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On Question, amendment agreed to.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Carter): My Lords, if Amendment No. 81 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments Nos. 82 and 83 on grounds of pre-emption.
Baroness Hanham moved Amendment No. 81:
On Question, amendment agreed to.
[Amendments Nos. 82 to 84 not moved.]
Clause 24 [Conformity with regional strategy]:
[Amendments Nos. 85 to 95 not moved.]
Baroness Hanham moved Amendment No. 96:
The noble Baroness said: My Lords, Clause 24 is perhaps one of the most controversial in the Bill. The new powers it gives rise to are centralising to the point of control freakishness. It puts into law the requirement for local authorities to adhere to government policy by having general conformity to the regional spatial strategy, which sets out the Secretary of State's policies.
As a result the Government will have a level of control over local councils not seen before in planning terms. When the local authorities draw up their plans for public consultation, there are opportunities for representations to be made by members of the public. That is an essential part of the planning system. Yet the local authorities' plans will have to be in conformity with the regional spatial strategy. The consultation process during the drawing up of that strategy is limited and by invitation only. There is consequently a consultation deficit.
If we take the example of airport development, the Government said in their recent White Paper that they wished to see a second runway at Stansted airport. That policy would be laid out in the regional spatial strategy. At that point, the local authorities will have to cater for an extended airport, including making provision for the thousands of additional houses required that are also in the sustainable communities plan. But that is all presupposing that the airport and/or housing will materialise, prejudging the result of a future planning inquiry.
The essence of Clause 24 brings a raft of questions to the fore. Clearly conformity with the regional spatial strategy where it is the overriding document is causing concern. For that reason I beg to move.
Lord Rooker: My Lords, I will check with Hansard and I do not want to make a meal of this, but the noble Baroness gave the game away with her final sentence. She referred to the "conformity" but did not use the phrase "general conformity". The whole of her speech was based on the assumption that the provision is much more narrow and precise than it actually is. We covered the matter in Committee; I understand that we are in a new area, but the test is of "general conformity" and not "conformity". That means that it is only where a local development document would cause significant harm to the implementation of the regional spatial strategy of the spatial development strategy—I shall read that again, because it is underlined and I must get the words right.
The test is of general conformity and not conformity. That means that it is only where a local development document would cause significant harm to the implementation of the regional spatial strategy of the spatial development strategy should the local development document be considered not to be in general conformity. That is the end of the underlined section of the brief.
We shall make the policy clear in the final version of PPS12—thank heavens for that. The point I am trying to make, in more colloquial English, is that we have to read the clause in the sense of the opening line of Clause 24(1),
If colleagues do not want local plans to be in general conformity with strategic plans, we can have a debate and perhaps vote on that basis, but not on the basis of conformity with strategic plans—it is general conformity. The point is that the principle of general conformity is long established. It is nothing that we have invented. It is the relationship now as we are before the Bill between the structure plans and local plans and between the Mayor's spatial development strategy and the London boroughs' unitary development plans.
General conformity serves an important purpose. It links the regional—I shall leave out London, as there is no sense in repeating it—level to the local level, ensuring that the strategies are translated into policies at local level so that they can be effectively delivered. As the detailed policies at local level will reflect the broader strategic direction established at the regional level, it reduces the risk of contradiction and uncertainty for people using the plan.
If we take the spatial nature of strategic plans for example—heavens above, the example I have is the London plan. The London plan, for example, covers land use planning issues, but it also deals with waste management, social inclusion, energy saving, tourism and sustainability. The effect of those strategic policies will be greatly reduced if there is no requirement at local level—where of course they will be implemented and where people will see the practical impact—for the policies generally to conform with them.
The point is generally to conform with the policies, not a specific, narrow targeted area. People need to have the clearest possible idea of the likely outcome of a planning application. The supplementary planning documents will also be covered by the general conformity principle. That will assist people before they start their planning.
