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SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
THE EUROPEAN UNION

EU—EFFECTIVE IN A CRISIS?

WITH EVIDENCE

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<i>Dr Denis MacShane MP, Minister for Europe,</i>	
<i>Ms Jill Parkinson, Head of Crisis Management/ESDP and Convention Section,</i>	
<i>Common Foreign and Security Policy Department, and</i>	
<i>Mr Rin Shadforth, Foreign and Commonwealth Office</i>	
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# SEVENTH REPORT

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11 FEBRUARY 2003

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By the Select Committee appointed to consider European Union documents and other matters relating to the European Union.

ORDERED TO REPORT

## EU—EFFECTIVE IN A CRISIS?

### Box 1

#### *Abstract*

Several aspects of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) are classified as non-military. These civilian crisis management capabilities are: *policing*; *the administration of justice (rule of law)*; *civilian administration*; and *civil protection*. Their combined goal is to allow the EU to provide assistance to countries in crisis. The first mission of ‘civilian ESDP’ began with the police mission to Bosnia (EUPM) in January 2003. The Committee found that preparations for the EUPM were highly successful. The Committee considers the EU’s civilian role in crises to be valuable.

The greatest surprise of the inquiry was that both Member States and media have so far shown little interest in the subject.

The Committee’s main conclusions are that the EU should:

- Clarify the scope and goals of civilian ESDP;
- Ensure that the EU works to fill the gaps in the existing crisis management provision rather than duplicate the work of organisations already active in this arena;
- Streamline the chain of command and control; and
- Set in place workable, long-term financing arrangements.

## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1. The period since the end of the Cold War has been characterised by widespread international instability. Conflicts have raged from Afghanistan to Sierra Leone, from Angola to Chechnya; while failed or failing states threaten to descend into chaos. Military force alone cannot tackle actual or potential instability. Thus, although American military might succeeded in toppling the Taliban regime in a matter of months, it will take years to achieve long-term stability in Afghanistan. Closer to home, the Balkans remain politically fragile in the wake of almost a decade of brutal ethnic conflict; the trend of failing states seems likely to accelerate in the future. In order to buttress security a variety of policy instruments are required. These range from military force to civilian instruments.

2. Does the European Union have a role to play in trying to prevent and resolve such instability and conflict? The EU, hitherto a civilian actor, has played an important, if often unnoticed role in stabilising regions threatened with insecurity by using the economic, technical and political means available to the

Community. Going beyond that Britain and France spearheaded an EU effort to establish a European Rapid Reaction Force in 1998; a military force to carry out the ‘Petersberg tasks’.<sup>1</sup> In response, the Nordic countries, drawing on their strong traditions in the area of conflict prevention and supported by the German Red-Green coalition, insisted that civilian crisis management capabilities are developed alongside the military aspects of the new European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).<sup>2</sup> The European Council in Cologne in 1999, and subsequent Councils in Helsinki, Feira, Nice and Gothenburg established four headline goals for civilian ESDP in the areas of *policing, rule of law, civil administration* and *civil protection*. Civilian ESDP is intended to allow Member States to respond at short notice to crises requiring non-military intervention. In November 2002, the Danish Presidency declared that the four headline goals had been met.

3. Considering the dearth of media and political attention that has been given to civilian ESDP in comparison to the military aspirations of ESDP it is interesting that the first ever ESDP mission is non-military; the EU took over the international police mission in Bosnia on 1 January 2003. Nonetheless, current policies on civilian ESDP are not yet certain. Many issues have not been finalised; for example the Committee examined the timing of civilian ESDP missions: should such missions only come into play following a military campaign, or is there scope for combining military and civilian missions? We accordingly concluded that an inquiry would be timely and of value.

4. In carrying out our investigation into civilian ESDP, we<sup>3</sup> identified two key issues for consideration:

- The scope of the EU’s civilian crisis management function:

Does civilian ESDP perform functions that could not be carried out as well or better by other organisations? The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has been active in police missions in the Balkans for some time and initially appeared to be the obvious candidate to take over the International Police Task Force in Bosnia when the UN mandate expired.<sup>4</sup> Member States already make active civilian contributions through a number of other organisations, most notably the OSCE and the UN and some, including Britain, are willing to act in a purely national capacity.<sup>5</sup> We therefore examined whether the civilian ESDP provides added value to international crisis management provision.

- The structures in place to formulate and implement civilian ESDP:

Four headline goals have been established; do they form the basis for effective crisis management? Do the international organisations in Brussels allow for effective civilian crisis management? Civilian ESDP was created as an intergovernmental policy area in the second pillar of the EU Treaty.<sup>6</sup> It therefore has to coexist alongside the Commission’s pre-existing prerogatives in the area of conflict prevention. In theory there is a clear distinction between conflict prevention (managed by the Commission) and crisis management (controlled by the Council). In practice the distinction is far from clear and can give rise to tension between the various institutions, as has been exemplified by the EU Police Mission in Bosnia<sup>7</sup> (hereafter EUPM). Although the EU has previously funded police training missions across the world from the EC budget, as managed by the Commission, it decided to take on the EUPM through its civilian ESDP procedures and hence run it more directly from the Council. We were keen to explore the implications of the potentially overlapping areas of competence of the Council and the Commission and their implications, particularly in terms of financing, as well as the scope for much better co-ordination between the Commission and the Council, and joint use in an emergency of their respective funds and instruments.

<sup>1</sup> The Cologne European Council meeting in June 1999 placed crisis management tasks at the core of the process of strengthening the European common security and defence policy; these are also known as the Petersberg Tasks (named after the place where the Western European Union Ministerial Council met in June 1992). Included are humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping and combat-force tasks in crisis management including peacemaking.

<sup>2</sup> Q25.

<sup>3</sup> Members of the Sub-Committee are set out in Appendix 1.

<sup>4</sup> Q195, Q196.

<sup>5</sup> Q151.

<sup>6</sup> Pillar One: European Community; Pillar Two: Intergovernmental/EU CFSP, ESDP; Pillar Three Intergovernmental/Police and Judicial Co-operation in criminal matters.

<sup>7</sup> See para 15 for detailed discussion of the EUPM.

## CHAPTER 2: THE CURRENT STATE OF CIVILIAN ESDP

## THE FOUR HEADLINE GOALS:

5. The objective of civilian ESDP is to allow the Union to respond at short notice to crises requiring non-military intervention. The decision at the Feira Council in June 2000 to concentrate on four non-military areas, namely police, strengthening the administration of justice, strengthening civilian administration and civil protection, reflects the intention that experts in these four areas should perform short-term crisis management rather than longer-term conflict prevention. Hence election monitors or human rights experts who are traditionally employed as part of a long-term conflict prevention strategy were not included in the headline goals.

