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Lord Harris of Haringey: First, my Lords, I declare an interest as a member of the Metropolitan Police Authority, and of the executive of the Association of Police Authorities.

This is a Home Office portmanteau Bill. It deals with the important issue of establishing the Serious Organised Crime Agency, and then a whole series of other issues only tangentially related, if at all, to the main purpose. I suspect that the other issues will command more time in today's debate than the core material of the Bill. That is not surprising, as among them are some significant and, in a number of cases, controversial proposals.

Clauses 121 to 123, together with Clauses 142 to 146, are intended to deal with the problems posed by animal rights extremists. The context of these provisions is that this country has some of the strictest rules in the world governing the use of animals in medical research, only permitted when there is no non-animal alternative, and with clear guidelines on the welfare of animals involved. In these circumstances, the behaviour of some extremists, which goes way beyond the right to legitimate and lawful protest, cannot be tolerated. These clauses are therefore welcome and proportionate.

In particular, I support Clause 122, which deals with demonstrations at private residences with the intention of causing alarm and distress, having been subjected to these on a number of occasions—not because of my involvement in animal research, but because of my then leadership of a local authority. While I, as a politician, may be used to abuse and aggressive demonstrating—I can certainly dish it out in return—it is not reasonable for the families of those against whom the demonstrations are targeted, or those who simply happen to live in the same house, or are neighbours, to be at the receiving end of early-morning chanting, late- night visitations, the dumping of ordure, or whatever else it might be.

Incidentally, I hope that my noble friend the Minister will be able to confirm that Clauses 142 to 146 will also apply to charitable research institutions.

Clause 124 and Schedule 10 create the offence of "incitement to religious hatred". I have long supported this, and participated in the debate initiated by my noble friend Lord Ahmed on this subject in October
 
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1999. It is inequitable that, while the offence against inciting racial hatred has been extended to Sikhs and Jews, the protection does not apply to other faith groups. Islamophobia has become more overt, with the demonisation in some quarters of all Muslims following 9/11.

Such demonisation, however, is not new. I remember from my childhood storybooks glorifying the Crusades, and depicting the infidel in the most unflattering terms. It has reached a new pitch in recent years, though, and this provision is long overdue.

There has been a vigorous campaign against the proposal on the grounds that it will inhibit free speech, and even stop comedians poking fun at religion. Like many of your Lordships, I enjoyed the monologues of Dave Allen, who sadly died a few days ago, but what he said about the Catholic Church could not be said to stir up hatred. Similarly, Alan Bennett's vicar in "Beyond the Fringe" may have punctured the pomposity of the Church of England—fortunately the Bishops' Bench is empty—but it did not bring about the religious hatred of Anglicans.

Like other of your Lordships, I too have received representations from the Police Federation about Clauses 116 and 117 and the creation of staff custody officers. I am in favour of using police officers to carry out those functions for which their training equips them, and I see nothing wrong in some tasks, which have historically been done by police officers, being carried out by police staff if that police training and background are not needed. In bringing forward these clauses, however, it is important that my noble friend the Minister is able to convince the House, and those outside it, that the disappearance of custody sergeants will not lead to a diminution of performance as far as the number of cracked trials and the number of offenders brought to justice are concerned.

I am conscious that I am rapidly using up my time, and I have not spoken about the new agency. That is the consequence of portmanteau Bills. Indeed, so wide is the canvas of this Bill that, should we have any time to consider it in Committee, I will be sorely tempted to put forward amendments on a number of other topics, which would clearly be encompassed within the long title.

I would like, for example, to strengthen further the laws on airguns and imitation firearms. The death of Andrew Morton, the two year-old from Easterhouse, Glasgow, who was shot in the head with an airgun pellet, has once again shown in the most tragic way possible that airguns are lethal weapons. Airguns are not toys. They are dangerous weapons that have become increasingly sophisticated over the years. Legislation must take that into account. Despite a recent increase in the minimum age for purchasing an airgun, they are still too easily available, and too many are already owned and used by those who have no good reason to keep them.

Similarly, imitation guns are too easily available and, despite the recent changes in the law, too many crimes still involve their use, and armed police officers
 
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too often have to be deployed in response before it is known whether the guns are imitation or not, with potentially lethal consequences.

