APPENDIX 1
Seminar at the Royal Institute of International
Affairs
Present:
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff,
Lord Hunt of Chesterton,
Lord Mitchell (Chairman),
Lord Soulsby of Swaffham Prior,
Lord Wade of Chorlton
Baroness Hilton of Eggardon,
Lord McColl of Dulwich,
Lord Oxburgh,
Baroness Walmsley,
Lord Wright of Richmond
They were supported by Rebecca Neal (Clerk), Jonathan
Radcliffe (Specialist Assistant) and Professor Philippe Sands
QC (Specialist Adviser).
| Participants were: |
|
| Duncan Brack, | Head of Sustainable Development Programme, Royal Institute of International Affairs
|
| Jo Chataway, | Senior Lecturer, Open University
|
| John Dudeney, | Deputy Director, British Antarctic Survey
|
| Robert Falkner, | Associate Fellow, Royal Institute of International Affairs
|
| Dougal Goodman, | Director, Foundation for Science and Technology
|
| Nicky Grandy, | Secretary, International Whaling Commission
|
| Dave Griggs, | Head of Hadley Centre, Met Office
|
| Lord Jenkin of Roding, | Chairman, Foundation for Science and Technology
|
| Philip Kendall, | Select Committee Liaison, FCO
|
| Andrew Levi, | Head of Aviation, Maritime and Energy Department, FCO
|
| Alistair McGlone, | Head of the Environment International Division, Defra Legal Services Directorate
|
| Doug Parr, | Chief Scientist, Greenpeace
|
| Amanda Plimmer, | Science Strategy Team, Defra
|
| John Pyle, | Professor of Chemistry, Director of Centre for Atmospheric Science, Cambridge University
|
| Mike Richardson, | Head of Polar Regions Unit, FCO
|
| Jane Rumble, | Deputy Head of Polar Regions Unit, FCO
|
| |
Duncan Brack, Head of Sustainable Development Programme, Royal
Institute of International Affairs chaired the seminar.
OVERVIEW OF
THE NATURE
OF INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS
Professor Philippe Sands QC, specialist adviser to the Committee
and Professor of Law at University College London.
1. Professor Sands provided an overview about the nature
of international agreements and how they are adopted.
2. The agreements with which the Committee was concerned
were public, binding, and international in nature.
3. There were three main types of agreement: the majority
were bilateral; some were regional; and some were global.
4. Global agreements ranged from those relating to climate
change and the ozone layer, to whaling and to biodiversity. There
had been at least 120 significant agreements adopted over the
previous eight years.
5. The manner in which science was incorporated into
agreements differed widely depending on the subject matter, the
terms of the treaty, the political background to the subject,
and the level of involvement by NGOs. At each stage of the process
of international agreements, science could play a role.
6. The major steps to an agreement were as follows:
(a) Deciding on the need for an agreement. Science could
inform a decision as to whether a subject needed an agreement.
Economic and social considerations could also play a role here.
(b) The formal negotiation process. Nation states brought
scientific perspectives to bear at the negotiating table. At the
table there would be a range of scientific opinions and also a
range of views about the relationship between scientific and non-scientific
considerations. NGOs would not normally formally participate in
these negotiations.
(c) Adopting an agreement. First, there was usually a
framework agreement, which was not usually very directive in tone.
This framework agreement might establish a Committee system with
a Secretariat to carry out more detailed work.
(d) Agreements subsequent to the framework agreement.
Subsequent agreements could take a number of forms, including
protocols. These would provide more detail than the framework
agreement.
(e) Domestic implementation. The nature of agreements
meant that there was often scope for different interpretations
of what the agreement required of the nation state.
(f) Potential disputes about the implementation of international
agreements. Some international agreements had dispute settlement
bodies.
INCORPORATING SCIENCE
7. Secretariats of agreements had different arrangements
for keeping up to date with and integrating science. Professor
Sands suggested the following points should be kept in mind throughout
the inquiry:
(a) the vast majority of international agreements did
not have formal methods for integrating science;
(b) only a significant minority had scientific committees;
(c) only a tiny minority of agreements had access to a
scientific body which worked to reach a scientific consensus (for
example the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change—IPCC);
(d) it would not always be possible to reach scientific
consensus, particularly in cases where scientific information
was lacking.
INVOLVEMENT OF
SCIENTISTS
Professor John Pyle, Director of Centre for Atmospheric Science,
Cambridge University.
8. Professor Pyle spoke about his involvement in writing
reports on the scientific assessment of ozone depletion as requested
by the Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol.
9. The co-chairs of the scientific group in charge of
writing the report developed a report outline and then invited
lead authors to assemble writers to produce chapters.
