Select Committee on European Union Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 184 - 199)

WEDNESDAY 3 MARCH 2004

DR CATHERINE BARNARD AND MR RICHARD HOBBS

  Q184  Chairman: First, may I welcome you on behalf of the Sub-Committee on Social Policy and Consumer Affairs, with which you are familiar now. I think you are very much in demand at the moment, Dr Barnard, and so we are glad to have you here. Thank you also for the short extra document which summarises to some degree the points from your report. I had a very long breakfast this morning; that is to say, I re-read your entire report this morning and so I am right up to date. We are very pleased to have you here and it is a great advantage to us. This session is open to the public and may be recorded for broadcasting. The verbatim transcript will be sent to you for correction. In due course, it will be published, after you have had a look at it, with the Sub-Committee's report. We are trying to move quite fast, as you know, because of the European Commission's deadline. We like to get ahead of events. If you do make corrections, perhaps you could do that fairly rapidly. The interests of the members of this Sub-Committee are on the table in front of you. Would you like to make an opening statement?

  Dr Barnard: We are happy to take questions. You have probably heard enough from us already in terms of looking at the report.

  Q185  Chairman: We have questions covering quite a wide range of points, but if I could launch myself with just one or two points of a general nature. We are very grateful for a report which covers a lot of evidence and facts about what is going on. Could you explain very briefly the structure and methodology for the rest of us here, and why the case studies were fairly limited in number? They did cover quite a number of employees; I do understand that, but there was a fairly limited number of case studies. Could you give us a brief word on that first?

  Dr Barnard: Just to give you a word of background, the Commission put this report out for tender and we tendered, along with, I gather, a number of other participants. We were successful in the tender. We delivered exactly what the Commission wanted, indeed slightly more than the Commission wanted. I should make clear that it was a fairly small budget report. The Commission wanted us to talk to the so-called social partners—so management and labour plus the main institutional players, the DTI, ACAS, HSE—as well as doing some more specific employer-based interviews. We operated a tiered approach. We interviewed, first of all, the public officials, and then we also interviewed representatives of both the employers and employees: the main employers' groups and also the main employee representatives. Those interviews gave us some indications of appropriate case studies. We had agreed with the Commission that we should take about five specific sectors. We chose those sectors in a variety of ways. We sat down and thought in what sectors the opt-out was most likely to be pertinent. Having come up with a list ourselves—the sectors you see in front of you like education, construction, financial and legal—we then tried to find an appropriate mix of employers, and so our mix was both small and large employers, unionised and non-unionised employers, and public and private sector employers. What we hope we achieved, and indeed the Commission said that they were extremely pleased with what we did produce, was a report which was able to map and represent the views of the different sides of industry, plus sector-specific case studies. You alluded to the fact that we used a rather small number of case studies. Once again, I want to reiterate that the Commission's budget for this research was extremely small. While of course the case study approach is not representative, we hope we did, on the basis of our experience and empirical work in related fields, get some useful case studies and produce some useful information.

  Q186  Lord Colwyn: It sounds like you worked more that 46 hours a week?

  Dr Barnard: It is astonishing that anyone who has anything to do with the Working Time Directive always exceeds the statutory maximum working hours. We have not signed up to that.

  Q187  Chairman: I wanted to ask one further question and that is about the misunderstanding about applying the Directive, not from yourselves but outside in business and elsewhere. In your report there is quite a lot of reference to that, and in particular to Regulation 20 and what is and what is not an autonomous worker. We could have thought of some very simple way of saying what is an autonomous worker, but we did not. It does seem from your report, and working from your report only, that there is quite a lot of difficulty among practical people in applying the autonomous worker definition as a consequence of the opt-out. Would you like to comment on that?

