called
"zero immigration policies" of the last 30 years. But
immigration into the United Kingdom, or into other EU Member States,
is just part of the story. Large-scale movements into and out
of the United Kingdom and the EU as a whole have in recent years
tended to result in relatively small net immigration. In the United
Kingdom, immigration from outside the EU has tended to include
large numbers from the "Old Commonwealth", from North
America and from the Far East, as well as from the "New Commonwealth".
Thus the notion that there is a given flow of migratory pressure
in one direction, and that the United Kingdom or the EU can simply
open or shut the "tap" to regulate this pressure, is
false. Given that immigration is such a politically sensitive
issue, it is vital that the real scale and nature of migratory
movements should be more widely known. We therefore welcome the
opening up of public debate on immigration policy in the last
year, to which the Commission's Communication has made a significant
contribution. (paragraph 39)
The UK Government also welcomes the Commission's
paper. It has come at a time when, here in the UK we are considering
how best to maximise the important social and economic contribution
that managed migration can make. The recently published Home Office
research has made a valuable contribution to this debate and has
drawn attention in particular to the scale and nature of migratory
movements.
133. Globalisation has had an enormous
economic and cultural impact on all developed societies. The constantly
increasing movement of people around the world is just one aspect
of this, facilitated by the growth in international air traffic,
increasing wealth and the affordability of transport, and the
proliferation of sources of information concerning other countries.
The advent of global communications and increased mobility through
cheaper international travel make long-distance migration a more
realistic option and a more widespread aspiration. In welcoming
the potential benefits of globalisation we recognise that there
will be an inevitable impact on migratory pressures. (paragraph
43)
The Government agrees that migration, in all
its forms, is an increasingly important international phenomenon
linked to globalisation. The world has become smaller. People
move, work and trade across international boundaries in ways that
were unthinkable even a few years ago. Governments, including
EU Member States, must try to make sense of these developments
and that is why the migration debate is so important.
134. It is doubtless the case that many
migrants are seeking better economic opportunities in a wealthier
host country. But economic factors are not necessarily the only,
or even the primary, motivation for some migrants. For example,
in 1997 almost two thirds of non-UK national immigrants into the
United Kingdom were from developed countries. On the other hand,
the EU's experience in successive enlargements has been that citizens
of poorer Member States have not taken advantage of their unquestioned
right to move to more prosperous Member States in anything like
the numbers that might have been expected. It therefore appears
that potential migrants do not necessarily conform to "rational
choice" theory. There are plausible grounds for arguing,
along with the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, that
economic development tends to promote rather than reduce migration
pressures. This is clearly an area for further research. In the
mean time we strongly urge the Government to resist any attempt
to tie EU development aid to the reduction of "push factors".
(paragraph 44)
We agree with the Committee that the factors
that lead to migration are complex and cannot be explained by
economic motives alone.
We also concur with the Committee in its diagnosis
that pursuing action to secure poverty reduction may in fact encourage
rather than discourage migratory flows in the short to medium
term. Successful development may create a class of would-be emigrants
seeking better education and opportunities and higher incomes,
and who are able to afford that choice. We therefore acknowledge
the Committee's conclusion that the EU should not seek to tie
its development aid to addressing "push factors". As
it has stated in its two White Papers on International Development,
the Government believes that development assistance, including
that of the European Commission and Member States, should be unambiguously
focused on defeating abject poverty.
However, one consequence of the increased migratory
flows mentioned in the Report is that more people are seeking
to use the asylum route as a means of entry into a desired destination
country, despite having no protection needs. This problem needs
to be tackled in a variety of ways, but an important element is
for the UK and its EU partners to engage constructively with the
countries in the regions from which these people are coming in
order to reduce the incentives they have for seeking to misuse
the asylum system. In this context we would not wish to rule out
the targeted use of money in some cases.
THE ECONOMIC
EFFECTS OF
MIGRATION
135. The Commission advances "the
concept of migration as a pattern of mobility". In so doing
it in fact simply describes what is and always has been the reality
of migration. Flows run not in one direction, or even in two,
but in countless different directions at once. Many immigrants
from third countries ultimately become emigrants in turn, either
returning to their country of origin or going elsewhere. Even
this secondary migration may not be the end of the story. As Dr
Coleman told us, "no immigration is necessarily permanent".
(paragraph 48)
The Government acknowledges the complexity of
migration patterns. Indeed paragraph 3.7 of the Home Office report
on Migration highlighted that historically migration flows involving
the UK have been both temporary and permanent.
136. In this context it is particularly
difficult to quantify the economic effects of immigration, and
still more difficult to relate these to the formulation of a new
policy. All migrants have some economic effect on both their country
of origin and their host country. Yet the present debate is focused
on "economic migrants", narrowly defined as those migrating
primarily for work purposes. We note the recent research commissioned
by the Home Office, which shows that immigrants in the United
Kingdom make a net contribution to national wealth. However, it
is by no means clear whether and how the contribution made by
"economic migrants", as presently defined, differs from
that made by other groups, including those entering for family
reunion. It seems that certain groups, notably refugees, have
particular difficulties in accessing the job market. We therefore
welcome the Government's commitment to further research in this
area, which should help to clarify the ways in which Government
policy can enable all immigrants to prosper and make the fullest
possible contribution to the economy. (paragraph 49)
We agree that migration does have a whole range
of economic and social impacts, whether or not people are coming
to the UK primarily to work. People coming here principally for
non-economic reasons (such as family reunion, or to study as students)
also have rights to work, and can have a number of impacts on
the local economies in which they live. Moreover, as the Committee
notes, different people stay for different time periods, some
settling in the UK, some having children here, and some moving
on, all with different short term and long term impacts on the
economy and society.
The Home Office research attempted to describe
the different economic and social impacts. It is difficult to
quantify these effects, but it is not impossible. As pointed out,
the Home Office study found that, overall, migrants had a net
positive impact on the UK in 1999 of around £2.5 billion.