Finally—and, I fear, fairly briefly—I shall refer to the new Serious Organised Crime Agency. It is right and proper to bring together the different agencies that are intended to impact on serious organised crime. A fragmented approach is not sufficient for modern criminal gangs whose ruthlessness should not be underestimated. Nor should we lose sight of the corrosive effect that such gangs can have on communities: the drugs they deal in and import; the people-smuggling; extortion, and so on. Moreover, the money, resources and technology they can command require a much better and more co-ordinated response from the state.

The new agency is a critical part of that response. However, it cannot be created and expected to operate in a vacuum. It must work closely with the police service around the country. Local forces, after all, will have the local information and intelligence, and they will also have to police the communities before, during and after a SOCA operation.

For that reason, I believe it is important that the terms and conditions of those who work for the agency should be sufficiently flexible to enable a proper interchange of staffing between the agency and the police service. Indeed, I hope that anyone aspiring to be a senior detective in a police force will see it as an essential part of their CV to have done a spell at SOCA—and vice versa. And it is for those reasons also that the new agency must not be constructed to denude the police service of its most able and experienced detectives.

There is also a risk that the new agency will behave and have more in common with the security and intelligence services than with policing and law enforcement bodies. If this is to be avoided, governance issues will be crucial. The agency must be seen to be accountable, and it must be seen to consult—with the police service, police authorities and the communities most affected by serious organised crime.

The principle of policing by consent must apply to this new agency, and for that to happen, good governance must be a priority. But if this is properly addressed, then I am sure that all of your Lordships will want to see the new agency achieve its promise and deliver what the public want to see: an effective fight against the most dangerous criminal elements in our society.

Lord Campbell of Alloway: My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, if only to be able to put the case against the offence of religious hatred.

The amendments proposed by Clause 124 and Schedule 10, which amends Sections 18 to 23 of the Public Order Act 1986, are concerned with various types of conduct. Words or written material likely to be seen or heard by any person in whom it is likely to stir up religious hatred are all opposed. Without amendment, these sections are concerned with racial
 
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hatred and impose limits upon freedom of speech—and rightly so—to avoid insult to the common humanity.

In this context, when this offence was first rejected by your Lordships, Earl Russell said of the "reach across"—I use his concept and his words—from racial to religious hatred that dealing with both in a single statutory framework was dangerous and ill conceived because religion is a matter of belief and choice, and our racial characteristics are not. I refer to cols. 240 and 241 of the Official Report of that debate.

Earl Russell also said that the "reach across" would also compromise both freedom of expression and freedom of belief. Indeed, the Joint Committee on Human Rights has already advised that on the facts and circumstances of any particular case, certain articles of the ECHR could well be engaged—a matter on which the trial judge would have to direct the jury, as this is a matter of law.

As faith has ever been an emotive subject of potentially combustible proportions, it is the intention to stand by the wholly objective analysis of Earl Russell.

I declare myself as a wayward Anglican who respects the faith—or the absence of faith—of others. A trial under these provisions would not be welcome in any private interest or in the public interest. The proceedings in any court of law, irrespective of conviction or acquittal, could themselves but stir up—there is no question of likelihood—religious hatred and religious contention. The instigators of these proceedings would be the zealots who control the moderates by various forms of threat, intimidation and reprisals.

The consent of Mr Attorney to the institution of these proceedings affords absolutely no safeguard whatever. His involvement in such affairs is wholly unacceptable. He is in a totally hopeless situation either way; his administrative decision would be challenged on judicial review by the zealots.

On receiving a complaint, the police have to open investigations. They seize files and documents and take a series of statements. No doubt there will be some leaked media coverage. On this material, depositions are prepared for trial, but the statements will not have been tested by cross-examination, albeit that in these circumstances, there is a high propensity for error.

The police, on the advice of counsel, conclude on this information that it is proper to proceed if there is more than a 50 per cent chance of success. Then they seek the consent of Mr Attorney. Then Mr Attorney makes an administrative decision one way or the other for which he cannot give reasons. Obviously he cannot, pre-trial. So what happens on judicial review when the court wants to know why he did what he did? There is absolutely no way in which Clause 124 and Schedule 10 could be amended to enable a trial such as this to ensue without doing the very thing that is contrary to the intendment of these provisions: that is,
 
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stirring up religious hatred. It would be wholly contrary to the public interest in our multi-religious society.

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