10. Lead authors and members of writing teams had been
drawn from a wide range of countries. Approximately 50 per cent
of the writers had been suggested by nation States; others had
been recommended by scientists already involved. Professor Pyle
emphasised that the best scientists had been involved.
11. The report was produced in little over a year. The
second draft of the report had been sent out to 133 reviewers.
There was then a week-long panel review which involved further
reviewers.
12. No one had been paid to be involved.
13. In order to maintain credibility the following had
been adhered to:
— participants should be scientific experts,
— there should be no policy statements in the report,
— there should be no pushing of particular research
agendas,
— all sources for the report were peer reviewed,
published or "in press". Dr Dave Griggs, Head of the
Hadley Centre.
14. Dr Griggs spoke about his involvement with the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change.
15. The IPCC provided objective core policy relevant
information. This was used by parties to the UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change to inform subsequent decisions. The IPCC secretariat
consisted of four staff members. It was funded by governments,
but this funding was not secured by the UNFCCC.
16. The IPCC produced regular assessment reports with
input from its three working groups. The Reports from each of
the three working groups included a short summary for policy makers
along with a longer technical summary and then chapters underlying
both those summaries.
17. The most recent report had been prepared by 122 lead
authors, 515 contributing authors, 21 review editors and 420 expert
reviewers 99 countries had been represented.
18. The summary for policy makers had been agreed line
by line at a plenary inter-governmental meeting in January 2001.
If there were significant concerns expressed about the scientific
evidence put forward in the report, it would be possible to acknowledge
this deviation in footnotes. This had not occurred.
VALUES AND
SCIENCE IN
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
19. Dr Robert Falkner, of the Royal Institute of International
Affairs
20. Dr Falkner explained that multilateral environmental
agreements (MEAs) were inherently precautionary: most MEAs were
adopted on the basis of limited scientific understanding: for
example, the Montreal Protocol, the Kyoto Protocol and the Cartagena
Protocol.
21. There were two main ways to dealing with questions
of scientific uncertainty and precaution in MEAs:
(a)
risk assessment could be centralised and an institution could
be asked to provide regular scientific reviews (the IPCC performed
this function for the Kyoto Protocol). The implication behind
this was that the scientific consensus could be reached and that
decisions on risk should be taken at an international level;
(b)
risk assessment and decision making could be decentralised (Cartagena
Protocol). Differences in risk perception would persist and so
decisions should be taken at the level of the nation State.
22. The precautionary principle was increasingly informing
MEAs. Precautionary action should:
(a) be prudent in order to protect the environment and
interest of future generations;
(b) be based on sufficient evidence but in advance of
scientific proof;
(c) be justified on the basis of reasonable judgements
of cost effectiveness; and
(d) place the burden of proof on those seeking a change
from the status quo.
23. A sharp distinction between value driven and science
driven international agreements could not be drawn.
Dr Douglas Parr, Chief Scientist at Greenpeace.
24. Dr Parr spoke about those international agreements
which particularly involved the precautionary principle (see below).
25. Science could not act as a universal language or
prevent values playing a key role. However, sometimes science
had encouraged political forces over the need for an agreement.
For example, science relating to ozone depletion had encouraged
politicians to take action and develop an agreement.
26. Scientists also played a role in appraising and developing
technology in order to develop alternative methods of taking action,
such as by producing CFC-free products to facilitate action to
prevent growth of the ozone hole.
Dr Nicky Grandy of the International Whaling Commission.
27. Dr Grandy pointed out that any views she expressed
were those of the IWC secretariat and not necessarily of member
countries.
28. The impact of whaling on human groups had now been
included as part of the scientific assessment relating to whaling.
29. Values were probably the most important factor in
international agreements. Values relating to whaling had changed
over time, with now a significant number of countries opposed
to any degree of whaling.
30. Taking a precautionary approach relating to whaling
agreements could help and should be employed.
31. There was need for a consistent approach about how
to cope with scientific uncertainty.
Dr Joanna Chataway of the Open University.
32. Dr Chataway suggested that science was traditionally
viewed as an independent source of objective knowledge, which
could bridge gaps between different political and cultural positions
in order to reach consensus in international agreements.
33. When the primary aim of an international agreement
was to increase economic integration, there would not be so many
concerns about acknowledging scientific uncertainty, and there
would be a firmer consensus. Scientific uncertainty was much more
likely to be acknowledged in agreements which had primarily social
aims. Nation States would then have the opportunity to take up
a scientific position which supported the interests of their country.
This could be prevent a strong consensus and might lead to a broader,
less directive agreement being reached.
POINTS RAISED
IN DISCUSSION
34. The Government Chief Scientist and departmental Chief
Scientific Advisers should, and did, play an important role in
keeping Ministers and officials informed of scientific developments
in areas relevant to international agreements.
35. Coordination relating to international agreements
between government departments could be improved.
