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Justice (Northern Ireland) Bill [HL]
Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend the Lord President of the Council, I beg to move the Motion standing in her name on the Order Paper.
Moved, That it be an instruction to the Committee of the Whole House to which the Justice (Northern Ireland) Bill has been committed that they consider the Bill in the following order:
Clause 1, Schedule 1, Clauses 2 to 5, Clause 16, Schedule 3, Clause 17, Clauses 6 to 11, Schedule 2, Clauses 12 to 15, Clause 18, Schedule 4, Clauses 19 to 23.—(Lord Davies of Oldham.)
Lord Renton: My Lords, on this occasion we are being asked to consider the clauses and schedules of this Bill out of their numerical order. That has sometimes been done in the past but the advantages of doing so have always been outweighed by the disadvantages. It always caused confusion.
Can the noble Lord say what argument the Government are putting forward to justify taking these clauses and schedules out of order?
Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, the noble Lord recognises that it is not unprecedented to move a Motion to indicate that clauses will be taken other than in numerical order. He will of course recognise that this Motion has been the subject of discussion through the usual channels and it is on that basis that I commend the Motion to the House.
Lord Renton: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that, though that course has been followed in the past, the practice has fortunately fallen into disuse? Why is it being revived on this occasion when no advantage will be gained?
Lord Skelmersdale: My Lords, before the noble Lord answers that question, I observe that Clause 16 is to follow Clauses 2 to 5. Everything else in the proposal is perfectly logical but that appears to be illogical. Can the noble Lord explain?
Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, the clauses grouped together relate to the criminal justice system. It was considered therefore that it would be for the convenience of the Committee that debates revolving around this specific area of the Bill should be grouped together. I understand that this procedure was the subject of discussion by the usual channels.
I recognise the point made by the noble Lord that this course should be followed only on exceptional occasions—I agree that it is more difficult for a Committee than going through the clauses in numerical
order. However, occasionally there are good reasons why certain clauses should be grouped together and that is the reason on this occasion.On Question, Motion agreed to.
Business
Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, before we commence the debate on the Defence White Paper, perhaps I can bring to the attention of noble Lords that more than 20 Members have indicated a wish to speak today. Should Back-Bench speeches each last for 10 minutes, the House should rise by the target rising time of 10 p.m. I draw the attention of the House to the fact that noble Lords followed a similar rubric yesterday in an excellent debate, which enabled the House to rise before the target time.
Defence
3.33 p.m.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Bach) rose to move, That this House takes note of the Defence White Paper: Delivering Security in a Changing World (Cm 6041).
The noble Lord said: My Lords, the Ministry of Defence published a Defence White Paper, Delivering Security in a Changing World, on 11 December, just one month ago.
Noble Lords will recall that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence made a Statement at the time in another place, which I repeated in this House. I am glad that today your Lordships' House has been given an early opportunity to debate the White Paper at greater length than was possible before the Christmas Recess.
In opening this debate I am sure the House will be delighted to hear that I intend to be short, for this is a chance for the House, with its abundance of military experience and knowledge, to express its views. I am particularly pleased that four former Chiefs of Defence Staff and a number of former Ministers and other experts in this field intend to speak. But one voice which will be absent today is that of Lord Hardy of Wath, who will be very much missed by the House in a debate of this kind.
I have particular reason outside of this House, from some years ago, for being grateful to Lord Hardy. He was an acknowledged expert on defence and the House will miss his expertise not just today, but also in the future.
I shall do my best to sum up and answer questions at the end. I hope noble Lords will indulge me if I undertake to write, addressing any points that I am unable to address today.
This is the first occasion in 2004 on which this House has had the opportunity to debate the business of my department. Before I go on to focus on the subject of our debate—related as it is to high level defence policy
and the future structure of our Armed Forces—I want to pay tribute to the many thousands of service personnel, sailors, soldiers and air force personnel, who have been serving their country on operational duties over the Christmas and New Year period, most obviously in Iraq but also, it should not be forgotten, in the Balkans, Afghanistan, West Africa, Northern Ireland, the Falkland Islands and Cyprus. Those young men and women have gone about their business with the steely determination, professionalism and good humour for which the British Armed Forces are deservedly renowned. They and their families deserve our thanks and admiration in equal and generous measure. I am sure the whole House will join me in wishing them well.It is a truism that since the fall of the Berlin Wall there has been a period—at least in our lifetimes—of unparalleled change in the world of defence and security. Our predecessors had to deal with it and we have to deal with it now. The massive, monolithic threat of the past has gone and the world is undoubtedly the better for that. But gone too are the old certainties. The strategic landscape is very different now from that which we faced 20 years ago. The threats we face are increasingly unpredictable.
The challenge for those engaged in the nation's defence has always been to ensure that the military and other capabilities they sustain match the threats we face, just as at critical moments in our nation's history we need to adjust the capabilities, skills and structure of our Armed Forces to ensure that they are best placed to meet the challenge of today and tomorrow. Resting on the laurels of yesterday is simply not an option.
The 1998 Strategic Defence Review and the SDR New Chapter, that we published in 2002, unquestionably moved our Armed Forces in the right direction. But the strategic environment does not stand still. And nor must we. Our Armed Forces must continue to evolve if they are to be best placed to confront the key challenges of the early part of this century—the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the threat posed by international terrorism; and the consequences of failed and failing states.
The White Paper provides a comprehensive statement of defence policy set against the context of the strategic environment in which we operate. In doing so, it presents the case for more flexible Armed Forces structured and equipped to deal with the demands of multiple, concurrent small and medium-scale operations; forces that must be capable of operating across the operational spectrum, from war fighting to enduring peace support operations.
Of course, those forces must also retain the flexibility to allow them to be able to reconfigure at longer notice for the much less frequent, large-scale operations, for the most demanding of which it is almost inconceivable that the United States would not be involved, either leading a coalition or as a part of NATO. The White Paper sets out to strike that balance.