This figure reflects the contribution of all migrants, including
those who came through family reunion routes and as refugees,
as well as those who came through "economic" routes.
Further work is underway to better understand the economic impacts
of migration both on source and host countries, for different
types of migrant, for different groups of the population, and
in different areas. Further work is also needed to develop our
existing data sources in order to better understand these impacts
in the longer term—data on the economic impacts of migrants
broken down by route of entry is not currently available. It is
essential that our migration policies—both on entry controls
and integration mechanisms—are underpinned by a good understanding
of the economic and social impacts they create.
137. It is unclear what impact external
factors, not readily quantifiable in fiscal terms, may have on
these calculations. In particular, the effect of increased immigration
on host communities, and especially on scarce social resources,
deserves closer examination. Unless steps are taken to ensure
that that the social infrastructure is adequate for all, there
is a risk that opposition to immigration may develop among the
indigenous population. (paragraph 50)
We agree that the impact of migration at the
local level—on public services, housing, regeneration of
local economies—deserves closer examination. We are working
closely with DTLR to develop a programme of work to better understand
these impacts to better plan for local service provision. Work
is also planned to examine the impact of dispersal of asylum seekers
on local host communities and ways of facilitating integration
both from the asylum seeker and local community viewpoint.
The Government acknowledges that we need more
research to inform the debate on migration including how we can
balance legal migration to promote economic growth with social
stability. Work is already under way but there is clearly more
to be done.
LABOUR SHORTAGES
138. It is clear that there are labour
shortages in Europe. Media attention has tended to focus on shortages
in information technology and other high skill sectors. Immigrant
labour can play an important part in overcoming these shortages.
However, many low skill sectors are even more reliant on immigrant
labour. It is disappointing that the Communication pays so little
attention to this area, particularly as most Member States are
experiencing the expansion of the "black economy", which
employs many thousands of irregular workers and illegal, unregistered
immigrants. The effects of the "black economy" on workers,
in terms of low wages, loss of benefits or dangerous working conditions,
are unacceptable. Any immigration policy, whether organised at
Community or national level, must address this problem. (paragraph
57)
The Government acknowledges that one of the
challenges is to tackle the number of migrants who are employed
illegally. Barbara Roche's speech in September 2000 was about
the need to look at both the benefits and the challenges of managing
migration; and about beginning a wider debate on what a modern
immigration might look like.
The Government is concerned about the role of
those who engage illegal workers and the impact such illegal working
has on communities. There is a need to address the specific problem
identified and the government will be looking further at the legal
entry routes for people seeking to work in the United Kingdom.
139. However, there are also unresolved
problems within the labour markets of Western Europe—high
unemployment and low participation rates in the resident population,
lack of mobility, and a high drop-out rate in some sectors. These
too must be addressed, through initiatives aimed at improving
mobility, developing life-long education and re-training programmes,
encouraging workforce participation and tackling exclusion. We
welcome the emphasis on such programmes in the Lisbon Presidency
Conclusions and the Employment Strategy, and in particular the
Commission's recent Communication on New European Labour Markets.
(paragraph 58)
The Government agrees with the Committee that
the problems it has identified do need to be addressed in order
to achieve full employment through reform of the EU's labour markets.
The Government would stress that the UK is engaged with the relevant
EU initiatives such as those on improving mobility, promoting
lifelong learning and achieving social inclusion.
In particular, the Government took a full part
in helping to develop the agenda for the Lisbon Special Summit
and we welcome the progress that has been made in taking forward
the Presidency Conclusions. One of the commitments was to develop
a Europe-wide database on jobs and learning opportunities, which
was originally proposed by the UK and will address many of the
problems the Committee has identified.
This year the Employment Guidelines were significantly
changed to help co-ordinate strategic action in member states
in some key areas and we look forward to the Joint Employment
Report being published in the Autumn as it will evaluate the progress
made through national Employment Action Plans.
UK welcomes the Communication on new, open labour
markets as a positive contribution to the debate about the steps
needed to meet the Lisbon goal and targets. The Communication
presents a useful analysis of how and why the EU labour market
is changing, the barriers that currently exist and possible solutions.
The Communication's proposals should help to increase the transparency
of, and improve access to, European labour markets.
The UK particularly supports those proposals
which also seek to increase skill levels. The UK favours the suggestion
for a High-Level Skills and Mobility Task Force, which was subsequently
agreed at the Stockholm Council. It is hoped that the Task Force
will identify the barriers which prevent the development of a
mobility culture and suggest practical
140. Managed immigration, though not
the whole solution to labour shortages, can play an important
part in alleviating shortages in specific sectors, both high and
low skill. But any immigration policy aimed at meeting labour
shortages must be formulated in the wider context of employment
policy. At the moment the relationship between the proposed Community
immigration policy and the existing policies at EU and Member
State level to increase employment is far from clear. In such
a sensitive area it is vital that this relationship should be
made transparent. (paragraph 59)
The Government completely agrees with the view
that labour migration must fit with wider employment policy. One
of the messages in the Commission's recent communication on Community
immigration policy is that there must be coherence between policies
on immigration and those directed at labour markets. The Government
hopes that this will be an outcome of the debate launched by the
Communication.
However, while the Government believes that
Employment Strategy, particularly post-Lisbon, and economic migration
are complementary strategies for ensuring the proper functioning
of the labour market, we also believe that there must be a distinction
between them. At the EU level, the UK—like many member states—does
not feel that any potential competition between theses two strategies
requires special mechanisms.
The Government also agrees that migration can
help the labour market by being used to meet recruitment gaps
in the short term and increasing, or adding to, human capital
by bringing new skills or attitudes. However, we also need to
be aware that it may also reduce training and education incentives,
and, by increasing competition for jobs, undermine existing employability
programs.
Migration policy, however it operates, can be
a useful policy tool but it is not a substitute for a well functioning
labour market and effective policies on skills and training. In
the Government's view, the primary focus for the EU should be
on making labour markets efficient so that jobs come up all of
the time and that all people are able to access and take up those
jobs.