  Mr Hobbs: Yes. There are some grey areas as well as some specific derogations. You have alluded to one, which is obviously the autonomous worker provisions in Regulation 20 and Article 17(1) of the Directive. I think that is a matter of concern to us, that the Commission's Communication fails really to address this issue of the autonomous workers. Perhaps we could cover that point in a little more detail during the session. That is one area. Another grey area is that the law says there should be an agreement in writing and it does not make clear whether that agreement should be a separate agreement from the contract of employment. We did find in one of our case studies that the opt-out agreement was included as a standard term of the contract. Our employment law practitioner, who has specific experience of working in this field, said that in about 50 per cent of cases he included the opt-out as a standard term in the contractual package. As I say, it is debatable. It is a grey area: should it be separate or is it allowed to be in the standard terms of the contract? Another grey area was about the need to keep up-to-date records. It is unclear what form those up-to-date records should actually take. We found that in most case studies there was no central record of people who had opted out. Obviously now, the way the law is drafted in the UK, that implies that there is no need to keep a record of hours worked once somebody has opted out. We found that that was very much the case, that people were not keeping this information. The Health and Safety Executive did say that where enforcement action has been taken, it is about record-keeping as much if not more than actual hours worked. Those are some of the grey areas where there are difficulties. There were also some specific cases where there were deviations from the law. Some people had actually included an agreement to opt into the 48 hour week, as much as to opt out of the 48 hour week. In fact in an interview with one HR director, in talking about this, she almost reversed the regulatory presumption by saying that they would have to sign the agreement to opt in so that the regulations would apply to them. There was a misunderstanding there. Opt-out agreements have also included issues such as rest breaks and night work as well as the 48 hour week. There was some misunderstanding, as you say, about applying the regulations.

  Dr Barnard: That means, and as you know the opt-out is very narrowly drawn, that you can only opt out from the 48 hour week. We did find evidence of employers getting employees to sign to opt out of rest breaks, holiday entitlement and so forth, which is absolutely unlawful. We also found that the tribunals were having difficulty applying the regulations. This stems from the rather rigid distinction in the Directive and the regulations themselves between the concept of entitlements and the concept of limits. As you know, there is a limit on working time and a limit on night work, but only an entitlement to rest breaks. The limits are enforced through criminal action, whereas the entitlements are enforced through civil action, which creates a lacuna for individual employees who would actually like to enforce the 48 hour week but they are left with a criminal action that is meant to be brought by the HSE or local authorities. To our knowledge, only one single prosecution has ever been brought under the working time regulations. So there is this lacuna for individual employees who want to enforce their rights. Although in quite an important case called Barber v RJB Mining, the High Court said the 48 hour limit would become a term of the contract, for rather important legal reasons it is difficult to enforce that in the tribunal unless your employment has been terminated. That is why tribunals, quite understandably, have been seeking to give remedies to employees and workers who have been forced to work in excess of the 48 hours, but, strictly and legally speaking, that is actually in breach of the regulations and it is ultra vires the powers of the tribunal. They have been giving compensatory awards, admittedly quite small awards, of about £100.

  Q188  Chairman: I did notice in your report that you were explicitly illustrating that a number, one or two, of the judgments of the employment tribunals were based erroneously on Regulation 30. That was also the case in Watson v Swallow Hotels. I totally agree with you but it does show, coming back to my basic point, that there is quite a bit of misunderstanding right through the system at the moment. We will probably find that quite important when we come to the report.

  Q189  Baroness Howarth of Breckland: I want to talk a bit about the evidence base of the report. I cannot claim, unlike the Chair, to have read every single word, although I have read the summaries. I am informed, but not to the degree of the Chair. I am interested, and it is reinforced by what you have said about the budget and the level of the work, in the evidence base. It is clearly empirical and it is a reasonable size but, in terms of the whole work force, in percentage terms is not huge. I just wondered what weight you think we could give to that and whether you think there could be more analytical research carried out if the resources were available and what would give us the proper evidence about the uses and abuses of the system.