6. The specific targets within the civilian headline goals were further elaborated at the Gothenburg Council in 2001. The headline goals are summarised in the box below:

**Box 2**

*The Member States have pledged to provide by 2003:<sup>8</sup>*

***Policing***

- a minimum of 5000 police officers.
- 1000 are to be deployable within 30 days.

***Rule of Law***

- 200 rule of law experts. This includes international prosecutors, lawyers, and judges able to train and monitor local staff, or, in exceptional circumstances, to replace local staff temporarily.
- This is to include a ‘rapid response’ group of rule of law specialists, capable of deployment at 30 days notice to provide early planning on rule of law support.

***Civilian Administration***

- ‘a pool of experts’ to set up, or ensure the existence of a functional administrative apparatus, while promoting transition to local ownership as soon as possible in the fields of General Administration, Social Services and Infrastructure.
- Tasks for this ‘pool of experts’ are yet to be defined.

***Civil Protection***

- 2–3 assessment teams of 10 experts each available for dispatch within 3–7 hours of a natural or man-made disaster to assist in assessing the damage and to recommend additional civil protection from EU intervention teams. These experts should be on 24-hour call from a group of up to 100 specially selected experts for this purpose.
- Civil protection intervention teams of up to 2000 persons ready for deployment at short notice.
- Supplementary or more specialised resources from government or non-governmental services to be dispatched within a week.

7. On 19 of November 2002 the Danish Presidency announced that the targets in the four groups had been met.<sup>9</sup> We were surprised to learn from the Minister for Europe, Dr Denis MacShane MP, that some documents regarding the pledges of experts from individual Member States for the four headline goals are confidential.<sup>10</sup> Although figures on the breakdown of the Member State and third country contributions for the EUPM are available<sup>11</sup> the Committee found it baffling that figures on overall

<sup>8</sup> Presidency Report to the Gothenburg European Council on European Security and Defence Policy.

<sup>9</sup> EU Civilian Crisis Management Capability Conference; Danish Presidency press release. Declaration para 2.

<sup>10</sup> Q174.

<sup>11</sup> See Appendix 4 for detail.

pledges from Member States in response to the *rule of law* and *policing* targets for civilian crisis management personnel have been classified by the Council Secretariat; given that details concerning the pledges of Member States were made public following a military ESDP conference in November 2000.<sup>12</sup>

8. The Committee considered the four headline goals; we note concern over the dilemma of establishing the *rule of law* headline goal. Although there are accepted international rule of law standards it is not clear what the EU should do to assist a country where the legal framework has failed. The Committee consider the term '*rule of law*' to be impractical. In real terms this headline goal appears to refer to the administration of justice. What would happen if the country was, for example, predominately Muslim? Would the Union assist in the creation of a Sharia law system? As the Member States have different legal traditional cultures and styles, would they be able to agree on a common model? The headline goals require early clarification.

#### THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE FOR CIVILIAN ESDP

9. The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) was set up in June 2000 in order to allow the EU to meet the four headline goals. It is staffed by the national civil services and reports to Political and Security Committee (PSC) at the Council. The PSC<sup>13</sup> monitors the international situation in the areas under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It helps define policies for the Council, either at the request of the Council or on its own initiative, and monitors policy implementation. The Joint Situation Centre (JSC)<sup>14</sup> provides the PSC with intelligence appropriate for crisis management. The PSC also maintains a privileged link with the High Representative whose own Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) monitors and plans civilian crisis responses. As with all other Council bodies, the Commission is fully associated with the work of the PSC and represented on it.<sup>15</sup>

10. A set of Crisis Management Procedures involving all the committees have been put in place. FCO representatives have referred to these as 'rather lengthy' and 'a living document intended to be continually revised in the light of experience'.<sup>16</sup>

#### FIRST PILLAR ACTION

11. The Union has been involved in conflict prevention since its inception; since April 2001 conflict prevention has been one of the explicit aims of all its external programmes.<sup>17</sup>

12. The Commission divides conflict situations into three stages:<sup>18</sup>

- the stage preceding the crisis;
- the crisis itself; and
- a stage of reconstruction and rehabilitation.

13. During the stages preceding a crisis and in its aftermath the Union has a number of instruments at its disposal. It may attempt to address a conflict situation long before it escalates into an acute crisis; for example by providing human rights monitors or funding food security programmes. During the reconstruction and rehabilitation stages, the Union may fund humanitarian aid; for example securing the safety of refugees, fund mine clearance operations and provide support in the development of adequate civilian infrastructure.<sup>19</sup> These instruments and programmes are adopted by the Council and are currently mostly managed by the Commission.

14. According to Mr. Joost Korte, Deputy Head of the Cabinet of Commissioner Chris Patten, one of the key reasons behind the Council's decision to develop civilian ESDP was the need to expand the EU's options during the acute stage of a crisis.<sup>20</sup> This positive and necessary development should not upset the already existing programmes and procedures for crisis management that were enacted by the Council

<sup>12</sup> "Capabilities Commitment Conference 20 November 2000".

<sup>13</sup> The PSC is composed of ambassadorial-rank diplomats from the 15 Member States.

<sup>14</sup> See Appendix 5 for detail.

<sup>15</sup> Civilian ESDP decision-making structures are summarised in the Appendix 6.

<sup>16</sup> p36–p37.

<sup>17</sup> Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, COM (2001) 211 final.

<sup>18</sup> Q51.

<sup>19</sup> A comprehensive discussion of the Community policies are described in 'Suggestions for procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU crisis management', a working document produced by CIVCOM for the Council. A version from 19 December 2002 was made available for the Committee to consult.

<sup>20</sup> Q51.

and that are running well. Although this neat division of responsibilities between the Council and the Commission may be theoretically useful, there are a number of areas of over-lapping competences and potential conflict. The Committee was provided with a number of practical examples:

**Institutional organisation:** During the preparation for the EUPM, the Commission has handled legal and budgetary issues in the PSC.<sup>21</sup>

**Finance:** In accordance with Article 28 TEU and Article 274 TEC, the Commission manages many parts of civilian ESDP financing, for example the Special Representatives are paid from Community budgets and the Commission has paid for the start up costs of the EUPM.

**Training:** The Commission has paid for 80 per cent of the trial training programme for civilian ESDP experts.<sup>22</sup>

**Headline goals:** There is considerable overlap between Commission programmes and the ESDP civilian experts groups. Most notably, the EU is now operating two different civil protection schemes. On 23 October 2001, the Council decided to establish an EC civil protection mechanism, co-ordinated by the Commission. This mechanism, which brings together the civil protection services of the Member States, can be used in third countries. The civilian ESDP civil protection mechanism, planned at the Council, can draw on the Community one, but is nonetheless separate. Both are modelled on the UNDAC system.<sup>23</sup>

#### THE BOSNIA POLICE MISSION

15. In February 2002, some two months after ESDP was declared operational at the Laeken Council, the EU High-Representative Javier Solana suggested that the Union take over the police mission in Bosnia from the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF).