141. Governments have generally failed
to keep pace with current labour market developments; still less
can they predict future trends. In the context of globalisation,
and if competitiveness is to be maintained, intervention in determining
the needs of labour markets, whether at government or EU level,
should be limited. Immigration policy should be framed so as to
allow businesses to meet their legitimate recruitment needs quickly
and efficiently. (paragraph 63)
The Government agrees that any immigration policy,
here in the UK or in the EU, will need to maximise the benefits
of being part of an open globalised economy and the potential
it offers for the free exchange of ideas and cultures. We agree
that policy should enable businesses to meet their legitimate
recruitment needs quickly and efficiently. To this end we have
streamlined the work permits system to make it more responsive
to the needs of employers. Indeed, we are expecting to issue 150,000
work permits this year. We are also looking at provisions to enable
foreign students completing degrees in the UK to transfer into
the work permit category without first having to leave. In addition
we have recently transferred responsibility for the work permit
system to the Home Office. However there are threats as well as
opportunities in migration which require government action. We
need to continue our efforts in tackling the inhuman trafficking
and smuggling of people which undermines many of our social policies.
DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE
142. The population of Europe will age
considerably in the coming century. It is worth emphasising that
insofar as this reflects improved health and life expectancy it
is a welcome and inevitable development. However, there are legitimate
concerns about the long-term implications of falling fertility
rates, which in 1999 ranged between 1.89 children per woman in
Ireland to only 1.19 in Spain. (paragraph 66)
The Government Actuary Department Projections
produced by Eurostat [3]
the Statistical Office of the European Community, show every European
Union (EU) country experiencing population ageing, to a greater
or lesser extent, over the first half of this century. The number
of young people will continue to fall, while the number of older
people will increase. Low fertility is one factor in population
ageing. Postponement of births by women is likely to mean that
long-term fertility levels are higher than the current very low
fertility rates found in some EU countries. However, even under
the high fertility scenario in their projections, Eurostat assume
that the completed family size in the EU will be under 2.0 children
per women.
143. The economic consequences of population
ageing are also hard to predict, and will vary considerably from
country to country. Dr Coleman estimated that for the United Kingdom,
with its relatively high fertility rate, the cost of sustaining
the ageing population might equate to about 0.5 per cent off economic
growth rates per year (compared with what would otherwise have
been the case had the population not been ageing). Many complex
factors affect such calculations, and we have not received sufficient
evidence to form a view on what level of "potential support
ratio" will prove to be economically sustainable. However,
it is clear that all EU Member States will have to find ways of
adapting to demographic changes, though for some, such as Italy
and Spain, the problems are likely to be more severe and will
require more rapid solutions. (paragraph 67)
It is correct that fertility rates in the UK
are currently higher than many EU countries. In 1999, nine of
the 15 EU countries had a lower total fertility rate than the
United Kingdom. This is one of the factors in the ageing of the
population being less marked for the UK compared to the EU as
a whole. We share the Committee's view that the demographic pressures
facing us are different to others in the European Union. However
any quantifying of the cost to an economy is very difficult to
predict.
144. The Tampere European Council called
for measures on the admission and residence of third country nationals
to be based on "a shared assessment of the economic and demographic
developments within the Union". However, the wide variations
between Member States suggest that such an assessment will be
difficult. It may not be possible to devise an effective EU-wide
policy in this area. (paragraph 68)
The Committee's view is shared by the Government.
Wide variations in economic and demographic situations within
member states will make any common assessment difficult. This
is not to say that an effective EU wide policy framework cannot
be devised. The Commission acknowledges differences in Member
States in its communications and presents options of regional
and national variations of practice within a common legal framework
where appropriate. Within that they do see scope for third country
nationals throughout the European Union to share some rights and
obligations. These rights and obligations will form the core of
any effective EU-wide policy and the Government will take an active
role in developing policy.
145. "Replacement migration"
cannot by itself solve the demographic problems facing the EU
Member States. This is the conclusion of the UN Population Division,
the European Commission, and of all the witnesses who gave evidence
in this inquiry. To sustain the existing age profile of the population
would require impossibly high levels of immigration into not only
the EU but all developed countries. However, the Commission believes
that immigration could help to offset short-term difficulties,
while other long-term responses to demographic change are implemented.
We are unconvinced by this particular argument, and at the very
least the Commission's suggestion requires considerable refinement
and explanation. Demographic change is a long-term problem, and
requires long-term solutions. We have already argued that managed
immigration may play an important part in overcoming labour shortages.
While demographic change may contribute in certain circumstances
to such shortages, its specific consequences are the ageing of
the population and the fall in the "potential support ratio"—the
ratio of those of working age to those aged 65 and over. These
problems do not in themselves justify increased immigration in
the short term. Member States are already acting individually
and collectively to tackle unemployment and low workforce participation
rates and may need also to examine the retirement age and pension
arrangements. (paragraph 69)
The conclusions from the Stockholm Council in
Spring 2001 commit the Council and Commission to producing a joint
report on increasing participation and promoting active ageing
for the Spring Council in 2002—in Barcelona. The Government
sees this as an opportunity to focus on labour market reform and
creating more and better jobs. We have made the point to the Commission
and to the current Presidency that we must take a long-term view
on this. This is particularly true when considering the development
of a sustainable pensions regime.
The Government's own view is that our national
action should be to make progress on tackling age discrimination
in employment and implementing a range of measures to increase
the proportion of people aged over 50 in employment. Importantly,
these measures are part of a wider strategy to help older people
remain active longer through work, learning, volunteering and
family care.
We also refer to our response to paragraph 140.
ILLEGAL MIGRATION
146. Illegal migration is an enormous
world-wide business. For smugglers it can be highly profitable,
while for migrants it is expensive and dangerous, as the tragic
deaths of Chinese migrants, discovered in Dover, demonstrated.
The wider costs are all but incalculable. We welcome collective
attempts by the Member States of the EU to combat this trade.