  Dr Barnard: I think our methodology is totally legitimate. Indeed, a lot of empirical research is done on this basis, a relatively small number of case studies but done properly or as properly as possible within the confines of resources. The other possible approach, and one which the Commission absolutely did not fund and was not requesting anyway, would be a much larger statistically representative survey of   perhaps 1,000 employers sending out full questionnaires to employees and working on that basis. The Commission absolutely did not want that and did not fund it. However, the DTI commissioned parallel research at the same time as we were doing our own. The CBI, the EEF and the Institute of Directors have all done their own research, as much as they can. It is important that we did what the Commission asked but the Commission asked us as academics, being as impartial as we could be, just to try and map and indeed tell the story of what seems to be going on with the opt-out. Of course, it was not just our report that the Commission was relying on. They received all the evidence from these other groups, and indeed they cite some of it in their own consultation document. I think it would be a fair summary to say that if you look at the evidence as a whole, both the DTI-commissioned work, the other employer organisations' commissioned work and our own, you actually get quite a lot. The story is largely the same, namely that there is quite a lot of use of the opt-out; there is quite a lot of use of the opt-out because it is so convenient, because the rest of the regulations are so user unfriendly. There is quite a lot of use of the opt-out where it is not actually necessary at all, but employers do it to cover their backs. In certain circumstances, there is some misuse or abuse of the opt-out. I know that the issue of the abuse of the opt-out is one that you are concerned about. The question is: what is meant by abuse? To what extent is it abusive to ask me when I am starting my first job in one of the City law firms, as in the case of the students that I deal with on a daily basis, to sign the opt-out when I sign my contract? Is it abusive to ask me to do that when I am informed that I can back in to the 48 hour working week? I sign this because I know that it will help my career, because the culture in the City is long hours and because ultimately I may well be made a partner, and one of the ways of being made a partner is to show my commitment and I demonstrate my commitment through long hours. Is that abuse or is that just more indirect pressure because we know that is the culture in which the work is being done?

  Q190  Baroness Howarth of Breckland: The next question is not on my list of questions but from what you have just said: in your research, did you find that, by having the pressure of the Directive, people were finding alternative solutions to work problems rather than, as you were saying, just being almost bullied into signing the document because that is the way your career moves forward?

  Dr Barnard: We found that because the opt-out was the easy response to a lot of these really quite difficult issues, employers resorted to the opt-out and thus did not try to find more innovative solutions to the more structural problems about why there is such a long hours' culture in British workplaces. From that point of view, you could perhaps argue that the use of the opt-out is a barrier to some form of innovative practices. I think it is quite striking, in the couple of instances that were reported to us where quite major reforms were put in place to workforce practices, that that was because the HR person thought that the opt-out was about to disappear. You could argue that the opt-out to that extent might be a barrier to reform in some circumstances.

  Mr Hobbs: That was the case on a couple of occasions. There were a couple of occasions in small engineering companies where there had been radical change in the shift patterns for economic reasons and so one of the firms had faced a 50 per cent fall in demand and had been taken over by the French parent company. They had moved from what they called a typical UK manufacturing site of a day shift and a night shift and lots of overtime and now they had a double day shift of 6 to 2 and then 2 till 10. When there is an economic imperative, and perhaps firms believe there is an economic imperative, they will probably innovate and they will move. Perhaps they just do not see complying with law as a sufficient incentive, if you like, for them to start innovating. I think you said something about bullying of workers to sign an opt-out. One of the union respondents said that it is almost as much a conspiracy between workers and their employers and the workers are quite happy to keep doing overtime when they get paid time and a half for doing almost the same work. So they are happy, not in every case, I agree, but in general to go along with this and sign the opt-out to get the overtime pay as much as employers like using the opt-out to have the flexibility and benefits that they see coming from using the opt-out. It is not necessarily a case of always bullying employees to use the opt-out.

  Q191  Lord Colwyn: My suspicion would be that the opt-out clause might either appear in very small print so it was not terribly obvious, unless the workers are perhaps in a more union-based situation where it is more obvious. Do you feel that then it is going through without being really noticed by the workers? Do you see contracts? Did you talk to workers who knew they had signed the opt-out?

  Mr Hobbs: We did see several opt-out agreements but, we did not interview workers. From what employers told us there was an occasion in one of the case studies when the opt-out was a standard term of contract but in others they said, "Yes, it is a separate agreement. We explained to them that this is their right and they have a choice." We have to take their word on that. In some cases the circumstances were such as to raise questions such as when one employer had consistently referred to the need to work long hours throughout the recruitment process.

  Q192  Lord Colwyn: When you take on a new credit card, for instance, you know you should read the small print, but you do not, do you? I just wondered whether it was something similar to that?

  Mr Hobbs: I think that happens on occasions. It is hard for us to say from our evidence because we did not speak to the workers as such. I would also say that where there was a union presence in organisations, I do not think that made any difference to people not signing it. The general view was: we will have a chat about it with the unions as to how we shall do this and shall it be a seven-day notice period or a three-month notice period? They would agree that is all right, and the people can sign it. Again, that is very much a generalisation; there are specific examples where that was not necessarily the case.