16. The EU has been able to set up the EUPM through the commitment of 480 police monitors plus other civilian support. Several major elements of the mission are worthy of note:

- Lord Ashdown was appointed on 13 March 2002 in a double-hatted<sup>24</sup> capacity as both EU Special Representative to Bosnia and High Representative for the implementation of the Dayton accord, to allow for effective co-ordination between the police mission and the Union's CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation) programme which prioritises the rule of law.<sup>25</sup>
- Agreement has been reached on the participation of police and civilian personnel from 18 non-EU states.<sup>26</sup> The United States declined the invitation to participate.<sup>27</sup>
- Officers deployed in Bosnia will receive one week of training prior to their deployment.<sup>28</sup> However, two-thirds of this force were in Bosnia since 1 December 2002, and therefore had the opportunity to acclimatise prior to the mission becoming operational.<sup>29</sup>

17. The EUPM will not carry out executive police functions but will provide advice in a 'monitoring and inspecting mode'. Lord Ashdown has also indicated that organised crime will be a priority—this will require the deployment of an additional 24 officers.<sup>30</sup>

18. The EUPM appears to be a relatively straightforward first test for civilian ESDP. The International Police Task Force (IPTF) was on the ground since 1995 and the EU had 12 months warning of its task to replace the UN.<sup>31</sup> The EUPM, moreover, has been able to retain the services of the final IPTF Commissioner, Sven Fredrikssen, who will serve as the first EUPM Commissioner.

19. The fact that the Bosnia mission is occurring at all marks a turning point in the history of ESDP. Moreover, the Union responded impressively to an American threat to withdraw from Bosnia early in

<sup>21</sup> p26–p32.

<sup>22</sup> p38.

<sup>23</sup> United Nations Disaster Assessment and Co-ordination.

<sup>24</sup> 'Double Hatting' denotes an individual who represents two institutions.

<sup>25</sup> Q109.

<sup>26</sup> Bulgaria; Canada; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Estonia; Hungary; Iceland; Latvia; Lithuania; Norway; Poland; Romania; Russia; Slovakia; Slovenia; Switzerland; Turkey and Ukraine.

<sup>27</sup> Q109.

<sup>28</sup> p38.

<sup>29</sup> Q115.

<sup>30</sup> Q109.

<sup>31</sup> Q10.

July 2002 (over the dispute about the International Criminal Court). The Council and Commission managed, within the space of two weeks, to put into place plans for the EUPM to replace the IPTF immediately.<sup>32</sup> Several issues arising from it have been identified by the Committee:

**Financing**<sup>33</sup>: Start-up costs have been provided by the EC budget, despite the fact that the EUPM is being operated under ESDP; a second pillar institution. Running costs will come from the Member States. The financial arrangements for the mission are being determined on an *ad hoc* basis. One witness asserted that, for the European Commission, the question of financing and the role of the EC budget has been the key difficulty encountered in planning the operation.<sup>34</sup>

**Procurement**: The need to comply with Community Procurement regulations (requiring all procurement to take place through open tender) required a considerable proportion of planning time; there are no rules governing procurement procedures during a crisis. Whilst the one year lead time for the operation made this manageable, it could represent a problem for future missions.<sup>35</sup> This has further hampered co-operation between international organisations; for example the EUPM encountered problems in buying or leasing UN equipment due to both EU and UN restrictions.<sup>36</sup>

20. **The Committee recommend that Member State pledges for civilian ESDP are transparent**, this would be useful for two reasons: (i) the publication of figures can help to persuade reluctant Member States to do more and: (ii) a lack of transparency reinforces the lack of public attention on an area of the EU which should be a focus for Member States and media alike.

21. **The Committee also recommend that the four headline goals are more clearly defined.**

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<sup>32</sup> Q10.

<sup>33</sup> p50.

<sup>34</sup> Q117, Q118.

<sup>35</sup> p39.

<sup>36</sup> p37.

## CHAPTER 3: THE SCOPE OF THE EU'S CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

22. There is disagreement between the Member States concerning the appropriate objectives for the ESDP, including its civilian aspects. Should the EU be able to intervene globally or merely in its own region? Should the EU be able to do a full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks, or should there be burden sharing with other organisations? In this section we look at the objectives and evaluate the danger in the current lack of clarity on civilian ESDP.

## WHERE SHOULD THE EU INTERVENE?

23. The EU has named no specific geographical limits to civilian ESDP. According to the British Government 'In principle, the EU could agree to run a civilian crisis management operation anywhere in the world'.<sup>37</sup> The Council decides every six months on crisis management priorities in the so called 'global overview'—which defines some 25–30 areas of incipient crisis which the various Council bodies monitor, in particular the Joint Situation Centre.<sup>38</sup>

24. For the moment, the EU appears likely only to intervene in its own region. Mr Feith, Deputy Director General at the Council, said quite unequivocally 'for us the Balkans is the priority as far as ESDP is concerned'.<sup>39</sup> More specifically, Mr Feith mentioned ESDP engagements in 'Bosnia and in Macedonia'<sup>40</sup> although he predicted a military mission 'elsewhere in the vicinity of Europe'.

25. The fact that the EU speaks of global ambition but only acts locally is a cause of regret for some of the witnesses who gave evidence to the Committee. The International Crisis Group maintains that it is important that the EU is perceived to have genuinely a global agenda.<sup>41</sup> Other witnesses explained that it is more helpful for other actors that the EU is frank about its intentions to continue focusing on the Balkans.<sup>42</sup>

## CO-OPERATION WITH OTHER ORGANISATIONS AND THIRD COUNTRIES

26. There are a number of organisations, both intergovernmental and non-governmental, who are currently active in civilian crisis management. In Europe, the OSCE is the most established actor, while the UN is globally recognised for its conflict prevention and crisis work. In establishing another civilian crisis management capacity the EU needs to be mindful of several potential problems:

**Double-hatting:** The Committee was informed that there are insufficient numbers of experts for all crisis management missions.<sup>43</sup> The UN, OSCE and EU draw on the same pool of trained personnel. This fact led one witness to recommend UN/EU common training modules, to maximise interoperability.<sup>44</sup>

**Duplication:** Given the limited number of experts and the limited financing which has been committed to crisis management, any duplication of crisis management services is worrying. One clear example is the ESDP Civil Protection mechanism. The mechanism mirrors the dispatch of assessment and co-ordination teams by the UN through the United Nations Disaster Assessment Co-ordination (UNDAC) system (managed by the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs; OCHA).

