CHAPTER 2: the current state of civilian
The Four Headline Goals:
5. The objective of civilian ESDP is to allow
the Union to respond at short notice to crises requiring non-military
intervention. The decision at the Feira Council in June 2000 to
concentrate on four non-military areas, namely police, strengthening
the administration of justice, strengthening civilian administration
and civil protection, reflects the intention that experts in these
four areas should perform short-term crisis management rather
than longer-term conflict prevention. Hence election monitors
or human rights experts who are traditionally employed as part
of a long-term conflict prevention strategy were not included
in the headline goals.
6. The specific targets within the civilian headline
goals were further elaborated at the Gothenburg Council in 2001.
The headline goals are summarised in the box below:
|Box 2 The Member States have pledged to provide by 2003:|
· a minimum of 5000 police officers.
· 1000 are to be deployable within 30 days.
Rule of Law
· 200 rule of law experts. This includes international prosecutors, lawyers, and judges able to train and monitor local staff, or, in exceptional circumstances, to replace local staff temporarily.
· This is to include a 'rapid response' group of rule of law specialists, capable of deployment at 30 days notice to provide early planning on rule of law support.
· 'a pool of experts' to set up, or ensure the existence of a functional administrative apparatus, while promoting transition to local ownership as soon as possible in the fields of General Administration, Social Services and Infrastructure.
· Tasks for this 'pool of experts' are yet to be defined.
· 2-3 assessment teams of 10 experts each available for dispatch within 3-7 hours of a natural or man-made disaster to assist in assessing the damage and to recommend additional civil protection from EU intervention teams. These experts should be on 24-hour call from a group of up to 100 specially selected experts for this purpose.
· Civil protection intervention teams of up to 2000 persons ready for deployment at short notice.
· Supplementary or more specialised resources from government or non-governmental services to be dispatched within a week.
7. On 19 of November 2002 the Danish Presidency
announced that the targets in the four groups had been met.
We were surprised to learn from the Minister for Europe, Dr Denis
MacShane MP, that some documents regarding the pledges of experts
from individual Member States for the four headline goals are
Although figures on the breakdown of the Member State and third
country contributions for the EUPM are available
the Committee found it baffling that figures on overall pledges
from Member States in response to the rule of law and policing
targets for civilian crisis management personnel have been classified
by the Council Secretariat; given that details concerning the
pledges of Member States were made public following a military
ESDP conference in November 2000.
8. The Committee considered the four headline
goals; we note concern over the dilemma of establishing the rule
of law headline goal. Although there are accepted international
rule of law standards it is not clear what the EU should do to
assist a country where the legal framework has failed. The Committee
consider the term 'rule of law' to be impractical. In real
terms this headline goal appears to refer to the administration
of justice. What would happen if the country was, for example,
predominately Muslim? Would the Union assist in the creation of
a Sharia law system? As the Member States have different legal
traditional cultures and styles, would they be able to agree on
a common model? The headline goals require early clarification.
The Institutional Structure for
9. The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis
Management (CIVCOM) was set up in June 2000 in order to allow
the EU to meet the four headline goals. It is staffed by the national
civil services and reports to Political and Security Committee
(PSC) at the Council. The PSC
monitors the international situation in the areas under the Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It helps define policies for
the Council, either at the request of the Council or on its own
initiative, and monitors policy implementation. The Joint Situation
provides the PSC with intelligence appropriate for crisis management.
The PSC also maintains a privileged link with the High Representative
whose own Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) monitors
and plans civilian crisis responses. As with all other Council
bodies, the Commission is fully associated with the work of the
PSC and represented on it.
10. A set of Crisis Management Procedures involving
all the committees have been put in place. FCO representatives
have referred to these as 'rather lengthy' and 'a living document
intended to be continually revised in the light of experience'.
First Pillar Action
11. The Union has been involved in conflict prevention
since its inception; since April 2001 conflict prevention has
been one of the explicit aims of all its external programmes.
12. The Commission divides conflict situations
into three stages:
the stage preceding the crisis;
the crisis itself; and
a stage of reconstruction and rehabilitation.
13. During the stages preceding a crisis and
in its aftermath the Union has a number of instruments at its
disposal. It may attempt to address a conflict situation long
before it escalates into an acute crisis; for example by providing
human rights monitors or funding food security programmes. During
the reconstruction and rehabilitation stages, the Union may fund
humanitarian aid; for example securing the safety of refugees,
fund mine clearance operations and provide support in the development
of adequate civilian infrastructure.
These instruments and programmes are adopted by the Council and
are currently mostly managed by the Commission.
14. According to Mr. Joost Korte, Deputy Head
of the Cabinet of Commissioner Chris Patten, one of the key reasons
behind the Council's decision to develop civilian ESDP was the
need to expand the EU's options during the acute stage of a crisis.
This positive and necessary development should not upset the already
existing programmes and procedures for crisis management that
were enacted by the Council and that are running well. Although
this neat division of responsibilities between the Council and
the Commission may be theoretically useful, there are a number
of areas of over-lapping competences and potential conflict. The
Committee was provided with a number of practical examples:
During the preparation for the EUPM, the Commission has handled
legal and budgetary issues in the PSC.
