Examination of Witnesses (Questions 180-199)
WEDNESDAY 10 JULY 2002
MR BRIAN
PEARCE AND
REVEREND JONATHAN
GORSKY
Earl of Mar and Kellie
180. I am very interested in what has been said
and I am particularly interested by the relationship between blasphemy,
heresy and treason. Clearly treason is very definitely still on
the statute book. Blasphemy we are questioning. What is the position,
do you think, about heresy? Let me say, whilst possibly giving
you a chance to think about it, that certainly in Scotland the
General Assembly of the Church of Scotland and some of the other
presbyterian churches still have what amount to heresy trials—not
often; they are usually referred to as doctrinal matters—but
they have recently led to one or two people being dismissed from
the ministry. May I therefore ask you: How is this blasphemy,
heresy and treason really working out now as opposed to clearly
a definite feature of the past?
(Mr Pearce) My Lord Chairman, perhaps I should emphasise,
as Jonathan Gorsky did, that a number of the observations I might
make will be on a personal basis rather than on behalf of the
Network's nearly 100 member organisations and their members, but
I think my response would be to say that, in my view, the question
of heresy is a matter for the faith community concerned and not
a matter for the state.
181. Have we removed from the statute book any
laws which ever existed about heresy?
(Mr Pearce) One of my inadequacies is not being a
lawyer and I would hesitate to give a sweeping pronouncement on
that point.
Lord Avebury
182. On this question of heresy, there was a
famous case in the middle of the 19th century of a vicar called
Gorham who was unsound on the doctrine of baptismal regeneration
and the Bishop of Exeter, whose name was Philpotts, removed him
from the living, after grilling him for five days on what he believed
regarding the necessity of the application of the water and the
formula to the regeneration of the infant. He appealed to the
Court of Arches, who upheld the decision of the Bishop. Finally,
he went to the Privy Council, which reversed the decision and
reinstated Mr Goran. Would that still be possible today?
(Mr Pearce) I would hesitate to offer an authoritative
response to that, particularly in the presence of my Lord Bishop,
because of course one of the areas I had in mind in being cautious
was the interaction between canon law and the role of Parliament
in relation to canon law and therefore the role of the Parliamentary
institutions in that area. I would stand by my general observation
as a statement of personal view.
Baroness Perry of Southwark
183. I was very taken by what Reverend Gorsky
said about the change in the perception of blasphemy over time
and how it is now perceived very much more as a protection of
the peace of the realm, so to speak. Then, Mr Pearce, I think
you also said that it is perhaps the protection of God rather
than the protection of God's people, so to speak, or God's followers.
I really wonder how one deals with the fact that certain things
written and said and done do cause very deep offence to members
of the religion concerned and therefore, even if they are not
instantly given to fatwa or to rioting, do disturb what we think
of, in a civilised and peaceful country, as the way in which we
want to be seen and want to behave. Is there not a defence of
a law against blasphemy on the grounds that it does protect people
from feelings of deep offence and deep threat towards their own
religion, whatever it is?
(Revd Gorsky) I seem to remember that a very similar
point was in fact made by Lord Scarman in his discussion of these
matters and I would certainly agree with the point that people
can be deeply hurt by observations respecting their faith. I think
this is especially true of those who inhabit what you might call
traditional societies and for whom the ways of the modern world
are rather distant from their own perceptions. I can well imagine
this within some Jewish communities and certainly within a good
many Moslem communities, so, indeed, people can be very deeply
hurt. The question, of course, is to what one might do about it
and whether the law can be of assistance in these matters, and
here I am not at all sure. Perhaps, further on in our proceedings,
we might speak of the work of different organisations such as
the Inter Faith Network and the CCJ, in trying to promote understanding
of this in society as a whole. We are trying to create a climate
where people are aware of the sensitivities, where they know how
hurtful these matters can be and react and respond accordingly
in educational frameworks and in the discourse of their different
religious communities. I am not at all clear as to how the law
might protect people in this context but I think that the matter
you have raised is obviously of great importance.
