Submission from the Jubilee Campaign
1. Jubilee Campaign is a human rights organisation
specialising in campaigning on issues of religious freedom. While
Jubilee Campaign categorically condemns all religious hatred and
incitement to religious hatred, we do not believe that it is practical,
appropriate or necessary to create an offence of incitement to
religious hatred. We also believe that the current religious offences
in the UK, notably blasphemy laws, should be maintained as it
poses some deterrence against blasphemous acts. In this submission,
we focus on the proposed new offence of incitement to religious
hatred, which we oppose strongly for the following reasons:
2. Even the representative of the Home Office's
Race Equality Unit states in his verbal evidence to the Select
Committee that the Home Office does not have a definition of what
is religious. If the definition of religion or religious is unclear,
an offence of incitement to religious hatred is extremely problematic,
since this offence cannot be defined sufficiently clearly to allow
for an intended appropriate use of the law but also to prevent
inappropriate use, ie potential abuse of this offence. Potential
abuse of this legislation is likely to curtail religious freedom
as well as freedom of speech, both rights are covered under the
European Convention on Human Rights which has been incorporated
into UK law. We are concerned that the definition of incitement
to religious hatred may be a very subjective one, for example
a member of one religious community may claim that a statement,
even regarding one of the basic beliefs of this religion made
by another religious community was meant to incite religious hatred,
even though it was not intended as such. For example a Christian
quoting from the Bible the verse which states, "go and make
disciples of all nations", (Matthew 28: 19) in a sermon might
be accused of inciting religious hatred (and prosecuted) even
though this was not his intention. There is a very serious danger
that this new offence could be abused and lead to miscarriages
of justice. Attempts to enforce this offence are likely to violate
religious liberty and freedom of expression and result in cases
being brought under the Human Rights Act with regard to alleged
violations of such rights.
3. It is obvious that there are numerous
differences between the different religions and constant debate
over the merits and rightness of one religion as compared to another.
These debates also occur between secularists and those who are
religious. Disagreements and debates over religious matters may
be wrongly construed as offences of incitement to religious hatred.
In fact, those who are intolerant towards others who express differing
religious views may wrongly accuse them of incitement to religious
hatred as a means to try to silence them. We are therefore concerned
that the new offence of incitement to religious hatred could be
used to silence statements on religious matters and prosecute
members of any or even no religion. Ironically, this offence is
likely to be abused in such a way as to actually increase religious
intolerance and hatred as it would be a handy and destructive
weapon which can be used by one religious group (or even those
of no religion) against another.
4. As a human rights organisation, we are
also very concerned that the introduction of a new offence of
incitement to religious hatred might stop human right abuses being
reported where there is a religious dimension as one or the main
element to the human right abuses. This may be especially relevant
if the human rights abuses occur in another country, but also
if occurring in the UK. For example, if in country X there exists,
as confirmed by independent observers, widespread human rights
abuses by ethnic and religious group A against a different ethnic
group B which also has a different religion then representatives
of religious group B in the UK might not be able to speak out
against the human rights abuses because this could be construed
as incitement to religious hatred and be prosecuted. For the follower
of one religion, any criticism, justified or not, of this religion
by a member of another religion could be construed as incitement
to religious hatred. The same might apply to media reporting of
human rights abuses by one religious group against another. This
will have very harmful results for both human rights reporting
and attempts to galvanise international pressure to stop human
rights violations with a religious element.
5. Another difficulty is that in many conflicts
with a religious element, there may also be non-religious elements
involved, for instance, class, language or race may also be factors
so it would be very difficult in such cases to say whether or
not it is really a clear cut issue of religious hatred or some
other form of hatred. The motivation is also extremely difficult
to establish, for example it may often not be possible to establish
whether the main motivation was racial or religious hatred. However
actual harm done, for example broken bones, is relatively easy
to establish. In this example, the actual physical harm done should
be punished and this is possible under current criminal law. We
maintain that the introduction of such a new offence is not only
problematic, but also unnecessary within the current legislative
framework. The current law is adequate to deal with violence and
threats, for example, laws on assault, actual bodily harm and
public order offences.
6. Freedom of speech allows the expression
of differing opinions, even though others may disagree with the
opinion voiced. One arena where the debate is often heated and
sometimes violent is that of politics. The violent anti-capitalist
demonstrations by anarchists, the poll tax demonstrations in the
80s, the recent assassination attempt on the French President
and the recent assassination of a political candidate in the Netherlands
are just some examples of political disagreements turning into
violence. However, freedom of speech is not curtailed because
of differing political opinions. Imagine the adverse impact on
democracy if an offence of incitement to political hatred was
created. Such an offence would become a much favoured weapon by
opposing political groups to bludgeon one another with. So why
not permit the same freedom for religious views as for political
views? It is very difficult to see any rational arguments to justify
creating an offence for inciting religious hatred while abstaining
from creating a similar offence for inciting political hatred.
We should ask ourselves: since we allow plenty of freedom for
political debate and if violence occurs, deal with it using existing
criminal laws, why not do the same for debate and differences
between religions?
19 July 2002
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