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SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
THE EUROPEAN UNION

A FRACTURED PARTNERSHIP?  
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE  
EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED  
STATES OF AMERICA

WITH EVIDENCE

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# THIRTIETH REPORT

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1 JULY 2003

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By the Select Committee appointed to consider European Union documents and other matters relating to the European Union.

ORDERED TO REPORT

## A FRACTURED PARTNERSHIP?

### RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

#### CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

##### **Box 1**

##### *Abstract*

The European Union's relations with the United States are at their lowest ebb for at least a generation. How did this happen? What can be done about it?

The outrage of 11 September 2001 thrust international security to the top of the US agenda, overshadowing the great bulk of transatlantic business that is done quietly and well. EU Member States agree with the US about the key security objectives, but there are serious divergences about how to achieve them. The Iraq crisis highlighted these divergences very sharply.

Both sides will be losers if the relationship remains bad. There is a massive agenda on which they need to work together. Both need to put effort into repairing the damage, even if differences about method persist. They should accentuate the positive, look to the future, and not focus on blaming or punishing for the past.

The EU for its part needs to:

- Help shoulder post-conflict burdens in Iraq, without arguing about whose fault they may be;
- Put its weight behind the Middle East peace process, and re-double its effort against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
- Build up its own military capability;
- Improve methods of handling and communicating agreed EU foreign policy, and explain itself better to the US; and
- Exploit NATO as the best forum for transatlantic dialogue in defence and security.

1. This inquiry into international security relations between the European Union and the United States of America could not have come at a more critical time for those relations. The Iraq crisis revealed new and deep divisions in the transatlantic partnership. In some respects relations are at their lowest ebb for at least a generation. How did this come about? How can it be redressed? Has there been such a sea-change that the former close relationship is beyond recapture?

2. We<sup>1</sup> recognise that the end of the Cold War heralded a change in world order that is yet to come to a conclusion. With the disappearance of the Soviet threat Europe's geopolitical importance as a possible cockpit of conflict has declined, while new threats elsewhere have intensified. The US holds pole position as the sole world super-power, whereas the EU's foreign policy remains in its infancy, having been contemplated seriously only a decade ago.

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<sup>1</sup> Members of Sub-Committee C which conducted this inquiry are listed at Appendix 1.

3. In addition US attitudes appear to have changed towards the EU as the Union has moved to become a foreign policy actor as well as an economic force. Serious disagreement first appeared on the Kyoto protocol<sup>2</sup>, but subsequent disagreements have escalated into what has been termed by Mr Timothy Garton Ash<sup>3</sup> “a very deep crisis of the post Second World War West”<sup>4</sup>.

4. In this report we describe the current state of the relationship and discuss the issues it raises. We underline the importance and benefit of good relations to both parties and suggest what steps might be taken in both policy and process between the EU and US to improve matters.

5. We began work in January 2003 as debate about a possible war in Iraq was reaching a peak. A wide range of discussions in London and Washington D.C. and evidence sessions held in Brussels helped us to form an understanding of the changing climate of foreign policy on the two sides of the Atlantic.<sup>5</sup> We received written submissions or took oral evidence from the United Kingdom Government, other EU Member State governments, and individuals and non-governmental organisations both on the continent of Europe and in the United States.<sup>6</sup> We are grateful to all for the contributions made to our inquiry.

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<sup>2</sup> The European Union has been a key supporter of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The Kyoto Protocol is an agreement to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, and equivalent gases, by 5 per cent in the first decade of the Twenty-First Century, and was adopted in December 1997. The Protocol looked unlikely to be ratified by the US Senate even under the Clinton Administration and was effectively abandoned by the Bush Administration. In March 2001 the President wrote a letter to Senators noting the ‘clear consensus that the Kyoto Protocol is an unfair and ineffective means of addressing global climate change concerns’ and saying that any climate change measures would be subordinate to concerns about US economic growth. (Letter from the President to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig and Roberts, March 13, 2001.)

<sup>3</sup> Director, European Studies Centre, St Antony’s College, University of Oxford.