  Q193  Baroness Howarth of Breckland: I understand you to be saying that the workforce generally thinks it is all right, but the report was made before the amendment of the Directive came in during August, and we heard a lot about the doctors and particularly in relation to junior doctors. Would that amendment change any of your report's findings, do you think, and are you aware of any significant changes since your research was carried out that would call for further analysis?

  Dr Barnard: We do not think that the 2000 Directive would make a significant difference to our findings. Of course, we know that there is a serious problem with doctors. The Directive, as you know, tiers the reduction of the working week. The problem with doctors is what constitutes working time and the definition of working time. This, of course, takes us to the judgments of the European Court of Justice in SiMAP and Jaeger where the Court of Justice gives quite a broad, generous definition of working time; if you are on call and on the premises, that time constitutes working time. Therefore, we imagine that there is even greater pressure to use the opt-out for doctors, not just junior doctors, and to make sure that there is no breach of the law in respect of those doctors. I think it is very interesting that the opt-out, when the basic 1993 Directive was introduced, was taken advantage of only by the UK and Ireland and Ireland phased it out, and it is now being introduced on a sectoral basis in a number of countries to deal with this very specific problem of what constitutes working time.

  Q194  Baroness Howarth of Breckland: Can you clear up one matter? Your article in the Financial Times of 6 January suggests that you felt that your report had rather inaccurate coverage in the media and elsewhere. Could you tell us what that is about and where you think inaccurate coverage has come?

  Dr Barnard: When the Commission asked us to write the report, they decided to make it a confidential document, which meant that we were not allowed to talk about it to the press. It also meant that the only way that people could gain access to the document was by using the access to information procedures under European Community law. To my knowledge, the Commission has been willingly giving out our report to anyone who has requested it, but we have not been able to give out our own report or talk about it. That led to the fact that certain interest groups used our report to support their own particular agendas. That caused us certain difficulties because we felt that our report, which had been commissioned to be as fair and balanced as possible—and it is something the Commission said we had achieved well in their view—was not being fairly represented. In the end, the Commission agreed that we could write a piece to the FT to try and say that the situation was more complex than it first appeared, particularly on this question of abuse and what actually constitutes abuse. It goes back to the question: to what extent is there arm-behind-the-back direct form of pressure, of which we did not find that much evidence, and to what extent is there also the indirect pressure in the example I have given you about City firms where the expectation is of long hours and so people sign the opt-out. Of course, it depends how you define abuse.

  Q195  Baroness Howarth of Breckland: Can I ask you the obvious question: do you not think it would be better if this was on the open market and the internet and everyone could read it?

  Dr Barnard: Yes, I agree.

  Q196  Lord Harrison: On balance, what do you believe the impact would be on UK competitiveness if the opt-out were removed? In a way, I think Mr Hobbs touched on this in the sense that he implied that there were other issues involved in British competitiveness. Would you like to expand on that?

  Mr Hobbs: Probably the findings from our study are relatively inconclusive about the arguments for and against using the op-out on business efficiency grounds. Yes, we found that some employers said that if the opt-out goes, that was significantly going to increase their costs and that will make them uncompetitive against foreign competitors who are not in the EU. There was a definite cost issue, and basically that was related to the need for more labour but also indirect costs; you might need more plant and machinery, cars and uniforms. There was an issue that it could increase costs. There was another argument that it is actually more efficient just to use existing workers rather than take on new people so as to comply with a lower limit. That could be the case for highly skilled employees and operating plant. It could also be the case in law firms and investment banks where individuals have critical knowledge and a key person relationship applies. If the opt-out went,  we could say that that might damage competitiveness. Some said it provides operational flexibility. For a food manufacturer, demand could increase by 50 per cent on a daily basis. They said that to respond to that they have the opt-out that allows them to increase their production and it would be difficult to plan that into an annualised system. With financial services, the investment banks said that when they had been doing merger and acquisition deals, there was a need for people to work very intensely and it is not easy to plan that sort of work into an annualised hours system.