Finance: In accordance
with Article 28 TEU and Article 274 TEC, the Commission manages
many parts of civilian ESDP financing, for example the Special
Representatives are paid from Community budgets and the Commission
has paid for the start up costs of the EUPM.
Training: The Commission
has paid for 80 per cent of the trial training programme for civilian
Headline goals: There
is considerable overlap between Commission programmes and the
ESDP civilian experts groups. Most notably, the EU is now operating
two different civil protection schemes. On 23 October 2001, the
Council decided to establish an EC civil protection mechanism,
co-ordinated by the Commission. This mechanism, which brings together
the civil protection services of the Member States, can be used
in third countries. The civilian ESDP civil protection mechanism,
planned at the Council, can draw on the Community one, but is
nonetheless separate. Both are modelled on the UNDAC system.
The Bosnia Police Mission
15. In February 2002, some two months after ESDP
was declared operational at the Laeken Council, the EU High-Representative
Javier Solana suggested that the Union take over the police mission
in Bosnia from the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF).
16. The EU has been able to set up the EUPM through
the commitment of 480 police monitors plus other civilian support.
Several major elements of the mission are worthy of note:
Lord Ashdown was appointed on 13 March
2002 in a double-hatted
capacity as both EU Special Representative to Bosnia and High
Representative for the implementation of the Dayton accord, to
allow for effective co-ordination between the police mission and
the Union's CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development
and Stabilisation) programme which prioritises the rule of law.
Agreement has been reached on the participation
of police and civilian personnel from 18 non-EU states.
The United States declined the invitation to participate.
Officers deployed in Bosnia will receive
one week of training prior to their deployment.
However, two-thirds of this force were in Bosnia since 1 December
2002, and therefore had the opportunity to acclimatise prior to
the mission becoming operational.
17. The EUPM will not carry out executive police
functions but will provide advice in a 'monitoring and inspecting
mode'. Lord Ashdown has also indicated that organised crime will
be a prioritythis will require the deployment of an additional
18. The EUPM appears to be a relatively straightforward
first test for civilian ESDP. The International Police Task Force
(IPTF) was on the ground since 1995 and the EU had 12 months warning
of its task to replace the UN.
The EUPM, moreover, has been able to retain the services of the
final IPTF Commissioner, Sven Fredrikssen, who will serve as the
first EUPM Commissioner.
19. The fact that the Bosnia mission is occurring
at all marks a turning point in the history of ESDP. Moreover,
the Union responded impressively to an American threat to withdraw
from Bosnia early in July 2002 (over the dispute about the International
Criminal Court). The Council and Commission managed, within the
space of two weeks, to put into place plans for the EUPM to replace
the IPTF immediately.
Several issues arising from it have been identified by the Committee:
Start-up costs have been provided by the EC budget, despite the
fact that the EUPM is being operated under ESDP; a second pillar
institution. Running costs will come from the Member States. The
financial arrangements for the mission are being determined on
an ad hoc basis. One witness asserted that, for the European
Commission, the question of financing and the role of the EC budget
has been the key difficulty encountered in planning the operation.
Procurement: The need
to comply with Community Procurement regulations (requiring all
procurement to take place through open tender) required a considerable
proportion of planning time; there are no rules governing procurement
procedures during a crisis. Whilst the one year lead time for
the operation made this manageable, it could represent a problem
for future missions.
This has further hampered co-operation between international organisations;
for example the EUPM encountered problems in buying or leasing
UN equipment due to both EU and UN restrictions.
20. The Committee recommend that Member State
pledges for civilian ESDP are transparent, this would be useful
for two reasons: (i) the publication of figures can help to persuade
reluctant Member States to do more and: (ii) a lack of transparency
reinforces the lack of public attention on an area of the EU which
should be a focus for Member States and media alike.
21. The Committee also recommend that the
four headline goals are more clearly defined.
8 Presidency Report to the Gothenburg European Council
on European Security and Defence Policy. Back
EU Civilian Crisis Management Capability Conference; Danish Presidency
press release. Declaration para 2. Back
See Appendix 4 for detail. Back
"Capabilities Commitment Conference 20 November 2000". Back
The PSC is composed of ambassadorial-rank diplomats from the 15
Member States. Back
See Appendix 5 for detail. Back
Civilian ESDP decision-making structures are summarised in the
Appendix 6. Back
Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, COM
(2001) 211 final. Back
A comprehensive discussion of the Community policies are described
in 'Suggestions for procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU
crisis management', a working document produced by CIVCOM for
the Council. A version from 19 December 2002 was made available
for the Committee to consult. Back
United Nations Disaster Assessment and Co-ordination. Back
'Double Hatting' denotes an individual who represents two institutions. Back
Bulgaria; Canada; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Estonia; Hungary; Iceland;
Latvia; Lithuania; Norway; Poland; Romania; Russia; Slovakia;
Slovenia; Switzerland; Turkey and Ukraine. Back
Q117, Q118. Back