This is not new or something that we have invented. It operates now reasonably successfully. I do not see transferring it to the new system as a problem. On the other hand, if the provision made a change and stated that documents had to be in conformity with the plans, I would have a view to share with the noble Baroness
Baroness Hanham: My Lords, I said the words "general conformity" when I spoke to the amendment. Perhaps I swallowed the first word a little, but I hope that the Minister heard me.
I was interested to hear the Minister say that this is how things have been done in the past. However, we have not had regional spatial strategies in the past, nor have we had the very wide policies coming from those strategies—and we shall return to the position in London in later amendments.
General conformity will be hard to define. What part will conform and what part will not? If the Minister says that it simply has to "take account of" then why does not the clause say that? Or if "consideration" must be given, why does it not say so? The words "in general conformity with" acknowledge specifically that the document will have to relate extremely closely to the regional spatial strategy.
I shall not take this matter any further today. I hear what the Minister has said, but for the purposes of this debate, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 25 [Revocation of local development documents]:
Clause 26 [Revision of local development documents]:
Clause 27 [Secretary of State's default power]:
Baroness Hanham moved Amendment No. 99:
The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I return to the question of whether the amount of intervention—in my notes I have the word "interference"—from the Secretary of State is of concern to us. Amendment No. 99 seeks to qualify when it might be appropriate for the Secretary of State to become involved in the new development planning process.
At the moment, the wording of Clause 27(1) is decidedly vague on when the Secretary of State will or may intervene. The subsection reads:
The amendment has been tabled to ask the Minister to spell out more clearly how he envisages the default power will work. Perhaps he could give examples of
Lord Rooker: My Lords, although I shall cite a few examples for the noble Baroness, the short answer to the amendment is that the Secretary of State has a duty to act reasonably at all times. It is unnecessary to qualify the reference in Clause 27 by adding the word "significantly". If a local planning authority failed to prepare a development plan document for an insignificant reason, the Secretary of State would not intervene. This is not something that he would do on a whim.
The noble Baroness asked me for examples. We make no bones about the fact that the power is deliberately wide and not restricted to any particular circumstance. There are numerous circumstances in which a local planning authority could fail to carry out its plan-making functions correctly, some of which I shall set out.
It could be a failure to prepare a development plan document to deliver the requirements as set out in the regional spatial strategy. It could be where a plan clashes without sufficient justification with national or regional policy. As I said in Committee, we accept that sometimes there will be clashes and contradictions because of local circumstances, but where there is insufficient justification, there would be a problem. It could also be where a plan causes harm to other areas, such as to an adjoining local authority area. It could be where a local planning authority fails to deliver the development plan document as set out in its local development scheme, and where the local planning authority fails to adopt development plan documents after an examination.
These are instances where the Secretary of State would wish to use the default powers. I do not deny that they are sanctions, but they would be operated only on the basis of the Secretary of State being reasonable at all times. If the Secretary of State were to operate unreasonably, there is always the possible threat of judicial review. Further, I am absolutely certain that good legal advice from within government would be offered to the Secretary of State before he sought to use these powers, so that he could not be accused of acting on a whim, being party political against a particular authority, or reacting to a personality clash. Good reasons would have to be given. The examples I have given are the kind we envisage.
"(c) any recommendations made by the person appointed to carry out the independent examination of the document."
Page 13, line 20, leave out subsections (2) to (4).
Leave out Clause 24.
"The local development documents must be in general conformity with—"
followed by paragraphs (a) and (b). It is not a precision test, as the noble Baroness implied.
Page 15, line 14, after "are" insert "significantly"
"This section applies if the Secretary of State thinks that a local planning authority are failing or omitting to do anything it is necessary for them to do in connection with the preparation, revision or adoption of a development plan document".
How is such failure to be judged? What criteria is the Secretary of State to use when assessing whether there has been failure or omission? We believe that there would have to be a very good reason for the Government to call in a development plan document. I do not believe that it is reasonable for the default power to come into effect if there is a minor failing on behalf of the local authority.
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