Chairman: I do not want to cut this short, but
there are two other slices of this material which I want to get
through. Lady Richardson and then the Bishop of Portsmouth.
Baroness Richardson of Calow
184. You expressed the law being a framework
for creating a respectful and cohesive society. The fact that
the blasphemy laws have not been used, does that suggest that
they are not framed properly or that they have actually acted
as a force for peace and have done what they were required to
do, and that therefore this does have a restraining influence
simply by being there, even if it is never used, even if legally,
by law, it would be difficult to use?
(Mr Pearce) I think that would be a very difficult
judgment to make. In a sense it is like trying to decide how many
undiscovered murders have been committed. But I would have thought
it is difficult to argue there is no restraining influence whatsoever
as a result of having that law. The point I made about the law
of treason, is that one expects to see that as part of the legal
framework even though we do not currently have many cases of treason
being brought, and that therefore that in itself is not an argument
against having such a law, I would just like to clarify this,
if there was any misunderstanding. My point was that, while the
blasphemy law in terms of how it is framed is designed to protect
doctrine, divinity, etc, it seems to me that any replacement law
in current society would have to focus on the protection against
vilification and contempt of believers and that it would be difficult
for that simply to protect one part of one faith tradition. But
that it is a legitimate part of the framework of law, if it is
judged that it is desirable, seems to me to be apparent, because
there are many restrictions in law on the freedom of speech. One
point on which the seminars to which I have referred were quite
clear is that no one present argued in favour of absolute freedom
of speech. Indeed, Professor Simon Lee gave a list of 12 or 14
grounds on which freedom of speech is curtailed. But it is a judgment,
as so often, for society and for its legislators to make on where
the balances lie between leaving these matters unregulated by
law and providing some protection, some bulwarks, which we put
in position to reinforce the kind of society in which we want
to live and which we want to have.
Bishop of Portsmouth
185. Orthodoxy, right, belief, orthopraxy, putting
into practice. The tension here, is it not, is about where putting
into practice inevitably occupies other people's space in relation
to their beliefs. It seems to me that it is very clear from what
both of you are saying and from our own deliberations, which you
can probably guess as well, that there are grave misperceptions
about the blasphemy law. The blasphemy law actually, in a kind
of non-legal way, is already owned by people well outside the
Church of England, as is clear from what people have said, and
that is one of the conundrums we are in. What sort of advice can
you give to us to wrestle with that and apply it?
(Mr Pearce) Perhaps I might just observe that sometimes
when I am talking about inter faith relations in this country
I ask, "Is this a Christian country? Is it a multi faith
society? Is it a secular society?" and suggest that the answer
is perhaps that it is all three simultaneously and that what we
are dealing with now is how those three dimensions relate to one
another. Just to pick up on a point on which I did not comment,
the question about whether there was any justification for keeping
the blasphemy law, even if it only gave limited protection to
one particular faith and, indeed, one particular part of that
faith, I think a case could be made out for that in the context
of the role of the established Church. As I understand it, neither
the established Church nor other Churches are seeking to say that
that is the optimum solution if one was legislating afresh. And
the two points are not quite the same.
Baroness Massey of Darwen
186. Two things. One is the Reverend Gorsky's
issue about: Is the law an answer, and, if people are being deeply
hurt, what can the law do? You suggested other means of perhaps
addressing that. Do you have any evidence of what might work,
apart from the framework of law, to show that things can be done
without law? Secondly, as an inter faith Network, do you get people
phoning you up about the issue of religious hatred? What do they
say and what are their concerns about religious hatred or racial
hatred?
(Revd Gorsky) Briefly, in respect to the question
to myself, if you want to know how matters between different faith
communities can be alleviated without recourse to law I could
commend to you the modern history of Christian Jewish religions.
