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Lord Bach: My Lords, the noble Lord is right, as usual.
Lord Luke: My Lords, I am grateful indeed to the Minister for that confirmation. When the project to build these carriers as replacements for the Invincibles was announced, I, like I suspect many of your Lordships, was delighted. However, I wondered even then whether there might be problems with funding and we might find ourselves with only one or even none. I also wondered where they might be built. Well, it appears that we are going to get two carriers—I am delighted—and that they will be built in Britain—and I am even more delighted. The tripartite arrangement between BAE/Thales and the MoD should make for the best of all worlds, provided—and it is a big "provided"—that it works in practice. Is it working as the Minister would wish? Is there a fully integrated management team to run the project?
Can the Minister comment on the various rather dispiriting reports concerning the budget for building these ships? Is it true that whereas the MoD has allocated some £2.8 billion for the construction, the contractors have said that the figure should be more like £4 billion in order to achieve the specification laid down? It has even been suggested that to meet the shortfall the Type 45 destroyer and Astute submarine programmes will be drastically cut. If that happens, would it not seriously affect the protection available for the carrier battle group when it deploys? Who can tell whether a future opponent might have some viable submarines or missiles? Remember the Falklands.
Another solution suggested has been to cut the size of the carriers. This would surely mean that fewer combat aircraft could be carried and it would not be possible to deploy fixed-wing aircraft to scout well ahead of the fleet to give the earliest possible warning of incoming attacks. And it might not be possible to use either ship as a proper floating command and control centre at sea. I understand that there are doubts as to whether the American STOL version of the joint-strike fighter will be ready on time, so it would seem to be essential to provide for the capability to deploy conventional versions of the fighter which it is planned to build and which may be ready earlier. If that is the case, might that not open up the possibility of co-operation with France on its projected new carrier—hence possible cost-sharing, which I am sure would be welcome? What type of engines are envisioned for the carriers? Are we considering nuclear power, as used most successfully by the French and United States carriers? There is also the question of stability. A 60,000 tonne vessel is surely much more efficient at launching and recovering aircraft in rough weather than one of 50,000 or 40,000 tonnes.
Can the Minister assure us that the March deadline for agreeing the production contract is still in place, or has it slipped to June, as suggested in the media? We know where they will be built in Britain, in four different shipyards, and that they will be constructed in individual large blocks that will be shipped on barges to the site for final assembly. Can the Minister assure us that that procedure is both practical and cost-efficient?
Will there be any spare space built into the design of those ships? After all, they will not come on-stream until 2012 and 2015—is that correct?—with a life expectancy of at least 30 years, probably. Surely it is most likely that future advances in technology will require accommodation within the hull of the ship, with little extra cost at the planning stage. As the battle fleet will consist of only two capital ships, rather than the present three, all except major repairs and maintenance will surely have to be carried out at sea when operations are ongoing. In which case, will there not be a requirement for extra Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships to provide on-station engineering facilities?
We have a tradition in this country of being immensely proud of our great ships. The two aircraft carriers are the first proper capital ships to be built in and for this country for more than 50 years. Let us hope that they will be built to be fully capable of doing what the Navy requires. If that turns out to be the case, we shall have ample reason to be enormously proud on the day that they first sail into Portsmouth harbour.
5.2 p.m.
Lord Bramall: My Lords, I want to express my admiration to the noble Baroness the Leader of the House and to the Minister for this early defence debate—and not even on a Friday. That is very gratifying. Its purpose is to discuss the Government's plans, as set out in the latest White Paper, for the
future of our Armed Forces, to which the whole country manifestly owes so much—as so many noble Lords have already said, and as the right honourable gentleman the Prime Minister emphasised when he was in Basra.It was therefore to be hoped—and certainly what the Armed Forces deserve—that there would be a clearly stated intention to match resources to current and likely future commitments, such as probably having to keep troops in Iraq until 2006, and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Dean, said in her marvellous speech, to put right the chronic weaknesses of manning overstretch and, in a few cases but significant respects, equipment shortages.
Sadly, we are presented instead with a document that is long-winded, repetitive and, as the noble Lord, Lord Luke, said, strong on lofty sentiments and virtuous expressions of intent but singularly ill-defined in detail on how those worthy aspirations are to be achieved.
Of course, there are some good things to report on both the capability and performance of our forces, and some sound, if transparently obvious, things to say about the combat and security scenarios and challenges that our forces may face in future. But many of those things are pretty old hat and merely reflect the direction in which our Armed Forces have been moving during the past 20 years.
No—and this is my main criticism—the White Paper represents more an elaborate distraction from the real problems that beset the services, especially from the impending Treasury cuts that are undoubtedly in the wind. In fact, its main purpose seems to be to create a plausible rationale for why certain reductions could be made within a coherent policy, irrespective of the fact that some of them would be damaging to the morale and effectiveness of the Armed Forces, and therefore not in the national interest.
To do that, the White Paper champions at least three illusions or fallacies. First, although, perhaps understandably, not mentioned in the text, but made great play of by Ministers when defending their policy, is that for the first time in about 17 years, the defence budget is actually being marginally increased in real terms during the current three-year period. Incidentally, without that expectation, the Armed Forces would not have been able to deploy for war in Iraq as effectively as they did. But that is largely an illusion.
I suggest to the Minister—he can deny it hotly if I am wrong—that those boasted-about increases are in fact being off-set, and more than off-set, by the money that the Treasury now wants back from the Ministry of Defence because of the new accounting system. That accounting system was forced on the department by the Treasury and is working greatly to its disadvantage because of the large number of expensive pieces of capital equipment on the defence books. That is a clear case of moving the goal posts. In reality, therefore there will be a lower, not a higher, cash flow on which to draw and virtually every vote holder will once again be compelled to do so much, if not more, with less. Hence the injunction to find savings.
The first fallacy centres on the first of two potentially damaging phrases that are given prominence in the White Paper. That is;
- "the requirement for our Forces to be structured and equipped to deploy rapidly for small and medium scale operations".
- "capable of reconfiguring at a longer notice for the less frequent, yet more demanding, large scale operations".
Even allowing for the premise of longer notice—although deployment in both Gulf Wars and other campaigns had to be at short notice, once political decisions had been made—and ignoring the fact that even medium-scale operations require heavy armour and fully mechanised armoured personnel carriers both for protection and to dominate the opposition, such a deferred reconfiguration makes absolutely no allowance for regular unit and formation training in the operational role with equipment similar to that to be used in war. That could have serious repercussions.
The second fallacy is based on a second damaging statement—again highlighted as especially significant. It states:
- "The focussing of our planning should be on the military effects we require of our Armed Forces"—
- "rather than on simple calculations on platforms and unit numbers".
Such a policy might have some substance if warfare was always to be of short duration and involve no lengthy aftermath. However, recent events have confirmed that it is invariably easier to get into a conflict than to get out of one; and that to win the peace properly requires troops on the ground for a considerable period, with even more troops, ships and aircraft in the background to help relieve them to sustain the commitment.
No, figuration or configuration of the forces is not the problem. The problem is manning—now and in future—and the stretch to which that manning contributes. Go around any units in the field and that message comes through loud and clear—the noble Baroness has done this; I am sure she has received the same message. The order of battle, which was established by the admirable, albeit progressively underfunded, Strategic Defence Review, has served the country well. It has enable the Armed Forces to move swiftly and easily from internal security, through peacekeeping and peace enforcement, to low-intensity operations and finally to high-intensity warfare. It has not fallen down on rapid deployment for any of those situations. At the same time—this is important—it has provided a proper roulement so that the operational formations have time for unit and formation training, which are so essential for a proper war-fighting capability. However, even that deployable strength has not been able to produce a reasonable interval
between operation and training tours away from the home base and families. This is not therefore the time to abandon that order of battle but to strengthen it and to see that it works properly in respect of stretch as well as operations and training.I am not saying that combat units, particularly infantry, cannot be reorganised to give stronger, more battle-ready and more homogeneous units within a broader regimental system, which would save on overheads and movement costs and facilitate regimental homes where families could base themselves and put down roots. But I am saying that, generally speaking, the current order of battle should be maintained. If there are any areas where force levels can come down—most of those are still problematical—they should provide an opportunity, not to disband units and thus prolong over-stretch, but to use the manpower saved to improve the situation. The proven size of the British Army—if it goes much lower it could well lose its critical mass—should not, in these dangerous times, be sacrificed on the wings of still-to-be-proven emerging technology, important adjunct as that may prove to be one day, or the invariably parsimonious attitude of the Treasury.