<sup>4</sup> Q89.

<sup>5</sup> A list of witnesses is given at Appendix 2.

<sup>6</sup> Evidence can be found at the end of this report.

## CHAPTER 2: THE PRESENT STATE OF THE EU/US RELATIONSHIP

6. The relationship between the United States and Europe is of great breadth and depth. In the main it works well and fruitfully. Commissioner Patten's Chef de Cabinet told us that "across the board our relations with America are extremely good. In many areas we co-operate, we have common interests and we pursue those interests together."<sup>7</sup> Where the Union itself has clearly defined competence, for example in respect of trade and the single market, the United States has long been accustomed to dealing with the Union (principally the European Commission) as the prime interlocutor.<sup>8</sup> Dr Anne Deighton of the British Foreign Policy Resource Centre, University of Oxford, explained further: "the way in which the European Union has been able to act collectively towards the United States over legislation relating to terrorism, money-laundering and other activities is quite remarkable."<sup>9</sup> Differences arise and have occasionally been very sharp, for example over US actions on steel imports or EU actions on genetically modified foods.<sup>10</sup> We were told that such disputes have been, however, generally managed by well-understood methods, and they rarely seemed seriously to affect wider transatlantic links.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Mr Antony Cary, Q183.

<sup>8</sup> Q196 one billion dollars trade a day or 1-2 per cent of our trade.

<sup>9</sup> Q94.

<sup>10</sup> Q216.

<sup>11</sup> Q183.

**Box 2***EU-US Relations: The Transatlantic Dialogue*<sup>12</sup>

The European Union and the United States are the two largest economies in the world. They account together for about half the entire world economy. They also have the biggest bilateral trading and investment relationship. Transatlantic flows of trade and investment amount to around \$1 billion a day, and jointly their global trade accounts for almost 40 per cent of world trade.

*Diplomatic Relations*

The United States has maintained diplomatic relations with the European Union and its forerunners since 1953.

The European Commission is represented in the United States by a Delegation in Washington, which was established in 1954. A New York office, accredited as observer to the United Nations, was established in 1964. In 1971 the Washington office became a Delegation with full diplomatic privileges and immunities. The Delegation represents the European Commission in its dealings with the US government.

*Transatlantic Co-operation*

The landmarks in EU-US relations in recent years are the **Transatlantic Declaration**, the **New Transatlantic Agenda** and the **Transatlantic Economic Partnership**. The Transatlantic Declaration was adopted by the US and the EU in 1990. It laid down the principles for greater EU-US co-operation and consultation. Co-operation was established in the fields of the economy (trade liberalisation, OECD, competition policy), education, science and culture, and global challenges. A machinery of twice-yearly summits and ministerial meetings, ad hoc EU Troika/Presidency meetings with the US Secretary of State, and briefings on European Political Co-operation (now CFSP) was set up in the Declaration.

In 1995 the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) and the EU-US Joint Action Plan were adopted. The NTA and the Action Plan provide a framework for EU-US partnership and co-operation across a wide range of activities under four broad chapters: (i) promoting peace and stability, democracy and development around the world; (ii) responding to global challenges; (iii) contributing to the expansion of world trade and fostering closer ties; and (iv) building bridges across the Atlantic.

In promoting peace and stability the EU and the US are working together in areas such as the former Yugoslavia and in the Middle East Peace Process. In the economic field the EU and the US mostly work together within the framework of the Transatlantic Economic Partnership and under the multilateral umbrella of the WTO.

The EU and the US launched the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) at the London summit in May 1998. The TEP is an extension of the approach taken in the NTA. It includes both multilateral and bilateral elements. Bilaterally the purpose is to tackle technical barriers to trade. The purpose is also to stimulate further multilateral liberalisation by joining forces on international trade issues such as labour integration, and on business, environmental and consumer issues. It is however too early to say what will come out of this partnership.