(paragraph 74)
Member States of the European Union concluded
at the Special European Summit at Tampere in 1999 that they must
work together to combat illegal immigration:
"The European Council is determined
to tackle at its source illegal immigration, especially by combating
those who engage in trafficking in human beings and economic exploitation
of migrants."
The UK is committed to tackling illegal immigration
with its EU partners. Much has already been achieved in this field
and work is ongoing. Examples of work in this area include:
— The Prime Minister's initiative to
combat illegal immigration through the Balkans.
— The UK's involvement in the PHARE
JHA horizontal programme, the Budapest process and the Stability
Pact's migration and asylum initiative.
— The UK's support of the French Presidency's
proposals to combat illegal immigration.
— The UK's concrete offer to support
the Belgian Presidency's initiative for a High Impact Operation
at the future external borders of the EU.
147. However, it is clear that control
measures and policing will not in themselves solve the problem
of illegal migration. They address the symptoms rather than the
cause. While we are not aware of any clear evidence that the opening
of legal avenues for immigration will reduce the pressure of illegal
migration, this is clearly a widely held view. Prime facie,
it seems reasonable to assume that potential migrants, given the
option of applying for a legal right of entry into the EU, will
choose this rather than paying heavily for the services of smugglers.
This is an area that at the very least deserves thorough research,
which would include analysis of the experience of the United States,
Canada and other countries of immigration. (paragraph 75)
We welcome this conclusion. We accept that increasing
the legal routes to work will not on their own solve the problem.
Further research is underway to try to investigate the characteristics
of the illegal population, and their motivations. However, this
is a very difficult area in which to undertake research and we
are, of course, exploring whether there are lessons to be learned
from experience in other countries.
148. In our Report on Enlargement
and EU External Frontier Controls we highlighted the danger
that by focusing largely on control measures the EU might "push
would-be immigrants . . . into the hands of organised crime".
We argued that the EU would at some point have to "formulate
a coherent immigration policy" in order to "reduce the
demand for the services of organised criminals". This would
involve the EU in "having to look at ways to manage the admission
and settlement of immigrants as well as ways to prevent their
entry". We see no reason to change our views now. (paragraph
76)
The Government recognises that reducing the
demand for the services of organised criminals is an important
dimension to a new immigration policy. The Government is committed
to having a coherent immigration policy that achieves this whilst
meeting real expectations and emerging needs.
149. Since the Amsterdam Treaty came
into force the balance of Council activity has been heavily on
the side of control measures. The present Communication, and the
debate it is intended to instigate, offer an opportunity to redress
the balance somewhat. This is a very welcome development, and
we look to the Government to play a constructive role in the debate.
(paragraph 77)
The Government has taken the opportunity to
participate proactively in the debate on what a future migration
policy might look like beginning with Barbara Roche's speech last
year. We will continue to participate constructively and we welcome
the contributions from the Community Communication and the House
of Lords report to this debate.
THE CASE
FOR A
COMMUNITY IMMIGRATION
POLICY
150. The Heads of State and Government
at Tampere committed themselves to a common approach to several
areas of immigration policy. There is a strong political will
across the Community to develop a common approach. While there
will be dissenting voices, we express our support for this development.
(paragraph 80)
The Government has welcomed the Commission Communication
as a first response to the call for a common EU immigration policy
and we support the proposition that immigration policies must
be transparent, rational and flexible.
The UK retains its right, under the Protocol
on the Position of the United Kingdom and Ireland which is annexed
to the EC and EU Treaties, not to participate in measures in this
area. The UK also retains the right to maintain its frontier controls,
under the Protocol on the Application of certain aspects of Article
14. Government policy is to retain control of UK immigration policy,
having regard in particular to the UK's position on frontiers.
However, this does not mean that the UK's immigration policies
need be seriously at odds with those of participating Member States.
The UK intends to be an active participant in
the forthcoming European debate.
151. The Community is already moving
towards the harmonisation of policies on asylum and temporary
protection. This strengthens the case for a Community dimension
to immigration policy. In particular, a managed immigration policy
may help to diffuse the controversy currently surrounding the
right to asylum. (paragraph 83)
152. However, there is also a potential
for confusion. We support measures enabling and encouraging those
granted humanitarian protection to participate fully in the labour
market. Many refugees are highly skilled, and could contribute
substantially to the economy of their host country. But the grounds
for admitting economic migrants and refugees must not be confused.
The humanitarian foundation for refugee status must not be compromised.
(paragraph 84)
The Government agrees that the issues of migration
and asylum are by definition international and cannot be dealt
with in isolation. We aim to ensure, where appropriate, that the
UK's migration policies are broadly in line with those of other
Member States. At the same time we do have a distinctive view
on border controls and therefore, control on who can enter the
UK legally. That is why we have a reserved right to decide whether
to opt in. But it is also important to keep asylum separate from
migration.
We are committed to having a fair and credible
asylum system which honours our international obligations. The
Government fully endorses the view that there should be a clear
distinction between those granted leave in the UK as refugees
or as being otherwise in need of protection, and those granted
leave on other grounds.
153. Free travel areas can exist without
the harmonisation of immigration policies. Examples include the
British-Irish free travel area and the Nordic passport union.
However, the number of countries involved has been relatively
small and the migratory pressures have, arguably, not been as
great or as diverse as those affecting the Schengen area. Moreover,
the incorporation of the Schengen acquis within the framework
of the EU has strengthened the link between the Schengen area
and the establishment of an internal market where goods, persons,
services and capital can move freely. The evolution of the internal
market is not yet complete as far as third country nationals are
concerned. Nevertheless, the existence of the Schengen area provides
a compelling argument for the development of a Community immigration
policy. (paragraph 86)
The Government welcomes the incorporation of
the Schengen acquis into the framework of the EU. The UK
has sought to participate in those provisions of the Schengen
acquis which do not concern border controls. The Government
considers that common travel arrangements are entirely sensible
for those countries with land borders but that our island geography
means that checks at ports and airports, where traffic to the
UK is naturally channelled, are the most effective way to control
immigration to the UK. The right of the UK to retain checks at
its internal frontiers is reflected in the UK's Frontiers Protocol
to the Amsterdam Treaty, which was agreed by our EU partners who
understand the UK's reasons for wishing to maintain frontier controls.