This Government have tried to do their best for the Armed Forces, but they unnecessarily mucked about with the Territorial Army, our best and most important reserve, which is essential both for the strengthening of the regulars and for dealing with any terrorist threat to the country. It is still too small and being too restricted on training, as the noble Lord said. There are also still gaps in the equipment programme, particularly in communications, especially ground-to-air equipment. In Iraq, our land forces were able to operate effectively with vital air power only by being able to use the ground-air communications of the United States Marine Corps.
The accommodation of our men and women leaves much to be desired. It must be put right if people, to which the White Paper continually refers, are to be properly motivated, retained and receptive to the flesh-and-blood leadership. That leadership now comes more from leaders in the field—commanding officers and the high morale that they can induce—than from vague policies and theories hatched in what the White Paper pleases to call, rather incongruously, the head office.
In a world in which might still manifestly appears to be right, there must be no falling down on defence funding, which now represents such a marginal part of a growing gross national product—hardly 2 per cent. It is so necessary for the Armed Forces of this country—one of its most priceless assets and the most cost-effective means of punching our weight and exercising influence in this dangerous world.
Perhaps it would not be a bad idea—to use a historical analogy from 1900, when what seemed a comprehensive victory then developed into an ongoing struggle—if the next election were a khaki election and perhaps won by those seen to be supporting the Armed Forces, as they deserve, and keeping them in proper working order, at home and abroad, for the very dangerous years that lie ahead.
5.14 p.m.
Lord Lyell: My Lords, it is a privilege to follow the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, which I have had the chance to do once or twice previously. I thank the Minister, and his colleagues, for presenting us with this White Paper. I add my tributes to my former chairman Lord Hardy of Wath, as I am the secretary of the House of Lords Defence Study Group, to whose activities I may refer later. I hope that the Minister will pass on the defence group's thanks to the officer—previously Dr Moonie but now Mr Caplin—who organised and gave enormous assistance to us. I also thank my colleagues who take part in the group's visits, notably, the noble Lords, Lord Rogan, Lord Luke and Lord Brougham and Vaux, who cannot be with us today, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Sharp and Lady Strange, to whom I may refer later.
The most notable speech among the glittering array today was that of the noble Baroness, Lady Dean, who made most of my speech for me. I commented earlier this week, not so much about the hardware, which we could discuss all night, but about the people. To somebody with a young and enquiring mind, as I have been described, despite being well into my seventh decade, I could go on about joint-strike fighters, carriers, missiles, weapons and every kind of equipment. But, as the noble Baroness, Lady Dean, said, we are all concerned about the people.
It is at this stage that I always ask whether the Minister and others will play bingo and open up the happy essays, on which I have commented. Will the Minister glance through paragraph 2 of supporting essay five, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Dean, referred—he need not reply to me today—which refers to the age and demographic pattern of the United Kingdom and the necessity of trying to recruit 26,000 people each year from a shrinking age group of recruitable people? I hope that that can be done. Paragraph 5.5 deals in depth with recruiting, as pointed out by my noble friend Lord Vivian, and refers to the shrinking pool of the population.
Paragraph 5.6 refers to retention. The first sentence states that the skills acquired in the Armed Forces are very marketable and that our personnel represent an attractive recruitment target to other employers. Will the Minister and the Government read that paragraph, which sums up the feelings of many noble Lords, including the noble Baroness, Lady Dean, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall?
Paragraph 5.20 refers to accommodation, to which the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, referred. I hope that it is improving—there is certainly a large amount of investment in it. However, when the noble Lords, Lord Luke and Lord Rogan, accompanied me to Colchester to visit the 16 Air Assault Brigade and the 3rd Battalion Parachute Regiment, some of the accommodation could only be described tactfully as lamentable. Other accommodation could do with improvement, but perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Rogan, and others might carry on with that.
During the past year the Defence Study Group made a number of visits—we do not just study and remain in your Lordships' House to look at glossy brochures. Noble Lords may be amazed that my noble friend Lord Murton of Linisfarne, on his 89th birthday, and 14 other noble Lords accompanied me on a visit to the 1st Battalion Scots Guards, my regiment and that of my noble friend Lord Burnham. It is fairly easily accessible. The commanding officer there accepted the message repeated today by my noble friend Lord Vivian, the noble Baroness, Lady Dean, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, and that will no doubt be repeated by many others: it is essential that we recruit and retain as many servicemen as possible, and that we make them happy and content. That is a continual battle that we hope the Minister and the Government will be able to continue to fight and to win.
During that visit we learned some very interesting facts in a briefing about pay. I shall not go into that today. However, there was one example of the overstretch. There was growing concern in that battalion—they are used to it; indeed these Guardsmen and these soldiers are flexible—but they had to carry out continual public duties, they were also having to watch as reserves for fire problems, and they were living in London when they had been told that in March 2003 they were to go to Munster, be retrained and take their place in the Army group. Certainly, they were to go to Munster. It had been delayed. The commanding officer advised me that they had not been able to train as a battalion for three whole years. Training is fine, you can train right up to battle group level, but to train as a regiment with all the accompanying equipment that we shall hear about is pretty necessary. Just for one battalion or one regiment not to have that for three years is a bit difficult.
We found that morale was enormously high, and if the noble Baroness, Lady Strange, has time, she might let your Lordships know exactly what we saw in the barrack room at left flank, 1st Battalion Scots Guards. She pointed it out to me, and it was an example of superb morale. During the year we also visited young recruits at the Royal Marines Training Centre at Lympstone, where we found everything that the noble Baroness, Lady Dean of Thornton-le-Fylde, had said. We found young men of 18, 19 and 20 extremely well motivated, well trained and keen to move on, but above all superbly supported by every one of their trainers.
We went on to RAF Benson, where we saw helicopters. My noble friend Lord Luke and the noble Lord, Lord Brett, came to Cyprus, where the morale of everyone was enormous. I hope the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, will appreciate that the words of praise spoken by everyone about RAF Akrotiri were still ringing in our ears when we got back and throughout the months afterwards. I hope that the Minister will take that on board.
One of the final visits was to Colchester, where there has been an enormously successful transition. I hope that I have it right that 16th (Air Assault) Brigade or
air mobile brigade are there. We also visited the 3rd Battalion the Parachute Regiment. It seems that this has been enormously successful.I conclude by coming back to the people: the men and women of our defence forces and the Armed Forces. I also remember that of the reserves we met in Cyprus, between 10 and 15 per cent of one of the regiments consisted of reservists. Of the first four to whom I spoke after they had received their Cyprus medals, three of them were reservists.
We look at these lovely, glossy brochures, the essays, the Defence Estimates, all these lovely things that are well produced, and are much appreciated from the Minister. As far as I am concerned, and I hope that your Lordships who float and those who fly will forgive me, but soldiering, and indeed all service life, is not always pretty. It can be harsh, it can be messy. My noble friend Lord Burnham referred to one or two notable people who had formed his career, such as Sergeant Major Lynch, who probably served with my father some 61 years ago. For me it was Drill Sergeant Clements of the Coldstream Guards, who we called Kiwi—a boot polish. He polished his boots, I do not know what else he did, but he certainly formed me and 16 other young men aged 18 into soldiers. Everything that I have seen this year, and other Members of your Lordships' group who have been around will confirm this, shows that the spirit of Drill Sergeant Clements and what he did for me is alive today. It is growing. It is because of people like him that the noble Baroness, Lady Dean of Thornton-le-Fylde, saw those 18 year-olds in Afghanistan who knew what to do in an emergency—they knew what Sergeant Clements told us was the "set drill". Their spirit is also alive today.
There are three, if not four, noble and gallant Lords to follow me, which is why I must sit down. I thank every one of those soldiers, servicemen and women all round the world who serve us: serving yesterday, serving today and serving tomorrow. I hope that the Minister will be able to confirm for us tonight with this White Paper that the Government will make sure that they are able to do their job not just now, but in 20 or 30 years' time, when we are no longer here.