In the **Bonn Declaration** adopted at the 21 June 1999 EU-US summit in Bonn both sides committed themselves to a “full and equal partnership” in economic, political and security affairs. This explicit recognition is a step forward from the NTA. The Bonn Declaration outlines how the EU and the US want to shape their relationship over the next decade and is embedded in the NTA process.<sup>13</sup>

7. Since the end of the cold war and the EU’s gradual development, after the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, as a more coherent foreign policy actor, transatlantic differences have appeared in the more general area of foreign affairs.<sup>14</sup> The catalogue of foreign policy issues over which EU members and the United States have been at odds includes a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT)<sup>15</sup> to proscribe

<sup>12</sup> As summarised on the European Commission’s website:

[http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/us/intro/index.htm](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/us/intro/index.htm) (as of 13 June).

<sup>13</sup> [www.europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/US/intro/index](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/US/intro/index).

<sup>14</sup> QQ178–180.

<sup>15</sup> Nuclear weapons testing is currently suspended by a voluntary moratorium by nuclear states. A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has been signed by more than 150 countries but will come into force only when 44 actually or potentially nuclear-capable countries ratify it. In the summer of 2001 the Bush Administration made it clear that it considered the CTBT ‘fatally flawed’ and would not seek its ratification by the Senate. This Administration decision on the CTBT came two months after the announcement that it would withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and would go ahead with a new missile defence system.

the testing of nuclear weapons; the Kyoto Convention to limit environmental damage; aspects of the break-up of Yugoslavia and the conflicts which ensued; verification arrangements to underpin the 1972 Convention prohibiting biological weapons; and the International Criminal Court (ICC).<sup>16</sup>

8. The reaction to the events of September 11 2001 in the US nevertheless showed the EU united in sympathy and support. As *Le Monde's* now famous headline<sup>17</sup> declared "We are all Americans now." It was at European initiative that NATO, for the first time ever, invoked Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty in support of the US (and in Washington we more than once heard regretful afterthoughts expressed that the EU's initiative had not been picked up more positively by the US). The EU also unanimously supported the first stages of the drive against terrorism by providing assistance to the United States in Afghanistan. For example Germany, despite its reluctance since 1945 to make overseas military deployments, has provided a large number of troops for post-conflict stabilisation there.

9. As 2002 progressed, however, the problem of Saddam Hussein's Iraq exposed transatlantic differences of view. The US National Security Strategy document<sup>18</sup> of September 2002 was a further indicator of the shift in EU/US relations, intensifying European fears that the US was set on a more hawkish policy of unilateral military action to deal with perceived threats to US security. The salience given to the concept of pre-emptive attack worried many EU Member States. These concerns also deepened divisions among Member States themselves on how to deal with terrorism in general and Iraq in particular.

10. The US approach to dealing with Iraq sharpened these divisions both among EU Member States and between some of them and the United States. It proved impossible to reach a solidly common EU view. The Iraq episode also highlighted wider divergences over underlying themes, such as claims to a national right of preventive war, the value, role and authority of the United Nations Security Council, the relevance of commitments to NATO allies, and the general balance between dialogue, "soft" power and force in dealing with international problems.<sup>19</sup>

11. The most damaging phase was between late January and March 2003, when governments on both sides of the Atlantic used the media to underline political divergences and even exchange insults. The US seemed willing to exacerbate differences among EU Member States and between some of them and EU "accession countries", for example in the matter of the statement of the "Vilnius Ten"; and some Member States worked directly against US preferences.<sup>20</sup>

12. The emphasis placed upon issues of national security by the current US Administration, especially since 11 September 2001, reinforces the tendency to see the overall relationship as characterised by such disagreements rather than by the mass of other transatlantic business that is transacted quietly and successfully. Since the end of the Iraq war relations have become less heated, but they remain strained.

### Box 3

#### *Europe and the European Union*

Many in the United States draw no clear distinction between Europe (or "the Europeans") as a whole and the European Union in the strict institutional sense, and views about the former influence perceptions of the latter. Our analysis of the current condition of the relationship is therefore widely drawn; but we have sought to focus our recommendations more closely upon what the Union itself, and Member States acting through it, might do in the future.