Military action is, of course, used only as a last resort when the cross-government effort in crisis prevention and management has been exhausted. The Government
are clear that it is most effective when brought to bear through multinational coalitions and alliances. The ability to operate alongside others, particularly our NATO and EU allies and partners, therefore remains at a premium. We must ensure that our Armed Forces are prepared and equipped to lead or act as a framework nation for ESDP or similar ad hoc coalitions where the United States is not engaged. Interoperability, whether with our European, American or other allies, will be at a premium.As my right honourable friend said on 11 December in his Statement in another place, the department is currently undertaking a significant examination of its capabilities and overheads to establish the precise nature of an appropriate and sustainable force structure and future investment programme to support the policy set out in the White Paper.
A great deal of work is going on within the MoD to examine different aspects of military capability. I should stress that, as with the Strategic Defence Review and the New Chapter before it, this involves expert military and civilian personnel.
One thing is clear. We must exploit new and emerging technologies so that we can exploit the full potential of our military capability and deliver ever more rapid and precise military effect. Critical to this will be the development—and I hope that the House will forgive me if I descend for a moment into the vernacular—of what we call network enabled capabilities. By that I mean the more effective knitting together, via sophisticated communications networks, of intelligence collection, analysis, command and strike assets. Or, put more simply, linking the sensors more effectively to the shooters.
The drive to developing network enabled capabilities will allow us to capture the operational benefits that modern technology, particularly in the realm of communications and information technology, has to offer. It will allow us better to understand developing crises and threats; more effectively to plan for military contingencies; and, ultimately, to conduct military operations faster and with greater precision.
But, my Lords, this is not only about investing in high-tech equipment. Rather it is the restructuring of the Armed Forces so that they are better able both to make use of it and, critically, to undertake the three concurrent small and medium-scale operations, including peace support and counter-terrorism operations that have already become the norm and which we can expect in the future.
Painful as it always is, we must not shirk from making tough choices. In the last spending review we announced the largest sustained increase in planned defence expenditure for 20 years. But our resources must now be directed at those capabilities that are best able to deliver the full range of military effects that we require. We must be rigorous in dispensing with those capabilities that do not. In today's world, not to do so is simply not an option.
The exercise that we are engaged in is about reprioritising. It is about restructuring our Armed Forces and their supporting infrastructure
appropriately to meet the changed strategic environment outlined in the White Paper. And it should be seen in the context of the increased resources that were made available to the MoD in the 2002 spending round.As was indicated in the White Paper, this may mean reductions in some of the older surface vessels, heavy armour and single-role fast jets, but this will be offset by investment in new medium-weight forces and network enabled capabilities. We have already announced the creation of a new light brigade in lieu of one of our armoured brigades, and we expect to be in a position to make further announcements later in the year.
In a changing world, our Armed Forces must continually adapt if they are to stay ahead of potential adversaries. This is nothing new: historically, our Armed Forces have a proud record of adapting successfully to meet the threats with which they are confronted. This White Paper provides the security and policy baseline against which decisions will be made to ensure that our Armed Forces are equipped and structured to meet the challenges of the future. I beg to move.
Moved, That this House takes note of the Defence White Paper: Delivering Security in a Changing World (Cm 6041).—(Lord Bach.)
3.44 p.m.
Lord Vivian: My Lords, it is a great privilege for me to participate in this exceptionally important debate and I should like to thank all noble Lords for taking part in the assessment of the White Paper. I am also very pleased to see that the noble and gallant Lords, Lord Bramall, Lord Vincent of Coleshill, Lord Craig of Radley and Lord Guthrie of Craigiebank, are all contributing to this debate. With their wealth of military experience, I ask your Lordships to pay particular attention not only to their remarks today, but also to the astute and very wise contributions that the noble and gallant Lords made during the Loyal Address.
This debate on the Defence White Paper sets the scene for the future defence of the realm. The White Paper was disappointing in the way that it failed to address the financial implications of what is intended to be a major reorganisation of our Armed Forces. It was also alarming and particularly damaging to the morale of all our servicemen and women in that there was virtually no detail showing how this major reorganisation would take place, what cuts it may involve and over what time-frame. However, it must be said that the morale of troops deployed on operations is currently as high as it has ever been.
The defence of the realm is to protect the United Kingdom and its overseas territories from military threats and terrorism; to safeguard the national interests of the United Kingdom wherever they are threatened and to contribute to world-wide peace and security.
Within this future security environment, the Armed Forces face a broader range of tasks across a wider geographical area than before. The United Kingdom will not be able to contribute militarily to every international crisis. Participation will be in coalitions with other countries. The United Kingdom's Armed Forces must be prepared for asymmetric attacks including the use of weapons of mass destruction and they must be equipped and configured to fulfil the roles of homeland defence, countering international terrorism and high-intensity warfare.
There are three major standard planning assumptions which must not create overstretch through over-commitment. The first is to deal with enduring medium and small-scale peace operations, including a small intervention operation at brigade and battle group level. The second is in a crisis in which the United Kingdom should rapidly carry out the same operations, including a limited duration medium-level intervention operation. Thirdly, the United Kingdom should be capable of carrying out a large-scale intervention operation at divisional level, including a small-scale peace support operation.
What I have briefly outlined are the proposals in the Defence White Paper, with which we do not disagree provided that Her Majesty's Government can give an assurance that there are, and will continue to be, sufficient resources of personnel and equipment for these planning assumptions. However, what is not suggested is how this vast reorganisation is to be achieved through any detailed structural change, apart from on the land forces side, turning the 4th Armoured Brigade into a mechanised brigade and converting the 19th Mechanised Brigade into a light brigade. This lack of information has been especially harmful to the morale of the troops and it is now essential that the MoD states in detail how this reorganisation is to be carried out or whether this White Paper is just another smokescreen disguising severe cuts for the future.