Obviously there are most profound theological differences between
Christians and Jews. Over the ages many hurtful statements have
been made by all of us on all sides and I think that we can report
a transformation in that over the past half century, but the key
work has not been in law, it has been in dialogue, it has been
in greater understanding, it has been in scholarship, it has been
the preaching and teaching of each faith community, it has been
endeavours to influence education—a whole range of matters,
but it has not had recourse to law. On the basis of that experience,
I would certainly say that it is possible to achieve great changes.
And people internalise these changes. You know, if one has only
the matter of law, then I do not offend because I do not wish
to offend the law, whatever my personal feelings might be; whatever
my personal views might be, I will not utter them for fear of
giving legal offence. That is not the ideal situation; the ideal
situation is when I am no longer harbouring such thoughts in the
first instance. I think that is what all of us involved in inter
faith relations are ultimately trying to achieve. The law undoubtedly
has a very significant role in the protection of people, but I
would argue that by itself it is insufficient.
(Mr Pearce) If I may take first the question of inquiries
from the outside world about issues such as incitement of religious
hatred, it would be true to say that we do not receive many of
them other than when the issue is in the public domain and is
before Parliament, when there is clearly interest in what is going
to happen or not to happen to proposals of that kind. So they
are issues which are real issues, in which people are interested
and are concerned about. I would naturally agree with what Jonathan
Gorsky has said about the very important dimension of work to
promote inter faith dialogue, inter faith relations. I think we
could say that in particular inter faith relationships and in
relationships collectively within this country there has been
a good deal of progress over the last 15 to 20 years. There is
a great deal more to do and there are many difficulties at the
present time in terms of the impact of overseas events in the
Middle East and in the South Asian sub-continent on relationships
here, which is, I think, a factor that needs to be weighed in
the balance when you are considering the issues that are before
you here. The point that I would simply make is that it does not
seem to me that it is an either/or situation. It is not: Shall
we use the route of law or shall we use the route of dialogue
and of education of young people, children and of adults, in a
search for greater mutual understanding and greater mutual respect?
Because, while it is obviously absolutely vital that proper, robust
exchanges in terms of criticism, questioning and expressions of
dissent, should not be in any way inhibited by the law, that is
different from an attitude of vilification and I think it is possible
to draw that distinction. The law is constantly having to draw
difficult distinctions. I would simply make the point that it
is very difficult to encourage open and free dialogue, involving
people of faith communities who may feel insecure and may actually
have a sense of fear in relation to their own religious identity.
Dialogue, and mutual understanding can be developed much more
successfully in a society where it is absolutely clear that people
of different faiths have a legitimate place, that their place
is respected, and that they will not be subject to ill treatment
and abuse.
Lord Avebury
187. You have mentioned the case of Salman Rushdie.
Mr Rushdie said some things which were highly offensive but would
they have been caught by any general law on blasphemy? Let me
take an example. He—admittedly not in the direct narrative
but in what he said about somebody's imaginings—postulated
the idea that the Koran was not dictated by the Angel Gabriel
because when the amanuensis came to write it down he falsified
some of the facts and the prophet did not notice. That satisfied
him that these words were not of divine origin. He was calling
into question, or at least the narrator was, the divine origin
of the words of the Koran. Do the witnesses think that it would
be conceivable to extend the law of blasphemy in such a manner
that all the sacred works of every religion were protected, not
from vilification but, as in that case, from denial, and denial
not in terms of what the author was actually saying to the readers
but what the author postulated one of his characters might be
thinking or dreaming?
(Revd Gorsky) I think the very short answer to that
is: In an age of modern scholarship and scholarly analysis of
text the answer is probably no, unless you wish to bar people
from scholarly analysis of all religious texts—and there
are of course scholarly critics of the Koran as well as people
such as Rushdie. It is in the nature of such inquiry as to question
the provenance of origins of text and I very much doubt that extending
the law of blasphemy would be at all useful or helpful in that
context.