<sup>16</sup> 139 countries are signatories to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court establishing the Court, which is situated at The Hague in the Netherlands. 90 countries have so far ratified the treaty, including all 15 EU Member States. When the ICC treaty was signed in July 2002, a one-year temporary exemption for American nationals was accepted. In June 2003 the US announced that it wanted to lengthen this exemption in order to negotiate bilateral agreements with governments not to surrender US nationals to the Court. So far the Bush Administration has signed 37 such 'immunity pacts'. The US has accused the European Union of actively lobbying countries, including the 10 prospective members of the Union, not to sign bilateral deals with the US, while many EU Member States have expressed concern that the US is actively seeking to undermine the power of the Court.

<sup>17</sup> *Le Monde* dated 13 September 2001.

<sup>18</sup> National Security Strategy available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>.

<sup>19</sup> QQ97, 165.

<sup>20</sup> Q70.

## CHAPTER 3: PROBLEMS AND ATTITUDES

13. The EU's role in representing the interests of its Member States in international fora is increasing. There is no question about its legitimacy. Moreover, it is to be expected that the EU and US will sometimes see international questions in a different light. EU interests are just as likely as those in the trade field to point occasionally in a direction different from expressed US preferences. This may be due to differences in approaches and methods rather than of ultimate goals. The US Administration's use of selective multilateralism and some Member States' preferences for a "multipolar" world, for instance, tend to widen divergences. Nevertheless, the differences in policy ought not to result in recriminations or insults.

## THE EU'S PLACE IN US FOREIGN POLICY

14. We were warned by Mr Quentin Peel<sup>21</sup> before our visit to Washington in February 2003 that the US "do want support from the Union but they do not want competition and criticism".<sup>22</sup> This proved a sound prediction: we left the US capital with the impression that the US attitude to the EU was "if you agree with us, fine—if you don't then get out of our way".<sup>23</sup> We heard "neo-conservative" voices in Washington happy to say that whenever it became clear that the Union as a whole would not back US action, as in Iraq, they would want the US actively to pursue a policy of dividing Europe either along the line of the English Channel or by exploiting a supposed dichotomy between "old" and "new" EU Member States. This is a marked change from the traditional US preference from that for a united (but preferably also compliant) EU.<sup>24</sup>

15. Nothing as stark as this was said to us from within the Administration, but we detected some traces of that attitude. It is driven in some degree by the suspicion that certain EU Member States are minded to oppose what the US is doing in order deliberately to create a "counterweight" (a term apparently established in Washington discourse as implying opposition for its own sake) rather than because of reluctant, if unavoidable, differences of policy. This suspicion may well be overblown, but it is evidently felt in some quarters of the Administration although strongly repudiated in others.

16. The current US Administration also appears frustrated with the EU's inability to pull its weight militarily. They see the EU as lacking the military power as well as the cohesion to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century, with many Member States failing to meet goals agreed in NATO to improve the capability of their armed forces. Such perceptions have been reinforced by the recent infelicitous proposal by Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg to set up a new EU military planning headquarters. This appears to be a duplication of current assets rather than an increase in practical capability. The Policy Director at the Ministry of Defence noted that "the US have been strong supporters of Europe improving its capabilities and of buying the necessary equipment...they want to see Europe doing more".<sup>25</sup> But some in the United States believe that even if European capabilities were improved the EU would mostly be unwilling to use them in "hard" military situations.<sup>26</sup>

17. This is combined with a widespread view in the US that the Union is preoccupied with its own internal development and is more concerned with process than with practical results. It has been noted that in the spring of 2003 the European Convention was hard at work on the wording of foreign policy articles for the new EU constitution at the same time as the biggest substantive crisis ever in EU foreign policy was taking place.<sup>27</sup> Mr Klaus Becher from the International Institute for Strategic Studies agreed; "I think European governments cannot simply be in the institution-building mode. They also have to deliver."<sup>28</sup>

18. There is a very low level of US understanding, even in Washington, about what the European Union is and does.<sup>29</sup> Many Europeans are frustrated at US ignorance, and sometimes the deliberately dismissive attitude, about the nature of the Union, its remarkable advances, and its achievements over the past several decades.<sup>30</sup> We suspect, for example, that few in the US are aware that the EU and its

<sup>21</sup> Foreign Editor, Financial Times.

