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Lord Elton: The noble Baroness said something that has taken me by surprise and that I suppose should have been clear. The Bill currently does not extend the interest of the commissioner, or accessibility to the commissioner, to people over 18 in these institutions; it merely means that those institutions can remain in contact with the commissioner although some of the people within them are actually in contact with the commissioner. In other words, it is not an extension at all; it is merely a definition of the sub-18 group.

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: I was not referring to institutions but to services. When we discussed the commissioner, I said that his remit in the main covered children from the ages of nought to 18. However, there are certain groups, in particular care leavers and those with learning disabilities, where it might be appropriate, because of the nature of what has happened to those individuals, for the commissioner to have an ongoing interest in them. We agreed to consider that matter.

There are certain services available to children and young people—Connexions, care leavers and young people with learning difficulties being the obvious three—where the relevant age range is much broader. We did not want to create an artificial inappropriate cut-off point with regard to those services; hence the fact that the Bill has different age groups in different clauses. That applies within the overview that the remit of the commissioner and of children's services generally applies to the age group of minus nine months, in some cases, to 18. We seek to ensure that we do not cut across services rather than institutions. I shall come to the specific point that the noble Lord made about the criminal justice system in a moment.

As I said, we have linked the provisions in the Children Bill to the provision of services in terms of how they operate on the ground and to existing legislation. There is a very strong link in practice to the Children Act 1989, which defines children generally as under 18.

The other clauses in Part 2 do not rely on a definition of a child. The coverage of the information-sharing provision, the remit of the director of children's services
 
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and lead member and the coverage of the new inspection arrangements are all defined by the functions and services to which they refer. As such they already in practice—I hope that this will please the noble Lord, Lord, Elton—cover the broader age range as the relevant definition is the service not the age of the child. I apologise as this is a rather technical matter. I assure the Committee that the grid will be very helpful.

Similar arguments apply to the miscellaneous provisions in Part 5. There are two exceptions: the private fostering clauses—which we shall debate later—where we already have an established definition of a privately fostered child under 16, or 18 if the young person has a disability. We believe that it is important not to disturb a recognised definition which, as I understand it, works well.

Clause 47 concerns the power to give financial assistance. The purpose of this clause is to broaden the department's ability to give financial assistance to those providing services to children, young people and their families—typically voluntary and community organisations—in a way that reflects its increased responsibilities. In keeping with this, the clause already allows for support to be given for the purposes of working with children and young people up to the age of 20.

I have given a rather detailed explanation of the different age ranges and the core principles relating to previous legislation or to the service provision that is on offer. That results in the Bill referring to different age groups. We have given a promise and a commitment to look again at the commissioner's remit in terms of the specific groups to whom the noble Earl referred. However, we consider that generally the age of 18—when a child becomes an adult—is the relevant age limit in this regard.

For those caught up in the criminal justice system the age of majority is 18. It is important to recognise that those in the criminal justice system who are aged 18 are considered adults in that system. Therefore, although I respect the view of the noble Lord, Lord Elton, and, indeed, that of the noble Earl, with whom I have already discussed the matter this morning, that more needs to be done in that regard it is not a matter for this Bill or this Minister. It is a question of whether more can be done in that regard in the criminal justice system. Through the Children Bill we take a strong interest in young people in institutions. However, there is a cut-off point at 18. The Committee may disagree with that but it is the reality. I should be happy to discuss that further with noble Lords on another occasion.

The measure describes the services that will be provided, supports previous legislation and ensures that services will be able to operate effectively. I hope that noble Lords will consider that I have answered their questions. I shall send noble Lords the grid to ensure that the matter is absolutely clear.

Baroness Sharp of Guildford: I have not previously spoken in this debate. We give our general support to the amendment. I am very grateful to the Minister for
 
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her clarification. It has helped the Committee a great deal. However, we have a minor amendment, Amendment No. 109ZA, that we shall discuss later. Will the Minister ensure that a copy of the grid is sent to noble Lords on these Benches as well as to other noble Lords?

Lord Elton: I look forward with eager interest to the arrival of the grid, which will make a great deal clearer what I have sought to follow in the current debate. It seems to me that there is not the merit in Clause 6(8) that I accorded to it, but I may be corrected in that regard when I read the grid. Therefore, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Baroness Finlay of Llandaff moved Amendment No. 79A:

After Clause 5, insert the following new clause—

"PART 1A

REASONABLE CHASTISEMENT
REASONABLE CHASTISEMENT

(1) Battery of a child cannot be justified in any proceedings on the grounds that it constituted lawful punishment.
(2) Battery of a child is not unlawful if the act amounts to the use of reasonable force in order to—
(a) avert an immediate danger to the child or any other person;
(b) avert an immediate danger to property; or
(c) prevent the commission of a crime, or an act which would be a crime if the child had reached the age of criminal responsibility.
(3) For the purpose of subsections (1) and (2) above "child" means a person under the age of 18.
(4) Section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (c. 12) (cruelty to persons under sixteen) is amended as follows.
(5) In subsection (7) at end insert "subject to subsection (8) below".
(6) After subsection (7) insert— "(8) Corporal punishment administered to a child cannot be justified in any proceedings on the ground that it was administered in pursuance of a right exercisable by virtue of subsection (7) above. (9) For the purpose of subsection (8) above, administering corporal punishment to a child means doing anything for the purpose of punishing that child which would constitute unlawful battery." (7) This section extends to England and Wales only.""

The noble Baroness said: It is a great honour and privilege to introduce to this Chamber an opportunity to right a historic wrong for children. The significance is great, and the time is long overdue. Yet, the aim is very basic. I apologise to the Committee that my cold makes my voice come and go.