Turning to the maritime situation, delivering a land attack capability and securing access to the theatre of operations are identified as future priorities. The introduction of the future carrier and the joint strike fighter are regarded as vital to increasing the ability to project air power from the sea. The Type 45 air defence destroyer will also be crucial for enhancing the protection of joint and maritime forces and assisting force projection. Will the Minister now confirm how the Royal Navy is to be restructured? How many Type 23 and Type 42 frigates will be paid off; how many of the 12 Type 45 air defence destroyers will actually be ordered; and can the Minister also confirm that the SSN Fleet will shrink to as few as five boats and that they will be delayed coming into service?
Can the Minister confirm that the carrier programme is also being scaled down from the advertised 60,000 tonnes to as little as 50,000 tonnes? This would mean that fewer than 150 joint strike fighters would be ordered. In addition, it remains likely that the in-service date of 2012 will slip to 2015. Furthermore, the Sea Harrier is being withdrawn from this year and the fleet will have no organic air defence cover for 10 years or more. The noble and gallant
Lord, Lord Boyce, in his excellent maiden speech, alluded to the fact that however clever the technology, it does not deliver the capability to be in two places at the same time, and cutting the number of ships will certainly prevent this.Turning to the Army and our land assets, the White Paper assesses that the future security of the United Kingdom requires a reorganised force structure and new capabilities. In order to increase the flexibility of the Army to respond to crises a new complement of medium weight forces requires to be developed, as was seen when both 16 Air Assault Brigade and 3 Commando Brigade required heavy armour in order for them to achieve their objectives in Iraq.
It is envisaged that a move towards a more graduated and balanced structure of light, medium and heavy forces will over time lead to a reduced requirement for main battle tanks and other heavy armoured fighting vehicles and heavy artillery. However, it would be most unwise—indeed dangerous—to reduce too much of the Army's heavy weaponry. Just over 17,000 vehicles of ex-Soviet equipment with a heavy war fighting capability remain in service scattered throughout the world. The military doctrine aims of mobility and lightness are required to be balanced against retaining firepower and protection.
As I have already mentioned, the White Paper outlines the intention to create a new light brigade and reduce the number of armoured brigades from three to two. While this reorganisation would certainly allow for more rapid deployment, no restructuring and no loss of manpower should take place until the future rapid effects system vehicle is in service. It has been ascertained that on present planning some 480 Royal Armoured Corps trained personnel will be lost. This should be prevented, particularly as it is assumed that there will be a requirement for two future rapid effects system regiments when they come into service. Even now the four existing armoured reconnaissance regiments require a fourth fighting squadron, as was shown in Iraq.
As at 1 October, the Army was below strength by some 4,700 trained troops and in June 55 per cent were deployed on, recovering from or preparing for operations. There is absolutely no justification for any reduction of regiments, battalions or units. Cutting numbers would be an act of sheer folly. If the White Paper involves cuts in any way, we shall oppose them vigorously from these Benches. In fact we need to recruit the under-strength figure of 5,000 as quickly as possible.
The former Chief of Defence Staff, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Guthrie, warned during the Loyal Address against the great dangers in concentrating our efforts to too great an extent on one emerging threat, forgetting that there are other threats which have not gone away and for which we should still be prepared. Numbers of Armed Forces personnel still matter, particularly involving low intensity operations, as shown by the British contingent in Iraq.
It also enables the Army to retain personnel and allows them sufficient time for training and courses, so vital to ensuring successful operations, which I shall cover in a moment. Without the correct number of established troops the gap between operational tours reduces from the recommended 24 months down to as low as six months in some cases, and on average down to 10 months. The more experienced petty officers and NCOs not unreasonably wish to spend more time with their families, and the White Paper has nothing to suggest that there will be less separation. In fact it expresses the exact opposite: that the serviceman's and woman's life will become harder; that there will be more frequent operations at a higher tempo; and that they will be liable to even more separation than before.
Turning to air assets, the White Paper focuses on the projection of air power from both land and sea, offering capabilities across the range of air operations but with a clear emphasis on offensive effect. There has been much speculation about cuts to the Eurofighter. Will the Minister clarify the situation regarding the numbers that will be ordered in tranche two and whether tranche three will be cut completely?
Will the noble Lord also confirm that the Tornado 3 will now not get the helmet-mounted sight for ASRAAM and that Brimstone is being cut back? Will he also confirm that not all the GR7s will get the Pegasus engine and that none of them are getting ASRAAM? Finally, would there not be a saving if the contract for the A400 transport aircraft was cancelled in favour of purchasing more C130s and C17s?
I was unable to find any meaningful comment about the defence budget in the defence White Paper. The SDR stated that 2.5 per cent of GDP should be reserved for defence, but the figure has already fallen to 2.3 per cent and is now heading for around 2.2 per cent. As I have said before, we believe that the budget is deeply in the red and that the equipment and the personnel budgets are overspent this year. I wonder whether it is true that cuts of £1 billion per year for the next four years will have to be made.
The Minister, in his courteous reply to me on the recent Statement, although agreeing that sufficient funds would be made available for network-enabled capability, stated that it might not be possible to procure all the other measures that we would like to. If this is the case, what are the projects that will not be funded and, therefore, cancelled?
I now turn briefly to the vital issue of training. Due to budgetary concerns and the shortage of time between operational tours, personnel have not been carrying out sufficient training, leading to a skill shortage among the most experienced soldiers. This involves both field training and individual courses and leads to a loss of crucial battle-winning skills. If we do not allow our forces to have the time to train properly, we will start to lose battles and lives will be lost quite unnecessarily. If this should happen it will not be the fault of commanding officers but of the Government, who have not allowed the resources to be made available for a full-strength army and yet are frequently prepared to over-commit the Army time and time again.