<sup>22</sup> Q64.

<sup>23</sup> Q94.

<sup>24</sup> QQ58, 60, 97, 181–182, 264.

<sup>25</sup> Mr Simon Webb, Q171.

<sup>26</sup> Q24–Q25 Q103–Q111.

<sup>27</sup> QQ14, 19, 29.

<sup>28</sup> Q19.

<sup>29</sup> QQ60–63, 221.

<sup>30</sup> QQ60–63.

Member States give much more in development aid (whether measured by governmental inputs or by the aggregate of these and private giving) than does the United States, both in absolute terms and as a proportion of national wealth.<sup>31</sup> Mr Quentin Peel noted “the degree of ignorance there is [in Washington] about what Europe as a whole and European countries do on the aid front”.<sup>32</sup>

#### THE US’S PLACE IN EU FOREIGN POLICY

19. As yet EU Member States rarely deal with the US through the Union on foreign policy issues. Member States have, moreover, different visions of how the EU should work with the US: Mr Charles Grant<sup>33</sup> noted that “the British philosophy is if we get our act together as Europeans and become more effective...then we can help our partners across the Atlantic...and then they will respect us...because we are useful. ...The French philosophy is that Europe needs to get its act together so that it can stand up when necessary and indeed challenge the US.”<sup>34</sup> This divergence reinforces the general preference of many Member States for conducting foreign policy relations through long-established bilateral links. At the same time, they see no contradiction in wanting the US to deal with the Union when there is a common EU mind. As CFSP matures this ought increasingly to be the case, though NATO should remain the main focus for EU/US dialogue on security and defence issues.

20. It is widely believed in Europe that US scorn for the EU’s activity in foreign and security policy reflects both a lack of awareness of the extent to which common EU positions have been developed (for example over the Israeli/Arab problem) and unreasonable expectations of the pace and breadth of progress in an enterprise challenging the methods and outlooks of long-established sovereign states.<sup>35</sup> US ignorance may in some measure reflect shortcomings in the presentation and co-ordination of EU foreign policy in Washington. Our visit there left us uneasy about this.

21. There is an impression within the EU that the US, especially under the current Administration, is much less interested than it used to be in listening to and taking account of the views of others. Furthermore, it is perceived as being less sympathetic to the concepts and structures of international order, particularly where rules and procedures are in place which might constrain US freedom to use its power to act at will. Europeans, by contrast, remain united in their attachment to such concepts and structures.<sup>36</sup>

#### PUBLIC OPINION

22. Generalised anti-Americanism in Europe and matching anti-Europeanism in the United States, while still minority sentiments, are at disturbingly high levels, with offensive caricatures readily traded.<sup>37</sup> If this is allowed to fester, the damage to the EU/US relationship, already severe, will get worse, to the serious disadvantage of both sides.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> QQ44, 50, 124.

<sup>32</sup> Q78.

<sup>33</sup> Director, Centre for European Reform.

<sup>34</sup> Q56.

<sup>35</sup> QQ267–268.

<sup>36</sup> QQ14, 95.

<sup>37</sup> Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Project. “Views of a Changing World” 2003.

<sup>38</sup> Q60.

**Box 4***The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy*

How can EU members have a Common Foreign and Security Policy and yet disagree fundamentally over issues like the Iraq crisis?

The Common Foreign and Security Policy is intergovernmental. In other words, Member States retain control over the agenda and the Union has a common policy only in so far as the Member States agree on one. The Treaty of the European Union stipulates that Member States shall support the Union's foreign and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity; and shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. Member States are thus bound to ensure that national policies conform with positions agreed at EU level.

In practice, if an issue proves particularly divisive, as the crisis in Iraq was, the common position is likely to have little substance, leaving Member States free to pursue their national interest. An effective EU common foreign and security policy exists only in areas where Member States see a clear advantage in reaching agreement.