The amendment's aim is simply to allow children the same legal protection from violence that adults enjoy today—no more and no less. The proposed new clause does not create any new offence. It does not interfere in any way with parents' rights to use reasonable force to protect and restrain their children and to punish in non-violent ways. The proposed new clause would revise the common law "reasonable chastisement"
 
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defence. The leading case dates back to 1860, when Chief Justice Cockburn ruled in a case where a teacher had beaten a child to death that,

"By the law of England, a parent . . . may for the purpose of correcting what is evil in the child, inflict moderate and reasonable corporal punishment".

I shall explain the amendment. Subsection (1) of the proposed new clause would mean that battery of a child could no longer be justified as a lawful form of punishment. Subsection (2) would make it clear that parents can use reasonable force to protect children and property and to prevent commission of a crime. Loving, caring parents need to use physical actions at all times, especially with young children, to protect them—to grab and lift them, to restrain them and so on. That is part of day-to-day parenting. This reform would not interfere with that at all.

Subsection (4) of the proposed new clause would amend Section (1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, which is the only place where the "reasonable chastisement" defence is confirmed in statute. Again, parents' rights to punish children and use physical actions to protect them and other people and property, or to prevent a crime being committed, are preserved. Put most simply, the proposed new clause would place children in the same position as adults under the law on assault and meet the UK's human rights obligations.

Peter Carter QC, the leading authority on offences of violence and chair of the Bar human rights committee, has advised on the wording of the proposed new clause. He has provided reassurance that it would not result in increased prosecutions of parents for minor incidents and would not create any new offence. I am, of course, happy to share his legal opinion with any noble Lords who wish to see it.

We can be confident that parents would be prosecuted for minor assaults of their children only in the most exceptional circumstances, for example, where a child is particularly vulnerable. Adults are seldom prosecuted for minor assaults on other adults, such as slaps on the arm et cetera, and the same would be true for children. Before any prosecution, the Crown Prosecution Service has to consider whether two tests are satisfied: first, that there is sufficient evidence, and, secondly, that it is in the public interest. The interests of the child are invariably considered as part of the public interest, and prosecuting parents is very seldom in the interests of children. What public interest could there be in prosecuting a loving parent for a trivial assault? Any attempt to bring a private prosecution for assault is reviewed by the Attorney-General, who may discontinue the case or take it on, in which case the same tests are applied.

This Government have done a great deal to encourage good parenting and to safeguard children. The efforts by government organisations and individuals are admirable, but the state of the law undermines them. The reform is not to increase formal interventions in family life. The current threshold that triggers a formal investigation of abuse is when a child is identified as suffering or likely to
 
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suffer significant harm, as stated in Section 47 of the Children Act. There is no reason why that threshold should change.

The noble Lord, Lord Condon, apologises for being unable to be in his place today, but he has expressed his support in principle for the amendment. I have also had a very useful conversation with the Chief Constable of Dyfed-Powys, Terry Grange, who is the current chairman of the Association of Chief Police Officers. He feels that the time has come for change in the law, and that guidance from the Home Office and Crown Prosecution Service can provide protection from any vexatious complainant, adult or child, and ensure implementation of the principles expressed in Working Together to Safeguard Children to guide inter-agency co-operation on child protection.

My own experiences working as a junior doctor and seeing how difficult it was to prosecute even flagrant abuse is, sadly, still the experience of my colleagues. We live in a society that has condoned violence against children. In the 1990s, the Department of Health commissioned a research study that gathered information from parents and children. Parents were interviewed in confidence and admitted to very high levels of corporal punishment, with the admission of violence doubling when both parents were interviewed. Three quarters of mothers said that they had already smacked their baby before its first birthday, which is before language has developed.

Overall, 91 per cent of children had been hit, with the youngest and most vulnerable hit most often. Almost half the children were hit weekly or more often. One fifth had been hit with an implement, and 35 per cent had been punished severely, which is defined as with the intention, potential, or actually to cause harm to the child. That included actions that were repeated, prolonged or involved use of implements.

I know what it is like to be lonely, living in a high-rise block with no money and two babies, one of whom cries incessantly. Without the restraint of having worked in paediatrics and having seen the results of shaking and hitting, I would have lost my rag. I fear that once I hit I would have been unable to stop, such was the pent-up emotion that I felt. That was as a young mum. The purpose of this reform is to send clear and unequivocal messages to parents that assaulting children, like assaulting adults, is wrong and unlawful.

The trouble is that hitting a child starts as a response to the pent-up feelings of the parents. Most parents report that they regret having hit, but it escalates so easily into more serious violence. Aggression breeds aggression. Almost all abuse takes place in the context of so-called punishment or so-called discipline. Research clearly shows that corporal punishment has all kinds of negative effects on mental health, parent-child relationships, increased anti-social behaviour and child aggression. Light corporal punishment easily and often escalates into injurious violence. Children who were pinched, slapped, shaken and spanked were seven times more likely to experience severe violence such as punching, kicking or hitting with an object. They are being taught that the way to
 
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cope with feelings of frustration in oneself is to hit someone who is vulnerable. Our society has condoned that.

There is huge support for the amendment. The Children are Unbeatable! Alliance is the largest alliance of organisations ever assembled to campaign on a single issue for children. The National Assembly for Wales debated the matter in plenary in January and, by 41 to nine votes and subsequently on a unanimous vote, stated that it,

"regrets that the UK Government continues to retain the defence of reasonable chastisement".

I shall listen very carefully to the Government's response today. As a Member of the Cross Benches, I hope that all parties in the House will allow us a free vote on the issue if that seems necessary on Report. I beg to move.

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