  Q197  Lord Harrison: Could I press you on this, in the sense that I think you are being good researchers and describing the field as it was told to you but what I am trying to press you on is: did you weigh up the kinds of answers that you were getting so that you were able to come to a view, at the end of the day, about whether any claim that competitiveness would be hurt was a genuine one, more than just an anxiety? Was it your then view, taking a bird's eye view, to say that that really is something we should worry about?

  Mr Hobbs: As I said, we did weigh the evidence and we did balance the evidence that we were given. At the end of the day, on balance it is quite a difficult decision to draw from quite a limited field. The evidence on balance was inconclusive. I have gone through some of the arguments that say if the opt-out went, then, yes, it could be damaging to UK competitiveness. On the other hand, I can give you arguments to say it is probably damaging UK competitiveness to maintain the opt-out, to use the opt-out and then maintain that the UK has a culture of long hours. I could go through those arguments. My point is that we weighed the elements, we balanced the evidence; we did not have to put a conclusion like that forward in our report but our conclusion would be that on balance it is difficult to say from our evidence.

  Q198  Lord Harrison: You also mention, and this is something that we had told us by the TUC, that there were other issues which affect competitiveness but trying to work in with WTD acted as a catalyst to further those other avenues, which should have been gone down to increase competitiveness. There have been some clear examples from the NHS with the "Hospital at Night" project and so on. If all those are taken into account, and in the one sense all those things should have been done anyway, I would have thought by any enlightened management, is there still on the edge this question of the length of the working day, the working hours?

  Mr Hobbs: I think it is very difficult to say. If you remove the individual opt-out, how is that going to relate to increased investment in capital machinery or capital investment, and how is it going to relate to increased training because those are very complex and big issues in themselves? We would say, on the other hand, yes, we found evidence, for example from the CBI, that there is an over-reliance on the opt-out where a change in organisation or working practice is warranted. Yes, in some cases it has been a barrier to innovation. In some cases I would say it is damaging competitiveness and it has perhaps been easier, as we have said, for some managers to say that they will just use the opt-out rather than digging deep and looking at the whole issue of work organisation. However, one important point here is that it is very easy just to dismiss the view that, "Oh, well, there is a culture of long hours working in the UK" because employers' organisations and the unions themselves recognise that there is a difficulty in reducing workers' hours if it is going to mean reducing workers' pay. That is doubtless going to involve an awful lot of tricky negotiations. Some organisations were quite frank with us in saying that perhaps these are difficult issues that they do not want to get involved with because it could actually lead to more industrial disputes and more problems. In the broader picture, you could say that that could damage competitiveness. It is not easy just to say whether or not it is going to damage competitiveness; it is a very complex issue. I think that is what our report observed. I think the Commission recognised that as well.

  Q199  Chairman: Could I come on to the reference period? Of course, this is linked with the fact that we have a relatively low number of collective agreements in the UK; indeed, we have not got many workforce agreements either because they are too complicated or businesses do not want to get involved in that. If you could get a situation in which the reference period were extended, for example to 12 months, without the need for collective agreements, do you think that would go some way to solving our problems? There is some information from the DTI's estimation of hours worked over a whole year, for example, in your report. I would like your comment on that.

  Dr Barnard: I think it would help because if you are just calculating the 48 hours over a four month or 17-week reference period, it is tricky and it is difficult to accommodate peaks and troughs in demand. I do think that a 12-month reference period would help. However, there is still a number of employees, and I think the labour force survey indicated 1.8 million employees or workers who would still exceed the 48-hour limit, even if it was referenced over 12 months. It also would not help those areas where they are dealing with labour shortages, skills shortages. Even if the working week was referenced over 12 months, you could not actually get other people in to do the jobs because there just are not the skills there. Some companies told us of the problems about the pressure on flexibility, that you cannot programme your peaks and troughs in advance even over a 12-month cycle rather than over a shorter period. Of course, finally, it would not help to deal with the situation of those employed on very short, fixed-term contracts. If you are employed under a four month or a six month contract, having your working time referenced over a year would not be of much use.

  Chairman: I will ask Lord Colwyn to move on to the point about junior doctors, about which we have had quite a lot of evidence. That is going to be very disruptive and a problem.


 
previous page contents next page

House of Lords home page Parliament home page House of Commons home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2004