CHAPTER 4: the structure in place to
formulate and implement civilian esdp
36. The EU is yet to define in concrete terms
the objectives of civilian ESDP. As a consequence, it is impossible
effectively to evaluate whether the structures currently in place
are appropriate. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) told
the Committee that they consider the EU to have adequate capabilities
to provide 'basic civilian crisis management'. For example, only
480 out of the 5000 police officers originally pledged by Member
States have been required for the EUPM in Bosnia. Nevertheless,
the EU does not appear to be in a position to mount additional
police operations elsewhere. On the contrary, witnesses agreed
that, alone the EU can only hope to manage the EUPM; this is due
to the EU's limited planning capacity and the question of financing.
37. Whilst quantitative targets have been met
the EU civilian crisis management capability may be impaired by
an inability to recruit appropriately qualified personnel.
The Rule of Law headline goal has been singled out as an
area where the recruitment of experts has proved problematical.
Experience shows that greater investment will also be needed in
retaining experts. According to a recent International Crisis
Group (ICG) report, lawyers who have entered Bosnia and Herzegovina
to help reform the judicial system, often stay for only a few
months, partly perhaps because Member States pay secondees very
little over and above the per diem they receive or perhaps because
they are also working for other similar organisations elsewhere.
38. The Committee was advised that establishing
clear objectives for civilian ESDP is crucial for creating appropriate
capabilities. One objective may be to fill existing gaps in international
capacity provided by other organisations.
39. Currently, a clear gap exists in the area
of policing. In a post-conflict situation, international
peacekeepers are employed to do tasks which would be more appropriate
for a police force. BASIC recommends that the EU might do well
to focus its efforts on establishing a mobile police force that
could enter crisis situations on short notice, leaving the training
and monitoring of local police forces to the OSCE.
40. The EU is particularly well equipped to develop
a flexible, mobile police force given the diversity of police
forces within the Member States ranging from gendarmerie to unarmed
police. The International Crisis Group stressed the importance
of the principle of 'horses for courses' in planning police missions.
Different crises will require different sorts of police force;
the Union already holds a welcome degree of flexibility in the
kinds of police mission it could undertake.
41. The Committee received less evidence concerning
the areas of Rule of Law and Civil Administration,
reflecting the fact that these two areas of capabilities are at
present, less developed. Dr MacShane, Minister for Europe, did
however, place emphasis on the Rule of Law as a key priority
for the civilian ESDP.
Again, the EU should work to define these categories to fill existing
gaps and in particular, avoid overlap with the OSCE.
42. The Pillar I civil protection mechanism seems
a better co-ordinated and better funded version of the ESDP civil
protection mechanism. As this mechanism is intended to work in
third countries in close co-operation with the UN it is hard to
see why a separate ESDP mechanism which can draw on the Community
would be required. This duplication could be solved by placing
it under Pillar One and therefore the Commission's co-ordination.
43. The Committee also considered whether the
headline goal should be expanded to include capabilities categories
for other types of experts. Witnesses did not agree on this issue.
Election monitoring; is carried out effectively by the OSCE Office
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OdiHR), which employs
a large cadre of monitors from EU Member States. The Commission,
moreover, already funds much of this activity. Similarly, the
OSCE's Rapid Expert Assistance Co-operation Teams (REACT) are
designed to deploy quickly professionals with skills in media
development, human rights monitoring and democratisation, amongst
44. Civilians who volunteer to serve on ESDP
missions are assumed to have the appropriate qualifications in
their field of expertise.
Two further issues merit attention in this regard. The first is
whether civilians are sufficiently prepared for international
missions. The second is the issue of interoperability. How can
interoperability be best achieved? As things stand, 'the principle
is that training is a national responsibility'.
45. There is no specific co-ordination between
Member States on police training. Nevertheless, most Member States
use the United Nations Police Peacekeeping course as a basis of
international police training; as a result there are significant
similarities between national courses. These courses include training
in mission safety, human rights and the principles of democratic
46. The Commission is currently running a pilot
scheme for rule of law and civil administration.
