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Lord Thomas of Gresford moved Amendment No. 10:
"DURATION AND RENEWAL OF CONTROL ORDERS
(a) has effect for a period of 12 months beginning with the day on which it is made; but
(b) may be renewed on one or more occasions in accordance with this section.
(2) A non-derogating control order must specify when the period for which it is to have effect will end.
(3) The court may renew a non-derogating control order (with or without modifications) for a period of 12 months if it—
(a) considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism, for an order imposing obligations on the controlled person to continue in force; and
(b) considers that the obligations to be imposed by the renewed order are necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting involvement by that person in terrorism-related activity.
(4) Where the court renews a non-derogating control order, the 12 month period of the renewal begins to run from whichever is the earlier of—
(a) the time when the order would otherwise have ceased to have effect; or
(b) the beginning of the seventh day after the date of renewal.
(5) The instrument renewing a non-derogating control order must specify when the period for which it is renewed will end.
(6) A derogating control order ceases to have effect at the end of the period of 6 months beginning with the day on which it is made unless—
(a) it is previously revoked (whether at the hearing under subsection (1)(b) or otherwise under this Act);
(b) it ceases to have effect under section 5; or
(c) it is renewed.
(7) The court, on an application by the Secretary of State, may renew a derogating control order (with or without modifications) for a period of 6 months from whichever is the earlier of—
(a) the time when the order would otherwise have ceased to have effect; and
(b) the beginning of the seventh day after the date of renewal.
(8) The power of the court to renew a derogating control order is exercisable on as many occasions as the court thinks fit; but, on each occasion, it is exercisable only if—
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(a) the court considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism, for a derogating control order to continue in force against the controlled person;
(b) it appears to the court that the risk is one arising out of, or is associated with, a public emergency in respect of which there is a designated derogation from the whole or a part of Article 5 of the Human Rights Convention;
(c) the derogating obligations that the court considers should continue in force are of a description that continues to be set out for the purposes of the designated derogation in the designation order; and
(d) the court considers that the obligations to be imposed by the renewed order are necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting involvement by that person in terrorism-related activity."
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this has already been spoken to. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 6 [Modification, notification and proof of orders etc.]:
Lord Goodhart moved Amendment No. 11:
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 7 [Criminal investigations after making of control order]:
Clause 9 [Appeals relating to non-derogating control orders]:
Clause 10 [Appeals relating to derogating control orders]:
Clause 11 [Jurisdiction and appeals in relation to control order decisions etc.]:
Baroness Scotland of Asthal moved Amendment No. 15:
Clause 11, page 14, line 8, leave out from "exercise" to end of line 10 and insert "or performance of any power or duty under any of sections of or in connection with the exercise or performance of any such power or duty;"
The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I beg to move.
Lord Elton: My Lords, will the noble Baroness tell us a bit about the amendment because it is not in a group? It stands by itself.
Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, this is a consequential amendment on new Clause 7 which covers criminal investigations after the making of a control order. It was intended to bring the Secretary of State's decision under the new criminal investigations clause within the rule in Clause 9(1) in order that such decisions cannot be questioned in any legal proceedings other than before the court or on appeal from such proceedings. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
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Clause 13 [Reporting and review]:
Lord Kingsland moved Amendment No. 16:
The noble Lord said: My Lords, we now come to the group of amendments which can be summarised by the expression "sunrise clause"—no, "sunset clause".
Lord Kingsland: I knew this Bill would get to me sooner or later, my Lords.
It is useful to look at the role of the sunset clause in the context of Amendments Nos. 18 and 19 in the next group, which deal with the establishment of a committee of five Privy Counsellors. Last night, between the hours of 10 and roughly 11 o'clock, the Committee looked into both these groups of amendments in considerable detail. So I hope that this debate, which is of course important, will nevertheless take place in somewhat shorter order.
It is important to understand at the outset the interdependence between the sunset clause and the Privy Council clause. As your Lordships are well aware that there was, in relation to the 2001 terrorism legislation, an important Privy Council investigation chaired by my noble friend Lord Newton of Braintree. Your Lordships will recall that that report came to a number of conclusions which were subsequently—and, I suspect, rather embarrassingly for the Government—endorsed by the Appeal Committee of your Lordships' House.
The report of my noble friend Lord Newton of Braintree lay on the table, totally ignored by the Government, for a year. That must not happen with the report that will be made by the new committee of Privy Counsellors, set up, as I hope it will be, under this Act.
That is why the sunset clause has to be seen in relation to the Privy Council clause. Without the sunset clause, there is every chance that the report of the new committee of Privy Counsellors will be ignored in the same way as the report of my noble friend Lord Newton has been ignored. So the two are interdependent. Equally, when your Lordships come to consider the next Bill following the death of this Bill—which I hope will be next November—your Lordships will be informed by the report of the Privy Counsellors and will know better what changes to make.
On the substance of the sunset clause, I say simply this: the Bill suspends habeas corpus. For that reason alone, we need a sunset clause. It is unacceptable that this fundamental right should be cast aside for any longer than is necessary. Parliament has spent the past 700 years protecting our liberties. It seems outrageous that we should be asked to allow an open-ended right to remove the most fundamental of them from our statute book.
However, there is an added reason for having a sunset clause. Parliament is the great protector of liberty, yet Parliament has been given no real
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opportunity to scrutinise the Bill. The other place, moreover, was in an even worse state than we are. The elected House examined a text that everyone knew would be changed when it came to your Lordships' House.
4.30 p.m.
We—and I think the Liberal Party, too—have been accused by the Government of undermining the security of the country by seeking to make changes to the Bill. I wholly reject that suggestion. We are just as keen as the Government to ensure that the security of every citizen is guaranteed, but our response must be proportionate, and that requires ensuring that the minimum necessary sacrifice of liberty is made. That the legislation has not been scrutinised is an additional reason for having a sunset clause. I beg to move.
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