36. In some cases communication between Government and
the scientific community could be enhanced. In relation to some
international agreements officials felt well served by the scientific
community.
37. Measures needed to be taken to increase awareness
in the scientific community about international agreements and
the role they should play in communicating with governments.
38. Countries carried out negotiations in different ways:
(a) In the UK, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office would
generally take the lead. The lead official would not usually have
a legal background. There would be co-ordination with relevant
Government departments prior to negotiation but there would be
scope to change position at the table.
(b) In the USA, the State Department always led. They
would have extensive briefings with all relevant departments in
Washington DC and a position would be agreed prior to the negotiations.
The State Department would have to return to Washington DC to
consult with other departments before deviating from the agreed
position.
(c) Germany often had a large delegation with representatives
from all different departments at the negotiating table.
39. In the UK, Cabinet Committees would be appointed
for very significant agreements.
40. Industry could have a significant presence at negotiations.
They would not have representatives at the table, but could sit
in the room and would be there to inform Government representatives.
On occasion there could be more industry representatives than
delegates.
41. Many MEAs required commitment from developing countries
(such as the Convention for Biological Diversity and the Kyoto
Protocol). Therefore, it was very important to ensure that scientists
of developing countries were involved in scientific assessments.
The IPCC covered expenses of participants from developing countries
in order to enable them to attend meetings.
42. Issues of funding for scientists to be involved in
scientific assessment should be considered when negotiating agreements.
43. Scientists needed to "sell" their success
stories of how international agreements could lead to change;
the ozone hole and the Montreal Protocol was a particularly good
example.
44. Agreements should be responsive to changes in scientific
understanding. This could be achieved by having regular scientific
meetings to feed into Conference of the Parties.
Visit to Antarctica
1. The Committee visited a British Antarctic Survey base
on the Antarctic Peninsula and the Falkland Islands. Lord Mitchell
(Chair), Lord Oxburgh and Baroness Walmsley represented the Committee
and Rebecca Neal, Clerk of the Committee, accompanied them. Professor
John Lawton, Chief Executive of the Natural Environment Research
Council (NERC), Dr Tim Moffat, Assistant to the Director of BAS,
Professor Chris Rapley, Director of BAS and Dr Andrew Tyler were
also present throughout the visit.
2. The Antarctic comprises seven claimant territories,
one of which is the British Antarctic Territory (the others are
territories of Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand
and Norway. The Antarctic Treaty entered into force in 1961, with
the objectives to:
— keep Antarctica demilitarised, to establish it
as a nuclear-free zone, and to ensure that it is used for peaceful
purposes only;
— promote international scientific cooperation in
Antarctica; and
— set aside disputes over territorial sovereignty.
3. There are five further agreements which govern activities
in the Antarctic and, collectively known as the Antarctic Treaty
System, namely:
— Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic
Fauna and Flora (adopted June 1964).
— Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals
(adopted December 1972, entered into force March 1978).
— Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine
Living Resources (CCAMLR) (adopted May 1980, entered into force
April 1982).
— Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral
Resource Activities (CRAMRA) (adopted June 1988, but superseded
by the Environmental Protocol (see below) and unlikely to enter
into force).
— Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic
Treaty (adopted October 1991, entered into force January 1998).
4. The British Antarctic Survey aims to carry out world-class
science in the Antarctic and related regions and to maintain "an
active and influential regional presence" in the Antarctic.
BAS has two research stations on the Antarctic, one at Rothera
on the Antarctic Peninsula.
5. The Committee visited Rothera from 9 January to 14
January. The aims for the visit were:
— To visit a scientific enterprise whose boundaries
and framework are entirely regulated by binding international
agreements;
— To inquire about and observe the ways in which
scientists from the countries which are party to these agreements
interpret them and how they work together;
— To learn from those involved in implementing the
agreements whether the scientific assumptions and technical information
which underpinned the agreements have, in the light of experience,
turned out to be adequate and accurate; and
— To establish what lessons may be learned that
are relevant to the drafting of future agreements which have scientific
implications.
SCIENCE IN
THE ANTARCTIC
6. The Committee heard that Rothera was BAS's largest
base and was occupied both in winter and in summer. It contributed
to earth systems science, looking at connections between the atmosphere,
the biosphere, geospheres, fresh water and the oceans. BAS conducted
research into marine and terrestrial biology, the ice sheet and
climate, the oceans and atmosphere and geology.
Marine and terrestrial biology
7. There were a number of ecologically simple communities
of organisms and plants which had evolved in the Antarctic to
be able to survive prolonged freezing. In contrast the marine
environment was one of the most thermally stable environments
at the Earth's surface. Scientific projects aimed to develop understanding
of how species cope with environmental change.
Ice sheet and climate
8. The Antarctic ice sheet played a key role in climate
and provided a record of climate extending back half a million
years.
