Supplementary memorandum from the British
Humanist Association
A INTRODUCTION
A.1 This second submission to the Select
Committee addresses itself in more detail to the law repeals (other
than those related to blasphemy) proposed in clause one of the
Bill introduced by Lord Avebury. In our original memorandum, we
referred briefly to this aspect of the Bill in paragraph 3.3.
A.2 We also wish to make a correction to
paragraph 3.2.1 in the previous submission, and to make an additional
comment on the draft guidance prepared by the Attorney General
in the context of the proposed Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security
Act 2001.
B REPEAL OF
LAWS RELATING
TO PUBLIC
WORSHIP
B.1 The Law Commission's 1985 report reviewed
the law on offences relating to public worship, taking account
of representations made following their 1981 consultation paper.
They proposed that the laws specified in clause 1(1)(b) and (c)
and 1(2)(c), (e) and (f) of the Bill introduced by Lord Avebury
could be repealed without replacement, but suggested that section
two of the Ecclesiastical Courts Jurisdiction Act 1860 fulfilled
a useful purpose but should be replaced by a new enactment, which
they outlined without providing a full draft.
B.2 The British Humanist Association agrees
that all these provisions should be repealed. However, and particularly
in the light of the proposal on incitement to religious hatred,
we oppose the proposal by the Law Commission that section two
of the Ecclesiastical Courts Jurisdiction Act 1860 be replaced.
We do concede that some minor amendments to other general laws
may be necessary, subject to legal advice on the extent of such
provisions. For example, if the Public Meetings Act 1908 does
not apply to religious services, it would be a relatively simple
matter to extend it. The principle governing our approach is that
religious organisations, places and activities should not have
specific protection.
C THE LAW
COMMISSION'S
PROPOSALS FOR
NEW OFFENCES
The Law Commission proposed two new offences
to replace section two of the ECJA, to which we respond as follows:
C.1 Distruption of worship
C.1.1 One proposed new offence was "disruption"
of "a religious service or act of worship" "by
means of offensive or disorderly words or behaviour". The
offence would extend to all "acts of worship occurring in
a public place" but would not cover worship in private dwellings.
There would be no requirement to prove intent.
C.1.2 We agree that religious services should
not be disrupted without good cause (such as was in our view present
in the Brighton church case, as strongly argued by the defence
on that occasion). However, this protection should be provided
under general rather than specific legislation. Laws already exist
against acts of violence, causing damage, threatening behaviour,
causing a breach of the peace etc, and under the proposed Bill
behaviour likely to incite religious hatred will be added to this
long list.
C.1.3 What remains is deliberate interruption
of religious proceedings. But public meetings, orchestral concerts,
theatrical performances, art exhibitions and all manner of other
occasions, including, one might add, humanist funerals, weddings
and other ceremonies, also require to be protected from disruption,
and the same law should be sufficient for religious assemblies.
The Law Commission's only argument to the contrary was the assertion
that "a special offence penalising offensive behaviour which
seriously disturbs religious services . . . is
justifiable on the grounds that worshippers engaged in such activities . . . should
be entitled to do so free of undue disturbance which might cause
outrage or offence". So also should concert audiences and
playgoers, and the Law Commission's studiedly vague comment in
respect of religious activities that "where particular activities
are in progress or where premises are specially set aside for
particular purposes, these justify the special protection which
an offence would give" applies equally to chamber music at
the Wigmore Hall as to revivalist preaching to a charismatic congregation.
C.1.4 We object particularly strongly to
the Commission's proposal that their proposed offence should apply
to religious worship wherever it took place, including open air
meetings, which would be an invitation to envangelical groups
to stage impromptu outdoor prayer meetings free from any objection,
however much to the annoyance of other users of the public places
they took over. If, despite our objections, the Law Commission's
proposal is adopted, at least its application should be confined
to registered places of worship.
C.1.5 We also object to the removal of the
requirement to prove intent: it would seem to bring into the law's
embrace acts by disturbed people and unintentional acts, maybe
committed in ignorance that an act of worship was in progressfor
example, the offending conduct could take place out of sight but
within earshot of the religious proceedings. (We note that the
Commission suggests defences for unwitting conduct for their second
proposed offence.)
C.2 Offensive behaviour in places of worship
C.2.1 The second new offence would forbid
"behaviour in a place of worship which is likely to cause
serious offence to anyone who ordinarily uses it for the purpose
of worship", subject to defences related to specified types
of unwitting breach of the law.
C.2.2 The intention of this proposal was
to deal with acts of desecration of places of worship at times
when no-one else was present (so that breach of the peace was
unlikely), where the act was in a private place (so that section
5 of the Public Order Act 1986 would not apply), and where there
was no criminal damage or other specific offence. The example
the Commission gives is of "a receptacle for holy water [being]
filled with objectionable matter".
C.2.3 It is by no means as clear to us as
it was to the Commission that acts that cause no damage and do
not threaten public order should be banned. Many people have to
tolerate a great deal of annoyance in ordinary life. But even
if some protection is needed, it should be given under a suitable
law of general application, not by giving legal privileges to
religious organisations. For example, it may be considered justifiable
to prosecute someone who urinates in a chalice. Such conduct is
undoubtedly offensive and deplorable. So also is the regrettable
and more widespread practice of pushing faeces through letterboxes
in disputes between neighbours or in cases of racial hatred. The
same law should be used to deal with all of these, and if a new
offence has to be created, let it be a general one of utility
to all, not a special law to benefit religious groups.
D CORRECTION
TO PARAGRAPH
3.2.1 IN THE
BHA'S PREVIOUS
SUBMISSION
D.1 In the process of redrafting paragraph
3.2.1, we inadvertently stated that the blasphemy law "protects
certain beliefs and makes it illegal to question them or deny
them". Our intention was to state that this was the origin
of blasphemy law. We are aware that the current interpretation
involves "words which are scurrilous, abusive or offensive
and which tend to vilify the Christian religion"
E ADDITIONAL
COMMENT ON
THE DRAFT
GUIDANCE PREPARED
BY THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
FOR THE
PROPOSED ANTI-TERRORISM,
CRIME AND
SECURITY ACT
2001
E.1 As stated in its earlier submission,
the BHA welcomes the draft guidance prepared by the Attorney General
in the context of the proposed Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security
Act 2001, believing that it would be valuable to set out in this
authoritative way the safeguards that should ensure that legitimate
methods of religious debate, including robust criticism, satire
and comical representations of religion, are not restricted. We
are, however, concerned about the wording of paragraph 5.12 of
the draft guidance, which emphasises the "high threshold
tests", but then states that "people who are religious
or who follow particular religions are unlikely to offend the
statute" and that "legitimate expressions of religious
belief which . . . could not be construed as anything
other than the expression of a religious tenet are, similarly,
not likely to amount to an offence of incitement to religious
hatred". This could be interpreted as implying that people
who are not religious are more likely to offend the statute if
they express their non-religious beliefs in the same or similar
ways, and we consider it essential that the Attorney General's
guidance on the proposed Religious Offences Act rectifies this.
July 2002
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