**Shifting Institutional Responsibility:** The third danger in the EU's development of civilian crisis management capacity is that this will blur the lines of authority between the organisations. To prevent this relevant international organisations should create a plan which determines organisational responsibility under set foreseeable circumstances. It would be a mistake to leave this task until the next crisis; under those circumstances institutional rivalries concerning responsibilities would be embarrassing and dangerous, particularly when the same countries are members of the same organisations.<sup>45</sup> While some flexibility should be retained, knowing which agency is suitable for acting in certain crises would save valuable time in deploying the most appropriate crisis managers.

<sup>37</sup> p39.

<sup>38</sup> Q87.

<sup>39</sup> Q109.

<sup>40</sup> Q123.

<sup>41</sup> Q49.

<sup>42</sup> Q186.

<sup>43</sup> p51–p52.

<sup>44</sup> Q182.

<sup>45</sup> p49.

27. The dangers of duplication and shifting organisational responsibility are well recognised. Witnesses stressed the need to co-ordinate with other organisations.<sup>46</sup> ‘HMG consistently stresses that the EU should ensure that its civilian crisis management activity is developed in a mutually reinforcing way with that of other organisations’.<sup>47</sup> The OSCE was singled out as a particularly important partner.<sup>48</sup> The EU and OSCE share geographical territory, membership and operate extensively within common areas, for example election and human rights monitoring. Saferworld emphasised that ‘the OSCE is to the EU civilian crisis management what NATO is to EU military crisis management’.<sup>49</sup>

28. The Committee was told that relations with NATO were good.<sup>50</sup> Nevertheless, it is still the case that EU civilians cannot operate directly under NATO command. At present NATO and the EU are working closely together, for example in Bosnia under SFOR (Stabilisation Force) and EUPM.<sup>51</sup>

29. Macedonia was cited by witnesses as an example of effective co-operation where the EU led in creating a diplomatic and political climate which allowed the deployment of NATO peacekeepers. These peacekeepers then worked very well with the OSCE’s broader mandate for security sector reform. One example was the provision of maps identifying the location of minefields supplied by NATO to OSCE.<sup>52</sup>

30. The Committee took evidence from several non-governmental organisations (NGOs).<sup>53</sup> It would appear that some NGOs have good relations with the Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit in the Commission and the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit in the Council. It was suggested to the Committee that there is good co-operation at senior levels. Commissioner Patten appears to take NGOs very seriously, as do Lord Robertson and High Representative Javier Solana.<sup>54</sup>

31. At an operational level, however, sufficient co-ordination appears to be lacking.<sup>55</sup> ‘There is still insufficient understanding of the role of NGOs and civil society in general and the impact they can have in a crisis situation’.<sup>56</sup> Saferworld recommend that an effective system of policy dialogue between NGOs, the Council and the Commission should be established. ‘It is important that the EU’s civilian crisis management policy and operation is informed by policy dialogue involving NGOs and other civil society groups working on the ground’.<sup>57</sup> The Committee agrees.

32. The EU needs to re-visit its relations with other ‘third countries’ when considering action under civilian ESDP. BASIC<sup>58</sup> suggested that the EU should not attempt civilian crisis management without the United States, Russia, Canada, Switzerland and Norway.<sup>59</sup> The Committee notes that the US is the only one of those countries listed by BASIC which did not offer personnel to help staff the EUPM.

**33. The Committee recommends that the EU give a clearer definition of the type of operation that it might consider undertaking to allow for more effective co-operation with several key organisations; in particular NATO, UN, OSCE, as well as relevant NGOs.**

**34. The Committee notes that clear objectives are vital for defining the function of civilian ESDP and for co-ordination with other crisis management organisations. The Committee recommends that the geographical scope of civilian ESDP is related to the resources and structures available.**

**35. It is crucial that relevant agencies co-ordinate on the ground to avoid unnecessary and potentially competitive duplication and to ensure that appropriate information is shared. We recommend that relevant international organisations create a plan which determines organisational responsibility under set foreseeable circumstances.**

<sup>46</sup> p48.

<sup>47</sup> p40.

<sup>48</sup> Q18, Q20.

<sup>49</sup> p59.

<sup>50</sup> p37.

<sup>51</sup> p40.

<sup>52</sup> Q182.

<sup>53</sup> BASIC, EPLO, European Centre for Common Ground, ICG, Saferworld.

<sup>54</sup> Q7.

<sup>55</sup> Q7.

<sup>56</sup> Q184.

<sup>57</sup> p58.

<sup>58</sup> BASIC—British American Security Information Council.

<sup>59</sup> p49.

CHAPTER 4: THE STRUCTURE IN PLACE TO FORMULATE AND IMPLEMENT CIVILIAN  
ESDP

CAPABILITIES:

36. The EU is yet to define in concrete terms the objectives of civilian ESDP. As a consequence, it is impossible effectively to evaluate whether the structures currently in place are appropriate. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) told the Committee that they consider the EU to have adequate capabilities to provide ‘basic civilian crisis management’. For example, only 480 out of the 5000 police officers originally pledged by Member States have been required for the EUPM in Bosnia. Nevertheless, the EU does not appear to be in a position to mount additional police operations elsewhere. On the contrary, witnesses agreed that, alone the EU can only hope to manage the EUPM; this is due to the EU’s limited planning capacity and the question of financing.<sup>60</sup>

37. Whilst quantitative targets have been met the EU civilian crisis management capability may be impaired by an inability to recruit appropriately qualified personnel.<sup>61</sup> The *Rule of Law* headline goal has been singled out as an area where the recruitment of experts has proved problematical.<sup>62</sup> Experience shows that greater investment will also be needed in retaining experts. According to a recent International Crisis Group (ICG) report, lawyers who have entered Bosnia and Herzegovina to help reform the judicial system, often stay for only a few months, partly perhaps because Member States pay secondees very little over and above the per diem they receive or perhaps because they are also working for other similar organisations elsewhere.<sup>63</sup>

38. The Committee was advised that establishing clear objectives for civilian ESDP is crucial for creating appropriate capabilities. One objective may be to fill existing gaps in international capacity provided by other organisations.

39. Currently, a clear gap exists in the area of *policing*. In a post-conflict situation, international peacekeepers are employed to do tasks which would be more appropriate for a police force. BASIC recommends that the EU might do well to focus its efforts on establishing a mobile police force that could enter crisis situations on short notice, leaving the training and monitoring of local police forces to the OSCE.<sup>64</sup>

40. The EU is particularly well equipped to develop a flexible, mobile police force given the diversity of police forces within the Member States ranging from gendarmerie to unarmed police. The International Crisis Group stressed the importance of the principle of ‘horses for courses’ in planning police missions.<sup>65</sup> Different crises will require different sorts of police force; the Union already holds a welcome degree of flexibility in the kinds of police mission it could undertake.

