Previous Section Back to Table of Contents Lords Hansard Home Page

Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale: My Lords, this Bill is an attempt to give everyone in the community the right to live in a safe and secure environment free from the fear of crime. I can deal in the time allowed with only a few points, but as a general comment, I should like to say that in a democratic society everyone has the right to voice their opinion and to demonstrate, but human rights and freedom of speech and assembly must be balanced by citizens' responsibilities to others. No one has the right to incite hatred against religious groups, to intimidate or harass others going about their lawful business, or indeed to disrupt the working of Parliament. All faith communities and those working in the bioscience industry deserve the full protection of the criminal law when their human rights are threatened.
 
14 Mar 2005 : Column 1109
 

I know from mail received that many Christians are concerned that in some way the provision on incitement to religious hatred will adversely affect them. I am sorry that they are so concerned, but I believe that when they look at this provision closely, as it has emerged from another place, they might be reassured that their fears are unfounded. This provision is about protecting people, not about protecting the religion itself. Because of the contents of the letters that I have received, I think it is important to emphasise what these provisions do not do. They do not prevent criticising the beliefs, teachings or practices of a religion or its followers; proselytising one's own religion or urging the followers of another religion to stop practising theirs; telling jokes about religions; expressing dislike of one particular religion or its followers.

This provision is needed to curb the activity of extremist organisations. ACPO has said that the hatred stirred up by extremists such as the BNP contributed to the Bradford and Burnley riots in 2001. It is also intended to have a deterrent effect. The Board of Deputies of British Jews believes that having the offence of incitement to racial hatred has reduced the amount of anti-Semitic literature. It removes a loophole where mono-ethnic faith groups, such as Sikhs and the Jewish community, are protected under the incitement to racial hatred provision; whereas multi-ethnic groups, such as Muslims and Christians among others, are not protected, as the right reverend Prelate has just explained.

It will also, it is to be hoped, reassure Muslim communities in this period when many feel vulnerable that they do have protection in law from acts of racial hatred against them. Much was said during our discussions on the Prevention of Terrorism Act about signals being sent to our Muslim communities. Well, this is surely a very positive signal, as well as being the right thing to do. Support for this provision has come from ACPO, the CRE, Justice and the Law Society. If time had permitted, I would have quoted from the excellent statement of last January from the Churches' Commission on Inter Faith Relations in support of this provision. That statement, signed by the noble Baroness, Lady Richardson of Calow, and by representatives of many other faith communities, which time prevents me mentioning, is an excellent statement of the case for such a provision, and I commend it to your Lordships.

The Minister will be aware that the Scottish Police Federation has various concerns about this Bill, as the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond, has already enumerated, and it does not support SOCA operatives being given the powers of a constable in Scotland. The Law Society of Scotland seeks confirmation that those so designated to operate in Scotland will have knowledge and training in Scots criminal law and procedure. I would be very grateful for the Minister's comments on that.

I now turn to a subject that is not in this Bill, but which was debated during its passage in another place and in the media. The noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, raised it today. It is the question of the use of intercept
 
14 Mar 2005 : Column 1110
 
evidence in court. As I said in the debates on the Prevention of Terrorism Act, I am extremely worried about the growing clamour for intercept material to be produced in court. The whole area of intercept is much more complex and sensitive than most people, including fortunately the targets, ever imagine. The slightest exposure of intercept product risks blowing for good that particular operation with its techniques, as well as in some cases putting at risk human agents. It is often said, "other countries use intercepts in evidence; why can't we?". Well, there are actually many reasons, but I will just be able to touch on three.

Our sophisticated expertise in this field is quite considerable, and in fact I would venture to say outstanding, which of course means that we have much more to lose. A national police force operating on its home ground in a straightforward telephone tap really would usually have little to lose in terms of giving away techniques or endangering sensitive sources. Our legal system, with its adversarial roles for counsel, means that the defence counsel can range far and wide on evidence or with someone in a witness box. In other countries, where there is an investigating judge or magistrate, things can be different, and sensitive material can be used without the risks involved in using it in a British court. In this country we have a very close relationship between our security and intelligence services and our law enforcement agencies; a relationship which, if not unique, is very rare when you look at other countries. To use material from the services, which have to take more risks and use sophisticated techniques sometimes involving agents, is to endanger much more than most people realise.