The MoD lists some 350 planned exercises each year. Seventy-two percent of these exercises have been cancelled due to the increased level of operational activity; namely, due to Operations TELIC and FRESCO. Eleven per cent have been cancelled due to decisions by host nations and a further 11 per cent have been subsumed into other exercises or rescheduled for this year. In total some 94 per cent of exercises were lost last year. This situation should be rectified immediately.
In conclusion, we are not giving our Armed Forces a fair deal. At regimental level—although not when troops are operationally deployed, as I have already mentioned—morale is low and has been made worse by publishing a White Paper without the required detail. This has given rise to uncertainty within the ranks as to where their future lies. Many are considering early release. The Armed Forces do not understand why the armed services should be reduced when the threats are greater than ever. They believe that they have put their lives at risk and now they find that their jobs are at risk. They consider that EU defence ambitions pose a threat to NATO and that government cuts are causing unacceptable reductions in operational exercises and readiness, a subject that I have not covered today as there have been two major debates recently on the issue.
Our Armed Forces are the best and command great respect throughout the world even though they are under-equipped and over-stretched, as verified in the recent NAO report. They are to be congratulated on their outstanding achievements in Iraq. I praise our Armed Forces for their dedicated loyalty, their professionalism, their highly efficient skills and their willingness to serve the country. I pay great tribute to their families for the support they provide to their husbands or wives at all times.
It is our duty to ensure that our Armed Forces receive a fair deal and that we provide the resources to ensure that their lives are not put unnecessarily at risk. Currently, I regret that I do not feel that we are giving them the fair deal that they so justly deserve.
4 p.m.
Lord Redesdale: My Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for introducing the debate, and echo his words about Lord Hardy of Wath. He will be missed not only by those on his own side but by all Peers in the House.
The Defence White Paper is a short, aspirational document with exceptionally good photographs. We welcome it, but I hope that the Minister will not be too upset if I start with a complaint. I shall not report him to the ombudsman about it, but perhaps to the campaign for plain English. The MoD may even win an award for this one.
The second paragraph of the second column in Chapter 1 states:
- "Military effectiveness would be enhanced through increased 'Jointery' between the Services".
There is little to disagree with the sentiments set out in the White Paper. However, by reading between the lines, I have one or two concerns about the implications of some of the proposals. Paragraph 3.5 of Chapter 3 states:
- "The most demanding expeditionary operations, involving intervention against state adversaries, can only plausibly be conducted if US forces are engaged, either leading a coalition or in NATO".
Obviously the state and the size of our Armed Forces means that that is the case. However, I do not believe that the presumption should be made that we would only go into a US-led coalition—not that I am saying that we would not, but I have an issue with the fact that no mention is made of the United Nations or, indeed, a United Nations mandate. It seems that the state of operations has changed somewhat if we can start talking about a coalition of the willing involved in state intervention without a UN resolution. That may not be the intention, but it seems to be the implication of what has been written. While I do not deny the importance of NATO, or, indeed, the importance of the US—I could not do so with the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, giving me one of his looks—it is unfortunate that this was stated in such a way.
I believe that even the Americans will have difficulty in looking at state intervention in the short term—especially with our present commitments. The Foreign Secretary said that it is unlikely that we will leave Iraq until 2007 at the earliest. I have been given no specific dates on when we will leave Afghanistan. We still have significant commitments in the Balkans. However, we cannot overlook this issue, as it is the basis of over-stretch. We have many troops overseas, and I echo the Minister in welcoming the incredible efforts of our armed servicemen —especially those who were serving overseas during the holiday period.
The nature of our present commitments will determine our future commitments. These are not operations in which we put people in and then take them out again; they are all operations where we were involved in the fighting in the first place. We now have a significant and long-term commitment in peacekeeping and peace making.
That is one of the implications of the SDR, which did not envisage such long-term commitments. We cannot depend on high-scale technological innovations to deal with peacekeeping, which relies on boots on the ground and has implications as to how many troops the Armed Forces will require.
- "Where the UK chooses to be engaged, we will wish to be able to influence political and military decision making throughout the crisis, including during the post-conflict period".
That is an important point, and one that needs further debate. I hope that the Minister will say whether a report is being written about our effect on political decision
making and our effect on the post-conflict situation. That will have a major effect on whether we are involved in any further action.Moving to another aspect of the report, I shall focus on missile defence technology. Paragraph 3.12 is a masterpiece of equivocation. I was most heartened in reading it because it gives no indication that we will spend money on missile defence technology. The Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Vivian, talked about defence cuts. We could save an enormous amount of money by not getting involved in this area in the first place.
The national missile defence programme is not something that can be viewed in the abstract. It has already caused the end of the anti-ballistic missile treaty; it has destroyed an international treaty. Although there might be cost benefits in the development of interceptor technology, the Government will have to be extremely careful about the costs that they will be expected to pay in initiating research and development. Even increasing the missile shield to this country would not outweigh those costs considerably. The size of the budget needed to contemplate an effective missile defence capability would be enormous, and I question from where the budget for such expenditure will come. Obviously, in the short term—up to 2012–2015—there will be considerable difficulties. Any further massive commitment before then is unachievable.
I turn now to the good news that was announced in a Statement yesterday in another place, which is in today's Hansard. I refer to the achievement of the Civil Contingency Reaction Forces to full operating capability. This is a valuable step forward for the reserve forces and should be welcomed. I have a couple of questions about the capabilities of this organisation. The Territorial Army and the reserve forces have had their man-training days cut a number of times. To make that body effective and to have the ability to deal with NBC threats, many man-training days will be needed. I know that because I instructed on NBC drill when I was in the Territorial Army. It was a particularly unpleasant experience standing in a tent filled with CS gas. It is vital that the lessons are learnt properly.
A further question is whether the necessary kit will be available to the Territorial Army to meet that capability. It is a fact that most territorial units do not have the necessary kit to deal with hazardous materials. They have the kit necessary for training, but it does not work. That failure cannot be taken lightly.