41. The Committee received less evidence concerning the areas of *Rule of Law* and *Civil Administration*, reflecting the fact that these two areas of capabilities are at present, less developed. Dr MacShane, Minister for Europe, did however, place emphasis on the *Rule of Law* as a key priority for the civilian ESDP.<sup>66</sup> Again, the EU should work to define these categories to fill existing gaps and in particular, avoid overlap with the OSCE.

42. The Pillar I civil protection mechanism seems a better co-ordinated and better funded version of the ESDP civil protection mechanism. As this mechanism is intended to work in third countries in close co-operation with the UN it is hard to see why a separate ESDP mechanism which can draw on the Community would be required. This duplication could be solved by placing it under Pillar One and therefore the Commission’s co-ordination.

43. The Committee also considered whether the headline goal should be expanded to include capabilities categories for other types of experts. Witnesses did not agree on this issue. Election monitoring; is carried out effectively by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OdiHR), which employs a large cadre of monitors from EU Member States. The Commission, moreover, already funds much of this activity. Similarly, the OSCE’s Rapid Expert Assistance Co-

<sup>60</sup> Q120, Q166.

<sup>61</sup> Q179.

<sup>62</sup> Q23.

<sup>63</sup> International Crisis Group, “Courting Disaster: The Misrule of Law in Bosnia and Herzegovina” Balkans Report No. 127, 25 March 2002.

<sup>64</sup> p50–51.

<sup>65</sup> Q12.

<sup>66</sup> Q146, Q147.

operation Teams (REACT) are designed to deploy quickly professionals with skills in media development, human rights monitoring and democratisation, amongst other things.<sup>67</sup>

#### TRAINING

44. Civilians who volunteer to serve on ESDP missions are assumed to have the appropriate qualifications in their field of expertise.<sup>68</sup> Two further issues merit attention in this regard. The first is whether civilians are sufficiently prepared for international missions. The second is the issue of interoperability. How can interoperability be best achieved? As things stand, 'the principle is that training is a national responsibility'.<sup>69</sup>

45. There is no specific co-ordination between Member States on police training. Nevertheless, most Member States use the United Nations Police Peacekeeping course as a basis of international police training; as a result there are significant similarities between national courses. These courses include training in mission safety, human rights and the principles of democratic policing.<sup>70</sup>

46. The Commission is currently running a pilot scheme for *rule of law* and *civil administration*. The British Government has expressed support for this undertaking. Within the framework of the pilot scheme common courses will be organised by training institutes in individual Member States, based on models developed by a core group of Member State training institutes. The Greek Presidency is expected to launch further initiatives on civilian training in the first half of 2003<sup>71</sup> while the Commission training project will be evaluated during the Italian presidency (second half of 2003).<sup>72</sup>

47. The Committee notes that civil protection is not covered by the pilot scheme. DfID has been closely involved with running a further pilot scheme based on Red Cross and OCHA experience in the humanitarian field.<sup>73</sup>

48. The United Kingdom Government has not as yet taken a definitive decision on how its training should be organised.<sup>74</sup> As things stand, however, HMG envisages leaving Member States to carry out the training based on common modules. According to the Government this will strike the right balance between 'developing member state capacities to train various types of civilian experts, and on the other, establishing a coherent EU approach to crisis management operations'.<sup>75</sup> The ICG supports the idea of common modules taught nationally to ensure that all experts share common ideas as to how to operate in the field.<sup>76 77</sup>

49. The Committee is not fully convinced of the continuing viability of purely national training schemes. Such schemes, based on years of experience from UN missions, are sufficient for preparing civilians for international missions, but may not provide enough interoperability on the ground. Not least, this is because experts on civilian ESDP mission will be required to intervene as 'Europeans',<sup>78</sup> rather than national experts, as is the case for those seconded to an OSCE or UN mission.

50. A Europe-wide centre to provide training and enhance interoperability was suggested as a mechanism to encourage interoperability.<sup>79</sup> BASIC also stressed the importance of including other interested parties in such schemes, including important civilian crisis management actors such as Norway, Canada and Switzerland. The Committee do not believe that a European training centre would be necessary to enable interoperability.

<sup>67</sup> p51.

<sup>68</sup> Recruiting appropriately qualified personnel is a separate issue, see para 36 on capabilities.

<sup>69</sup> Q112.

<sup>70</sup> p38.

<sup>71</sup> Q113.

<sup>72</sup> p38.

<sup>73</sup> p38.

<sup>74</sup> p38.

<sup>75</sup> p39.

<sup>76</sup> Q32.

<sup>77</sup> Q34.

<sup>78</sup> Q6.

<sup>79</sup> Q119.

## INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE:

*Pillar structure:*

51. EU external policy has to be formulated and implemented within the pillar structure, as embodied in the Treaties.<sup>80</sup> We wished to explore the implications of the pillar structure for civilian crisis management, as this area is unusual in that it requires quick decision-making and flexible implementation.

52. The FCO told the Committee that effective crisis management is possible within the current pillar structure.<sup>81</sup> The Commission was similarly keen to stress that the pillar structure is a workable framework for EU crisis management; any problems are no more than examples of the type of 'bureaucratic in-fighting' which would be expected in any political system.<sup>82</sup>

53. Nonetheless, the Commission conceded that there is room for improvement in the effectiveness of cross-pillar co-ordination and coherence.<sup>83</sup> Some of the new structures in the Council Secretariat overlap with the tasks of the Civil Protection and Crisis Management Unit in the Commission. Moreover, under the relevant Council decisions and within the financial envelopes allocated by the budgetary authority (Council and EP) the Commission can mobilise considerable financial resources and expertise in these areas from the EC budget as well as expertise which the Council Secretariat might struggle to match, making duplication even less rational.<sup>84</sup>

54. Specific processes have been put into place to facilitate co-ordination between the EU institutions (Council and Commission) and between them and the Member States: the 'Procedures for Coherent Comprehensive EU Crisis Management' is, according to the FCO, a 'living document'. A 'Crisis Response Co-ordinating Team' has been set up to co-ordinate the activities of Commission and Council officials in the time of a crisis.<sup>85</sup> According to the FCO such co-operation works well.<sup>86</sup> The Committee notes that the EU is only just beginning to experience this reality during a 'live' mission.