5.24 p.m.
Baroness Strange: My Lords, we are all grateful to the Minister for initiating this debate on the White Paper and welcome with him the "Queen Elizabeth" and the "Prince of Wales". I add, with all noble Lords who have already spoken, my regrets for the loss of Lord Hardy of Wath, who not only headed the defence study group, but was a jolly member on so many visits and is so much missed by all of us, and by all the dogs, which he loved.
Like all those who have already spoken, I am enormously grateful to the gallant men and women of our services who defend us against assaults, who defy terrorism, and who work long, hard and unstintingly on behalf of others at Christmas and on all other holidays too. We are all proud of them, of their courage, professionalism, and all that they do to make
the world a better place for us all. As my noble friend Lord Lyell said, I was much impressed by our visit to the Scots Guards. There are forces deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Northern Ireland and other places. They are all suffering severely from overstretch, as so many noble Lords, particularly my noble and gallant friends Lord Bramall and Lord Craig of Radley and the noble Baroness, Lady Dean of Thornton-le-Fylde, and the noble Lord, Lord Redesdale, have already said.We all know that 24 months between front line unaccompanied tours is the absolute minimum. Now the average is between nine and 10 months, and with some specialised forces, such as the Royal Engineers or Queen Alexandra's Royal Army Nursing Corps, it is sometimes as little as two months.
One must ask why there is so much overstretch. The answer is simple: there are too many holes to fill, and too few people to plug them. We must either cut down on our commitments, which would be unfair to many people around the world who have come to rely on us, or we must employ more people.
I will speak about the Army, as my noble and gallant friend Lord Craig of Radley has already spoken so persuasively on the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. In 1992 we had far fewer commitments than we have now, yet we had 145,000 men in the Army. Today, we are precisely contained with 102,500 men. Why do we not have more men? Is it recruitment? This has been bad, certainly in Scotland with the disastrous attempt to employ a civilian agency for the job, when the numbers fell dramatically. This mismanaged attempt has fortunately now come to an end, and we are back to using the services as recruiters, with much more satisfactory results. Is it retention? Again, though not entirely, that seems to be flattening out.
It must simply be lack of cash. Why? One can only think that there must be some spider sitting in the centre of its web eating up all resources that come its way. Could this by any chance be the Treasury? Surely it would be more productive if people could be recruited from the dole to the armed services, so that they could lean a skill that would stand them in good stead in the future. I only know that as a taxpayer I would rather see my money spent on the services than on illegal immigrants, layabouts and bureaucracy.
There have recently been ill-founded rumours about the Scottish regiments. There are now only six Scottish infantry regiments: the Lowland regiments—the Royal Scots, the Royal Highland Fusiliers, the KOSBs—and the Highland regiments—the Highlanders, who are already an amalgamation of the Queen's Own and the Gordon Highlanders, the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the Black Watch. I checked and counter-checked and asked everyone I could think of, and I was happy to hear that the rumours were ill founded. We need every Scottish soldier and every Scottish regiment, including the cavalry and the Scots Guards.
I shall add a tiny, slightly self-indulgent footnote about my family connections with the Black Watch. A great-great-uncle served in it—or in the 42nd Highlanders, as
it then was—in the 19th century. As he was a keen ornithologist and had made a complete stuffed collection of all European birds, being himself a taxidermist, he hoped that his postings would send him on a migratory route—and they did.My husband's uncle, General Evans, won the VC while in the Black Watch, during the First World War. My father had a varied military career; he was also in the Black Watch. He began by driving an ambulance in France in 1917. In 1918, he was a cadet in the Grenadier Guards. He joined the Black Watch as a captain, in 1939, when he was put to guard the Forth and Clyde canal at Grangemouth. Feeling that the Germans were unlikely to mount an attack there, he returned home to farm and started the Megginch platoon of the Home Guard, in which he ended the war as sergeant major.
5.31 p.m.
Lord Rogan: My Lords, I am again grateful for the opportunity to pay tribute in the House to the professionalism and dexterity of our Armed Forces, in Iraq and in the other theatres of conflict in which we are engaged. I welcome the Government's defence White Paper, but I will draw the House's attention to a number of issues that must be addressed if its implementation is to equip our forces to engage successfully in combat and peacekeeping missions in the post-Cold War world.
My main concern about the Government's proposals is that they may leave our forces understaffed, undertrained and overstretched. We are all aware of the changing nature of conflict operations. Future military engagements are increasingly likely to be largely conducted from operational headquarters, at the expense of the front line. However, we must not let modern technology make us complacent. We must heed the lessons of our colonial past, in order to fulfil our foreign policy commitments, without repeating the errors of previous engagements. I refer, of course, to Iraq.
In 1920, a revolt in Iraq forced our government to install an administration that we had to support with force for 35 years. In the words of our commissioner in Iraq at the time:
- "The main problem facing the occupation authorities was lack of trained officials. Consequently, damaging mistakes were made and uprisings were common, especially in rural areas as the local population chafed under direct rule by European military administrators".
The warning signs are already there in Iraq. We must act to redress the situation and ensure that our forces are operationally equipped and supported to carry out their task to the best of their ability. By that I mean that our operational planning in such conflict areas must strike a balance between what I call the "micro"—the troops on the ground and their equipment—and the "macro"—the smart bombs and high-tech, sophisticated weaponry of modern war. We must ask ourselves whether we have enough manpower to remain in Iraq until 2006, while successfully fulfilling our other commitments around the world and the increasing demands on our Armed Forces for homeland security. We have been there before, and this time we must get it right. I fear that we will shortly have to face that problem.
On the issue of maintaining the competency required to succeed in our foreign policy goals, I draw the House's attention to the question of the aspirational six-month operational tour with a two-year gap in the force readiness cycle. With approximately 30 per cent of our land forces committed to operations, it is logistically impossible to maintain the cycle of training, operations, rest and recreation and then training. The pressure of that constant rotation has a detrimental effect on service family life.
On the other side of the picture, is it desirable to rotate soldiers on a six-month basis? In Iraq, our soldiers go to considerable lengths to familiarise themselves with the sensitivities of the locals and to promote our message in the post-Saddam era. They are moved on when they could be at their most effective. Iraq, like many other states where we have foreign policy commitments, is a diverse and heterogeneous society. Our troops need the correct training and length of service to fulfil our objectives.
I have considered the role of our men and women as soldiers, sailors and air force personnel. We must also think of them as husbands, fathers or wives. For them to perform at their best, we must ensure that we have the resources to enable them to have sufficient leave, while improving their families' living conditions at home. There is a lack of opportunities for R and R during the operational readiness cycle that must be redressed. As with many things in life, the solution is simple. Happy soldiers make more efficient soldiers, and we will achieve that by having more, not fewer, personnel.
Why do we have a manpower shortage? That question has been asked before in the House. With infantry battalions suffering from under-recruitment and those with new recruits having insufficient time to train them, why cannot the services fill those vacancies? More must be done to promote the military career in schools and universities, so that, once again, our young people find it an attractive option. Young people must be made aware that apprenticeships are available through the Armed Forces. For many, it is a platform on which to build a variety of future careers. Moreover, the problem of increasing numbers leaving the services after nine or 10 years must also be
addressed if we are to retain the experience and expertise on which modern armed forces thrive. Operation TELIC highlights some of the problems.This is the first time in 60 years that we have seen the compulsory mobilisation of our reserve forces. At the same time, we are reducing the Territorial Army. Such contradictory and short-sighted thinking will leave us without the resources to cope with the increasing security demands outlined in the defence White Paper.
The White Paper highlights the fundamental nature of our transatlantic alliance and the global threat presented by international terrorism and failing states. With such a policy, we will be in the front line of future conflicts and at the heart of the peacekeeping and stabilising operations that will follow. As such, it is equally fundamental that we are equipped for the tasks that we will face in this military sphere.
Finally, to meet our foreign policy commitments over the coming years we must harness new technologies, exploit our excellence in operational and logistical expertise, and modernise and develop our military forces in a fashion that matches the security threats facing us. To do that, we must remember that the end product of our foreign policy can match its aims only if we retain sufficient personnel to deliver our goals and ensure that our forces are fully trained and equipped to succeed in the field.