Atmospheric science
9. Research aimed to facilitate understanding of what
the links are between the ice, ocean and atmosphere to develop
climate models, to be able to predict climate change over the
next 100 years.
Geology
10. The Antarctic had a geological history going back
more than 2,000 million years. Research into the rocks here helped
to understand environmental and continental change and how life
had evolved over time.
SUPPORT UNDERPINNING
THE SCIENCE
11. The science carried out by BAS contributed to understanding
the ozone hole, climate change, ecosystem science and could continue
to provide deeper knowledge about the physical world.
12. A significant amount of infrastructure and support
was required to carry out this science. The Committee visited
all areas of the base, from the kitchens to the desalination plant.
Of particular importance was the need to maintain a communications
tower, planes and a runway. Accurate weather forecasting was essential
as the weather was key to field trips and long distances were
flown across a number of weather systems. This was made clear
to the Committee when they flew about 200 miles south of Rothera
to visit field sites at Coal Nunatak and Fossil Bluff.
13. About half of the number of staff present at Rothera
were support staff, there to facilitate scientists to be able
to survive in as safe as an environment as possible.
14. Much research was carried out in the field and when
scientists go off base they are allocated a field assistant, an
expert in surviving safely in one of the most hostile environments
in the world, with temperatures way below freezing, high winds,
high ultra-violet radiation and a very dry atmosphere. The Committee
experienced the difficulties of living in the field, of setting
up and living in camp and of the dangers of very quick weather
changes from sunny and dry to very low visibility. They also saw
the importance of in-depth understanding of the terrain, of always
having to be aware of the possibility of crevasses.
SCIENCE AND
POLITICS
15. In order to be able to continue to carry out high
quality science, it was important that the pristine environment
of the Antarctic is protected as much as possible. To this end,
science and politics interacted on a daily basis, with the scientists'
activities both facilitated and constrained by the treaties.
16. The treaties relied on scientific information provided
by the Scientific Committee of Antarctic Research (SCAR) (via
its Standing Committee on the Antarctic Treaty System), a Committee
of the International Council for Science (ICSU). In particular
SCAR provided the scientific basis for all environmental decisions
relating to the Antarctic.
17. From 1961 representatives from the Antarctic Treaty
System were able to visit any other national station on the Antarctic
to view the facilities and to ensure that there is compliance
with the treaties. Rothera had been visited in January 1999 and
as a result had built a sewerage treatment plant.
18. Various environmental decisions had been taken by
the ATS without full and comprehensive scientific data. These
included:
(a)
Banning all dogs from the Antarctic. This was decided on the basis
that dogs introduced distemper into the seal population, which
had since been realised was not correct.
(b)
Introducing sewerage plants. It was still uncertain that this
was the best way to carry out waste disposal. Rothera was carrying
out a project to examine the impact of their sewerage system.
19. On-going debates included:
(a) The impact of humans on the pristine fragile environment—did
they introduce viruses for example? There was currently some pressure
to introduce legislation about this, yet this would be based on
sketchy data from research on one penguin population. It had been
surmised that humans eating chicken had introduced Newcastle's
disease. However, lawyers had now referred to the need to examine
chicken carcasses for signs of this disease, yet Newcastle's disease
could not be identified by visual checks. In addition it was not
clear that humans were the most likely source of alien viruses:
there were migratory species, such as skewers, which were known
to spend time in South America and had much closer contact with
penguin and seal populations than humans.
(b) Impact of tourism. Tourism at present was mostly confined
to ocean voyages with very few tourists landing. However, this
industry was only likely to increase and it was not established
what the likely impacts of this would be. Of greater concern was
that many tourist vessels did not have double-strengthened hulls
and often travelled through unchartered waters. There was a risk
of accidents through colliding with icebergs, which could lead
to a large number of deaths and injuries and would place a large
responsibility on the scientific bases to launch rescue operations
and to shelter survivors —which bases were not equipped
to deal with.
FALKLAND ISLANDS
20. The Committee met John Barton, Director of Fisheries
of the Falkland Islands Government, Paul Brickle, Fisheries Scientist,
Sasha Arkhipkan, Senior Fisheries Scientist, Phyllis Rendall,
Head of Mineral Resource, Falkland Islands Government, Howard
Pearce, Governor of Falkland Islands, Harriet Hall, Deputy Governor,
Gordon Liddle and Richard McGee, Andy Douse, Conservation Manager
of the Falklands, Drew Irvine, General Manager of Argos Limited.
PLUS names of all present at meal at Howard Pearce's—I am
not sure I have.
Falkland Islands Fisheries
21. South Georgia fishing territory was covered by CCAMLR,
the Falklands was not.
22. There were a number of conservation zones in the
Falkland Islands fisheries. Fishing needed to be carefully managed
and required international cooperation and good relationships
with industry to be able to do so.