55. Whilst the overwhelming view of EU 'insiders' was that the pillar structure can be made to operate effectively for civilian ESDP 'outsiders' who presented their opinions to the Committee were unanimous in their scepticism.<sup>87</sup> Many of these observers point out that the division of labour between pillars one and two seems almost arbitrary. Moreover, whilst they agreed with the FCO that co-ordination processes are adequate at senior administrative levels, many desk officers are less aware of what their counterparts in the other institution are doing, or even of who these counterparts are.<sup>88</sup>

56. Numerous solutions have been proposed to the problem of inter-pillar co-ordination. Witnesses<sup>89</sup> expressed a preference for the merging of the roles of the High Representative and the Commissioner for External Relations. The British Government, for its part, suggested the degree of urgency in each case should be the criteria for deciding whether the Commission or Council should take the lead in any putative operation. Thus, if an urgent crisis occurs in an area of key EU interest, then the Union should intervene through second pillar. Less pressing issues should be left to the Commission.<sup>90</sup> These matters are currently under discussion in the Convention on the Future of Europe.

57. Perhaps the most serious consequence of the division of the EU's response capacity between Pillar II and Pillar I is to raise the possibility that the Union's reaction to any crisis will be driven by institutional considerations rather than by a problem-solving approach. This message was delivered unequivocally to the Committee by both Saferworld<sup>91</sup> and the Commission itself: 'We would like to convince Member States of a broader approach, which is to say that crisis management does not start

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<sup>80</sup> All three pillars of the EU potentially have a role to play in civilian ESDP. The roles of the first and second pillars have already been referred to: Pillar 3 (Justice and Home Affairs) may also be involved, for example, in efforts to combat international crime or the smuggling of small arms and light weapons<sup>81</sup>. Lord Ashdown's initiative to target organised crime in Bosnia as Chapter of the EUPM illustrates how civilian ESDP can involve Justice and Home Affairs.

<sup>81</sup> p36.

<sup>82</sup> Q52.

<sup>83</sup> Q52.

<sup>84</sup> Q59.

<sup>85</sup> See Box 3 for detail.

<sup>86</sup> p36.

<sup>87</sup> Q181.

<sup>88</sup> Q6.

<sup>89</sup> p57.

<sup>90</sup> p36.

<sup>91</sup> p57.

when there is a crisis'.<sup>92</sup> The Swedish Presidency championed the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts<sup>93</sup> which highlighted the need to make crisis management capabilities available to conflict prevention operations.

58. The Government favours using more EU Special Representatives alongside rapidly deployable headquarters as a way of ensuring effective co-ordination.<sup>94</sup> Currently experience with these appointments, in particular with Lord Ashdown, has been generally positive. However the effectiveness of Special Representatives is contingent upon their authority and personality, which means that it is not hard to imagine far less effective appointments. Moreover, as the EU becomes more involved in crisis management, as it has repeatedly expressed the ambition to do, a proliferation of Special Representatives might not always be an ideal way to ensure overall institutional and policy coherence.

#### INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE: PLANNING AND FORMULATING POLICY IN THE COUNCIL

59. One key reason why the EU is not yet able to mount more than one civilian ESDP operation at one time is that mission planning and support capacity is not yet fully in place. In the words of the Commission 'We [the EU] cannot quite yet mobilise 300 prosecutors...at the press of a button'.<sup>95</sup>

60. The Minister for Europe was impressed by the speed of the EU's reaction to the crisis in Macedonia and to events in Montenegro.<sup>96</sup> The Council Secretariat also emphasised the speed at which the EU was able to respond to the crisis in July 2002 when the US threatened to withdraw from the International Police Task Force (IPTF);<sup>97</sup> it is clear that the current committee structure does not lend itself to fast decision-making.

61. The number of Council committees that have been set up to deal with ESDP reflect normal EU procedures for developing policies but these will not be an effective way of taking decisions in an acute crisis.<sup>98</sup> The FCO conceded that during the planning for the EUPM there have been departures from the 'rather lengthy process set out in the EU's Crisis Management Procedures'.<sup>99</sup> One witness from the Council Secretariat said 'I think we could do with less of the procedures and committee involvement'.<sup>100</sup>

62. An initial effort to streamline the EU's Crisis Management Procedures is underway as a result of the first crisis management exercise held in May 2002<sup>101</sup> (See Box below).

63. An additional factor related to decision-making effectiveness concerns staffing. The ICG pointed out that EU operational structures cannot be staffed by diplomats alone. Planning and mission support should be carried out by experienced field operatives, perhaps from NGOs, contracted out by the Union not diplomats based in the Council.<sup>102</sup>

<sup>92</sup> Q51.

<sup>93</sup> The EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, signed at the Gothenburg European Council, June 2001.

<sup>94</sup> p41.

<sup>95</sup> Q54.

<sup>96</sup> Q165.

<sup>97</sup> Q117.

<sup>98</sup> See Appendix 6 "Sharing the Decision Making Structures" (3 charts).

<sup>99</sup> p36.

<sup>100</sup> Q112.

<sup>101</sup> p36-p37.

<sup>102</sup> Q36, Q37.

**Box 3***Lessons learned from the CME02:*

The EU carried out its first exercise 'CME 02'<sup>103</sup> between 22 and 28 May 2002 to test the Union's decision-making mechanisms in a crisis situation. The scenario involved a fictitious Atlantic island. Participants included the Member States, the Council Secretariat, including the Joint Situation Centre, the Secretary-General of the Council, and the Commission.

According to the Foreign Office the exercise underlined three key problems in the way the EU deals with crisis management:

(i) Further work is required on achieving civil-military co-ordination throughout the planning and operational phases of an operation. The Danish Presidency has reacted to this short-coming by producing an Action Plan, which the Greek Presidency hopes to complete.<sup>104</sup>

(ii) CME02 demonstrated very clearly that more efficient Crisis Management Procedures will be required. The role of CIVCOM for example was not reflected in the Crisis Management Procedures—yet during the exercise it was tasked to evaluate and advise on strategic options for a police component.<sup>105</sup>

(iii) CME02 also demonstrated the need to further define the role of the Crisis Response Co-ordinating Team (CRCT), to serve as co-ordinating body between Council Secretariat and Commission officials during a crisis. Little use was made of the CRCT during the exercise.<sup>106</sup>

The CME02 exercise was designed to test decision-making mechanisms, and as a result ignored many critical aspects of any possible mission; the most important of these, according to the Foreign Office, was the humanitarian situation on the ground.<sup>107</sup> In any actual crisis interaction with the key humanitarian agencies on the ground will be of utmost importance.

64. The co-ordination of EU humanitarian aid, channelled through ECHO<sup>108</sup> in the Commission and civilian ESDP is more than an institutional problem. 'Given limited financial resources, linking the provisions of humanitarian assistance to geo-political priorities would risk ignoring areas of real need'.<sup>109</sup> Certainly, ECHO should not be tied to EU crisis management, but its input in some of these operations is crucial.