We have military experience gained from our previous operational successes in Northern Ireland, Afghanistan and elsewhere. We must preserve and build on that in order to play a leading role in our conflict regulation commitments and the future foreign policy ventures that the Government White Paper outlines.
5.40 p.m.
Baroness Cox: My Lords, as a civilian I speak with temerity. However, I spend much of my time in conflict zones that are relevant to aspects of the White Paper, including security environment, international terrorism and failing states. I shall refer to Indonesia, Sudan, Nigeria and North Korea, as well as touch on threats at home. The first three countries share a common theme; namely, bitter religious conflicts associated with the disturbing spread of militant Islamism in wars in which many moderate Muslims suffer alongside those of other faiths. I include North Korea as I was there recently with the noble Lord, Lord Alton. Britain's contribution to addressing that critical situation is greatly appreciated.
In Indonesia, Sudan and Nigeria, in total, millions have died in recent years and many more millions have been displaced by religious conflicts associated with militant Islamism, often funded internationally and supported by international jihad warriors. I emphasise that I do not wish to promote Islamophobia. In all those countries, the majority of Muslims live peaceably with their compatriots of other faiths. Many courageously oppose their militant Islamist co-religionists, such as those Muslims in Sudan fighting alongside Christians and traditional believers against the Islamist National Islamic Front regime or those in Indonesia who have
been attacked by Lasker jihad warriors for reconciliation initiatives with Christians. They share our concern about the spread of militant Islamism, which underlies many of the conflicts abroad and threats of terrorism here at home.Indonesia, Nigeria and Sudan have great strategic significance for the United Kingdom. All three are major exporters of oil with huge still untapped reserves. All control major sea lanes of communications—Indonesia controls the Strait of Maluku; Nigeria controls the West Africa corridor; and Sudan controls the Red Sea—which are of great importance to British and allied commerce. Although there are some hopeful developments in Sudan's peace process, there are still major unresolved problems, such as the continuing fighting in Darfur, the NIF's insistence on Sharia law, and the unresolved status of the marginalised regions, which may trigger further conflict and destabilisation.
Both Nigeria and Indonesia are currently containing conflicts associated with militant Islamism, but the situations are very precarious. In Nigeria, we were told by Muslim leaders in the north that they intend to expand the number of states subject to Sharia and, ultimately, to change the Nigerian constitution into an Islamic constitution, with very serious repercussions. In Indonesia, President Megawati is upholding a constitution which enshrines religious tolerance, but she faces challenges from militant leaders who wish to change that constitution to one more conducive to militant Islam.
The slide of those countries, potentially, into instability, further civil war and anarchy, and the spectre of take-over by terrorism-supporting jihadist regimes, threatens the stability of three regions of crucial significance for the UK. Therefore, Her Majesty's Government must take very seriously any signs of impending collapse caused by the rise of militant movements. The global situation indicates that the stability and the viability of a growing number of countries are threatened by militancy, radicalism and terrorism.
Britain, as a country with global strategic, political and economic interests, will be adversely affected because many British forces may find themselves involved in an increasing number of conflicts and crises, such as fighting terrorism and trying to prevent the collapse of states. Thus, it is imperative for Her Majesty's Government to ensure that our Armed Forces are adequately prepared for such intervention operations: that is, expanding and properly equipping the myriad of excellent special forces; increasing the military and intelligence communities' expertise on the special features of crises in developing countries; and preparing dedicated special forces teams for crisis management and interaction with local and indigenous forces.
The UK must also vastly expand its strategic mobility capabilities—both in the air and on the sea—to move forces and to sustain them in many distant corners of the world. The United Kingdom has traditionally had an excellent reputation in those fields among allies and foes alike. The current situation in
Iraq and Afghanistan proves that the participation of British forces is sought after because of their excellence, but there are not enough of them and their equipment is lacking. To meet the emerging challenges, it is imperative to increase these forces and to update their equipment.I turn briefly to some signs of hope in different parts of the world, with developments to be welcomed and encouraged. In Indonesia, reconciliation initiatives have brought some respite in Maluku, although Sulawesi is still troubled by conflict. Therefore, there is a need for efforts to promote further reconciliation. Last February, in Jakarta, I was pleased to help to establish the International Islamic Christian Organisation for Reconciliation and Reconstruction—with the much needed and more felicitous acronym of IICORR—with the former President Wahid as its honorary president. Perhaps I may express my gratitude, through the Minister, to the Foreign Office for supporting an IICORR conference to be held in London later this month.
North Korea is another area where there is a possible ray of hope. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, and I, having been robust critics of the widely reported violations of human rights there, returned from our visit with cautious optimism, believing that the time may have come to offer a helping hand if North Korea is beginning to try to embark on a process of glasnost. We therefore established the North Korea/United Kingdom parliamentary group as an arena for continuing dialogue and for raising continuing concerns.
We cannot ignore the situation on the Korean peninsula, if only because the UK has been a member of the UN command in Korea since the Korean War of the early 1950s. While Britain does not have significant forces in north Asia, the UK can still play a significant role in the current crisis, which could escalate into a regional and a nuclear war. Experts have identified that one of the key factors in the heightening of tension in this crisis is North Korea's lack of understanding of the West, particularly the United States.
Many agree that the only viable way out of the current crisis is through meaningful negotiations. But there can be no realistic negotiations when one side—North Korea—has difficulties grasping the overall strategic position because of its prolonged isolation. While the United States has virtually no contacts and communications with North Korea, the United Kingdom has full diplomatic relations. Therefore, one of the key contributions that Britain can make to defusing the crisis on the Korean peninsula is to help the leaders in Pyongyang to adopt pragmatic negotiation positions. Although that point might seem unrelated to the defence White Paper, it is relevant because failure of the current negotiations involving the United States and North Korea could cause the eruption of a regional war likely to include the use of weapons of mass destruction, and Britain has treaty obligations to participate in such a war.
The overarching issue is the threat posed by North Korea's escalation of its nuclear programme. All the government representatives that we met in Pyongyang,
including the President of the Praesidium, emphasised a willingness to begin a process of denuclearisation if they could receive two assurances; that is, first, a promise of no pre-emptive first strike by the United States; and, secondly, respect by the international community for peaceful coexistence of two systems within one country. I therefore ask the Minister whether Her Majesty's Government might be able to provide some such reassurances, as appropriate.Before I conclude, perhaps I may raise one final concern that I have identified on many previous occasions, but to which, as yet, I have received no reply. I refer to the danger of Islamist penetration of key military and strategic institutions in the United Kingdom. One instance involves the employment of firms with responsibility for the installation of security surveillance systems in sensitive establishments. For example, I referred previously to a man who has been a significant shareholder in the firms IEDS and Protech; he is the owner of the Al Shifa plant in Khartoum, and has presumably been closely associated with the National Islamic Front regime which has Al'Qaeda sympathisers among its top leadership. Those firms provided security surveillance to British Army and other Ministry of Defence establishments, as well as our nuclear installations at Dounreay and Sellafield, British Airways and the Houses of Parliament. Could the Minister reassure the House that there is no danger of financial penetration by Islamists in those and other institutions of key military and strategic significance?
In conclusion, I should like to add my tribute to all that has been said in the debate so far on all that has been achieved by our Armed Forces in recent years in Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and, as the Prime Minister recently made clear, in Basra, Iraq. But success is not a recipe for retraction; rather it is an indication of the need for enhancement to fulfil the roles outlined in the White Paper—deterrence, prevention, containment and protection.
Much has been achieved with present capabilities, but there are concerns over many of the proposed reductions. I hope that the Minister will reassure your Lordships that our Armed Forces are and will be fully equipped in every aspect so that they can continue to serve our country, and many peoples around the world, with the professionalism and the commitment for which they are deservedly renowned.
5.51 p.m.
Lord Vincent of Coleshill: My Lords, sometimes there is an understandable perception in defence debates that the same points are being made again and again by succeeding speakers. In one sense that can give the impression that there is not much else to say; but in another, it can indicate more widely held and growing concerns on the same important issues, which I believe is the case today.
I have little to say about the defence White Paper itself. It is a broad, high-level analysis of the changing strategic environment in which our Armed Forces are operating today and will have to operate in the future, including the lessons learnt from recent operations.