As I have said before, I have rarely come across a lawyer who did not want intercept material in court, but they almost all believe that there is nothing a court cannot and should not deal with. It is perhaps understandable that the legal profession should think so, but from my own different professional experience, my judgment is different, and I am extremely disturbed at the idea of sensitive intercept material going into court proceedings.

This is a Bill, of course, in which we will hear much legal opinion, and we have in the House many representatives of the legal profession, some of them extremely distinguished. Speaking from experience of some nine years in this House, and especially from recent debates on Iraq and on the Prevention of Terrorism Act still painfully fresh in all our memories, I should like to submit, with respect, that lawyers are not the only people in our society who care deeply about justice and liberty and civil rights. They have chosen a profession that means that they know the detail of the law and the rules and practice of its procedures, but it does not give them a monopoly of wisdom about what is justice and what are human rights. The world does not begin and end at the door of a courtroom. It would well become lawyers if just occasionally they acknowledged that. Just as war is too important to leave to generals, I believe that in a democracy, justice is too important to leave to lawyers and judges. My Lords, I support the Bill.
 
14 Mar 2005 : Column 1111
 

5.9 p.m.

Lord Mackay of Clashfern: My Lords, it is obviously a superb opportunity to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Ramsay of Cartvale, and I am the first to acknowledge that lawyers have no monopoly of wisdom in this area. It is therefore important that this House is made up of a number of groupings—and lawyers are but a small, although quite an important, part.

I wish to address only the part of the Bill that deals with incitement to religious hatred. I should declare an interest as patron of the Lawyers' Christian Fellowship, as president of the Scottish Bible Society and as one who seeks to practise the Christian religion—although I do not succeed as much as I would like.

My impression is that much of the difficulty that has arisen in this area relates to confusing what one group within a faith wants or does with the whole faith. For example, I have always felt uneasy when a particular outrage is described as the work of "Islamic extremists" or "Islamic terrorists". It might be interesting to look at a description given by the Prime Minister in a speech to his constituency about this matter when he described how he was galvanised into the war on terror. He said that the actions which killed 3,000 were the work of religious fanatics. He said that they were pleased that they killed 3,000, they would have been more pleased if they had killed 30,000 and they would be still more pleased if they had killed 300,000.

I ask myself, if this provision in this Bill had been the law at the time, would the Prime Minister have been transgressing it? I have looked carefully at the words of the provision and I would find it difficult to mount a defence. That does not tell me that what the Prime Minister said was wrong, because most of us, probably all of us—certainly I for my part—would strongly agree with what he said. But it indicates to me that the words chosen to describe this particular offence in this provision are not adequate for the purpose.

There is already a good deal of law in relation to this matter. I simply mention the prosecution of Norwood for putting in his window a notice suggesting that Islam should be banished from the United Kingdom and associating Islam with the 9/11 outrage. He was successfully prosecuted. ACPO has indicated that there might be difficulties, but there was a successful prosecution in that case and it seems to me that the principle in that case covers a great deal of what is found offensive at present.

It is said that there is a loophole in the law because Sikhs and Jews are protected as races whereas other religions are not protected. But of course the Jews and Sikhs are protected as races because they are races. It does not follow that because a person is a Jew by race, he is a Jew by religion. We may have an example of that quite soon. It does not follow that because a person is a Sikh by race, he is a Sikh by religion. Hatred based on race is an issue there—and race is not chosen, but is determined by one's antecedents. For example, it may well be a term of racial abuse to describe someone as a "person of mixed race" or "a mongrel".
 
14 Mar 2005 : Column 1112
 

The situation of religion is quite different. Religion is chosen. A person can change his religion, can embrace a new religion and can, as far as he is concerned, modify the views that he expresses.


Next Section Back to Table of Contents Lords Hansard Home Page