23. The value of fisheries to the Falkland Islands was
about £200 million, with squid providing 70 per cent of the
catch.
24. There was cooperation with Argentina on fishing because
of the proximity of their waters. There was a bilateral Commission
(South Atlantic Fisheries Commission). This had a Scientific sub-committee
which discussed straddling stocks, addressed conservation issues,
shared licensing lists. Their recommendations were not binding.
25. Research tasks carried out in relation to fisheries
included examining diet, parsites, environmental issues, fecundity
and oceanography. The Falkland Islands Government Fisheries Department
collaborated closely with the University of Hull and Imperial
College.
26. Researchers played a very important role (many of
whom were affiliated with Imperial College), as independent observers
present on ships to calculate catches. They had also carried out
research about the impact on birds of longline fishing and various
steps had been taken to reduce the numbers of birds dying as a
result of being caught up in fishing lines.
South Georgia Fisheries
27. South Georgia was an unpopulated island (about 30
people were there, most of whom were British Antarctic staff).
Revenue generated from South Georgia was spent on conservation,
advice and research—it did not provide income for the Falkland
Islands. Allowing fishing to be conducted in that area meant that
it was controlled rather than allowing over-fishing and provided
opportunities for research.
28. CCAMLR set the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for each
species in South Georgia waters following reports from its Scientific
Committee.
Control of the High Seas
29. The High Seas were very unprotected as there was
no multilateral agreement about fishing there. This would be significant
to controlling poaching.
30. It was important that the UK ratified the Convention
of Petrels and Albatrosses, to help reduce bird mortality. It
would also be a big step to managing fishing fleets in international
waters. However, the EU had not yet adopted this and it could
be difficult for the UK to ratify without EU doing so.
Fishing Industry
31. Industry was mostly very happy with the observers
present on board as it is in industry's interest to address changes
to be able to continue fishing.
32. There were joint venture projects between industry
and treaties—Argos Fishing for example advised on compliance
with CCAMLR.
33. Industry, such as Argos, carried out research into
new fishing methods which would have less of a negative impact
on the environment and minimise bird deaths. Argos, in conjunction
with Imperial College, were also looking to develop a tamperproof
ship monitoring system and of more efficient and accurate ways
of recording catch.
34. The UK did not at present have an industry representative
at CCAMLR. There needed to be an over-arching industry body which
could send a representative but this had not yet proved forthcoming.
However, the FCO did work closely with Argos and others.
Falkland Islands and the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD)
35. There were some major conventions that Overseas Territories
of the United Kingdom had not ratified, such as the CBD.
36. The UK had set up the National Biodiversity Network
as a result of the CBD and it could be helpful to conservation
of species in the Falklands to expand this to cover there too.
THANKS
37. The Committee met a large number of people on this
visit all of whom were extremely welcoming and helpful. We would
like to thank them all and, in particular, Professor Chris Rapley
for providing us with this opportunity, the Base Commander of
Rothera, Steve Marshall, and the Governor of the Falkland Islands,
Howard Pearce for facilitating an extremely useful and interesting
visit.
Visit to Geneva
1. The Sub-Committee visited Geneva on 4 and 5 March
2004 and met representatives of a variety of agencies of the United
Nations and other international bodies. Members present were Baroness
Finlay of Llandaff, Baroness Hilton, Lord McColl of Dulwich, Lord
Mitchell (Chairman), Lord Oxburgh and Lord Wright of Richmond.
They were supported by Rebecca Neal and Michael Collon, Committee
Clerks, and Jonathan Radcliffe, Specialist Assistant. They were
accompanied by Bob Fairweather from the Office of the United Kingdom
Permanent Representative.
OFFICE OF
THE UK PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE (UKREP)
2. The Committee met Mr Nick Thorne, the United Kingdom
Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and were given
an overview of the work of the different United Nations agencies
in Geneva.
3. The Committee heard that the United Kingdom generally
enjoyed excellent relations with these bodies, and on a personal
level with members of their staff.
4. The FCO played an important coordinating role when
different UK government departments were working with UN agencies.
There was no Cabinet Office unit responsible for coordinating
work on international agreements, though there was such a unit
for European Union matters.
5. In many cases the work of the different UN agencies
overlapped. There were some excellent contacts between individuals
based in different agencies, and the work of UN agencies could
be further improved through more formal meetings. The UN Environment
Programme (UNEP) had the advantage that the different secretariats
worked in the same building.
6. The United Kingdom played a disproportionate role
in providing high quality scientific, medical and technical advice.
UNITED NATIONS
ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME
(UNEP)
UNEP Regional Office for Europe
7. The Committee met Mr Frits Schlingemann, Director,
UNEP Regional Office for Europe, and Mr Michael Williams from
the UNEP Information Office for Conventions.