Some of the thinking behind the Commission communication
on a Community immigration policy, which is designed to launch
a wide debate on what a common EU policy should look like, echoes
the debate already being held in Member States, including the
UK, on the need for a more positive approach to migration. The
Government has already launched an internal debate to look both
at the benefits and the challenges of managing modern migration
and believes that further discussion at European level will be
helpful. It is not necessary for the UK to be a full member of
the Schengen acquis to take an active role in the development
of a Community immigration policy. What is anticipated is the
development of an overall framework for migration at EU level,
with common standards and procedures and a mechanism for setting
objectives and targets, which can be implemented by Member States
at a national level. This could then form part of an overall migration
framework in the Union.
THE SCOPE
OF A
COMMUNITY IMMIGRATION
POLICY
The limits of Community competence
154. The Commission, in responding to
the request of the European Council made at Tampere, has attempted
to define the scope of a Community immigration policy. This is
a welcome development. However, we agree with Graham Watson, MEP,
that both the EC Treaty and the Tampere conclusions are limited
in scope. The specific request of the Tampere European Council
was for "approximation of national legislations on the conditions
for admission and residence of third country nationals".
"Approximation" appears to be less far-reaching than
"harmonisation"—though the difference is not immediately
clear. Furthermore, the phrase "conditions for admission
and residence" may embrace minimum standards for determining
admission or the rights and obligations of legally resident third
country nationals, but does not go so far as to authorise a common
admission policy. Mr Fortescue himself accepted that admission
policy was outside the scope of the Communication, and we welcome
the assurance that what is envisaged is a framework within which
Member States will be able to develop their own admission policies.
However, we remain uncertain where "admission policy"
either differs from or overlaps with "immigration policy".
It is disappointing that the Communication has made no effort
to identify more precisely the limits of Community competence.
In such a politically sensitive area we look to all Member States
to examine closely the proposed immigration policy, and to resist
any drift towards Community involvement in areas beyond the scope
of the EC Treaty. (paragraph 88)
The Government agrees that there is a lack of
clarity about the limits to and ultimate objective of Community
activity in this area. Although it seems that there is no legal
distinction between the "approximation" and "harmonisation"
of national legal provisions, the extent to which laws are to
be approximated in any particular case will be a matter of a policy
judgment, which must be made in accordance with the principles
of subsidiarity and proportionality. The scope for continuing
national discretion will inevitably be a key area for discussion
as this work is taken forward. Since the UK decides on a case-by-case
basis whether to opt in to the adoption of legislative proposals,
there is an additional level of protection for our national position.
MEETING THE
NEEDS OF
BUSINESS
155. We share the concerns expressed
by the Immigration Law Practitioners' Association concerning the
approach outlined by the Commission. The preparation of regular
national reports, which will then be synthesised into further
reports, is too cumbersome to keep pace with the speed of developments
within the labour market. Member States are called upon to propose
"indicative targets" for immigration—we doubt
their ability to do so accurately, and fear that these targets
will in reality harden into quotas, which will become a handicap
rather than a help to businesses. We are also concerned about
the relationship between the proposed immigration policy and the
existing Employment Strategy. A co-ordinated approach to government
is clearly desirable, though it may be hard to achieve. The evidence
of the Immigration Advisory Service shows that even within the
United Kingdom it has not always been easy to reconcile the objectives
of the Department for Education and Employment with those of the
Immigration and Nationality Directorate. It is now being suggested
that immigration policy and employment policy should mesh together
at European level. It is far from clear how this will work in
practice, and it could simply be a recipe for confusion. (paragraph
91)
The UK is monitoring the approach proposed by
the Commission. In the meantime the UK work permit arrangements
are not quota based. They are responsive to the needs of UK business
and as a result there has been significant growth in the number
of permits issued in the last few years. Recently a fundamental
review of the arrangements has been carried out to ensure the
scheme was well placed to take account of recent and forecast
changes in domestic and international labour markets. Changes
have been made to the work permit skills criteria that recognise
the ongoing needs of British business to quickly fill key posts
where shortages exist. In June 2001 we transferred responsibility
for the work permit system to the Home Office which will assist
in co-ordinating migration and employment policy more closely.
156. What businesses need is a framework
within which they can rapidly respond to labour shortages, and
if necessary recruit from outside the EU. Community immigration
policy should be designed with this objective in view. (paragraph
92)
The work permit arrangements allow employers
in Great Britain to recruit or transfer key non European Economic
Area (EEA) nationals to work in this country, whilst safeguarding
the interests of the resident labour force. This aids British
employers in their development and helps them overcome short-term
labour shortages that it would not be feasible to meet by training
resident workers.
Following a fundamental review, the work permit
scheme has already been modernised to better meet business needs.
Work Permits (UK) currently reach decisions on more than half
of all fully completed applications received within one day and
around 95 per cent within five days. Customers have also recently
been given the facility to submit applications electronically
via the Internet. This serves to improve the speed, cost and quality
of the process.
Certain occupations are included on a skills
shortage list where it is acknowledged that suitably qualified/skilled
people are in very short supply. Occupations included on this
list change over time as a result of labour market developments.
UK employers are able to submit work permit applications under
a simplified procedure for shortage cases. A key feature of this
procedure is that the normal requirement to advertise a vacant
post and provide evidence of a recruitment search is waived. Work
Permits (UK) will continue to work closely with employers and
industry bodies in order to respond rapidly to skills shortage
developments.