## CHAPTER 4: LOOKING AHEAD

23. It is in the interest of both sides of the Atlantic to repair the harm done. The EU/US relationship matters because there is a significant international agenda in which the Union and the United States share deep, common and practical interests. The agenda includes, for example, counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism, combating transnational crime, spreading democracy and respect for human rights, maintaining order in post-conflict situations, deepening relationships with the countries of the former Soviet Union, and relieving poverty in developing countries. Together the two sides of the relationship can achieve a great deal in all this. By contrast, progress will be difficult, perhaps seriously impeded, if they are mistrustful and uncomprehending of one another, or lack the capability and will to work well together.<sup>39</sup> In that perspective the present state of the relationship is harmful to both sides.

24. In our judgement, EU Member States—and, in our strongly-held view, the United States too—must recognise a powerful common interest in restoring their relationship, for hard-headed practical reasons. Mr Klaus Becher<sup>40</sup> agreed: “In the end common solutions and common approaches will have to be found and have always been found because of the overriding interests of both sides to...(make) progress”.<sup>41</sup>

25. The first step to defuse this situation is to calm the rhetoric. We note that this process already appears to be under way. The Minister for Europe, giving evidence on 12 June 2003, informed us that “American Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said in Garmisch-Partenkirchen yesterday that the US/EU partnership was more necessary than ever. He also added that President George W Bush’s visit to Europe ten days ago was a signal for the normalisation of German/American relations. After the undoubted differences which existed over Iraq, both partners want to get back to serious business”.<sup>42</sup> Both should resist temptations, powerful and understandable though they may be, towards recrimination and even “punishment” in the wake of painful aspects of the Iraq episode. In our view every major participant made mistakes and has in turn some legitimate grievances. All will be losers if these are made important criteria for future choices.

26. Where divergences of view do persist, whether on Iraq or other issues, both sides need to seek to identify these early and deal with them in dialogue rather than by public denunciation. They should think particularly hard before translating disagreement into a programme of active opposition to another’s policies, save exceptionally when, as perhaps over the ICC, direct incompatibility is inescapable. Structured and regular consultation by way of an early warning system to discern and treat possible future difficulties might be useful.

27. Both sides should take care to avoid either accepting or reinforcing the “Europe as counterweight” perception. Europe should be seen, rather, as seeking to be a more effective partner. Similarly, the United States should reject, and EU Member States should not co-operate in, any deliberate policy of exploiting or aggravating differences within Europe. No-one on either side should build on recent discomforts in order to force artificial choices between close transatlantic partnership and the building of a more cohesive Europe. There is complementarity within the relationship which should be recognised—for example America’s “hard” power alongside the EU’s “soft” power.

28. The recommendations we make below could contribute to making the EU a more welcome and effective partner for the US in the longer term. In concentrating on this, however, we by no means wish to imply that nothing needs to be done on the US side.

## POLICY

29. Whatever opinions may still be held about how matters reached their present condition, **EU Member States should now do as much as they can, preferably within a UN framework, to contribute to Iraq’s future political, economic and social health.** As current events are demonstrating, these are not merely second-order or “clearing-up” tasks. **Member States should as far as possible co-ordinate their efforts through the EU. They should be closely aligned with any collective NATO efforts, for example in the support of an interim military administration.**

30. **The European Union should continue to work energetically with the US and other members of the Quartet to make progress in the Middle East Peace Process.**

<sup>39</sup> QQ32, 94, 183. See also “European Attitudes towards transatlantic relations 2002–2003: an analytical survey” Menon and Lipkin, May 2003 [www.notre-europe.asso.fr](http://www.notre-europe.asso.fr).

<sup>40</sup> International Institute for Strategic Studies.

<sup>41</sup> Q4.

<sup>42</sup> Q272.

31. **The EU should make extra effort to maximise its contribution in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.** Such efforts could relate, for example, both to co-operative threat reduction (CTR) programmes in the countries of the former Soviet Union and to measures to limit trade elsewhere that is relevant to the spread of weapons of mass destruction. While we have not yet been able to study in detail the recent principles and plans recently approved by EU Foreign Ministers for an EU strategy against proliferation, they seem to offer a good basis for action; but action itself will be what matters.