8. The Committee were told that each of the Conventions
negotiated under the auspices of UNEP had a legally separate secretariat.
This could be unsatisfactory, especially as they were not all
located in the same place. Sometimes a government was prepared
to fund a secretariat on condition that it was located in that
country.
9. Most of these secretariats had their own scientific
advisory panels. On some topics, such as hazardous wastes, scientific
expertise was scarce. In general, governments nominated scientists
to serve the secretariats in an individual capacity on a part-time
and unpaid basis. Most were happy to come to Geneva for a few
days, even though this involved taking time off work.
10. It was felt that the approach of the Inter-governmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) could work in other areas, such
as tackling water issues. The World Conservation Monitoring Centre
(WCMC, based in Cambridge), which acted as UNEP scientific assessment
centre, was another good example.
11. The coordination between the different networks of
scientists left something to be desired. However at the Seventh
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD)
at Kuala Lampur in February 2004 the WCMC, with its extensive
network of expert sources, had been asked to support the work
of the CBD Secretariat, which was felt to be a breakthrough.
12. The momentum for new initiatives came not from scientists,
nor from the UN, but from the governments of the states party
to agreements. It would be difficult for the UN to take the initiative
unless mandated by governments. Agreements on chemicals, for example,
had effects on employment as well as on health and the environment,
and it was for governments to coordinate these.
13. The Member States of the European Union almost always
spoke with one voice, the position being coordinated in advance
of the meeting. Since the previous year this had included the
new Member States.
14. Funding was always a problem, especially when different
bodies with overlapping interests competed for funds. UNEP's budget
of $60 million a year, less than that of some non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), was made up of voluntary contributions from
governments, and so could be vulnerable. Some major States were
not prepared to provide funding if environmental conventions touched
on sensitive issues such as nuclear testing or chemical warfare.
Others took the view that the liberalisation of trade always made
money, while environmental agreements always cost money. The truth
was more complex.
15. International organisations could find it difficult
to criticise countries openly—UNEP reports would not pin
blame on one in particular. However, there were ways of identifying
culprits, as some of the information collected was in the public
domain. NGOs were therefore able to pick this up and use it more
directly to put pressure on governments.
16. The precautionary principle was found to be a helpful
input to the decision making process, although care had to be
taken when incorporating it into agreements. The language used
to express it differed between trade and environmental agreements.
Essentially it was thought to be an extension of an Environmental
Impact Assessment, which was an accepted instrument.
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)
17. The Committee met Mr Willem Wijnstekers, Secretary-General
of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES), and Mr David Morgan, Chief of
the CITES Scientific Support Unit.
18. The Committee learned that CITES regulated the trade
in some 5,000 endangered animal and 28,000 plant species. This
did not include all the world's endangered species since many
were not traded. There were 165 signatory States. Each country
designated authorities for liaison with the CITES Secretariat.
In the United Kingdom the designated authorities were the Department
for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) for administrative
matters and the Joint Nature Conservation Committee and Kew Gardens
for scientific issues.
19. The Secretariat had three full-time scientists, and
could buy in external specialised scientific advice. NGOs were
sometimes able to provide that advice. UNEP WCMC was used to manage
the CITES trade database on behalf of the secretariat. A Memorandum
of Understanding had been signed with the World Customs Organization
and ICPO-Interpol which allowed for an exchange of information
and set out a joint work programme.
20. At a Conference of the Parties, any party could suggest
adding a new species to those covered by the Convention. Such
a proposal had to be backed by peer reviewed evidence of the threat
to that species, with each proposal judged against a set of strict
criteria. Additionally, other organisations, such as the International
Whaling Commission or the Food and Agriculture Organization, would
be asked for their opinion.
21. CITES had adopted the precautionary principle in
relation to listing species; the benefit of the doubt was given
to conservation of the species. However, the decisions were ultimately
taken by a two-thirds majority of the States present and voting.
The voting was not always in accordance with the scientific evidence;
sometimes the political importance of an issue transcended the
scientific importance.
The Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions
22. The Committee met Mr James Willis, Director of Chemicals
and Executive Secretary of the Convention on the Prior Informed
Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides
in International Trade (the Rotterdam Convention), and of the
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (the Stockholm Convention),
together with Mr Bo Wahlstrom, Senior Scientific Advisor, Chemicals.
23. The Rotterdam Convention, which had entered into
force on 24 February 2004, aimed to promote shared responsibility
in the international trade in hazardous chemicals in order to
protect health and the environment.
24. A chemical which was banned or severely restricted
by parties from two different regions would be considered for
listing as subject to the Prior Informed Consent procedure. Alternatively,
a single developing country could propose a "severely hazardous
pesticide formulation" for consideration. Such a proposal
had to be scientifically based, but the scientific evidence could
come from any relevant source. It would be evaluated by the Chemical
Review Committee, a committee of government-designated experts,
which would make a recommendation to the Conference of the Parties.