Following my comments on kit, I refer to the sad events in Iraq where soldiers lost their lives because of the lack of body armour. That vital piece of kit should now be considered essential to every soldier. Each soldier should be issued with a set of body armour that follows him from each posting as part of his personal kit. It should not be issued "as and when", depending on the operation. I know that there are cost implications, but the sad loss of life means that such body armour is essential.
The Armed Forces (Pensions and Compensation) Bill, which has recently been introduced, pertains to the White Paper, because it refers to this issue. I have asked
this question before; I am particularly concerned about it, although I know it will be debated in another place and in this House. The Secretary of State talked about the pensions review being cost-neutral. However, we have already been told that there will be winners—partners are to be considered for pensions. This will have a cost implication, and if there are winners there will also be losers. There is an assumption among members of the Armed Forces that officers' pensions will be raided to meet this added financial commitment. I hope the Minister can assure us that if there are to be losers, the cost-neutral option will not be invoked but new funds will instead be found for it.I finish on one point that struck me while reading this document. It is a short document, so I was able to read it quite carefully. I refer to defence diplomacy, which seems to have garnered a new meaning in this document. The assumption is made that we will be looking at further state interventions, but of course state interventions will be based on political objectives. These must be considered very carefully. One of the political objectives for going to war was to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. We on these Benches are concerned that the very case for going to war is disappearing quite rapidly. A couple of recent comments caused concern, particularly those made by Mr Bremer, who said that the network of tunnels and laboratories was a red herring. Could the Minister comment on that?
When is the Iraq Survey Group to make its final report? We know that the interim report has been made. A large percentage of personnel have been taken off the Iraq Survey Group and David Kay has resigned from it. On that basis, the survey group must be coming to the end of its natural life, so surely a final report can be expected. I very much hope the Minister can tell us when the ISG will report.
4.12 p.m.
Lord Clark of Windermere: My Lords, I begin by declaring an interest, as a non-executive director of Thales UK plc. I also lead the British delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.
I thank the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Redesdale, for the very kind remarks they made about Peter, Lord Hardy of Wath. Peter and I entered the other place in June 1970 and I am very much aware of all the interest he showed in both Houses in defence matters. It was typical of Peter that at his funeral service a poem on flight was read out by a former pilot officer, because he loved the RAF. He had the RAF flag draped on his coffin, and there was a very fine guard by the local ATC, a subject that Peter raised repeatedly on the Floor of the House. We shall miss him, especially in these defence debates, to which he brought a great deal of conviction and belief.
I echo what has been said, and is always said, about the quality of our Armed Forces. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Vivian, who said that they were simply the best, and they are. I hope that I am not causing offence to anyone if I say that it is quite remarkable that, generation after generation after
generation, such a high quality of men and women join the ranks of the armed services. The offence that I might cause—but hope I have not—is that I suspect that the young men and women in the forces today are better than the ones who went before. They are certainly as evenly matched. It is a great credit to our country and to the armed services that such qualities of bravery, statesmanship, diplomacy and service are shown among our young people. It gives us a great deal of hope.Equally, I am delighted that we are having this debate today. It is right and proper that we have an early debate on the White Paper. I am delighted that it is a short document; it builds on the original SDR in the new chapter, and allows us to study it very carefully—almost word by word, as the noble Lord, Lord Redesdale, has demonstrated. If there is a watchword in the White Paper, I guess it is flexibility. That is right and proper.
I am also conscious that in this debate, which I am looking forward to, we have so much expertise, experience and knowledge. I am sure the Ministry of Defence and Ministers will listen to what is said by those who have so much experience of these issues.
I mentioned NATO. I am delighted that almost at the beginning of the White Paper, the Government state unequivocally where they stand vis-a-vis NATO. Paragraph 2.18 says:
- "The UK recognises the pre-eminence of NATO".
Having said that, I am also conscious that there are movements in the European Union which some seek to portray as trying to wreck NATO. That is not how I see it, and I do not think it is how our North American colleagues see it. They have gone on at great length to we Europeans about taking defence seriously—I get it increasingly at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. The reality is that probably only our own country and our neighbours across the Channel in France are devoting sufficient of the national resources to the defence effort. We must find a way of persuading our other European neighbours that they must take defence seriously, and that means spending a bit more money on it. I hope that we will persuade the European Union that if it wants to be taken seriously in defence with the ESDP, it must put some money into it.
Equally, I am conscious that the agreement reached on 12 and 14 December, when we had the failed convention, was a step forward. I do not share the view that the installation of a new planning cell within the ESDP is weakening NATO. What was agreed on 12 and 14 December was a scaled-down operational planning unit, independent of NATO but amenable to the United States.
It is worth repeating in this House what the spokeswoman for the EU High Representative, Mr Solana, said. She said that the planning cell will operate only on very specific types of operations—ones that NATO has passed on to the EU. In that situation, the Berlin Plus arrangement will apply.
It is also interesting to see what else the spokeswoman said. She pointed out that the planning cell combined both the civilian and the military and that it would basically be concerned with reconstruction missions. Thus planning for combined combat missions is not foreseen. As she said:
- "We are not a military organisation. We are a civilian organisation that makes use of military assets".
I mentioned earlier that I thought flexibility was the watchword of the White Paper. It has to take into account the changes of threats—the buzzword is the asymmetric threat, which is certainly true—and the changes in technology. We are starting to utilise technology in the military field to the advantage of our servicemen and women and in order to achieve our objectives. Programs such as Fist or Watchkeeper and the other programs that the Government are advancing will help us along these lines.
However, I wish to raise the matter of communications with the Minister. Communications are critical—they are one of the four C's—to all that we achieve and need to achieve in theatre and in the strategic area. Noble Lords will be aware that the National Audit Office is no soft touch—it is its task to be robust—but its excellent report on Operation TELIC, the UK military operation in Iraq, is well worth reading. Tucked away there, in paragraph 4.8, it says:
- "The majority of communications equipment worked well in the operation, although the force sometimes"—
- "had difficulty maintaining strategic communications between the UK and units in theatre".