157. Several measures are open to the
Community in developing a flexible framework for managing economic
migration. Amongst them are the creation of a single European
information point for potential migrants, which should contain
full and independent information on employment opportunities and
conditions of entry and residence. However, we are concerned that
the credibility and efficacy of such an information point might
be diminished, were it to be used to attempt to dissuade migrants
from coming to the EU. We also support the proposal to make use
of the EURES network to help businesses recruit from outside the
EU. Other measures, such as allowing a rapid recruitment from
third countries where there are clear shortages in specific sectors,
or allowing qualified third country nationals to enter the EU
with a job-seeker's visa, are worthy of consideration. Improving
the recognition of qualifications could also help migrants to
make the most of their skills. Finally, more consistent and comparable
EU-wide statistics will greatly assist the development of future
immigration policy, and we commend the Commission's proposal to
improve data collection and analysis in this area. (paragraph
97)
The Government agrees with the Committee that
all the measures it has identified could be helpful. However,
they need to both fit together and they need to fit with the need
to improve the employability of the resident population, especially
those distanced from the labour market through various causes
of disadvantage, and to deliver employment opportunity for all.
Linked to this is the need, in the Government's
view, for care to be taken when addressing the issue of EU wide
data collection and analysis. While measurement is important and
creates the need for some commonality, this need should not be
used by the Commission to try and drive member states towards
collecting data for the sake of it and overriding national need.
Primarily, we need to measure what can be measured and what will
add value, as well as focus on what we want to deliver. We should
not use data collection and analysis to create targets which are
inappropriate to national contexts.
THE RIGHTS
OF THIRD
COUNTRY NATIONALS
158. The European Commission has demonstrated
its commitment to improving the legal status of legally resident
third country nationals. The European Council at Tampere also
made a commitment to granting third country nationals rights "as
near as possible to those enjoyed by EU citizens". We welcome
the Commission's proposed Directive on the legal status of third
country nationals, and trust that the Council will work rapidly
towards agreeing a text. (paragraph 102)
The Commission's proposal was formally presented
to the Council on 26 April and the first discussion at working
group level took place on 2 and 3 July. This is provisionally
listed by the Belgian Presidency for a decision at the December
Council.
159. The inconsistencies between the
rights enjoyed by third country nationals in different Member
States, and the difficulties they face in exercising nominal rights,
may seriously undermine any attempt by the EU to encourage managed
economic immigration. We have argued for an immigration policy
that responds quickly and flexibly to the needs of business. However,
a vital corollary of this is that legally resident third country
nationals should have a range of rights guaranteed at Community
level. One of these rights should be a limited security of residence
for third country nationals who lose their job for whatever reason.
This would considerably enhance the attractiveness of the EU as
a destination for migrants. (paragraph 103)
We support measures to ensure that the rights
of long-term, legally resident third country nationals are broadly
comparable to those of Member States' own nationals. This helps
to encourage integration into the host community. But the Tampere
Council qualified the rights of third country nationals as rights
within the Member State of residence. The Government would have
difficulty with any proposals, which granted rights of residence
for such persons in other Member States, because they would impede
our ability to operate an effective immigration control on third
country nationals.
160. The principle that increased rights
are acquired by third country nationals by virtue of length of
residence is well-established. It is generally recognised by a
change of status, from temporary to permanent settlement, what
in the United Kingdom is described as "indefinite leave to
remain". A further change of status, to full citizenship
of the host country, may ultimately assure the migrant of rights
exactly equivalent to those of native EU nationals. However, the
time it takes for third country nationals to acquire secure residence
status varies from two years in Finland to 15 years in Greece.
There is also considerable variation in the connected rights granted
to third country nationals, such as rights to employment or social
security. We do not believe such inconsistencies can be justified
within the "area of freedom, security and justice",
and we therefore fully support the Commission's proposal to grant
a "hard-core of rights" to migrants upon their arrival.
(paragraph 107)
The draft Directive concerning the status of
third country nationals who are long-term residents appears to
meet the call from the Tampere European Council in that it seeks
to establish an avenue to a set of rights that are as near as
possible to those enjoyed by EU citizens. It would provide for
a common long-term resident status which all third country nationals
residing legally could acquire in any Member State. Having achieved
this status, long-term residents would benefit from many of the
same rights as EU citizens. Third-country nationals would qualify
for the status after five years' legal and continuous residence
in most categories. The draft Directive would also give long-term
residents the right to (short-term) residence in a second Member
State. Those that did would have broadly similar rights as nationals,
except that they would not have the same access to social benefits.
161. However, we have reservations concerning
the proposition that rights should then be differentiated according
to length of stay. There will inevitably be an interval before
a right of permanent settlement is granted, but we believe that
any Community legislation should set this interval at no more
than five years, while allowing Member States with more generous
arrangements to preserve them. We do not believe that the rights
afforded to migrants before this period should be substantially
restricted other than in respect of length of residence. In other
words, the "hard-core of rights" should be construed
generously. (paragraph 108)
The Government agrees that it is important that
those third country nationals who are long-term resident in the
UK should enjoy clearly-defined rights and that these should approximate
to those enjoyed by British citizens. The Government notes that,
under the proposed Directive on the status of third-country nationals
who are long-term residents, the relevant period of residence
would be five years, whereas these rights are generally acquired
after four years in the UK. The Government considers that there
are no difficulties in principle with the Commission's proposals
insofar as they concern rights acquired within a Member State.
But it is not yet persuaded that the proposal that a long-term
resident should have similar rights when moving to another Member
State is consistent with its policy of maintaining control over
policy on admission to the UK.
162. Member States grant rights to migrants
from within the EU, to EEA or Swiss citizens, and in some respects
to Turkish or Moroccan citizens (by virtue of EU association agreements)
without imposing conditions as to length of residence. The Commission
and Council should reflect on these arrangements when discussing
the proposals for third country nationals. (paragraph 109)
The EU Working Group on Migration and Expulsions
recently commenced discussions on the draft proposal. The scope
of the draft Directive will be discussed in detail during the
course of the working party meetings. The draft proposal is without
prejudice to more favourable provisions of bilateral and multilateral
agreements between the Community or the Community and its Member
States, on the one hand, and third countries, on the other.