Given that many of the weapons systems and equipment still in service today are legacies of the Cold War, and that emerging science and technology have a significant influence on our future systems and the way in which they are employed in operations, it would be surprising if such a White Paper did not, at this time, point to the need for further changes. But the real challenge here is delivering those changes in an efficient and timely manner through a clear, well structured and adequately resourced implementation plan, of which there is little sign in this White Paper.
Changes on this scale can be extremely costly and disruptive at a time when members of our Armed Forces, as has been said repeatedly in this debate, relative to their numbers, have been more heavily committed to operations and to non-military duties such as fire fighting than they have for many years—a point made clearly and convincingly by the noble Baroness, Lady Dean, and many others. Nor, once the war fighting phase of an operation has been concluded satisfactorily, are new, so-called "network-enabling" capabilities any substitute for significant numbers of servicemen and women supporting the civil authorities in maintaining law and order and, where needed, dealing with much more violent and life-threatening incidents.
Our experiences in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and now Iraq show how long and demanding some of those post-operational commitments can be. As I said in one of our debates on Iraq before the operation itself started last year, it is all too easy to
- "win the war and lose the peace",
Nor should we underestimate the enormous challenges to be faced in re-aligning our future weapons and equipment programmes to meet the changing needs identified in this White Paper. For example, the operational capabilities of the Eurofighter, Typhoon, and the numbers required, were originally defined in the Cold War, when there was a significant air threat posed by the then Soviet Union both to this country and in the wider context of possible NATO operations. Today that threat has effectively gone.
Given that each Eurofighter is set to cost nearly £57 million and the overall programme some £20 billion, is that priority to be changed? If so, how is that to be agreed with the other nations concerned with the project, and then refunded realistically in our revised equipment programmes? I ask that not in any way to play down the significance of air power but as one example of the scale and complexity and the potential cost implications of the decisions that lie ahead in implementing the outcome of this White Paper efficiently.
But my greater concern is how the over-committed men and women in today's Armed Forces are going to come out of all this, given the widespread perception
that defence as a whole is under increasing financial pressure in real terms. That question was raised by my noble and gallant friend Lord Guthrie in the debate on the Queen's Speech and was never answered.Unlike any other profession, members of the Armed Forces have no choice on where and when they will be committed to operations and to putting their lives at risk. Apart from the increasingly longer periods of separation from their families which are occurring today, in many cases they are unable to catch up on important training, some of which can bear upon their qualifications for further promotion as well as their readiness for future operations. My main question on the White Paper, therefore, is whether it has been measured against a realistic plan for its practical implementation and not least with adequate resources to fund it effectively.
Supporting Essay No. 6 to the White Paper refers to a series of,
- "Departmental Objectives, supported by a number of targets, which are embedded in the Department's Public Service Agreement with the Treasury".
Does that so-called agreement include a clear definition of the changes now needed to implement the new strategic priorities broadly identified in the White Paper, together with the resources required to implement them effectively? If so, can the Minister tell us about that in more detail? Without that greater transparency there will be increasing and justifiable concern that, in the face of growing resource pressures, this broadly drafted White Paper will merely provide a basis for haphazard and ill considered cuts because there is no comprehensive and visible blueprint agreed with the Treasury against which those priorities for change and their affordability can be defined and measured more effectively.
6 p.m.
Lord Selsdon: My Lords, it is always a privilege to listen to your Lordships in defence debates. Not only do you learn a little about military matters, you learn other things as well. The noble Baroness, Lady Strange, reminded me of the great pleasure it was to listen to Lord Hardy talking about wildlife and birds. Had he been here today I would have wanted to ask him whether it is true that mobile telephones are having an adverse effect on racing pigeons—they lose their way—and on the migratory patterns of birds. However, in future I shall ask those questions of the noble Lord, Lord Whitty.
We have before us an essay—to employ the Freudian slip uttered by my noble friend Lord Lyell. It is quite good, although a few things are wrong. I thought for a moment that on page 19 the Union Jack had been photographed upside-down. I expected Mrs Thatcher's head to pop up behind the flag. Reference was made to "UK forces". I think that we should call them "British" forces because that word carries a good deal of weight around the world. Although it is a good essay, if I had written it for one of my tutors, he would have queried my objective in doing so. Violins play in it at certain moments, but the questions are: who are the enemies, where are they and what are we going to do about them?
Those questions are difficult. The paper contains 11 mentions of proliferation of terrorism or weapons of mass destruction. I want to ask only one question, a point that I have raised in the past with the noble Baroness, Lady Symons. I would much appreciate it if someone in the ministry could write me an essay which stated what are considered, these days, to be weapons of mass destruction and what are the antidotes to them?
During the First World War my grandfather was director of the restriction of enemy supply. When we introduce "fear words"—I have said before that terrorism is government by fear—we create fear which may not be necessary. I assume that, these days, our enemies are politicians, and that is because usually it is a political decision that leads to a conflict or troubles between tribes. Often I have to see us as others do because in my life I have unfortunately been condemned to travel among the more difficult and rogue states of the world. When talking recently with some Cuban friends, I asked, "Do you realise that you would not have gone to war with Iraq if Clinton had not sent that boy back to Cuba?". The Cuban vote would have gone the other way and we would have had a different form of government in the United States.
Looking at our relationships with different people today, more often than not we realise that we have to anticipate what kind of political decisions will be made by whom, where and when, which can lead to conflict. To state that our Armed Forces are a force for good is to go one better than to have an "ethical foreign policy", but having read this paper, this essay, I am not quite sure where we are going. There seems to be an element of camouflage within it. Usually in this kind of debate we have a Minister sitting alone, nodding as he realises that every noble Lord is asking for more expenditure while the Treasury is seeking less.
However, in this case, we do not necessarily need more expenditure. If we analyse what our Armed Forces are required to do, it boils down to certain individual requirements: they have to be everything from undertakers to firemen to preachers. It does not matter; they are there.
I was brought up to understand that we are three to one. Thus, although the United States has six times as many armed regular soldiers, sailors and airmen as us, if we are three to one, it is not quite such a big gap. If the rest of NATO has 12 times as many as us, those forces are not even as good as those of the United States, so it is not such a big gap. And if the rest of the Commonwealth has 12 times as many, that is our alliance.
Let us look at where our alliances lie these days. Of course one is with the United States, although occasionally it goes off and invades places like Grenada without actually asking us, even though the ODA was on the ground. Just after I joined the navy, the US objected to the French and British co-operating in Suez. However, it also goes off to do certain things on its own, such as with the Contras or in Iran. We then have to sort things out and wash the dirty linen.
I have friends in those rogue states. I do not want the House to think that I am a rogue Peer; it just so happens that I have spent much of my time in the Middle East and eastern Europe. The break-up of the Soviet Union led to problems in other countries in which the Soviet Union had had influence. As that influence waned, chaos ensued. Let us look even at India and Pakistan. The Soviets provided India with tanks while the West provided them to Pakistan. Yet the armies of those two countries are among the greatest in the world—and many of their soldiers were trained by the British.
I would suggest that our problems lie not with the equipment, but with our people. Perhaps we should look at those forces which are made up of people who are our allies: NATO, the EU and, above all, the Commonwealth. If we are looking for excuses to attack under the heading, "Defend", then that is a dangerous move.
I want to draw an analogy between Iraq and Zimbabwe. I regard the efforts made by the Nigerians at the last Commonwealth conference as quite outstanding as they sought to bring together the Commonwealth to deal with Zimbabwe. However, from the point of view of some of my friends in those states, they ask why we bothered to go down this route; why not just take him out as we did Saddam Hussein. Why did we go through the charade of the weapons of mass destruction that were probably never there when, considering the behaviour in that country, it was perfectly justifiable for someone to interfere? However, the more one interferes, the more enemies or problems are created unless somehow one has captured the high moral ground.