Indeed, this was further highlighted in Jane's Defence Weekly on 7 December 2003. An officer is quoted describing how a vital secure satellite communications link failed, just as the UK commanders in Qatar were trying to receive authorisation from government Ministers in London to allow the bombing of buildings in Basra. Obviously, this was critical. The report goes on to say that:
- "On the first day of the war, secure communications between London and the commander of UK forces in the Middle East, Air Marshal Brian Burridge at the US Central Command headquarters in Qatar, also failed after a contractor at a switching centre in London fitted new equipment without authorisation".
4.20 p.m.
Lord Burnham: My Lords, I support what has been said from other benches about Lord Hardy of Wath; I wonder what his greyhounds are going to do without him.
On around 31 May 1940, my father, having just disembarked from HMS "Worcester", was standing amid a great many dirty, dishevelled and wet soldiers who had, like him, come back from Dunkirk. Suddenly there was a shout and a battalion of Grenadiers—clean, boots clean, marching to attention and having all their small arms with them—came down from a ship and marched ashore. My father said that this convinced him that we were not going to lose the war, that there were these qualities of discipline in the British Army, at least in parts. This was probably largely due to the Guards depot at Caterham where the discipline was incredibly harsh and where soldiers were taught how to behave and how to carry themselves under arms.
Today, 63 years later, one cannot expect the same qualities as were seen then. Life has changed so enormously that this cannot be expected. Nevertheless, a man joining any one of the services has relinquished some of the rights that he has in civilian life. He must do so because it is the only way to get an effective force. In those days, and in the 1940s and the 1950s, great non-commissioned officers, like Regimental Sergeant-Major Lord of the Coldstream Guards and Lynch of the Irish Guards, shouted. They shouted very loudly, but it was through that that much of the discipline was achieved. Today, it is still necessary for non-commissioned officers to shout and attempts that have been made to do I know not what—to transmit orders by e-mail perhaps—are not acceptable. An order is an order. It is not a helpful suggestion.
However, if we say that about discipline, we must differentiate clearly between discipline and bullying. Discipline must be fair. Treatment by senior officers and non-commissioned officers must be seen to be fair and they must tolerate what is needed by a man who comes from civilian life and from a very different sort of behaviour. The discipline is backed by a series of inquiries and of courts, ranging from that of a company commander to a court martial. Here, with the courts martial, we must have considerable doubts as to what is going to happen. I have a Question down for next week which, if I get an answer from the Minister, I shall withdraw. It is undoubtedly true that there is some doubt about the Court of Human Rights and courts martial. I believe I am right in saying that the Navy has suspended all courts martial because the judges in them are naval officers in uniform. That is considered unfair. I do not know when any miscarriage of justice has been carried out since Admiral Byng, but this is the thought.
The discipline that we see is at present different in all three services. The Minister will not be surprised to hear me say that, as I have been chasing him, the noble Baroness, Lady Symons, and the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, before them, to ask what on earth is happening about the tri-service discipline Act that we were led to believe we would get. It has certainly been discussed in the Ministry of Defence since 1991, and I believe that it was discussed a good deal earlier than that.
A tri-service Act is absolutely essential with the jointery—my apologies to the noble Lord, Lord Redesdale—that we have seen among the services, and the operations carried out by people in different services who may have different discipline. That cannot be allowed to continue. I ask the Minister that very urgent steps be put in hand to put a tri-service discipline Act before your Lordships and another place.
It is ironic, given the length of time that has been taken, that the White Paper talks about a new initiative for joint service discipline. Generally, I would not like to insinuate that the Armed Forces are not disciplined; they are, much more so than the Americans or the Israelis. However, we need to be sure that the men whom we send into action are both disciplined and fit.
4.32 p.m.
Lord Craig of Radley: My Lords, it is a pleasure to see the noble Lord, Lord Burnham, in his place, and I am delighted to follow him.
Twenty-four hours before the defence White Paper was published, the Chancellor of the Exchequer said in the other place:
- "British inflation has been at its lowest for 30 years; interest rates are their lowest since 1955 . . . economic growth in this country is now strengthening . . . In a world downturn, Britain has achieved growth with low inflation and with high employment".—[Official Report, Commons, 10/12/03; col. 1061.]
The Treasury approach seems to be that the Armed Forces have consistently and magnificently achieved good results. The Cold War was won. When faced with the totally unprepared-for invasion of the Falkland Islands, the services surmounted incredible difficulties and succeeded in recovering the islands with some severe losses of ships to air attack but, mercifully, relatively little loss of life. More recently in the Balkans, Afghanistan and now Iraq, and in lesser numbers elsewhere, our services, alone or in conjunction with allies, have met all tasks and challenges. As Mr Hoon says in his foreword to the White Paper,
- "the UK's Armed Forces have consistently risen to the challenges set them, continuing a military tradition of which the whole nation can be proud".
On the other side of the Treasury's defence balance sheet are the frequent, almost yearly, adverse reports of the National Audit Office and others into waste and poor procurement practices by the MoD. The outrageous delays and cost overruns in getting Eurofighter/Typhoon into Royal Air Force service is a prime example. That and the other many failed procurement fixes in the past 40 or more years do not say much for smart procurement.
There has to be some recognition of the Treasury view that, given better housekeeping and management by the MoD, areas where the shoe is pinching in the defence budget could be helped without dipping further into the nation's resources. So what new thinking has emerged from the MoD's latest work? More resources are clearly not expected.