The British Government has expressed support for this undertaking.
Within the framework of the pilot scheme common courses will be
organised by training institutes in individual Member States,
based on models developed by a core group of Member State training
institutes. The Greek Presidency is expected to launch further
initiatives on civilian training in the first half of 2003
while the Commission training project will be evaluated during
the Italian presidency (second half of 2003).
47. The Committee notes that civil protection
is not covered by the pilot scheme. DfID has been closely involved
with running a further pilot scheme based on Red Cross and OCHA
experience in the humanitarian field.
48. The United Kingdom Government has not as
yet taken a definitive decision on how its training should be
As things stand, however, HMG envisages leaving Member States
to carry out the training based on common modules. According to
the Government this will strike the right balance between 'developing
member state capacities to train various types of civilian experts,
and on the other, establishing a coherent EU approach to crisis
The ICG supports the idea of common modules taught nationally
to ensure that all experts share common ideas as to how to operate
in the field. 
49. The Committee is not fully convinced of the
continuing viability of purely national training schemes. Such
schemes, based on years of experience from UN missions, are sufficient
for preparing civilians for international missions, but may not
provide enough interoperability on the ground. Not least, this
is because experts on civilian ESDP mission will be required to
intervene as 'Europeans'
rather than national experts, as is the case for those seconded
to an OSCE or UN mission.
50. A Europe-wide centre to provide training
and enhance interoperability was suggested as a mechanism to encourage
BASIC also stressed the importance of including other interested
parties in such schemes, including important civilian crisis management
actors such as Norway, Canada and Switzerland. The Committee do
not believe that a European training centre would be necessary
to enable interoperability.
51. EU external policy has to be formulated and
implemented within the pillar structure, as embodied in the Treaties.
We wished to explore the implications of the pillar structure
for civilian crisis management, as this area is unusual in that
it requires quick decision-making and flexible implementation.
52. The FCO told the Committee that effective
crisis management is possible within the current pillar structure.
The Commission was similarly keen to stress that the pillar structure
is a workable framework for EU crisis management; any problems
are no more than examples of the type of 'bureaucratic in-fighting'
which would be expected in any political system.
53. Nonetheless, the Commission conceded that
there is room for improvement in the effectiveness of cross-pillar
co-ordination and coherence.
Some of the new structures in the Council Secretariat overlap
with the tasks of the Civil Protection and Crisis Management Unit
in the Commission. Moreover, under the relevant Council decisions
and within the financial envelopes allocated by the budgetary
authority (Council and EP) the Commission can mobilise considerable
financial resources and expertise in these areas from the EC budget
as well as expertise which the Council Secretariat might struggle
to match, making duplication even less rational.
54. Specific processes have been put into place
to facilitate co-ordination between the EU institutions (Council
and Commission) and between them and the Member States: the 'Procedures
for Coherent Comprehensive EU Crisis Management' is, according
to the FCO, a 'living document'. A 'Crisis Response Co-ordinating
Team' has been set up to co-ordinate the activities of Commission
and Council officials in the time of a crisis.
According to the FCO such co-operation works well.
The Committee notes that the EU is only just beginning to experience
this reality during a 'live' mission.
55. Whilst the overwhelming view of EU 'insiders'
was that the pillar structure can be made to operate effectively
for civilian ESDP 'outsiders' who presented their opinions to
the Committee were unanimous in their scepticism.
Many of these observers point out that the division of labour
between pillars one and two seems almost arbitrary. Moreover,
whilst they agreed with the FCO that co-ordination processes are
adequate at senior administrative levels, many desk officers are
less aware of what their counterparts in the other institution
are doing, or even of who these counterparts are.
56. Numerous solutions have been proposed to
the problem of inter-pillar co-ordination. Witnesses
expressed a preference for the merging of the roles of the High
Representative and the Commissioner for External Relations. The
British Government, for its part, suggested the degree of urgency
in each case should be the criteria for deciding whether the Commission
or Council should take the lead in any putative operation. Thus,
if an urgent crisis occurs in an area of key EU interest, then
the Union should intervene through second pillar. Less pressing
issues should be left to the Commission.