I do not doubt that the individuals who make up our Armed Forces are streets ahead of everyone else in the world. They are not necessarily well remunerated and they are overstretched, but a 20 year-old who has been abroad other than in Northern Ireland for the first time comes back a wiser, braver, more interesting and more reliable man. During my time in the City we used to take whole-page advertisements in the Times and the Financial Times stating that we would welcome the opportunity to recruit people who had served in the Armed Forces and give them a secondary career. In my own family, as I have mentioned before, I have two nephews who served in the American armed forces who almost kicked themselves that they did not see 9/11 coming, because they rather regretted having left. I have another nephew with children in the Blues and Royals who wishes that there were more personnel to relieve him so that he could spend more time with his family.
I turn to another point. Through the Commonwealth or the empire we would train people—in banking and so forth, and in the military. I was rather surprised, therefore, to see on a television report the other day that we are shortly to train the Libyan army. I regard that as a great triumph if that is where we have broken through. Perhaps, given our considerable training abilities, one of our added roles that could be included on page 19 or wherever would be the opportunity to train other forces to be a force for good as well as to be competent.
When I consider some of the people that I have met in odd places, it is clear that you do not need much more than good uniforms, equipment, boots and guns if they are to perform a policing role. It is possible to integrate quite quickly.
I end with a story that has always fascinated me: that of the British fire bucket. I refer to the red bucket filled with sand into which cigarette ends were put. Those buckets were in tremendous demand in Africa and the Middle East because a red British bucket marked with the word "fire" and filled with sand is everything you could want to live with. First you take from someone's truck some petrol, put it in the sand bucket, set light to it, and place your tin on the top to heat up your baked beans. Before that, if you want a cold drink, you turn around the fan belt on the truck—the radiator will have long gone—and put the petrol in the bucket. The can of beer is put on top and the fan turned. The evaporating petrol will cool the drink in around 10 minutes. That same story was told to me only the other day by a young soldier who had returned from the Middle East. It is the way to get around.
I have such respect for the military that, unless we bite the bullet and say that we must recruit to our cause more people not only from our own country, but also from other countries, we will suffer for years to come. We have the ability to do what we need to do for the world, and the world is waiting for us. Please can we get on with it?
6.8 p.m.
Viscount Slim: My Lords, the Minister may be surprised to learn that I should like to start by congratulating him. A number of noble Lords have given him a pretty hard time over the medical services for the Armed Forces. However, the latest information suggests that there has been a vast improvement in the position, particularly within the Army medical services. I am told that recruitment is buoyant and that the work being done in operations overseas is excellent: good arrangements, good management, good consultants and good nursing. That is a hopeful sign because noble Lords were very worried about the state of the medical services.
It is not so pleasing that the bedding-in of the Army medical service with the National Health Service has not been a great success. It has not gone with a good swing. This is understandable. The Army medical service had its own esprit de corps and its own proud and well trained people. It must be very difficult to bring the two systems together. The differences are quite marked and consultants are leaving, which is sad.
Germany seems to be the most successful area, where primary, community and secondary care is quite excellent. I have a feeling—the Minister may care to expound on this—that it might be more convenient, and you might get better treatment, if you are wounded, injured or sick in the former Yugoslavia than if it happens to you in Iraq.
Are you, as a casualty in an NHS hospital, on a trolley for too long? Are there special ways of treating a wounded soldier? I have received no complaints from
the wounded soldiers I have spoken to but I wonder why we cannot give a member of Her Majesty's Armed Forces outstanding, immediate and proper care in an NHS hospital and ensure that he does not become merely another administrative number.Like the noble Baroness, Lady Dean of Thorton-le-Fylde, I, too, have had the privilege of visiting the junior soldiers in Yorkshire, both at Catterick and Harrogate. I had a full day at each location and I was most impressed. The noble Lord, Lord Burnham, need not be too worried. The standard of turn-out of all the British Army regiments in both places was quite outstanding.
Harrogate is a beautiful city and a tremendous example. If I were the Minister of Education I would invite my teachers to go there. The education there is quite superb. I suggest that the noble Lord, Lord Lyell, takes a team up there as soon as possible.
As the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Vincent, said, the White Paper represents a look into the future. A number of issues worry us all, but what worries me mostly is that you have almost admitted that you cannot and will not work alone; that you have to work with others. This always presents a problem. We have all had allies and coalition partners. If one looks at the 25 nations of Europe, one sees that some fairly funny coalitions could come about in a military sense. Certainly, good and tough as they may be individually, the armed forces of one or two of those places are a pretty ragamuffin bunch. If certain of them were beside me then, never mind the enemy, I would double my sentries at night.
I do not believe that enough attention has been given to the issue of allies. Many of us have experienced that they are there with you by day, disappear at night, are not there in the morning and you are left in a rather lonely situation. This is what worries me about the possible organisation that you want with light scale, medium and large scale formations. If a formation has to take the brunt of an attack, or whatever may be the problem, I should like to know a little more about how it will be dealt with if we are lightly scaled.
We have perhaps forgotten the lessons of Vietnam. It is not easy, but it is quite possible, to turn a guerrilla-type army into a conventional army. That is what defeated the Americans in the end in Vietnam. You can change armies. We have changed our own armies. In the war in the Far East, people who had only walked for miles and miles in jungles were suddenly able to convert very quickly to mechanised armoured formations.
This was only possible because there was plenty of manpower. The whole weakness of the White Paper is that the Ministry of Defence is relying on new technology. In my experience, whatever the technology, it cannot supplant manpower, the use of the man on the ground. It is a poor excuse to say that you can cut because you have new technology.
Some of this technology is way off in the distance—it is not here. I was interested in the paragraph on the Apache helicopter. Where is it? The last time I asked
the Minister, I heard that some were being mothballed; that there were no pilots for them because there was no money to pay for the training. Whatever the situation, there obviously will not be enough of these helicopters, either now or in the future.Perhaps the Minister can help me. There is a very unconvincing sentence in that paragraph about the fact that we are now reviewing and considering how best to use them. How many? I would have thought that the best way to regard an Apache helicopter—it should not need much consideration—is that it is there to kill and destroy the enemy and to support our forces on the ground. Any colonel of infantry, cavalry or artillery, or a good wing commander in the Royal Air Force, will help you sort that problem out rather quickly.
I know the Minister will not like me for saying it, but the mythical A400 is almost a joke. You say it is due to arrive in 2011. At my age, I cannot promise that I will be here to see it, but I shall do my best. It is bound to be delayed. As I have said to the Minister before, on paper it is a very average aircraft. You have the perfectly marvellous C17s; you have good and improved C130s; you are only keeping the A400 contract to be seen to be active in Europe. That is the reason. Putting it bluntly, it is sucking up to the French and the Germans to say that you are participating in this great project. You would have been far better, as you suggest—I hope that you will—to think again and reconsider the position. There are not many decisions in the White Paper; it is more "considering" and "looking at". Why not go for the C17? Why not improve the situation you have already?
Finally, I am very worried about the sentence that we will carry out large-scale operations if we have time to prepare. There is not often time to prepare. As you quite rightly write, our troops have to be taught about the effects of the defeat and the destruction of an enemy. That is needed—but that is what the troops today are not being taught.
6.20 p.m.
Earl Attlee: My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for introducing the debate. I remind the House that I have a peripheral interest.
The noble Viscount, Lord Slim, referred to the A400M aircraft. I agree with his comments, but it would be a little more effective if he were to address the House rather than the Minister.
Ministers trumpet the increase in defence expenditure in absolute terms, but surely the true measure is the percentage of GDP spent on defence. How do we draw the guns and butter curve? We may be in danger of following our continental partners in their defence effort, or lack of it.
Feedback from the defence industry is depressing. Concerns centre on delaying the implementation of programmes—in particular, the cost of maintaining bid teams. Defence contractors are becoming increasingly concerned that, in the end, no contract may be issued, despite the considerable expense of bidding for it.
Many noble Lords have referred to Op TELIC. Op TELIC 1 was undoubtedly an extremely successful operation. On the logistics side, in comparison to Op GRANBY—Gulf War one—we moved twice as much materiel in half the time. I see that the Minister is nodding.
Of course, there were disappointments, which are well known, and which noble Lords have covered. There were problems with stocks of materiel. For operations of a large scale or effort, it is clearly unwise to hold large stocks of materiel that may never be used. But, in transition to war, certain precursor materials may suddenly be in very short supply. An obvious example is activated charcoal. There are others that we need not know about. Perhaps we need to let some contracts to secure the precursor materials and facilities in advance.