163. The most important factor is that
legally resident third country nationals should have consistent,
enforceable, Community-level rights. If such rights are made available,
then they will enjoy de facto what Mr Fortescue described
as a "secure, stable situation". We are not convinced
that these rights should be embodied in some form of "civic
citizenship". While it might make the rights of third country
nationals more visible, we find the choice of words unfortunate.
The concept of "Union citizenship" has been widely discussed,
especially in the European Parliament, but has not found favour
among the Member States. The term "civic citizenship"
is subject to some of the same objections—it seems to convey
an implied challenge to the principle that EU citizenship derives
from national citizenship. This is not in our view likely to be
widely acceptable. (paragraph 110)
The Government maintains that citizenship of
the EU is derived from national citizenship. Article 17(1) TEC
specifically provides for this point. The Tampere European Council
endorsed the objective that long-term legally resident third country
nationals should be offered the opportunity to obtain "the
nationality of the Member States in which they are resident".
The Government is committed to retaining control over nationality
and the right to citizenship of the United Kingdom.
On the concept of "civic citizenship"
we would wish to know much more as it is very short on detail
at the moment. The Government will of course take an active role
in any discussions.
164. As long ago as 1992 the Select Committee
recommended that long-term resident third country nationals should
be given rights of free movement and employment throughout the
Community. We still hold to that view. It is part of the logic
of the Single Market that third country nationals, like citizens
of Member States, should be able to work throughout the EU, and
the failure to afford them this right may impose burdens on businesses.
This is particularly the case in the service industries. Given
the European Council's recognition, at the Lisbon summit, of the
increasing importance of services to the EU economy, it is very
disappointing that so little progress has been made either in
agreeing the proposed Directives on the freedom to provide cross-border
services, or in implementing the GATS. (paragraph 113)
This Government does not share the view of the
committee that a long term resident third country national should
have automatic free movement rights throughout the European Union.
We are taking an active role in ensuring that United Kingdom businesses
are fully able to benefit from the single market. We also comply
with our obligations under GATS.
165. We recognise that there are serious
fears in some quarters about any proposal to extend free movement
rights to third country nationals. We believe these fears are
over-stated. The experience of successive enlargements has shown
that EU citizens from poorer Member States have not by and large
taken advantage of their right of free movement in order to "shop
around" for more generous social provisions elsewhere. We
see no reason to believe that long-term resident third country
nationals will do so either. Cultural and family links, participation
in local communities and knowledge of languages, will play just
as large a part in their decisions whether or not to move to other
Member States as they do in the decisions of EU citizens. Nor
do we believe that the political consequences will be as damaging
as is feared: free movement rights for third country nationals,
as for EU citizens, will be driven by economic arguments, by the
needs of the Single Market. They are not free-standing rights.
We doubt that the arrival of limited numbers of third country
nationals, taking advantage of specific new rights to take up
employment throughout the Community, will have a major political
impact in their countries of destination. (paragraph 114)
We share the committee's view that previous
enlargements did not cause any great social difficulties. Research
undertaken to investigate potential inflows following future accessions
to the European Union will provide more information on this issue.
However, we continue to hold the view that individual Member States
should decide when a third country national may take up residence
in that Member State. We agree that economic factors are only
one of many that makes an individual decide to migrate to a particular
country. The research being commissioned at both national and
EU level will help us understand better the potential impact expanded
rights for third country nationals will bring and this will help
guide the Government in its future development of policy.
INTEGRATION
166. Increased immigration will have
an effect on the culture of every Member State. We whole-heartedly
share the Minister's conviction that the United Kingdom is enormously
enriched and strengthened by its social and cultural diversity.
This is an area where the United Kingdom has much to be proud
of. (paragraph 119)
The Government shares the Committee's view that
the United Kingdom is a more dynamic society enriched by our social
and cultural diversity and will continue to work to ensure we
can remain proud of our achievements in this area.
167. Nevertheless, views on these issues
differ widely across the EU, and there is no agreement either
on the meaning of "integration" or on the proper balance
to be struck between national culture and cultural pluralism or
multiculturalism. It is proper that these issues should be debated
openly, but we are not convinced that the EU is the appropriate
forum for instigating such a debate. There is general agreement
that action at EU level against racism and xenophobia, or against
discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin, is appropriate,
and this consensus was reflected last year in the swift adoption
of the proposals brought forward under Article 13 TEC. However,
the Commission's description of the European Union as a "pluralistic
society" glosses over the differences between Member States,
and the effects that immigration will have on the many diverse
societies that in fact make up the EU. An attempt at the European
level to pre-empt still controversial debates within Member States,
for example by urging political leaders or the media to promote
cultural diversity, could turn out to be counter-productive. (paragraph
120)
The Government believes it is essential that
Member States work together to tackle the issues of racism and
xenophobia. Such matters need to be discussed open and honestly.
The United Kingdom played a key role in ensuring that the two
Directives under Article 13 of the TEC were agreed as quickly
as possible. The Race Directive is an important step forward in
establishing a common standard of legal protection from racial
discrimination across the EU.
The Government agrees with the Committee's observation
about differences between Member States in terms of effects that
immigration may have on the many diverse societies within the
EU.
No two countries are exactly the same. Underpinning
the Commission's thinking is the acknowledgement that the social
impacts of migration have to be successfully managed. The challenge
for any individual Member State and for its respective wider civil
society in this area is to ensure that coherent policies are developed
which take account of a wide range of factors which bear on questions
of social inclusion.
168. We urge that rather than linking
integration policies to immigration policy, the EU should adopt
the approach recommended by ILPA, addressing the issues of security
of residence and legal equality for migrants. In particular, we
look forward to progress being made on the proposed Directive
on family reunification, which would in itself be a major step
towards promoting the successful integration of migrants. (paragraph
121)
The Working Group on Migration and Expulsion
and the Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum
have met regularly in order to examine the proposed Directive
on family reunification. Whilst some of the more difficult areas
have been resolved, outstanding reservations on the text will
need to be resolved in order to reach agreement. The key outstanding
issue remains the scope of the directive, with little agreement
on which family members should be covered and on how much flexibility
Member States should have to admit them.
