Memorandum by Ambassador Dr Theodor Winkler,
Director, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
(DCAF)
It is with pleasure that we address the House
of Lords Constitution Committee in answer to their call for evidence
on war-making powers. We were informed of this request through
our colleague Professor Ian Leigh, Professor of Law at Durham
University, and have read with great interest on your website
the scope of the Committee's inquiry. On behalf of the Geneva
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), of which
the United Kingdom is a Founding Member, we consider that our
research findings on the role of parliaments and the use of military
force abroad are directly related and may constitute a relevant
source of evidence for the inquiry.
The particular research of relevance to the
House of Lords Enquiry commences with the observation that the
current threats to security arising from terrorism, "rogue"
states and civil wars are highly complex and often trans-national
in nature and effect. Such threats can no longer be meaningfully
addressed at the national level alone but require an international
response. Since the end of the Cold War, the use of force under
international auspices (eg UN, NATO, EU) has increased substantially.
However, such actions have not necessarily been accompanied by
improvements in their democratic accountability. Pre-existing
problems and inadequacies of parliamentary oversight of armed
forces and the use of force at the national level of many democratic
states are mirrored, and even magnified, at the international
level. The effect of imperfect democratic controls at the national
level and the challenges to provide transparent and accountable
multilateral responses results in the so-called "double democratic
deficit" of the international use of force. In a recent publication
on this subject entitled "The `Double Democratic Deficit':
Parliamentary Accountability and the Use of Force under International
Auspices", we have analysed the challenges of parliamentary
and democratic supervision of international security structures
and have put forward proposals on how to improve democratic accountability
of multinational military responses to complex security challenges.
The enclosed Policy Paper "The Use of Force
under International Auspices: Strengthening Parliamentary Accountability"
addresses the themes which are mentioned in the Lords Constitutional
Committee Call for Evidence. Parliamentary practice in various
countries shows that parliament can play a substantial role in
the deployment of troops abroad in peace support operations. More
particularly, in the enclosed policy paper we have distinguished
four models for parliamentary involvement in the decision-making
involved in deploying troops:
1. Parliament has the right of prior authorisation
of PSOs, including the right to discuss and influence the details
of the PSO (eg as in Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands).
2. Parliament has the right of prior authorisation
but not the power to influence the detailed aspects of PSOs (including
rules of engagement, duration of the mission and mandate), giving
government full authority once parliament has authorised the mission
(eg, as in Italy and Norway).
3. The third group of parliaments does not
have prior authorisation power. Government can decide to send
troops abroad on peace missions without the legal obligation to
consult parliament. Nevertheless, parliament is informed about
the deployments. This is the case, for example, in Canada, France,
Poland, Portugal, Spain, the UK and the USA.
4. A fourth type of parliament is those
parliaments which have no authorisation power or right to information
about future or pending PSOs.
The main research findings of our research are
summarised in the enclosed DCAF policy paper which particularly
addresses questions 1, 2, 3, 4b, and 6 of the Committee's call
for evidence. We have also taken the liberty to include with this
letter the publisher's order form to our recent publication on
the double democratic deficit.
5 October 2005
Enclosed: H Born and H Hanggi, The
Use of Force under International Auspices: Strengthening Parliamentary
Accountability, DCAF Policy Paper No 7, August 2005. [Not
printed here.]
H Born and H Hanggi, The "Double
Democratic Deficit": Parliamentary Accountability and the
Use of Force under International Auspices, Ashgate, 2004.
[Not printed here.]
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