Noble Lords have referred to the NAO report, which suggested that intra-theatre communications systems were satisfactory. Whoever wrote that has obviously not tried to use the Ptarmigan secure radio system or to have a conference call.
I believe that many members of the Armed Forces will be extremely grateful for the very thoughtful and informed contribution from the noble Baroness, Lady Dean, who remarked on the wide range of skills of very junior soldiers, especially in the aftermath of conflict. She may be interested to know that at one point in operation TELIC, soldiers undertook "helmets off" policing and social duties, while in another part of the division, heavy armour was still being used aggressively, although not necessarily in anger. We were in two very different phases at the same time. I am pleased that that does not present a problem for our soldiers for the reasons described by the noble Baroness.
The noble Baroness also referred to the operational welfare package. She was quite right. The only difficulty that I had was with the absolute drivel coming from the satellite TV set. At one point we were being told that the operation was facing logistical meltdown—something that we in the logistic headquarters of 1(UK) Armoured Division were totally unaware of.
My final point on Op TELIC is that in the run-up we kept hearing that war was neither imminent nor inevitable. That was not my understanding even at the time. However, I was a little surprised when I got out into theatre to find out how far matters were advanced. It was a mystery to me why there was no overt activity regarding Op TELIC in the defence community, particularly in December. I do not understand Ministers' strategy. Why were they saying up until the last moment that war was neither imminent nor inevitable? Why did they not press the buttons in the defence community to ensure that the right kit was in place?
The 3(UK) Division will have a mechanised brigade replaced by a light brigade, and 1 (UK) Armoured Division is to have an armoured brigade replaced by a mechanised brigade. The formation readiness cycle—FRC—is already a bit ragged, due to the operational tempo. Do the changes make the FRC dead or unworkable? If not, what will happen if it is desired to
undertake an operation at a high intensity but a medium scale of effort, but there is no armoured brigade on high readiness year?The White Paper proposes lighter, more rapidly deployable forces. I think that the deployability of armoured vehicles by air is an overstated requirement, although some air-portability is obviously essential. As a result of the SDR, we now have rapid and effective sea lift.
My noble friend Lord Vivian referred to FRES—future rapid effect system. Our AFV programme seems to be subject to constant revision. Is FRES a platform or a concept? If it is a platform—a vehicle on the drawing board—is it tracked or wheeled? Is it conventionally driven or electrically driven?
On the subject of carriers, I reinforce the point made by my noble friend Lord Luke. Making carriers a little smaller will save minimal capital because the steelwork in a carrier is a relatively small proportion of the actual cost of building it, and an even smaller part of the whole life cost of the carrier. But it will significantly reduce the flexibility of the carriers in future years.
My final points concern manning. During Op TELIC we were desperately short of simple lorry-mounted infantry— just like the TA battalions that were cut in the strategic defence review. On Op TELIC we were unable properly to secure our rear areas. Numerous weapons and ammunition dumps operated by the Iraqi army had to be left completely insecure. The 1 UK armoured divisional support group had 1,000 personnel in theatre, but there was no dedicated guard force available. Even busy staff officers below the rank of major had to go on guard. Fortunately, I was a major.
Cuts in infantry are the last thing we need. I cannot help thinking that the cuts are in response to the feeling that it is impossible to man the Army to the current authorised limit, so the solution is to reduce the establishment. I suggest that such a policy is madness. The noble Viscount, Lord Slim, was a little more diplomatic. It is madness because to reduce the numbers in the Armed Forces will exacerbate overstretch and retention problems. If the Government cannot resist engaging in yet one more operation, we need a much larger Army, not a smaller one.
The noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, when extolling the virtues of the TA, post-SDR, told us that Ministers had provided for far more TA than was required to sustain the scale of operations envisaged in the SDR. What he forgot, and what I overlooked at the time, was the need for a follow-on force—what we now know as Op TELIC 2, 3, 4, 5 and beyond.
The TA cupboard of willing volunteers is practically empty. There are virtually no TA soldiers who could be of use on Op TELIC who have not already been compulsorily mobilised. Putting aside any legal limits, how frequently does the Minister think that TA soldiers can be compulsorily mobilised? I think that he has unrealistic expectations. I would suggest no more than every five years. To do so more often would be contrary to the ethos of the TA and would drastically change it.
6.29 p.m.
Lord Guthrie of Craigiebank: My Lords, there is much to welcome in the White Paper. The services need to change, and there are many examples in history of navies, armies and air forces failing when they did not adapt, restructure, equip and train themselves for new challenges. It must be sensible to take work forward on the Strategic Defence Review.
Defence planners historically have found it difficult to arrive at priorities when new threats appear in addition to those which already exist and have not gone away, and which the services must still be prepared to face. We have to plan for the unexpected. The Falklands War, the first Gulf War, the Balkans, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan were not expected, and there is no reason whatever to suppose that we are now entering a more stable decade and that we will not have to react quickly to the unexpected again. The only certainty is that there will be uncertainty, and the British must be prepared.
The White Paper sensibly judges that more emphasis should be placed on light forces as opposed to our heavy armoured forces. It rightly reminds us of the key role the reserves can play and have played recently. Their contribution in both Afghanistan and Iraq has been immense.
The Civil Contingency Reaction Forces are important and desperately needed. The White Paper gives them the priority they deserve.
The White Paper also rightly seeks to reorganise and improve the logistic system and support services. One wonders, if the Iraq war had gone on for much longer, how we would have managed logistically.
Although I approve the thrust of the White Paper, like the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, I have serious concerns. It does not attempt to go into detail—that is promised at a later time. Will the aspirations in the White Paper be properly funded? As has already been said, it is, as it stands, a bland document and lacks detail. It is full of buzz words and platitudes—flexibility, force multipliers, network-enabled capability. What does it actually mean? Everybody gives me a different answer.
It is difficult to judge whether the White Paper will eventually be good for defence and the country. Does the defence budget have the wherewithal to deliver the necessary coherent programme? Many in the services believe that it will lead to painful cuts; the White Paper is positioning defence in such a way as to make it vulnerable to Treasury assault.
Will there be less money for defence? In the debate on the Queen's Speech, I asked whether the defence budget was under extreme pressure, and whether it was true that around £1 billion savings per year for four years was planned. Nothing I have heard since has reassured me. I asked if this was correct and, if so, was it because of miscalculations or increased and unexpected commitments because of the new resource
budgeting system. Are the Ministry of Defence and the Treasury at loggerheads about the interpretation of accounting rules and procedures, as many say, or is it simply straightforward cuts? I would be very interested to hear the true position from the Minister.The Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Symons of Vernham Dean, did not clearly answer my full question about whether there were plans to cut the budget, as was rumoured, and what the size and the reasons for the problem were. She pointed out that a promised £3 billion increase, announced in the spending review of 2002, was still happening. This is welcome, but, quite honestly, it is wearing a bit thin. Much of the £3 billion was ring-fenced and it has made no difference to the lives of the sailors, soldiers, airmen and women in the front line. Many still live in slum-like conditions; they are denied resources and are overstretched. The noble Lord, Lord Rogan, explained this so well.
Around 50 per cent of combat arms training has been cut this year, due to lack of funds. At a time when the services could recruit, they are not allowed to recruit as many men and women as they wish, through lack of money. As a result, establishments remain unfilled, and overstretch is compounded.
We also hear that the Government are poised to cut the size of the Army the moment the situation in Northern Ireland appears normalised. This seems extraordinary, considering the overstretch problems we have. Training and families are suffering, as the noble Baroness, Lady Dean, described so well.
The men and women of our services are what make the British services what they are. The Government are, one hopes, aware of this, and are trying to alleviate their problems rather than compound them.
I also find it surprising that we are contributing to a European planning cell. Although it is envisaged as small, it is bound to grow in size at a time when financial and human resources are in such short supply in our services. Noble Lords should be under no illusions that the cell will have little or no military value. Its work could perfectly well be done by staff officers already in Belgium at NATO. The cell, some may think, gives political value, but even though it has no military value, defence will have to pay for it when it is faced with far, far more urgent demands. I strongly support the Europeans increasing their military capability, but the cell will do nothing towards this.