The White Paper combines to be both opaque and startlingly novel. It is opaque about what will actually be the out-turn for the size and shape of the three services. A series of revelations in the course of this year is promised. One came last week with the announcement that four Type 42 destroyers, the backbone of the fleet's air defence capability, will be mothballed. When the decision to withdraw air defence Sea Harriers was announced in 2002, noble Lords were assured that the fleet would have adequate air defence because of its Type 42s. Now the Royal Navy is going to be in even worse straits if attacked from the air. What more risks must we ask our servicemen and women to endure? Are the lessons of the Falklands conflict, when the fleet air defence was inadequate and half a dozen ships were sunk in as many days by enemy aircraft operating at extreme range from their bases, all forgotten?
The novel aspect was the statement that the Government do not expect to become involved in medium or large-scale operations without the United States. Given the pressures that the US so often places on the UK to participate with it, does that mean that we shall always be playing second fiddle to US foreign and defence objectives? While the government of the day may well wish to work with the United States government, is it really the case that, if faced with a problem of critical importance to the United Kingdom but not so viewed by the United States, such as the Falklands, the Government will not prepare for or be able to deal with it by military force? What valuable intelligence for a potential enemy.
Nevertheless, I welcome the White Paper's endorsement of participation with United States forces, particularly in the air. I shall quote from an interesting story among the lessons of Iraq, which reads:
- "Eight thousand miles away and ten time zones to the west, a US Air Force captain was remotely operating a Predator UAV"—
- "in the skies over Tikrit . . . The UAV's sensors were searching the ground for signs of Iraqi activity and sending the imagery via satellite back to the continental US. Ordering the Predator to zoom in on a suspicious object, the captain quickly identified an Iraqi SA-2 SAM system that had moved into a position from which it would be able to threaten friendly coalition aircraft".
Moments later, the Predator's laser designator was switched on to illuminate the SA-2 and guide the bomb to its destination. The Tornado crew watched their target take a catastrophic direct hit. After topping up their fuel from a VC-10 tanker aircraft, the Tornadoes returned to their holding orbit to await their next task. By any measure, that was a fine and by no means unique example of inter-service and international joined-up operations.
An Iraqi staff officer reported after the conflict that the Republican Guard divisions were essentially destroyed by air strikes when still 30 miles from their destinations. The Iraqi will to fight was broken from the air outside Baghdad. The contribution of air power as the arm of first choice for governments and its ability to hit hard—or the possibility of being hit hard by an enemy if our own air defences are inadequate—is an all-important lesson.
While air power played a key role in fighting and winning the war, it falls mainly to ground forces in large numbers to cope with the post-hostilities phase. Only last week the Prime Minister and other senior Ministers were predicting that substantial British Armed Forces will be in Iraq until 2005 or even longer. That concerns me, as it does other noble Lords, because of the numbers of ground and other forces and equipment that will be required to sustain our presence by roulement.
It seems also to contradict the view in Essay 1 where, following our early involvement we,
- "would expect to play a lesser part in enduring operations where many other countries can contribute".
Servicemen and women are the essential element to make all this work. Their motivation and commitment are essential. Therefore, soon after they have been under very great pressure is surely not the time to start cutting back people and equipment required to carry out demanding operational and continuing peacetime tasks.
Given the fine words of the Chancellor on 10 December the forces will feel demoralised and aghast by a whole series of cut announcements. Without reassurance of government support at all levels, retention, reserves and even recruitment will be hit. Commitments would then have to be curtailed even further or the Government will run the risk of some military catastrophe that should not have been allowed to happen.
Finally, I noted the content of the Written Statement of 6 January by the noble Lord, Lord Bach. It reports the implications of the ECHR judgments on two appeals by servicemen who were tried and convicted by their service courts martial. Their sentences were upheld by their service reviewing authorities and their appeals to the courts martial appeals court were unsuccessful. In the case of the naval accused, the European Court ruled that there had been a violation of Article 6.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights because his court martial
used serving naval officers. The court judged that this did not provide a sufficiently strong guarantee of the independence of naval courts martial. When the Human Rights Bill was in Committee in February 1998, in answer to concerns which I and other noble Lords had raised about the impact of the Bill on the Armed Forces, the then noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said:
- "I urge your Lordships to be of the view that the convention is a flexible instrument. It poses no threat to the effectiveness of the Armed Forces".—[Official Report, 5/2/98; col.768.]
The continuous erosion of longstanding and well understood arrangements for service discipline, of which this ruling about naval courts martial is but a further example, is most unhelpful and damaging to the essential trust and respect that must underpin the relationship between those in authority and those they command in the three Armed Forces. Once again, the assurance that the human rights convention poses no threat to the effectiveness of the Armed Forces is seen to be false.
4.43 p.m.
Baroness Dean of Thornton-le-Fylde: My Lords, I, too, welcome the opportunity to take part in the debate. As noble Lords have said, we sadly miss my noble friend Lord Hardy of Wath—Peter, as we all knew him.
Had this debate taken place this morning, I should have had to declare an interest as chairman of the Armed Forces Pay Review Body. Since I signed off the report at lunchtime today, I have a freedom which I should not otherwise have had. Perhaps I am a "has been"; I do not know.
I do not want to talk about the number of ships or planes but about the personnel who operate those ships, planes and tanks and who take part in the infantry. Every year seven colleagues on the Armed Forces Pay Review Body and myself were able to meet in groups of 10 or 12 about 3,000 personnel in the three services. We talked to them without their superior officers present and obtained a clear view of how they felt about service life.
Whenever there is a debate in this House or another place everyone refers to the professionalism of the UK Armed Forces: that they are the best in the world and how proud we are of them. Those statements are absolutely correct. However, in some areas they are wearing thin. When visiting Kabul in Afghanistan the year before last, I was at a meeting with about 12 young soldiers from the Anglians, two of whom were just 18, straight out of training and into an operational situation in Afghanistan. In the middle of the meeting there was thought to be a rocket attack on the building we were in. I was proud of the way in which the soldiers, including the 18 year-olds, reacted. I believe that it could not have happened without the wonderful training that the Armed Forces give those young people.