These matters are currently under discussion in the Convention
on the Future of Europe.
57. Perhaps the most serious consequence of the
division of the EU's response capacity between Pillar II and Pillar
I is to raise the possibility that the Union's reaction to any
crisis will be driven by institutional considerations rather than
by a problem-solving approach. This message was delivered unequivocally
to the Committee by both Saferworld
and the Commission itself: 'We would like to convince Member States
of a broader approach, which is to say that crisis management
does not start when there is a crisis'.
The Swedish Presidency championed the EU Programme for the Prevention
of Violent Conflicts
which highlighted the need to make crisis management capabilities
available to conflict prevention operations.
58. The Government favours using more EU Special
Representatives alongside rapidly deployable headquarters as a
way of ensuring effective co-ordination. 
Currently experience with these appointments, in particular with
Lord Ashdown, has been generally positive. However the effectiveness
of Special Representatives is contingent upon their authority
and personality, which means that it is not hard to imagine far
less effective appointments. Moreover, as the EU becomes more
involved in crisis management, as it has repeatedly expressed
the ambition to do, a proliferation of Special Representatives
might not always be an ideal way to ensure overall institutional
and policy coherence.
Institutional Structure: Planning
and Formulating Policy in the Council
59. One key reason why the EU is not yet able
to mount more than one civilian ESDP operation at one time is
that mission planning and support capacity is not yet fully in
place. In the words of the Commission 'We [the EU] cannot quite
yet mobilise 300 prosecutors
at the press of a button'.
60. The Minister for Europe was impressed by
the speed of the EU's reaction to the crisis in Macedonia and
to events in Montenegro.
The Council Secretariat also emphasised the speed at which the
EU was able to respond to the crisis in July 2002 when the US
threatened to withdraw from the International Police Task Force
it is clear that the current committee structure does not lend
itself to fast decision-making.
61. The number of Council committees that have
been set up to deal with ESDP reflect normal EU procedures for
developing policies but these will not be an effective way of
taking decisions in an acute crisis.
The FCO conceded that during the planning for the EUPM there have
been departures from the 'rather lengthy process set out in the
EU's Crisis Management Procedures'.
One witness from the Council Secretariat said 'I think we could
do with less of the procedures and committee involvement'.
62. An initial effort to streamline the EU's
Crisis Management Procedures is underway as a result of the first
crisis management exercise held in May 2002
(See Box below).
63. An additional factor related to decision-making
effectiveness concerns staffing. The ICG pointed out that EU operational
structures cannot be staffed by diplomats alone. Planning and
mission support should be carried out by experienced field operatives,
perhaps from NGOs, contracted out by the Union not diplomats based
in the Council.
|Box 3 Lessons learned from the CME02:|
The EU carried out its first exercise 'CME 02' between 22 and 28 May 2002 to test the Union's decision-making mechanisms in a crisis situation. The scenario involved a fictitious Atlantic island. Participants included the Member States, the Council Secretariat, including the Joint Situation Centre, the Secretary-General of the Council, and the Commission.
According to the Foreign Office the exercise underlined three key problems in the way the EU deals with crisis management:
(i) Further work is required on achieving civil-military co-ordination throughout the planning and operational phases of an operation. The Danish Presidency has reacted to this short-coming by producing an Action Plan, which the Greek Presidency hopes to complete.
(ii) CME02 demonstrated very clearly that more efficient Crisis Management Procedures will be required. The role of CIVCOM for example was not reflected in the Crisis Management Proceduresyet during the exercise it was tasked to evaluate and advise on strategic options for a police component.
(iii) CME02 also demonstrated the need to further define the role of the Crisis Response Co-ordinating Team (CRCT), to serve as co-ordinating body between Council Secretariat and Commission officials during a crisis. Little use was made of the CRCT during the exercise.
The CME02 exercise was designed to test decision-making mechanisms, and as a result ignored many critical aspects of any possible mission; the most important of these, according to the Foreign Office, was the humanitarian situation on the ground. In any actual crisis interaction with the key humanitarian agencies on the ground will be of utmost importance.