I hope I am wrong, but I and many still in the services believe that defence, despite the words of Ministers, is at a crossroads, vulnerable to serious cuts. If this does happen, the Government will be damaging what is probably the most respected institution in the world the British have. To put it crudely—I am emboldened to do so by what the noble Baroness, Lady Dean, has already said—I hope that when the Government announce what the promised detail is, they will reveal they have put their money where their mouth is.
6.38 p.m.
Viscount Brookeborough: My Lords, it is a great privilege, but rather daunting, to follow the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Guthrie. I welcome the White Paper, although I wonder whether, in 10 years' time, we will be able to say that the Government got it right.
First, I must declare a couple of interests. I am Honorary Colonel of the Royal Irish Rangers, the TA infantry battalion for Northern Ireland. I am also a member of the National Employer Advisory Board, which is part of the SaBRE campaign. My chairman, the noble Lord, Lord Glenarthur, is sitting opposite, so I will be careful about what I say. In addition, I have done 22 years in the armed services, of which 17 were in Northern Ireland. That had a connection with a part-time element, which will have some relevance when I talk about reserves.
What we have in the White Paper is a commonsense reaction to the current threats of today's security environment, but that is all. The people of this nation have a right to expect our Government to plan for the present threat and the type of operation likely during the next few years, but we also expect to see some joined-up thinking with the Foreign Office to take us into the medium and longer term. I am disappointed that there is no reference to foreign policy as such, except strategic planning.
I find the White Paper and the supporting essays good light reading. There is nothing in them dramatically new to anyone who keeps themselves up to date with current affairs, particularly military affairs. Essay 2 contains terms such as "military tasks", "strategic tasks" and "strategic effects". Paragraph 2.5 refers to eight strategic effects that the Armed Forces should be able to bring to bear against our opponents. Please note, it says the Armed Forces. They all seem relevant, except for the first, under (a) "prevent"—I think it should really say prevention.
With my military experience in Northern Ireland in supporting the civil power, I cannot agree with all these tasks. Only one out of five tasks under this heading could be considered wholly military. It is the fourth task, which could be achieved with military training to build local capacity to counter an emerging crisis. The third task of reforming the security sector is predominantly political. The other three tasks—I shall save time by not referring to them all—are, in my view, not only entirely beyond military capability but are also entirely political. For example, under the heading "Prevent", the first task is:
- "Address the underlying causes of instability, such as poor governance, political repression, social inequality and economic hardship".
To emphasise the quality of our forces in Op TELIC one only has to look at the three phases of that operation. They excelled in every single one of them: first, the invasion and the battle; secondly, the immediate aftermath of guerrilla warfare, where the remaining enemy concentrated on coalition forces; and, lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the current phase of counter-terrorism and keeping the peace while some of the enemy target, intimidate and kill their own nationals. That is the dividing line between guerrilla warfare and terrorism, and that is where we are now.
The key to achieving such successful results is good preparation, planning and command. However, we must remind ourselves that the critical phase of counter-terrorism and keeping the peace is largely a section task with corporals and privates. We need the hearts and minds programme and campaign and we need soldiers on the ground who have the ability to achieve results. They are vital and irreplaceable.
That brings me to manpower and the reserves. We are all aware of the shortfalls in manpower and skills in the Regular Army. It is evident at all levels from intelligent private soldiers to plastic surgeons. I want to give the Government a serious warning about future manpower levels, especially of the reserves. As I said earlier, the Government are thinking short-term, about our current operations. I am not ignoring the supply of ever more sophisticated equipment, but in this type of operation nothing will ever entirely replace intelligent, well-trained soldiers on the ground who can speak and negotiate with locals. Everyone from commanders on the ground to the Government has emphasised that the support of the reserves was vital to Op TELIC and that continued support is required in the foreseeable future.
The results of compulsory mobilisation of the reserves have been nothing short of remarkable and continue to be a success. We must realise that this has been done by intelligent mobilisation; that is, the mobilising of the people with the right skills and those who were most likely to be available in the first tranches. We have to ask whether this is sustainable in the short term and in the medium term. Several issues have a bearing on this. The first is the Reserve Forces Act that limits compulsory mobilisation for an individual to once in three years. The second is the trained strength of the Territorial Army. The third is employers and the fourth is the families. I believe it may be just sustainable in the short term, if you take the short term to be the three years—one cycle of compulsory mobilisation under the Reserve Forces Act.
The issues here are, first, intelligent mobilisation. Secondly, there is no doubt that the people who have not yet been mobilised do feel a little left out and therefore there is a groundswell of enthusiasm to be included. Thirdly, there is considerable turnover in the TA, which affects it, and strength on paper does not reflect trained strength. Therefore the pool available for operations is not as large as it might at first seem.
The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, said that it was almost completely exhausted; it is definitely some way towards it.We are also talking about the medium term, further ahead than three years from February/March last year when the operation started. The Government seem to agree that we shall still have soldiers in Iraq in 2005 and probably in 2006 and 2007. Also, we cannot forget that we still have reservists forming a large part of our forces in other parts of the world. This medium term is where I have my doubts. I have already mentioned the trained strength of the TA rather than the strength on paper.
I shall mention employers briefly. They have been very supportive, but we have to understand that we are in the first three year period, the first round if you like, and we shall move into uncharted waters at the end of that period. The development of SaBRE and the National Employer Advisory Board are crucial to the future relationship of, and co-operation between, employers and the Ministry of Defence. I shall not go into details in recent SaBRE reports but they should be read carefully. There are issues of concern and warning signs in responses from employers. They will become more relevant as we rely ever more on our reserves.
The families have been nothing less than brilliant but again, as with employers, this is largely first time round. They could hardly be more supportive at present but therefore the trend can only go the other way, gradually perhaps. We must be aware of that.
There are issues that can be addressed. The first is the shortfall in the Regular Army. The Government and senior command seem to shy away from accepting that there are gaps in Army manning and recruiting. From what I have heard, they simply do not refer to them as being gaps and shortfalls; they say that it is all managed, that there is no need to worry; and that it will be all right on the day. It was all right on this day, but wait for the next. However, if the Regular Army were up to establishment then only certain skills and professions required in the short-term would have been mobilised: QED. I do not deny that the reserves should provide for a shortfall, which is why we have them. However, I believe that the present shortfall may be too large to replace with reserves in the period after the first three years. We did have voluntary mobilisation for some time prior to the beginning of last year and that still has some effect on those who might be called up in the near future.
The answer is staring the Government in the face. They should increase the strength of the Regular Army before the over-stretched rubber band snaps and they should provide more funds for more training for the reserve soldiers, thereby increasing the fully trained strength of the reserve.
We cannot be certain of the reaction of employers to repeated mobilisation within the terms of the Reserve Forces Act. They are giving tremendous backing and I am not knocking them at all. They have been brilliant. My experience with part-time forces at home in Northern Ireland was that, about half way through our 30 years of trouble, some employers, including
government departments such as the education authority and the housing executive, of which I have personal experience, became reluctant to continue to let people off. That is a fact—it is not fiction—and it will creep in to some extent; not very greatly, I hope. We must be aware of it.The families are especially crucial. I cannot see any direct reference to them in the reserve forces part of the essays or the White Paper. I think that it is unforgivable. Beware the second time around if we do not look after them properly. It may not be the same.
I have another point on the employers and families. Much could be done, and I shall make one suggestion. Employers already see the value of Territorial Army soldiering to themselves at the present level, but we should not get carried away by trying to tell them that it will benefit a skilled worker and his business to send him into an area of conflict up to once every three years. It will benefit neither the employee nor the employer in business terms if we demand too much too frequently. We will lose their backing.
The Government and MoD should be down on bended knee to the employers and families, recognising that there is little or no added value to them in future in a greatly increased commitment. Employers and families of mobilised personnel should be treated in a privileged manner. For instance, they should be provided with more privileged information about an operation than appears in the Evening Standard or other newspapers or on the airwaves. It is very simple; we are not talking about secrets. Someone cannot be proud of his links with those on operations if those with no connection whatever know more than he does, by virtue of reading a later edition of a newspaper or listening to the latest news broadcast. With modern technology, I am sure that we can do better.
I hope that the Government take notice of this debate, not merely in replying, but in the months to come.
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