That belief was reinforced when I went to Harrogate and met 16 and 17 year-olds who, for the first time in the lives of many of them, had an investment in them
and care and support for them which they had not experienced in their family lives. There is no doubt that the training they receive is first class. Following that training, the responsibility they are given at such a young age would never be given in private industry in Britain. So we are right to be proud of our services. But it is no good saying that we are proud of them. We have to back it up by putting our money where our mouths are.While in Kabul, I also had meetings with General McColl who was highly regarded by the people there, whether young soldiers or some of the civilian population. He demonstrated the best of British leadership in the British Armed Forces. I do not refer just to the soldiering that they undertake but to the sensitive dealing with quite threatening situations by young solders of 18 and 19 in the Balkans conflict. Without wearing tin hats or body armour, they dealt sensitively with traumatised members of the population. Often they were young women who had been even more than traumatised and were not wanted by their own community.
In the early 1990s John Major appointed me as a trades union member of the Armed Forces Pay Review Body. There is no doubt that pay was then the number one issue. It is still an issue as it is for anyone who works to earn money. We could always pay people better. We commissioned a survey of 11 peer countries on the overall remuneration package over a career. Britain can, rightly, be proud of its reputation. We come in the top three with regard to every measure in the overall remuneration package. Current pension changes are a concern. Armed Forces need stability and certainty about their lives.
However, the concern expressed this year at every meeting relates to overstretch. The word is used a great deal but it pervades much of the Armed Forces life. Chapter 1 of the White Paper refers to, "more numerous crises", a "wider range", and "frequency and duration" of conflict than were envisaged in the Strategic Defence Review of 1998. I agree with that assessment which was confirmed during our visit.
When considering the recent conflict in Iraq, we mobilised more Armed Forces in a shorter time than in the Gulf War a decade earlier, alongside Operation FRESCO where 19,000 personnel were committed to cover for the fire-fighters' dispute. The White Paper refers to the impact of that on training. But overstretch affects family life. Leave with one's family is cancelled and other issues are involved. For instance, "You have a promotion, but you must miss your leave to take it. If you do not, you will lose your chance of promotion and not have the opportunity of using the training already taken".
The Secretary of State, in an interview in December, said that the average period between tours was 10 months as opposed to the 24 months laid down in the Strategic Defence Review. We know people who have experienced a shorter period between tours. All that comes down to the issue of overstretch. To the Armed Forces, Operation TELIC stood for "Tell everyone leave is cancelled" and they were right.
Every year, the review body conducts a survey on lost leave and hours of work. Until the past two years, the trend had been positive, but it then began to creep back up to the level at which it stood some years ago. That is concerning, but the reason is obvious. Service personnel in a conflict expect to work long hours—frankly, what else is there to do when you are in the middle of a desert in Iraq?—but the average hours worked annually by the forces in Northern Ireland are much longer than those of the civilian population.
The White Paper contained a document called the "essays" and I am particularly interested in Essay 5. It stated that a plan would be in place by April this year. Will we have an opportunity to debate that plan when it is drawn up? I would welcome that. I hope that it contains a section dealing with defence medical services, too. Great efforts are being made to improve them, but there must be a long-term plan with year-on-year improvement.
Recruitment in the Armed Forces has greatly improved, which is to be congratulated. Last year, more than 26,000 personnel were recruited against a target of 25,000. But having got them in, we need to ensure that they have a modern contract or compact—an overall term of engagement—with the nation. On that, I particularly welcome the White Paper. In many respects, the understanding has not kept pace with how their equivalents in civvy street see their employment and career opportunities. My noble friend Lord Clark mentioned flexibility, but I see it in a different way. People want control over their own lives and contracts and they want choices. Difficult as it is, the Armed Forces must move towards that understanding.
Separation from families is also a difficult area. When I went to Iraq in June, the welfare package was more advanced than it had been the previous year in Afghanistan. The MoD and the Armed Forces are getting much better in that. I accept that the nearness to the UK, the terrain and the environment in Iraq were different, so we would expect it to be better, but it was better. I sincerely believe that the welfare package and the understanding of the arrangements for families has risen up their priority agenda.
I welcome the White Paper and the opportunity to discuss these issues. I welcome the progress that has been made, but there is still a long way to go. I return to where I began: everyone says that we want UK Armed Forces to be proud of. That is a two-way stretch. We can be proud of them, but they need to believe that we share a concern and that we will resource them properly. Many improvements have been made, but the elastic has stretched too far. If we are to maintain our commitments—and we have over-committed—it is essential that the Armed Forces have the resources to back them up. Yes, improvements need to be made, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, said. Yes, there might be a view that no matter how much money is poured into the MoD it will spend it and want more. The blunt fact is that we must ensure that the Armed Forces have the resources they need to carry out the job we expect of them.
4.55 p.m.
Lord Luke: My Lords, first, I want to associate myself with the remarks made by the Minister and other noble Lords concerning the late Lord Hardy of Wath. He was an excellent chairman of the House of Lords Defence Study Group and a very nice man who I was proud to count as a good friend.
As has been emphasised in several excellent speeches in this timely debate, including that of my noble friend Lord Vivian, and in the media, the Defence White Paper is long on policy objectives—mostly welcome on this side of the House—but extremely short on detail. However, if leaks and gossip are to be believed—and I would like the Minister to confirm or deny them—the Armed Forces plan to accelerate the retirement of four destroyers; to accelerate the demise of two of the three Invincible-class carriers before their time; and the already announced deplorable departure of the Sea-Harrier jump-jets which play such a vital role in defending the fleet. If these are true, there will be a potentially dangerous series of gaps in the Navy's ability safely to carry out its present and ongoing remit in the next 10 years or so.
I shall now limit my questions and remarks to the two projected aircraft carriers. Am I right in the belief that they are to be called "Queen Elizabeth" and "Prince of Wales"? That sounds entirely appropriate and I hope that it is the case.
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