Chairman
188. I am going to go on, if I may, to what
is a fairly short point. There are a number of statutory provisions,
most of which I think are obsolete, about what happens in religious
buildings or in the surrounds of them and in the course of religious
services. We have had our minds drawn to Section 2 of the 1860
Act, which applies also under the 1855 Act to a lot of other places
of worship, where it could cover still the type of behaviour which
is not brought within either criminal damage or public order and
I wondered whether you could help us with any examples of the
sort of thing that I am talking about. For instance, some sort
of profanity when there is not anybody there and no damage to
the fabric or to anything occurs but nevertheless which is abhorrent
to the people whose building it is.
(Mr Pearce) I am not sure I can be of much assistance
to the Committee on this in terms of being aware of individual
cases or having any reflections to offer on the precise detail
which a law might or might not take in this area. It does seem
to me that the issue has some similar elements, not surprisingly,
to those in the other two main topics at which you are looking,
in the sense that clearly there would be a case, if one was retaining
offences of this kind, to extend them in some way, as I think
was indeed canvassed in the 1985 Law Commission report, to cover
places of worship of other faith communities. Again, I think it
is a question of balancing freedom of speech and of behaviour
against what seem to be reasonable restraints. On the face of
it, there is a case for there to be some legal restraint to prevent
people from abusive behaviour and desecration of places of worship
which are held dear by people in different faith communities.
(Revd Gorsky) I have very little to say about this;
only one thought occurs to me, in that I think sometimes we are
inclined to over-estimate the fragility of the sensitivities of
religious persons and religious communities: some of us can be
rather more robust than this discussion has occasionally intimated
and we are usually able to cope with those who make the type of
disturbance indicated under this line of questioning. Beyond that,
I have no great knowledge of this, and therefore I do no think
I can say too much that will be helpful.
(Mr Pearce) May I briefly add, I have in mind, for
example, the quite recent case of the desecration of a synagogue
in North London. I am not sufficiently versed in the law to know
precisely what legal offence might or might not have been committed
in that situation but it seems to me to be quite reasonable to
argue that there should be legal protection to prevent that kind
of event taking place. Whether it should simply be on the basis
of it being the same as damaging any other building, I think there
is a real point there for consideration.
Bishop of Portsmouth
189. That occurred to me while you were speaking.
It is an event that caused a great deal of upset way outside the
Jewish community. The question is, what kind of legal protection.
Is it covered under secular law? Should it have religious protection?
(Revd Gorsky) If I may say so very briefly, I think
this is adequately covered under secular law. The people who perpetrated
this, to the best of my knowledge, were not intending to commit
an offence against God; they were seeking to strike at a particular
community as persons. They were not making a theological statement;
it was a secular act of violence, and it was horrifying and regrettable,
but I personally think—again speaking only for myself—that
this is adequately covered by the general law of the country.
Chairman
190. I am going to go on because time is passing.
We asked three questions about examples of incitement of religious
hatred, any change over time and who ought to monitor it. I wonder
whether we could leave those for the moment. If you have examples,
I am sure they could be put on paper for us. I want very much
to go on to the group of questions, starting with 11, and 12 and
13. Assuming that it is agreed in principle that incitement of
religious hatred should be made an offence, could it be drafted
in some other way than in Lord Avebury's Bill, which is simply
an attachment to the Public Order Act in the same way that incitement
of racial hatred was attached to it? Is there any other method
of doing it? What should be the role of the law in addressing
matters of hatred? The definition of religious hatred is in itself
difficult because you have to define it in a way that at the same
time preserves freedom of speech. These are at the heart of some
of the things that we have to deal with and I would invite your
comments on questions 11, 12 and 13 which I have summarised.