THE POSITION
OF THE
UNITED KINGDOM
169. In our Report on Schengen and
the United Kingdom's Border Controls we reached the following
conclusion: The Government failed to convince the Committee that
systematic border controls as currently practised for all arrivals
in the United Kingdom, whether from the European Union or elsewhere,
is the most effective use of resources to control illegal immigration
or is focused on the main sources of illegal immigration. We also
doubted whether it would be "practical to maintain the principle
that passengers arriving in the United Kingdom are controlled
by nationality rather than by point of departure for the foreseeable
future". We reaffirm those conclusions. (paragraph 127)
The government continues to believe that frontier
controls are the best arrangement for the UK. We wish to exploit
the advantages of our island geography, and we consider that border
checks at ports and airports, where traffic is naturally channelled,
are the most effective way for us to control immigration. Frontier
controls also contribute to the detection of serious crime. We
have a tradition of personal liberty within the country, without
internal checks or identity cards. Moving controls away from our
borders would be a major departure from this, and we are not convinced
that it would be beneficial in terms of effectiveness, or of community
relations. At the same time we are seeking to take a more targeted
approach to immigration control, through the flexibility provisions
in the 1999 Act, which enable resources to be deployed in the
most effective way possible.
170. It is inevitable that the United
Kingdom's influence on the negotiation of those Title IV measures
that it has decided not to opt into will be much reduced. The
United Kingdom's influence on the forthcoming debate on a Community
immigration policy will be similarly weakened. This is particularly
unfortunate, as the debate within the United Kingdom on immigration,
which the Government has been keen to promote, is so well advanced
compared to most other Member States. (paragraph 128)
The Government rejects the assumption that the
UK's influence in this area will be weakened because of the reserved
right to decide whether to opt into Title IV measures. The UK
intends to and does play an active role in the debate on a Community
Immigration Policy. Our reserved right to decide whether to opt
in does not mean we want our immigration policies to be backward
looking and seriously at odds with other Member States. We will
be constructive in considering any emerging EU measures.
171. Historically the impulse behind
the breaking down of internal borders in the EU has been economic—in
particular the creation of the Single Market. Successive Governments
have long accepted freedom of movement for EU nationals for economic
purposes. The European Community is now far more than a common
market. We believe that there would be social advantages, as well
as economic benefits within the Single Market, in removing the
distinction between such free movement rights for EU nationals
and for third country nationals who have acquired legal rights
of residence in a Member State. (paragraph 129)
The Government does not support the extension
of the right of free movement to legally resident third country
nationals. The UK retains the right, under its protocol to the
Treaty Establishing the European Community, not to participate
in measures in this area. Government policy is to retain control
of our immigration policy. We could not agree to measures that
undermine the integrity of our frontier controls.
172. The Government's ability to maintain
the United Kingdom's independent admission policy will depend
on preserving the integrity of Title IV. We doubt whether this
will be feasible in the long term. The EC Treaty, especially after
Amsterdam, does not always make neat divisions between "immigration"
measures (which the United Kingdom can choose not to opt into)
and "Single Market" measures (by which the United Kingdom
is bound). The current disagreement between the Commission and
the United Kingdom over the proposal to extend the freedom to
provide services to third country nationals demonstrates the differing
interpretations of the EC Treaty. The European Court of Justice
may ultimately be called upon to decide on the precise boundaries
between these different areas of the EC Treaty. (paragraph 130)
The Government maintains that Title IV TEC remains
the only chapter of the Community Treaties which in accordance
with the provisions of A63.3(a) TEC may be used as the legal base
for measures dealing with the conditions for third country nationals'
entry to and residence within Member States. Each measure is,
however, examined on a case by case basis and the arguments for
any particular legal base are considered on their individual merits.
Whilst there are differing interpretations of the EC Treaty, and
whilst on occasion the ECJ may be called to give its opinion on
particular issues, the Government is confident that it will maintain
control of UK frontiers, including policy on admissions and residence
of third country nationals, in line with the UK's frontiers protocol.
173. The Government has stated its intention
to opt into EU-wide measures on controlling illegal immigration,
but not to opt into more "positive" measures, that might
impact on the United Kingdom's frontier controls. We have already
argued that the relationship between illegal migration and the
opening up of avenues for legal migration needs to be explored
and debated. We are therefore concerned that the Government's
insistence on maintaining an artificial distinction between "control"
measures and "positive" measures may hinder it from
making a useful contribution to this debate. We are disappointed
that the United Kingdom has set its face against a number of positive
measures, including the proposed Directive on family reunification.
We believe that the Community should grant legally resident third
country nationals a core of clearly defined rights. The United
Kingdom, which has a proud record of welcoming and integrating
immigrant communities, should be playing a full part in shaping
such European-wide rights. (paragraph 131)
This government intends to take an active part
in the European Debate on Migration and look forward to seeing
how this develops further under the Belgian Presidency and at
both the European Conference on Migration in October and the European
Council in Laeken in December. However we at the same time intend
to maintain our existing frontier controls in accordance with
the protocols secured at Amsterdam. This means that our approach
to the European debate will need to take account of our position
on frontiers.
We do not see this as a contradictory position.
Our Island geography enables us to take a distinctive view on
border controls, and therefore control over who is able to enter
the United Kingdom on a legal basis. This is why we have a reserved
right to decide whether to opt into commission proposals. This
does not mean that our Immigration policies will be seriously
at odds with other member states. We will be constructive in considering
any emerging issues and will consider taking part when it is considered
in line with our policies on migration.
3 Summary figures published in Demographic Statistics
1997. Eurostat (1997), see also the article Shaw, C, Cruijsen,
H, de-Beer J, de Jong, A. Latest population projections for the
European Union. Population Trends 90. The Stationery Office
(1997). Back
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