65. The Committee was advised that Member States should engage more directly with the European Parliament. The latter can play a constructive role; during the in Budget Council of November 2002 the European Parliament agreed to raise the CFSP budget from €40 million to €47.5 million<sup>110</sup> in exchange for some extra influence on Council decision-making in CFSP.

## FINANCING

66. Financing is the weakest part of civilian ESDP; the divisions between the two pillars; (Intergovernmental and Community) are at their most pronounced when deciding who holds the purse strings for civilian ESDP. Whilst the EU budgetary authority (Council and EP) allocates substantial amounts of money to first pillar programmes in the area of crisis management, mostly managed by the Commission, it only granted €47.5 million to the CFSP budget line. The present arrangement is not a long-term option. During our visit to Brussels the Committee were told that Civilian ESDP financing is 'a very shaky aspect of ESDP and EU peacekeeping'.<sup>111</sup> The procedures developed to finance the EUPM were created on an *ad hoc* basis and are, according to the Commission 'clearly not a sustainable situation'.<sup>112</sup>

<sup>103</sup> Crisis Management Exercise 2002.

<sup>104</sup> p37.

<sup>105</sup> p37.

<sup>106</sup> p37.

<sup>107</sup> p37.

<sup>108</sup> European Community Humanitarian Office.

<sup>109</sup> p40–p41.

<sup>110</sup> Q83.

<sup>111</sup> Q109.

<sup>112</sup> Q66.

67. Financing for the EUPM will be secured out of the Community budget; €47.5 million this year. 'The balance will be paid by Member States on the basis of costs lying where they fall'.<sup>113</sup> The proposals on financing the common costs for future missions were agreed at the General Affairs Council on 27 January 2003. The two options are; Post Operational Settlement of Costs or the Mechanism Option. Neither option appears to be a long-term option for financing major civilian crisis management operations.

**68. The Committee recommends that three of the four headline goal capabilities be developed further with the aim of filling gaps in international capacity. Civil Protection need not be handled under Pillar II. Nevertheless, the Committee is not convinced that further categories of experts are required to make civilian ESDP effective.**

**69. The Committee recommend that a training team is founded following an examination of its functions and responsibilities. This international nucleus of training experts would be more flexible than a permanent organisation and could call upon existing Member State assets; for example national police colleges, as required.**

**70. The Committee recognises that this inquiry is not an appropriate arena to discuss the reform of the pillar structure. We suggest that the Convention for the Future of Europe take note of the current situation and make recommendations to the IGC in 2004 which should act to remedy the problem.**

**71. The CME02 exercise has highlighted several issues: there is an urgent need for streamlining decision-making structures for crisis policy planning and implementation.**

**72. There needs to be enhanced co-ordination in civil-military relations. This co-ordination needs to occur at the level of the Council. The Government assured the Committee that the Greek Presidency will treat civil-military co-ordination as a priority.**

**73. The Committee was advised that Member States should engage more directly with the European Parliament. We agree.**

**74. The Committee consider the two recently agreed financing options for 'common costs' nothing more than a stop gap. The EU must determine long-term methods of financing all ESDP mission costs.**

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<sup>113</sup> Q84-Q108.

## CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS

75. Civilian ESDP is an important development for the EU. The continued instability across the world, including in the European near abroad, will require outside intervention to prevent or limit violent conflict. The EU has recognised, that often intervention is best carried out through civilian means. The EU, as a predominantly civilian actor, is well placed to develop civilian crisis management capability. Through its 15 Member States, soon to be 25, the Union has a wealth of experienced personnel to draw upon; for example police officers, prosecutors and administrators. The Committee has been impressed by the progress made in the four years since the initiative was taken to develop civilian ESDP, including in particular the preparation for the EUPM. Civil servants in both Member States and EU institutions have ensured progress, in spite of, or perhaps because of, the lack of media attention and political pressure unlike that which has accompanied the military side of ESDP.

76. Nonetheless, while civilian ESDP seems to be one of the quiet successes of the EU's foreign policy, this area suffers from some of the problems familiar to many of the EU's foreign policy initiatives. The objectives of civilian ESDP are yet to be clearly defined. While the broad mandate of the ESDP is defined within the 'Petersberg tasks' these are not sufficiently precise to provide a framework for civilian ESDP. Clear objectives are needed to provide a basis for co-operation with other organisations. At present, the 'double-hatting' which occurs limits the number of personnel one Member State can contribute. Member States must ensure that capacities match staff availability, while the EU must ensure that duplication with other organisations is minimised. Strategic thinking is therefore required when considering institutional responsibility. The OSCE may be better placed to intervene in order to develop democratic institutions, whereas the EU should focus on short-term police missions.

77. By engaging in strategic thinking about institutional burden-sharing the EU will be able to define more closely the function of the four headline goals. As they stand, the Committee found that three of the four categories are appropriate to civilian ESDP. *Civil protection*, however, is better handled by the Community; there is no need for two separate mechanisms within the EU. The Committee considers the current numerical targets set for the remaining three categories; *police*, *rule of law*, and *civil administration* to be appropriate. The Council Secretariat should be tasked to define these areas more precisely. Presently, the key question with regard to capabilities is whether the personnel promised by Member States matches in quality the quantities promised. Training is an area of concern; Member State personnel must be able to work together on the ground as 'Europeans'. The EUPM will be a useful indicator of the success of current training arrangements.

78. Civilian ESDP highlights the problems the pillar structure creates for the effectiveness of the EU's foreign policy. Dividing the EU's conflict prevention and crisis management responses by the EU's institutional organisation is not always desirable. The Committee recognises that this inquiry is not an appropriate arena for a discussion on the reform of the EU. We suggest that the Convention on the Future of Europe take note of the current situation and make recommendations to the IGC in 2004 which should remedy this problem.

79. The Committee recognises that civilian ESDP is still in its infancy and is only now, during the EUPM, to be tested in a live mission. The Committee have highlighted two particular shortcomings, evident from all the witnesses it consulted. The first is the issue of decision-making structures. Decision-making structures for civilian ESDP are over-complicated and unsuitable for use in a crisis situation. A streamlined solution is required within which clear lines of political control are easily identifiable. Appropriate command and control arrangements will allow the EU to react to a crisis in days rather than weeks. Financing is also a concern. The current financing arrangements are not sustainable. There is a need for efficient decision making rather than the tortuous negotiations which preceded agreement on financing arrangements for the EUPM.