(Revd Gorsky) First, in terms of the phrase "religious
hatred" I have found it somewhat confusing as to what was
implied, and had in fact to look at the text to learn what was
meant. I took it, at first, that religious hatred meant some sort
of theological animosity or an expression of hatred for a set
of beliefs or practices, or a hatred that is derived from a religious
motivation. I gather, judging by Lord Avebury's definition, that
that would not have been correct and that the point is that the
hatred in question is directed against a group of persons who
happen to be defined by religious belief. In my opinion—and,
again, speaking personally - I think that definition is helpful
for the simple reason that a great deal of the hatred and incitement
that occurs would fall within that definition. The people who
incite hatred against Jews, against Moslems and against others
are usually inciting hatred against a group of persons; they are
not making statements against the Koran or statements about Jewish
practice and they are not inspired by theological motive. They
wish to be damaging with respect to a group of persons albeit
that the group of persons might be signified or defined by their
religion. That is, I think, very, very frequent, whereas the sort
of religious hatred that I thought was being referred to is, I
think, quite unusual.. So I personally find the definition in
Lord Avebury's Bill helpful.
(Mr Pearce) My Lord Chairman, it might be helpful
to say that at the time when the Anti-Terrorism Bill was being
debated and was moving backwards and forwards between the two
Houses of Parliament, the general view which faith communities
were then taking was to support the enactment of legislation of
that kind. There was concern, on the part of some, about the inclusion
of that provision in the Anti-Terrorism Bill, and that is of course
now not a situation in which we find ourselves. There had of course
been pressure to introduce provisions parallel to those in race
relations legislation, in part in order to provide some equality
of treatment between different groups, given that some groups,
such as Jews and Sikhs, are deemed to be covered by the race relations
legislation, whereas other groups, such as Muslims and others,
are not. So, even on the part of those faith communities which
were not necessarily actively seeking that protection for themselves
or who were fearful of incitement of religious hatred in relation
to their own community, they wished to provide support to others
in the enactment of provisions of that kind. There are obviously
issues which arise, if one is taking this, as it were, as a free-standing
measure, about whether there are additions which could be made
to a legislative provision to reassure those who are concerned
about the way in which such protection might operate in order
to block proper comment and proper debate. But in broad terms
there is, I think, support for an enactment of something along
those lines, although no doubt the individual faith community
submissions will be making a series of detailed points, for example
about the role which the Attorney General might play.
Chairman: Do any of my colleagues want to ask
questions on this general area?
Bishop of Portsmouth
191. Jonathan Gorsky, on this distance between
the theologically educated person and the less educated, strongly
motivated half-believer—and I am speaking here, if I may,
for people of many different faiths—Is it not the case that
religious hatred, however one defines it, is something that the
well-educated, religious believer will find it much easier to
distance themselves from? Is it not the case that the less cerebral,
the less educated, the less church, temple, synagogue attender,
will be stirred up about it? I am trying to put a whole host of
ideas into a very tightly packed sentence because I am in the
presence of lawyers, but it is a serious question.
(Revd Gorsky) Yes, indeed, whether one can distinguish
between the well-educated and the less cerebral. One would hope
so, but I think one might frequently, alas, be disappointed. Unfortunately,
one can be very learned in religious traditions and, alas, filled
with animosity in consequence for believers of different faiths,
whereas for the less cerebral, again, I do not know. I am just
thinking of the sort of animosity that one encounters, and the
sort of animosity that one encounters is usually not generated
directly by religious concern, it is generated by communal dynamics,
by social dynamics, by ethnic dynamics, by an inability to come
to terms with those who are different from oneself, and if the
signifier of that difference is religious, then indeed that will
be marked out for attention. This is my experience of the matter.
It is quite rare to come across a sort of fully-fledged and genuinely
religious animus in people, and very common, alas, to come across
the types of prejudice that I outlined. I do not know whether
that deals with your question.
192. It does. We are trying to define what religious
hatred is and if we can define it, and there are open minds around
this table, we have to try and prescribe about it, and that is
a hugely difficult thing to do in the three-tier society you described—is
it Christian, is it multi-faith, is it secular, and it is all
three at the same time.
(Revd Gorsky) Can I briefly come back on that? There
are two things. There is, firstly, the concept of what the religious
hatred might be and how one would define it. Secondly, there is
what actually happens, which might only be a very small part of
the concept in question, and that is what I was trying to say.