32. **EU leaders should give renewed attention and priority, even amid economic difficulties, to driving forward the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) project to the full extent of the Petersberg tasks.** Premature claims that this has already been achieved will reduce political will within the Union and both respect and influence across the Atlantic. The Union should give determined attention to the further build-up of its real armed force capability and to the ability of Member States to operate effectively with one another and in wider military groupings. It should avoid unproductive duplication of what NATO is ready to provide and should take care not to create a pattern of European industrial protectionism for acquiring the new defence material needed.

33. At present the United States seems opposed to having NATO transfer to the EU prime responsibility for security in Bosnia. This would nevertheless surely be beneficial in the long run to transatlantic burden-sharing and confidence, and **we urge that the idea of the EU's taking on this task, still within a wider NATO framework, should not be abandoned.**

34. Care must be taken in the work of the forthcoming IGC to design a foreign policy framework flexible enough to avoid the risk that any unilateral action, or action by small groups of Member States, is automatically seen as a CFSP failure.

#### PROCESS

35. **The IGC needs to ensure that the EU improves communication and handling of its foreign policy. The current process of developing a Constitution for the Union is an opportunity for evaluating how the EU should deal with the US.** Many individual Member States rightly place great value upon their own bilateral relationships with the US and it would be neither desirable nor realistic to expect these to be abandoned. Member States should however recognise that on an increasing number of issues their interests are well served by having the Union act as one, and that arrangements for this need to be more effective. The proposed EU Foreign Minister would create a single point of contact for the US when dealing with the EU as a whole.

36. NATO should not be treated as a last resort or a disagreeable necessity. **EU members should recognise—as should the US—that NATO is the principal and most systematic forum for EU-US consultation on security and defence issues, and accordingly the best setting for transatlantic co-ordination and influence.**

37. **If an EU Foreign Minister position is established, arrangements should be made for the occupant and supporting staff to have ready access to deliberations in NATO.**

38. **The European Union should make a special effort to improve the clarity, force and cohesion of its collective voice on foreign affairs in Washington.** The embassies of Member States need to make a determined effort to co-ordinate the presentation and dissemination of policy and information on the Union. The United Kingdom Embassy is well placed to take a lead.<sup>43</sup>

39. **The European Union, collectively or through Member States, should put more effort into spreading knowledge about the Union across the United States.**

40. **Parliamentarians should consider what more they could do to enhance understanding.** We are aware that there are numerous efforts already made in this regard, both from within national Parliaments and in the European Parliament,<sup>44</sup> in addition to the work of such institutions as the North Atlantic Assembly; the British-American Parliamentary Group is another example of how Member State parliamentarians can form close relationships with the US Congress. At the same time, we recognise the limitations imposed by the multitude of demands upon Parliamentarians.<sup>45</sup> **The priority given to the organisation, preparation and co-ordination of transatlantic Parliamentary dialogue requires renewed attention.**

41. We make this Report to the House for debate.

<sup>43</sup> QQ56, 72, 188, 272.

<sup>44</sup> Q272.

<sup>45</sup> Q221.

## APPENDIX 1

**Members of Sub-Committee C (Common Foreign and Security Policy)**

Lord Bowness  
Lord Harrison  
Baroness Hilton of Eggardon  
Lord Inge  
Lord Jopling (Chairman)  
Lord Maclennan of Rogart  
Lord Morris of Aberavon  
Baroness Park of Monmouth  
Lord Powell of Bayswater  
Lord Watson of Richmond  
Lord Williams of Elvel  
Lord Williamson of Horton

The Sub-Committee records its gratitude to Sir Michael Quinlan GCB for his services as Specialist Adviser.

