Select Committee on European Union Written Evidence


Memorandum by Prof Dr jur M Kaiafa-Gbandi, Aristotle University Thessaloniki

  The above mentioned proposal of the Commission for a Framework Decision on procedural rights in criminal matters poses according to my view three basic questions:

    —  the first refers to the principle of mutual recognition;

    —  the second refers to the legal basis of the proposal, and

    —  the third relates (a) to the central position of the Commission for proposing minimum common standards that provide for such rights and (b) to the Non-regression clause of article 17.

SPECIFICALLY:

  1.  The principle of mutual recognition, which is held by the Council as "cornerstone of judicial co-operation" in criminal matters is not foreseen in the treaties for the field of criminal law. Its transfer from other fields is not at all self-evident, because of the special character of criminal law. Besides, such a transfer does not express the will of the legislator of TEU. Therefore every promotion of this principle, as long as the proposed regulations cannot be based on other provisions of the treaties, constitutes an excess of power from the organs of the Union, as the powers of the latter are given, special and restricted.

  The principle of mutual recognition is accepted in the field of criminal matters for the first time in the primary law of the Union in the Treaty for a Constitution for Europe, though it has caused in the frame of this Treaty as well intense dispute from different scholars[9].

  On the other hand it should be stressed, that the Commission considers its proposal as "a necessary complement to the mutual recognition measures that are designed to increase efficiency of prosecution .... especially with measures that envisage surrender of persons or of evidence to another Member State" (p 12 margin nr 51 of the proposal). In this way it becomes obvious, that the principle of mutual recognition does not serve here the rights of persons in criminal proceedings as such, but it ensures mostly the recognition of prosecution acts against them between the Member States. This constitutes a totally different starting point in finding ways for safeguarding the rights of persons. In other words the real motive, which is luckily visible in the proposal, is not a better safeguard for the rights of suspects or accused, but the facilitation of the penal repression through a more effective judicial co-operation between the Member States. In order to achieve that through mutual recognition of judicial acts an agreed minimum standard of rights for persons in criminal proceedings is required and has to be respected.

  The objective of effective penal repression through a more efficient judicial co-operation is, of course, not at all to be underestimated. All the same it has to be clear, that trying to find solutions for a better safeguard of rights for persons involved in criminal proceedings leads to different results than serving the judicial co-operation through common minimum standards, which could allow the mutual recognition of judicial acts. For the latter objective not only the philosophy but also the method and the outcome of the regulations differ.

  2.  According to the Commission its proposal is based on article 31 par 1c of the TEU. However this article, which regulates common action on judicial co-operation in criminal matters, when it talks about "ensuring compatibility in rules applicable in the Member States, as may be necessary to improve such co-operation", it is obvious that it refers to rules, which concern the judicial co-operation directly, as for example regulations for the transmission of documents, the communication of judicial authorities etc. The Commission regarding the rules about the rights of persons in criminal proceedings as rules which are necessary for the improvement of the judicial co-operation undertakes such a wide interpretation of article 31 par 1c TEU, that could practically include all the rules of the procedural system in a Member State. In other words even rules for the procedural settlements, for example, would be candidates for regulations of common minimum standards, so as to enable thereafter the mutual recognition of the relevant decisions of judicial authorities between the Member States. The same could be said about the possibilities of suspending prosecution etc. Obviously that was not the meaning of article 31 par 1c TEU. Thus under the existing legal frame there is no competence of the EU for setting standards for rights of persons in criminal proceedings. Such a competence is recognized for the first time in the Treaty for a Constitution for Europe, though even there is being intensely criticised, because of its orientation to the principle of mutual recognition.

  3.    (a)  The danger that is related to the very concrete proposal of the Commission on certain procedural rights in criminal proceedings throughout the European Union results from the logic of the minimum standards, which it introduces. The regulations aim at achieving a common agreement of the Member States for the safeguard of certain rights, that is to say a common point that will be reached after concession especially for those countries that ensure a higher lever of such rights in their internal legal space. That is the general philosophy of common minimum standards. Such a philosophy serves obviously a more effective judicial co-operation, because as long as the minimum common standards will be respected the recognition of the relevant judicial acts can be also achieved.