I would not deny that the type of religious hatred you mention
is possible and does exist, but I am saying in the generality
of incidents that we have encountered the hatred tends to be as
I described it rather than directly motivated by theology.
193. What I was talking about is what many Anglicans
call "folk religion" which all faiths have.
(Revd Gorsky) Yes.
(Mr Pearce) My Lord Chairman, may I briefly add two
points? The first is just to bring out more clearly the point,
which I think has already been made, that obviously one needs
to look at the use that is being made by the activities of right
wing extremist groups of attacks on and denigration of religious
groups. I think this is where the distinction to which Jonathan
Gorsky referred initially is very important, that the legislation
as drafted is about stirring up hatred of groups. That is of critical
importance. The second point is that I can well appreciate the
point that there may be sophisticated believers who find that
they are able to rise above expressions of hatred of their own
religion, but it does not mean to say that they will not be caught
up in very damaging ways in the social consequences of action
taken as a result of the incitement to religious hatred.
194. I was being descriptive, not pejorative.
(Mr Pearce) Indeed, but I just want to make that point.
It is of interest to everybody, it is not simply protection.
Baroness Perry of Southwark
195. I wonder if I could pursue this point,
that it is not so much what people feel and think but what they
do, it is the action that follows on the hatred. I always worry
about trying to legislate for people's feelings and people's thoughts.
In a sense people's feelings are often beyond their own control.
For example, I think of a friend of mine who worked amongst young
children in Nigeria who was told by one frank young person that
white faces made her feel genuinely ill because they looked like
the belly of a dead fish, and she found white people really quite
frightening and distasteful. She is entitled to that feeling and
as long as she did not behave in an unpleasant way to white people,
that is presumably tolerable. I wonder whether, rather than religious
hatred, we should not be concentrating on religious discrimination.
We have laws against racial discrimination, we do not have, as
I understand it, laws against religious discrimination. Is there
not something more we are looking for, which is a law which defines
people's actions and what they do rather than their feelings and
emotions?
(Revd Gorsky) There are two issues I think. There
is the issue of discrimination which is extremely important, but
there is also the matter of religious hatred. As it is being framed
here, there is an awareness that it does involve action, that
one is concerned that specific groups are being targeted in a
most unpleasant fashion, and it is that I think that we are trying
to address. Obviously, it is very difficult to legislate for feelings,
but those feelings are very frequently translated into action,
and that would not be covered purely under the rubric of discrimination.
The type of violence which occurred at the Finsbury Park Synagogue,
which the Bishop rightly pointed to, is not a matter of discrimination,
it is something rather worse, and it is certainly in the field
of action. So I think both points are important.
196. But is that not more a religious aggravation
to an offence—a religiously aggravated offence—rather
than religious hatred in itself? Because it resulted in action,
and the action is made worse by the fact it was inspired by religious
hatred.
(Revd Gorsky) I am not sure. We assume that the people
who perpetrated this particular act were motivated by right wing
fascism, Combat 18 type people, rather than actually being motivated
by religion. This is where one gets into difficulty with the phrase
"religious hatred". In Lord Avebury's sense, it clearly
was an act of religious hatred but it was not derived from religious
feeling or whatever. It does become quite abstruse, I think, at
this point.
Lord Avebury
197. This is the important thing, that we do
not have to identify what the person's motivation is, what we
have to look at is his intent. If his intent is to stir up hatred
against a group of people defined by their religion, or that what
he does is likely to stir up hatred against that group, then the
reasons why he perpetrated that act are not important to the law
and do not have to be dealt with in the court. So we are not talking
about somebody's feelings, are we? It is a much clearer concept,
would you agree? The question of intent is something which the
courts have had to construe in terms of the legislation on racial
hatred. Perhaps some people think they have not dealt with these
offences as frequently as they should, and we all know what the
difficulties are in getting the CPS to act, but since there is
a body of experience there do you not think the courts would have
no difficulty in reading across from the concept of racial hatred
which has been familiar to them for many years and applying it
to religious hatred?
