Select Committee on Constitutional Reform Bill Written Evidence


Memorandum by Justices' Clerks' Society

ROLE OF THE JUSTICES' CLERK

  The Justices' Clerk is the senior lawyer and adviser to the magistracy. Currently the appointment is made under the Justice of the Peace Act, 1997 and requires the post holder to be a solicitor or barrister of five years' standing or be a solicitor or barrister with five years' experience of working in Magistrates' Courts.

  The core responsibilities of the role are as follows:

    —  Provision of consistent and accurate advice to the lay bench both personally, and through the team of legal advisers.

    —  Training the lay bench, subject to the guidance of the Judicial Studies Board.

    —  Providing "pastoral support" to lay Justices.

    —  Facilitating the lay bench in its dealings with court users and partner agencies.

    —  Providing secretarial support to the Advisory Committee and Sub-Committees.

    —  Leading and managing the legal staff assigned to their areas including their training, development and assessment.

    —  Exercising powers under the Justices' Clerks Rules 1970 and delegating those powers to appropriate members of staff.

    —  Advising and supporting Magistrates' Committees and Panels.

    —  The listing of cases, magistrates' rota and policies on fines enforcement.

    —  Line management of court room and listing staff.

  The proposed changes in the status of the Justices' Clerk are contained in the Courts Act 2003. Whilst the protection from interference when carrying out judicial functions is replicated in the Courts Act, there was at first, a reluctance to have Justices' Clerks' appointments and removals subject to consultation with the local benches. This amendment was secured in the passing of the Courts Act and acknowledged the special and unique relationship that exists between the Justices' Clerks and the benches they serve. However, whilst the Government feels that the protections in the Courts Act are sufficient to guarantee the independence of the Justices' Clerks, many people involved in the courts believe that the transfer to the civil service will lead to a gradual erosion of this independence. This belief is based on the fact that, firstly the proposed abolition of the post of Lord Chancellor drastically changes the constitutional position. Secondly there is "guidance" frequently being issued by the Department of Constitutional Affairs, which regularly crosses the line into the judicial area.

  The proposal has been made to abolish the Office of the Lord Chancellor, to establish a Supreme Court, which will replace the House of Lords as a Judicial Body, and to create a Judicial Appointments Panel made up of independent members. The logic behind this proposal is to remove an anomaly from the constitutional arrangements in this country and to establish a true separation of powers between the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary. The Office of the Lord Chancellor had effectively straddled the three arms of government for centuries.

  There has been much opposition to what is perceived to be an over hasty and ill-considered policy which attacks the heart of the unwritten constitution of the country. If this claim is to be denied and refuted, it is necessary to ensure that the concept is applied throughout, and at every level of, the Judiciary and the Judicial System. The Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, High Court, Crown Court, County Court and the District Judges will be caught by this new system. However, it must be remembered that 97 per cent of all criminal cases are concluded in the Magistrates' Court. It is therefore essential that the Magistrates' Court is included in the process.

  The Lord Chancellor, acting on the advice of local Advisory Committees, formally makes the appointment of Magistrates. These Advisory Committees are made up of Magistrates and other persons with skills that will assist the appointment process. It is easy to envisage that this body can report directly to the new Judicial Appointments Panel, effectively acting as Sub-Committees. It may be prudent to review their constitution and membership as part of the overall process, but it could fit well with the arrangements proposed for the Higher Courts.

  There remains one element that does not fit with the new policy, and this concerns the position of the Justices' Clerk and Justices' Clerks Assistants (Legal Advisers) who have unique access to the retiring room while the bench is deliberating. Under the proposals, the Justices' Clerks and the Legal Advisers will become civil servants, employed by an Executive Agency reporting to the Director of Operations, in what was the Lord Chancellor's Department and, through that person to the Lord Chancellor, or the Secretary of State For Constitutional Affairs who will be granted this role by future legislation. The effect of this will be that the legal advice given to the Magistrates will, in the vast majority of criminal cases, be given by civil servants reporting directly to the Executive. This was expressed as a matter of concern in the second reading of the Courts Bill in the House of Lords and was identified as an issue for debate in the House of Commons by the Select Committee considering the Bill. It is easy to dismiss this by stating that Justices' Clerks and the Legal Advisers are not "Judiciary" and therefore, not within the intended reforms. However, this would be to ignore the Justices' Clerks' Rules 1970, whereby Justices' Clerks, and advisers are under delegated powers given the same substantial judicial powers as are given to a single justice. They are able to make, not simply quasi-judicial but full, Judicial decisions. On the 9 May 2003, the Lord Chancellor announced his intention to create greater Case Management powers and that these powers were to be given, primarily, to the Justices' Clerks. This follows the pattern established in Family Cases by the Children Act 1989, where Clerks have successfully been involved in Case Management for 14 years. It is clear that the Justices' Clerk has to follow a Judicial rather than Administrative line.

  All levels of the Judiciary support the principal that Justices' Clerks should be outside the civil service. This has been clearly stated on many occasions. The Unified Administration Judicial Committee expressed unanimous support for the statement of Lord Justice Judge (Deputy Lord Chief Justice) who stated that "the independence of the Justices' Clerk needed to go beyond statute" and that "Judicial independence could only be achieved if appointment, deployment and discipline were outside the political processes. . . the same consideration applied to Judges as for Magistrates, and the independence of Justices' Clerks underpinned the independence of the Magistrates". These statements of support summarise the views of all groups of the Judiciary and the bodies that represent them, including the Magistrates' Association.