  However if our objective is an actually effective safeguard for the rights of persons in criminal proceedings, this option is not the only one and definitely is not also the preferable one. In the legal theory, for example, it has been argued that "instead of only establishing common EU minimum standards regarding the rights of the defense and procedural safeguards one should also maximise these rights and safeguards, meaning that suspects and defendants should where possible be given the procedural rights that accrue to him/her under either the law of the issuing or enforcing Member State. This would mean that Member States enforce or execute another Member States' decision, as if it were taken or delivered in their own state, ie respecting the procedural rights and safeguards of their own criminal justice system plus, as a consequence of recognition of the other Member States' criminal justice system, also the procedural rights and safeguards of that other Member State that go beyond protection offered to suspects, defendants or accused persons in their own criminal justice system"[10]. Of course it is evident, that such an option is not easy to realise, but the question here is, how important the objective is. If the EU takes seriously its recent declaration, which is to be found in the Treaty for a Constitution for Europe, according to which the person is to be put in the core of the EU's action, it is clear that it has to look for more inventive solutions, at least in the field of safeguards for the rights of persons in criminal proceedings.

  (b)  The danger that the Commission's proposal creates, cannot on the other hand be avoided with the Non-regression clause of article 17. According to it "nothing in this framework decision shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the rights and procedural safeguards that may be ensured under the laws of any Member State and which provide a higher level of protection". Such a provision does not solve the problem. Because a Member State will, of course, implement its own rules, which may ensure a higher level of protection, nevertheless it will recognise at the same time the judicial decision of another Member State taken with lower standards, as long as the latter one respects the common minimum rules set in the proposed Framework-Decision. And here lies the difficulty, because in this way we are driven to a system of procedural rights of two speeds. The one related to the internal rules of a Member State, which may offer a higher level of protection for internal use only and the other, lower one, related to common minimum standards for use on the level of the relations with other Member States in criminal matters. The longterm effects of such a scheme are foreseeable and not at all to underestimate. Because no state that exercises power and tends to be amenable to less possible restrictions will retain for long its own higher level of protection, when from the system of common minimum standards will be clear, that generally something less is sufficient. The proposal of the Framework-Decision follows to that point also the logic of the Treaty for a Constitution for Europe, which has been justifiably criticised for leading to the predominance of the most punitive legislation in the EU[11], as the most protective rules for the rights of persons at the level of Member States are set aside in the frame of the law, which is developed in the Union.

  This is why according to my opinion the whole undertaking needs a basic re-orientation in order to be acceptable and could be proposed only through a Convention according to art 34 par 2d TEU.

October 2004






9   H Fuchs, Bemerkungen zur gegenseitigen Anerkennung justizieller Entscheidungen, ZStW 2004, 369-371, S. Gle , Zum Prinzip der gegenseitigen Anerkennung justizieller Entscheidungen, ZStW 2004, 361-362, M Kaiafa-Gbandi, I Synthiki gia to Europaiko Szntagma kai i proklisis gia ti poiniko dikaio sto xekinima tou 21 eona, (The Treaty for establishing a Constitution for Europe and the challenges for penal law at the beginning of the 21st century), Poiniki Dikkaiosini 2004, 572-573, B Schu­nemann, Grundzu­ge eines Alternativ-Entwurfs zur europa­ischen Strafverfolgung, ZStW 2004, 382. Compare however J Vogel, Licht und Schatten im Alternativ-Entwurf Europa­ische Strafverfolgung, ZStW 2004, 411-412, 422. Back

10   G Vermeulen, Mutual Recognition of Criminal Decisions, Expert Meeting on Criminal Law in European Dimensions, Maastricht University, 26-27.8.2004, in publication in Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 2005. Back

11   B Schu­nemann, Fortschritte und Fehltritte in der Strafrechtspflege der EU, GA 2004, 202. Back


 
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