(Revd Gorsky) I, again, am not at all sure about this.
Matters of intent are extremely difficult. If I recall correctly,
there has been considerable debate about the matter of intent
with regard to the 1986 Public Order Act, when the clauses on
matters of racial hatred in fact virtually abandoned the notion
of intent in favour of what was likely to happen in the circumstances;
regardless of my intent, if my actions are likely to cause X,
that is sufficient. But, again, I am not a lawyer and would not
comment on this. I can surmise that notions of intent could cause
considerable difficulty—how do you ascertain intent and
so on.
Chairman
198. May I suggest that we go on, because it
arises out of what we have just been discussing, to the last two
questions on this paper? We know the situation that the Jewish
faith has been recognised as being protected under the racial
hatred and other racial aggravation laws, nevertheless, Mr Gorsky,
particularly perhaps as we have you here, are there sources of
anti-Semitism in Britain today? What are they? How seriously does
it affect the Jewish community? Despite your protection by aggravation
on racial grounds, do you think aggravation on religious ground
would assist the Jewish community?
(Revd Gorsky) In terms of the sources of anti-Semitism
today, I think there is at least agreement on that point and I
will outline it in a moment. In terms of the impact of anti-Semitism,
there is considerable debate and I will try and give a couple
of sentences on that. The sources of anti-Semitism are several.
Firstly, as I mentioned in connection with the Finsbury Park incident,
the political right, the people inspired by fascism of one sort
or another, the ideas which have been, alas, a part of European
discourse for a very long time, the Combat 18 type of people,
who simply have great hatred for the Jewish community and other
communities they deem to be unacceptable or different from their
stereotypes of England and Britain. That is one source of anti-Semitism.
That is perpetually with us. It is not religious. Having read
some of the material, it is horrific but I do not think one would
describe it in any way as religious; these people are not interested
in religion, they are interested in ethnic hatred. The second
source is, as Mr Pearce alluded to earlier, the impact of the
Middle East conflict on the situation in this country with respect
to the Jewish community. Some supporters of the Palestinian cause
have indeed made very extreme utterances about Jews in general.
Not all, I would hasten to add; very many people who support the
Palestinians would be horrified by any sort of anti-Semitic overtones.
But there are some. Islamic extremists, again by no means the
whole of the Moslem community; relatively small groups of people
but very vocal, who are moved to great passion by the conflict
in Israel and Palestine, and their perception of Israeli behaviour.
That is the second source. I suppose, thirdly, the general residual
xenophobia in the community. But, as I pointed out in my submission,
one would not describe any of these sources as being religious.
There might well be people who retain a religious animosity to
Judaism, but in terms of their consequence they are not especially
significant. The significance is as I have outlined it. In terms
of the impact on the Jewish community, that is, as I said, debated.
There is a question of perception. Especially in our older generations,
people look at what is happening in the light of their experience
at the heart of the 20th century, they see things in the light
of the historical events which have dominated their lives, and
they are of course deeply perturbed by what is happening. Other
people might interpret it in a different way. I tend to compare
what is happening to what is happening to Moslems, to what is
happening to asylum seekers and others, what is happening in different
parts of the world. It depends on your frame of reference. The
number of anti-Semitic incidents have risen over the past few
years, I think largely in response to the situation in the Middle
East, and it does have an impact on the community. One has to
distinguish the objective impact which might be quite small, in
all honesty, from the perceptions of people, feelings and fears,
which might be perhaps more drastic. I think, very briefly, those
are the sources of anti-Semitism today and their impact. I am
one of those, and again I can only speak personally here, who
believe sometimes we do tend to exaggerate the impact of anti-Semitism
on our community. Other members of the Jewish community would
radically disagree with that.
199. But to add religious aggravation would
do nothing to help you, is that right?
(Revd Gorsky) To the best of my knowledge, it would
do very little.
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