  There is also clear support for the proposal that the training of Justices' Clerks and Legal Advisers, should come under the umbrella of the Judicial Studies Board (JSB) as they are part of the "Judicial Family". This proposal has been accepted in principle by the JSB and only requires a formal direction to the JSB from the Lord Chancellor to become fact. There remain issues of resources and timing but these are not without possible solutions. The principle was well illustrated by Lord Justice Kay who said that the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee was developing procedures for every tier of court. It would be quite illogical if the legal advisers to the Magistrates were trained differently and/or separately to everyone else in the process. It could potentially undo all of the efforts of commonality being established by the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee.

  The public will require confidence and expect transparency in any new system. The current situation, on abolition of the post of Lord Chancellor, would result in Justices' Clerks and Legal Advisers being appointed by a politician, in the form of the Secretary of State for the Department of Constitutional Affairs. (At present the appointment by the Lord Chancellor is an appointment in his Judicial capacity). If the Justices' Clerk is a civil servant he or she will be bound by the civil service code and, although theoretically protected by statute, the day to day pressures could easily result in the Government's view of legislation, rather than an independent view, being presented. The clear separation of roles inherent in the proposal to abolish the role of the Lord Chancellor, will be specifically reversed in relation to Justices' Clerks, who are the legal advisers to the branch of the Judiciary that delivers 97 per cent of all criminal cases and a large percentage of Family cases. It is difficult to envisage how a member of the public could conclude that a civil servant appointed by a Government Minister will be open and transparently independent in the advice given in any situation.

  There are already many examples of attempts at inappropriate instruction or direction whilst the Justices' Clerks are outside the civil service.

TRUANCY

  As part of a Government initiative on Truancy, a circular was issued which gave guidance on how to address the problem and "offered" the assistance of a District Judge (Magistrates' Courts) to any area that did not currently have one, to ensure a greater consistency. The expectation appeared to be that the District Judge would deliver decisions which were "on message", whereas the lay magistracy could not be relied upon to achieve the desired results.

"OPERATION PAYBACK"

  "Operation Payback" was a specific initiative as part of the Government's drive to increase the percentage recovery of fines imposed by the courts. Part of the guidance contained a suggestion that, prior to the special court hearings taking place, there would be a meeting of all parties involved including the Justices and the Clerk. This was clearly inappropriate and would have compromised the court but the Department's lack of knowledge in this area led to these "instructions" being issued.

TRANSFER OF FINE ORDERS

  The decision to transfer a fine is a Judicial decision. The Department proposed to issue instructions that were "directory and mandatory". The effect would be that the Department would tell the Magistrates and the Justices' Clerks how and when to use their Judicial powers. This was challenged and corrected but, in the absence of challenge, the circular would have been issued. There is no guarantee that consultation will be considered under the Unified Administration.

UNDER 14'S ATTENDANCE AT COURT

  No child under the age of 14 can be present at criminal proceedings unless a specific criteria is met. The final decision whether to permit the child to view the court rests with the court sitting on the day. The Department wished courts to adopt a procedure whereby school parties, not just individual children, could be given an advance indication that all would be well if they attended the court.

  There can be no guarantee in advance of the court and the purpose behind the original legislation was to prevent under 14 year olds attending court. It is not for the Department to "find ways around" the legislation. If Parliament wishes to allow under 14 year olds to attend court then it can legislate, it is not for civil servants to re-write the law or try to regulate its effect.

  These attempts to enter into the judicial arena have so far been challenged and resisted but this will become increasingly difficult when the challenge relates not to an outside body but directly to ones' employer. Whilst protection is available by statute and the professional bodies, the practicalities of careers, promotion and location will actually be, or appear to be, an undermining factor which will bring into question the true independence of the post holder. Current holders of the post of Justices' Clerk may be willing to resist now, but three or four generations on, what will be the culture in an environment where "true" independence has never been experienced?

  The Department for Constitutional Affairs has expressed a concern that if the Justices' Clerks were outside the civil service, there would be a lack of accountability. The Justices' Clerk is not trying to evade accountability, but the possibility of inappropriate influence. The Justices' Clerk in his judicial role is accountable, as with any Judicial decision, through the Higher Courts in individual cases. This process also guarantees consistency of advice. The resource management role can still be accountable to the Unified Administration and, on performance, to the Courts Board.

  Justices' Clerks would, in relation to the provision of training, be accountable to the Judicial Studies Board (JSB), with, ultimately, their involvement in training being terminated if they fail to meet the standards set by the JSB. The Justices' Clerks can still be a member of the Area Senior Management Team as, from a position of independence, there should be no compromise to their Judicial independence. The Legal Advisers would become civil servants but their independence would be guaranteed through the Justices' Clerk. The only person who can direct the Legal Advisers on law is the Justices' Clerk. Delegated powers to Legal Advisers and other staff stem from the Justices' Clerk and can be removed if their operation is being abused.

  Being outside the civil service would not prevent the Justices' Clerk from being the line manager of the legal team; this could either operate by virtue of the statute or by an additional contract term for legal staff. The Justices' Clerk could still give legal assistance to the administration staff and the Area Director.

  The clear belief of the Justices' Clerks' Society is that the Justices' Clerk should not be a civil servant but should be:

    —  A Judicial Officer appointed by the Judicial Appointments Committee.

    —  Bound by an appropriate Judicial Officer's Oath for the office held.

    —  Assigned to a specific area.

    —  Accountable for their overall performance with appraisal possibly through a 360º model.

  This would ensure independence and establish an important constitutional principle whilst still being engaged with the Unified Administration, responsible for the line management of the legal team, responsible for the training of Magistrates and legal staff and fully accountable. It would also ensure a more open and transparent system which would improve public confidence. Entry into the civil service would inevitably lead to control, compromise and lack of confidence.

April 2004



 
previous page contents next page

House of Lords home page Parliament home page House of Commons home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2004