The recommendation would be made after the proposal had been judged
against a set of criteria, one of which was whether the listing
of the chemical would lead to a reduction of risk for human health
or the environment of the party that submitted the proposal.
25. The Stockholm Convention would enter into force on
17 May 2004. It would eliminate the production, use and environmental
release of a number of categories of man-made persistent organic
pollutants (POPs), and limit their import and export to permitted
uses, or to what was necessary for environmentally sound disposal.
Production and use of DDT would be permitted only for those States
which still relied on it for health purposes. The Convention also
required States to reduce releases of unintentionally produced
pollutants, especially dioxins and furans. Demand for this Convention
came largely from the OECD countries. The scientific evidence
that POPs were harmful had been built up over many years and was
well established.
26. In order for a chemical to be listed as a POP, it
was necessary for governments to carry out scientific assessment
to establish whether the Convention criteria on the toxicity of
a chemical or its adverse effect on the environment as well as
the potential for bioaccumulation, persistence and long-range
environmental transport had been satisfied. The precautionary
approach applied; lack of full scientific certainty did not prevent
a proposal for listing a chemical from proceeding.
27. Scientific assessment often required resources for
measurement of levels of the chemical in human tissue samples,
such as the concentration of a POP in breast-milk or in blood.
This raised ethical issues. The contribution of the United Kingdom
in scientific matters was consistently outstanding.
THE BASEL
CONVENTION
28. The Committee met Ms Sachiko Kuwabara-Yamamoto, Executive
Secretary of the Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement
of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (the Basel Convention),
and Mr Pierre Portas from the Secretariat.
29. The Basel Convention had entered into force in 1992.
It now had 159 parties. It established a regulatory system for
the control of transboundary movements of hazardous and other
wastes, and for their management. The technical annexes to the
Convention, which could be amended to take into account new scientific
or technological developments, included categories and lists of
wastes and their hazardous properties. Amendments to annexes were
adopted by the Conference of Parties and entered into force for
all Parties six months after being circulated, unless one or more
parties opted out. Amendment to the text of the Convention itself
was a more protracted process.
30. There was increasing traffic of, for example, computers
and used cars from developed to developing countries, where they
would ultimately become waste products with hazardous components.
The precious metals in computers could be recovered by developed
countries, but developing countries rarely had the technological
resources.
31. There were four scientists on the staff of the secretariat,
who relied on scientists from the States and from non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) for much of the expertise. Scientific data
were however often interpreted differently by scientists from
NGOs and those from industry.
32. The subject matter of the Rotterdam and Stockholm
Conventions was similar to that of the Basel Convention. This
had raised the question whether the Stockholm Convention should
have been a Protocol to the Basel Convention, which would have
led to the Conventions having a common secretariat This initiative
could not have come from the secretariat; it would have had to
come from the parties.
33. The Basel secretariat had close relations with the
Rotterdam and Stockholm secretariats, and also with the World
Health Organization (WHO) (though they did not always agree on
their approaches), with the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) on pesticides, with the International Labour Organization
(ILO) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), and with regional organisations such as the EU and Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Working with
so many organisations could create problems. Additionally, in
some countries (though not the UK) the policies for the different
Conventions were dealt with by different ministries, which could
lead to conflicting approaches.
34. Individual UK scientists had contributed significantly
to the Convention; however the UK Government could perhaps be
more proactive. In particular, on the issue of dismantling "ghost
ships", the International Maritime Organization (IMO), ILO
and Basel Convention secretariat were developing joint guidelines,
but the UK had not been at the forefront of these discussions.
WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION (WHO)
35. The Committee met Dr Douglas Bettcher, Coordinator
of the WHO Framework Convention Team for the Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC).
36. The Committee heard that in the last 50 years the
accumulated scientific evidence had established unequivocally
the scientific case for the harm caused by tobacco when legally
used in precisely the way intended by the manufacturer. This evidence
was virtually uncontested. There was evidence of over 20 diseases
linked to tobacco smoking, which had killed an estimated 4.9 million
people in 2000. This was projected to double by the 2020s unless
action was taken; by 2020 developing countries would account for
70 per cent of deaths. Moreover, it was noted that over 35 million
pages of documentary evidence from the tobacco industry was released
as part of litigation of the State of Minnesota and Blue Cross
and Blue Shield against the tobacco industry in the 1990s. These
documents demonstrated that the tobacco industry knew that smoking
caused cancer as far back as the 1950s, and that the industry
systematically denied and covered up these facts. Moreover these
documents provided a window into the thinking and activities of
the transnational tobacco companies over a period of almost half
a century, and had proved to be an asset for planning public health
strategies to curb the tobacco epidemic.