80. The Committee may wish to return to this issue once the EUPM mission can be evaluated.

## CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS

81. Civilian ESDP is an important challenge to the EU. We recommend:

- **That civilian ESDP be more transparent and clear to allow scrutiny by Member States;** (para 20)
- **The scope and headline goals of civilian ESDP be clarified;** (paras 21 and 68)
- **A clearer definition of the type of operation that the EU might consider undertaking to allow for more effective co-operation with several key organisations and to avoid duplication;** (para33)
- **The geographical scope of civilian ESDP is related to the resources and structures available;** (para 34)
- **A clearer definition of the four areas of civilian ESDP to cover the need to fill gaps in international crisis management capacity;** (para 35)
- **The creation of an international training team of Member State experts;** (para 69)
- **That the Convention for the Future of Europe consider the limitations of the current pillar structure;** (para 70)
- **A more streamlined and responsive chain of command and control including other relevant organisations;** (para 71)
- **Enhanced co-ordination on civil-military matters;** (para72)
- **Member States should engage more directly with the European Parliament on civilian crisis management issues;** (para 73) and
- **A long-term system of financing;** (para74).

## APPENDIX 1

**Sub-Committee C (Foreign and Security Policy)****Members of the Sub-Committee**

Lord Bowness  
Lord Harrison  
Baroness Hilton of Eggardon  
Lord Inge  
Lord Jopling (Chairman)  
Lord Maclennan of Rogart  
Lord Morris of Aberavon  
Baroness Park of Monmouth  
Lord Powell of Bayswater  
Lord Watson of Richmond  
Lord Williams of Elvel  
Lord Williamson of Horton

The Sub-Committee records its gratitude to Anand Menon, Professor of European Politics and Director of the European Research Institute, University of Birmingham for his services as Specialist Adviser.

Members of the Sub-Committee declared the following interests in relation to this inquiry:

**Lord Inge**

Adviser, BAE Systems

Adviser, Alvis Vickers Ltd

## APPENDIX 2

**List of Witnesses**

The following witnesses gave evidence. Those marked \* gave oral evidence:

\*Mr Ian Davis, The British American Security Information Council (BASIC)

\*Mr Frederik Doré, Controller of Staff, European Council Secretariat

\*Mr Peter Feith, Deputy Director General, European Council Secretariat

\*Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Foreign and Commonwealth Office;

Department for International Development;

Home Office; and

Ministry of Defence

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany

\*Mr Joost Korte, Deputy Head of Patten Cabinet, European Commission

\*Mr Alexander McLachlan, European Commission

\*Mr Robert Monks, Intelligence Analyst, Joint Situation Centre, Brussels

Saferworld

British American Security Information Council (BASIC)

\*Mr William Shapcott, Head of Joint Situation Centre, Brussels

\*Ms Heike Schneider, Head of Office, European Peacebuilding Liaison Office

\*Ms Sandra Djuvara Melone, Executive Director, European Peacebuilding Liaison Office

\*Ms Laura Davis, Deputy Director, European Centre for Common Ground

\*Dr Nicholas Whyte, Balkans Program Director, International Crisis Group

The Sub-Committee held a private meeting in Brussels with the following witnesses on Monday, 2 December 2002:

Ms Marie Louise Overvad, Danish PSC Chair, European Commission

Mr Matthew Lodge, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

## APPENDIX 3

**Glossary of Acronyms and Technical Terms**

BASIC	British American Security Information Council
CARDS	Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation Programme
CIVCOM	The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUPM	European Union Police Mission in Bosnia
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
ICG	International Crisis Group
IGC	Inter-Governmental Conference
IPTF	International Police Task Force
JSC	Joint Situation Centre
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
OCHA	Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OdiHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PPEWU	Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit
PSC	Political and Security Committee
REACT	Rapid Expert Assistance Co-operation Teams
SFOR	Stabilisation Force
UN	United Nations
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment Co-ordination

## APPENDIX 4

**EUPM Selection Process as of 20 November 2002**

COUNCIL SECRETARIAT  
DGE IX  
POLICE UNIT

MEMBER STATES			
COUNTRY	Total	Police	Civ-Second
AUSTRIA	5	5	
BELGIUM	5	5	
DENMARK	13	12	1
FINLAND	22	16	6
FRANCE	75	75	
GERMANY	85	80	5
GREECE	10	10	
IRELAND	3	3	
ITALY	42	42	
LUXEMBOURG	2	2	
NETHERLANDS	28	28	
PORTUGAL	22	22	
SPAIN	26	24	2
SWEDEN	16	13	3
UNITED KINGDOM	64	58	6
TOTAL	418	395	23

THIRD STATES			
COUNTRY	Total	Police	Civ-Sec
BULGARIA	3	3	
CANADA	7	7	
CYPRUS	4	4	
CZECH REPUBLIC	6	6	
ESTONIA	2	2	
HUNGARY	5	5	
ICELAND	3	2	1
LATVIA	4	4	
LITHUANIA	2	2	
NORWAY	8	6	2
POLAND	12	12	
ROMANIA	6	6	
RUSSIA	5	5	
SLOVAKIA	4	4	
SLOVENIA	4	4	
SWITZERLAND	4	4	
TURKEY	6	6	
UKRAINE	5	5	
TOTAL	90	87	3

## APPENDIX 5

**Joint Situation Centre (JSC)<sup>114</sup>**

**Objective:** to provide the Council with high quality information. In 1998 when ESDP was first developed no structure existed to allow member states to share intelligence. Three years ago, there was some exchange of confidential information in the form of diplomatic telegrams. In the past twelve months the JSC has been recruiting intelligence analysts from Member States and facilitated information exchange through putting in place secure communication networks. It will shortly be installing secure communications to the five operational military headquarters.<sup>115</sup>

**JSC missions:**

1. Contribute to early warning (in conjunction with other Council military staff). Sources: open source material, military intelligence, non-military intelligence and diplomatic reporting;
2. Conduct situation monitoring and assessment;
3. Provide facilities for crisis task force; and
4. To provide an operational point of contact for the High Representative.

**Input:** Member States contribute two types of intelligence:

- diplomatic reporting; and
- information from external intelligence services

Very sensitive information is not shared.

The JSC is still operating on an experimental basis. Early indications suggest that it is working well.

**Output:** Standard output goes to members of the PSC and EUMC. The Commission receives the material through its representative on the PSC, but it has only a restricted circulation within the External Relations Directorate-General. At the moment nothing is distributed to the Parliament although the Council is negotiating arrangements to permit a limited release.

The JSC will operate 24-hours a day as of 1 January 2003 (to coincide with the start of EUPM).

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<sup>114</sup> Q87.


<sup>115</sup> The EU has no permanent operational headquarters. The United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Greece have made voluntary offers to headquarters. The French and British headquarters could be used today. (Q84).

APPENDIX 6


**Civilian ESDP Decision Making Structures**

**Phase 1 - Routine Phase**

**Phase 2 - Crisis Build-up / Elaboration of the draft CMC**



**Phase 3 - Approval of the CMC and development of strategic options**



**Phase 4 - Formal decision to take action, development of planning documents**