64. The co-ordination of EU humanitarian aid,
channelled through ECHO
in the Commission and civilian ESDP is more than an institutional
problem. 'Given limited financial resources, linking the provisions
of humanitarian assistance to geo-political priorities would risk
ignoring areas of real need'.
Certainly, ECHO should not be tied to EU crisis management, but
its input in some of these operations is crucial.
65. The Committee was advised that Member States
should engage more directly with the European Parliament. The
latter can play a constructive role; during the in Budget Council
of November 2002 the European Parliament agreed to raise the CFSP
budget from 40 million to 47.5 million
in exchange for some extra influence on Council decision-making
66. Financing is the weakest part of civilian
ESDP; the divisions between the two pillars; (Intergovernmental
and Community) are at their most pronounced when deciding who
holds the purse strings for civilian ESDP. Whilst the EU budgetary
authority (Council and EP) allocates substantial amounts of money
to first pillar programmes in the area of crisis management, mostly
managed by the Commission, it only granted 47.5 million
to the CFSP budget line. The present arrangement is not a long-term
option. During our visit to Brussels the Committee were told that
Civilian ESDP financing is 'a very shaky aspect of ESDP and EU
The procedures developed to finance the EUPM were created on an
ad hoc basis and are, according to the Commission 'clearly
not a sustainable situation'.
67. Financing for the EUPM will be secured out
of the Community budget; 47.5 million this year. 'The balance
will be paid by Member States on the basis of costs lying where
The proposals on financing the common costs for future missions
were agreed at the General Affairs Council on 27 January 2003.
The two options are; Post Operational Settlement of Costs or the
Mechanism Option. Neither option appears to be a long-term option
for financing major civilian crisis management operations.
68. The Committee recommends that three of
the four headline goal capabilities be developed further with
the aim of filling gaps in international capacity. Civil Protection
need not be handled under Pillar II. Nevertheless, the Committee
is not convinced that further categories of experts are required
to make civilian ESDP effective.
69. The Committee recommend that a training
team is founded following an examination of its functions and
responsibilities. This international nucleus of training experts
would be more flexible than a permanent organisation and could
call upon existing Member State assets; for example national police
colleges, as required.
70. The Committee recognises that this inquiry
is not an appropriate arena to discuss the reform of the pillar
structure. We suggest that the Convention for the Future of Europe
take note of the current situation and make recommendations to
the IGC in 2004 which should act to remedy the problem.
71. The CME02 exercise has highlighted several
issues: there is an urgent need for streamlining decision-making
structures for crisis policy planning and implementation.
72. There needs to be enhanced co-ordination
in civil-military relations. This co-ordination needs to occur
at the level of the Council. The Government assured the Committee
that the Greek Presidency will treat civil-military co-ordination
as a priority.
73. The Committee was advised that Member
States should engage more directly with the European Parliament.
74. The Committee consider the two recently
agreed financing options for 'common costs' nothing more than
a stop gap. The EU must determine long-term methods of financing
all ESDP mission costs.
60 Q120, Q166. Back
International Crisis Group, "Courting Disaster: The Misrule
of Law in Bosnia and Herzegovina" Balkans Report No. 127,
25 March 2002. Back
Q146, Q147. Back
Recruiting appropriately qualified personnel is a separate issue,
see para 36 on capabilities. Back
All three pillars of the EU potentially have a role to play in
civilian ESDP. The roles of the first and second pillars have
already been referred to: Pillar 3 (Justice and Home Affairs)
may also be involved, for example, in efforts to combat international
crime or the smuggling of small arms and light weapons81.
Lord Ashdown's initiative to target organised crime in Bosnia
as Chapter of the EUPM illustrates how civilian ESDP can involve
Justice and Home Affairs. Back
See Box 3 for detail. Back
The EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, signed
at the Gothenburg European Council, June 2001. Back
See Appendix 6 "Sharing the Decision Making Structures"
(3 charts). Back
Q36, Q37. Back
Crisis Management Exercise 2002. Back
European Community Humanitarian Office. Back