Members of the Sub-Committee declared the following interests in relation to this inquiry:

**Lord Inge**

Adviser, BAE Systems

Adviser, Alvis Vickers Ltd

**Lord Powell of Bayswater**

Director, Caterpillar Inc (US Corporation)

Director Textron Inc (US Corporation)

Vice-Chairman, Atlantic Partnership

**Lord Watson of Richmond**

Member of the Coca-Cola European Advisory Board

Member of the Y&R Partnership Board

## APPENDIX 2

**List of Witnesses**

The following witnesses gave evidence. Those marked \* gave oral evidence.

- \* Mr Matthew Baldwin, Deputy Chef de Cabinet to Commissioner Lamy, European Commission
- \* Dr Klaus Becher, International Institute for Strategic Studies
- \* Mr Anthony Cary CMG, Chef de Cabinet to Commissioner Patten, European Commission
- \* Mr Robert Cooper CMG MVO, Director-General, Enlargement, Development and Multilateral Economic Affairs, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union
- \* Ministry of Defence<sup>†</sup>
- \* Dr Anne Deighton, British Foreign Policy Resource Centre, Wolfson College, University of Oxford  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen, Denmark  
Mr John Palmer, Political Director and Mr Fraser Cameron, Director of Studies, The European Policy Centre, Brussels, Belgium  
Mr Toby Archer, Mr Hiski Haukkala, Dr Henrikki Heikka, Dr Arkady Moshes, Dr Hanna Ojanen, Ms Kristi Raik and Dr Tapani Vaahtoranta, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki
- \* Foreign and Commonwealth Office<sup>†</sup>
- \* Mr Timothy Garton Ash, Director, European Studies Centre, St Antony's College, University of Oxford
- \* Mr Charles Grant, Director, Centre for European Reform  
Dr Peter van Ham, Deputy Head of Studies, Clingendael Institute, The Hague
- \* Professor Christopher Hill, International Relations Department, London School of Economics  
Embassy of the Republic of Hungary
- \* Department for International Development  
Embassy of the Republic of Lithuania
- \* Mr Jim Nicholson MEP, European Parliament
- \* Mr Quentin Peel, Foreign Editor, Financial Times  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Poland  
Embassy of Portugal  
Mr Simon Serfaty, Director, Europe Programme, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C.  
Professor Alfred van Staden, Director, Clingendael Institute, The Hague
- \* Mr Gunner Wiegand, Head of Unit "USA" in External Relations Directorate, European Commission  
Ms Lisbet Zilmer-Johns, career diplomat in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, currently Visiting Scholar at the Institute for International Studies (IIS), Copenhagen, Denmark (in association with Mr Jess Pilegaard, Research Assistant IIS)  
Dr Przemyslaw Żurawski vel Grajewski, Researcher at the faculty of International Studies and Politology of the University of Lodz, Poland

<sup>†</sup> Combined written evidence

## APPENDIX 3

**List of Private Meetings****Meetings held in Washington D.C. Sunday 23rd February—Wednesday 26th February 2003**

The Sub-Committee held meetings in private with the following witnesses.

Representative Doug Bereuter, US House of Representatives

Mr Bob Bradtke, US Department of State

Mr Ian Brzezinski, US Department of Defense

Ambassador Guenther Burghardt, Head of the European Commission Delegation to the United States

Senator Thad Cochran, United States Senate

Mr Dan Fried, National Security Council

Mr Philip Gordon, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies and Saban Center

for Middle East Policy, and Director, Center on the United States and France, Brookings Institution

Dr John Hulsman, Research Fellow in European Affairs, Davis Institute for International Studies,

Heritage Foundation

Ambassador Robert Hunter, RAND Corporation

Ambassador Beth Jones, US Department of State

Dr Eberhard Koelsch, Minister and Deputy Chief of Mission, German Embassy

Mr Anatol Lieven, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Senator John McCain, United States Senate

Senator Pat Roberts, United States Senate

Ms Kori Schake, National Security Council

Senator Ted Stevens, United States Senate

Senator John Warner, United States Senate

## APPENDIX 4

**Glossary of Acronyms and Technical Terms**

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CTBT	Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty
CTR	Co-operative Threat Reduction
DfID	Department for International Development
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
ICC	International Criminal Court
MoD	Ministry of Defence
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
WTO	World Trade Organisation