37. In addition, the evidence for the harm caused by
passive smoking was unequivocal. However, the industry contested
it. The argument that smoking was economically beneficial did
not stand up. Spending on health and other costs outweighed economic
benefits from tobacco production and sales, and an estimated 355
billion cigarettes (one third of the world market) were smuggled
annually to evade tax, and were not subject to health warnings
and other tobacco regulations. Moreover, the links between tobacco
and poverty were convincing and disturbing: high rates of tobacco
use were witnessed in poorer and less educated populations both
in developed and developing countries, and it had also been demonstrated
that tobacco use in poor families displaced scarce family income
that could be used to purchase essential commodities, health and
education.
38. The WHO FCTC followed from a resolution at the 1994
World Conference on Tobacco and Health in Paris which had been
supported by the EU. This led to an initial resolution to be adopted
by the World Health Assembly of WHO in 1996, in which the member
states of WHO undertook to develop an international convention
on tobacco control. The Convention was opened for signature on
16 June 2003. So far it had received only nine ratifications (11
as at 26 April 2004), and it needed 40 for entry into force. A
United Nations Task Force on Tobacco Control, chaired by WHO,
was established in 1999 by the Secretary General to take forward
technical collaboration on tobacco control across the United Nations
system. WHO worked actively with other UN organisations, including
the WTO, ILO, FAO, IMF and the World Bank.
39. WHO and the World Bank had found that the most effective
strategies were those which controlled tobacco demand, such as
price increases and non-price measures such as strong health warnings
and complete bans on direct and indirect tobacco advertising and
sponsorship. Attempts to control supply, such as youth access
restrictions or crop substitution, were less effective. The WHO
FCTC built on this knowledge. There were a few provisions dealing
with supply, but the majority (articles 6 to 14) required or encouraged
States to increase prices and taxes, to regulate the contents,
packaging and labelling of tobacco products, to ban tobacco advertising,
and to increase public awareness of the dangers. Uniquely, article
19 encouraged the parties to strengthen their national laws on
criminal and civil liability with respect to tobacco.
40. The WHO had a Scientific Advisory Committee on Tobacco
Product Regulation which advised States on scientifically based
methods of regulation. There was seen to be a need to develop
further the science behind the effects of smoking and other forms
of tobacco use before more comprehensive global product regulation
measures (of for example the design and manufacturing of cigarettes)
could be put in place, possibly as a protocol to the Convention.
However, the machines and ISO standards, which had largely been
informed by tobacco industry interests, used to model smokers,
had been found to be far from perfect. All work was done by States;
within the global intergovernmental body established by the World
Health Assembly to negotiate the Convention there had been no
direct discussion with the tobacco industry on the content of
the WHO FCTC.
41. The United Kingdom had been one of the locomotives
for change, and very active and supportive. However it had yet
to ratify the Convention.
WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION (WTO)
42. The Committee met Ms Gretchen Stanton, Senior Counsellor,
Agriculture and Commodities Division, and Secretary of the Committee
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.
43. The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement) entered into force
in 1995. All parties to the WTO were parties to the SPS. It allowed
states to adopt measures for the protection of human, animal and
plant life notwithstanding that they hindered trade. The Agreement
was negotiated in the context of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), and administered by the WTO. It was aimed primarily
at avoiding trade restrictions, rather than protecting health
or the environment.
44. Measures adopted under the SPS Agreement had to be
scientifically based, and it was open to a State to complain about
trade restrictions which did not have a scientific basis. When
a complaint was made the WTO established a panel to look at the
scientific evidence. Panels consisted of experts on international
trade rather than scientists, but they were able to appoint scientific
advisers from a list of experts provided by the standard-setting
body in the relevant area. A panel had recently been set up to
consider the dispute between the EU and the US on GMOs.
45. The Agreement adopted a precautionary approach, so
that where scientific evidence of possible harm to human, animal
or plant life was insufficient, a State might adopt sanitary or
phytosanitary measures to restrict trade. However the Agreement
allowed only provisional measures to be taken, whilst additional
information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk
was sought. In the case of the EU ban on US beef because of the
use of hormones in cattle, the precautionary approach could not
be justified since the measure was not provisional.
46. The SPS secretariat had close relationships with
those at the WHO responsible for food safety and health hazards,
who sat on the SPS committee as observers. The WTO did not have
any in-house scientific expertise, so encouraged governments to
use internationally developed standards—"safe harbours"
such as the FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius or the FAO Plant Protection
Convention.
47. The EU acted on behalf of its Member States. If the
UK wished to lodge a formal complaint, this had to be done through
the EU. The UK could not act independently, though the UK delegation
(normally from Defra) did have a high profile at meetings and
was thought of very positively.
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