Memorandum by Professor John McEldowney
Introduction
The early history of medieval kingship provides
the background for an understanding of prerogative powers. The
King's authority rested on feudal rights and at the apex of power
the King could not be sued in his own courts and might exercise
residual powers to protect the realm and for the public good.
Setting limits on royal powers has taken several centuries. First,
the courts after the execution of Charles I began to reject some
of the more extreme examples of the Crown's claims for unfettered
powers. Taxation, if levied without the sanction of Parliament
was declared illegal in Darnel's case[19]
in 1627, earlier cases included the restriction that the King
must act through the courts of law and could not undertake his
own judicial process alone and that Parliament was the supreme
law maker. [20]The
Bill of Rights 1689 further settled the illegal use of certain
specific abuses of the prerogative and through the Petition of
Right 1628 and 1640 the subject's right to habeas corpus
was protected by Parliament and guaranteed by statute.
In the 19th century, it became accepted that
prerogative powers were undertaken under ministerial advice, responsible
to parliament. While this settles how prerogative powers must
be exercised, it remains a wide discretion on ministers when to
rely on prerogative powers and how best such powers may be made
accountable in an effective way.
The Prerogative of Declaring War in a Statutory
Context
The absence of a codified constitution with
written definitions and explanations gives rise to doubts about
how to define the prerogative[21]
and explain its application. It is clear that under prerogative
powers the Prime Minister may declare war and engage in military
operations in the defence of the realm. It is also clear that
Parliament has the authority over the supply vote. The formal
declaration of war is less common in recent times than in the
past. The law has been recently examined[22]
by the courts including the question of what constitutes a state
of war. Collins J held that war was a technical question which
was begun either by a declaration of war or by an act of force
which the attacked state treated as creating a state of war. The
Government's contention was that there was not a state of war
and that the use of force in Iraq was the result of the motion
agreed by the House of Commons on 18 March 2003 and UN Security
Council Resolutions 678 and 1441. [23]Similarly
it was also contended that in the cases of Korea and the Falklands,
successive British governments did not consider that in each case
a state of war existed. Article 51 of the UN Charter was invoked
in terms of the self defence exception to the prohibition against
the use of force. In 1999 the use of troops in Yugoslavia was
considered to be undertaken without the declaration of war. It
is clear that in the absence of a formal declaration of war, the
courts would determine this question on the basis of international
law, but in cases of doubt this would be determined by the executive.
Judicial acceptance of the executive's view, is therefore an implicit
acceptance of executive discretion. The question arises as to
whether this is appropriate when states do not appear to declare
war on each other. The declaration of war also carries ramifications
in terms of liabilities, property rights and international treaty
obligations over state neutrality.
While it is ambiguous as to the current use
of the formal act of declaring war, it is clear that it would
be difficult for the Prime Minister to declare war if there was
uncertainty over Parliament's willingness to vote supply. Parliament's
authority over supply is unambiguous. The anomaly is that Parliament,
as matters stand, does not have to be given formal warning of
the decision to go to war and has no apparent control over the
formal power of declaring war. While the Sovereign remains by
virtue of the prerogative and also statutory powers the commander
in chief of the armed forces, the armed forces are regulated by
statute and by the vote of Parliament to maintain the defence
budget and their maintenance. However, their control, organisation
and day to day operational decisions are excluded from oversight
by courts and stem from prerogative powers.
Recent trends are discernible. The prerogative
in general is subject to judicial review and increasingly the
Ministry of Defence is accountable in the civil courts for its
actions. Thus as the Crown has moved with more modern times, for
example since 1993 the Queen pays tax on her private income, their
still remains vestiges of prerogative immunities.
The legislative arrangements applicable to the
armed forces are indicative of the trend in favour of adopting
statutory codification and regulations. The Armed Forces Act 1966-2001
provides a detailed code of discipline and procedures. In contrast,
the convention remains that the prior consent of Parliament is
not required before the armed forces are committed. This includes
the use of the armed forces in aid of the United Nations or when
involved in humanitarian purposes. There is however, the need
for legislation to introduce conscription. [24]In
times of emergency and if Parliament is not sitting then reserve
forces may be called up. This is a conditional power as it is
subject to Parliamentary control and Parliament must be called
within five days under the Reserve Forces Act 1996. [25]In
the past few years limited use of the call up power was undertaken
in the Gulf war, Afghanistan, and more recently Iraq. This is
consistent with the trend in favour of detailed statutory regulation.
[26]
There is also a marked trend in terms of integrating
human rights into the basics of military law. This is part of
a gradual transition in favour of the codification and integration
of human rights into domestic law. This involves the interpretation
of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, [27]reflecting
the realities of the Human Rights Act 1998. It also involves integrating
EC law in terms of the application of EC law in employment matters
such as the Sex Discrimination Act 1975.
Is this trend in favour of statutory codifications
reversible? It is unlikely that there will be a retreat away from
replacing historic prerogatives powers with a more visible use
of statutory authority. This leaves unresolved the question of
whether to maintain the discretion of the Prime Minister to act
on behalf of the Crown and declare war while retaining the convention
that Parliament should be informed and kept up to date with developments.
In recent years the opportunity for debate and
discussion after the decision to go to war has been taken. There
are many examples which reveal how Parliament in the final analysis
relies on the Government to provide sufficient information and
allow debate. [28]The
lessons of the Iraq war are clear that the Government is largely
able to set the agenda, identify the issues and provide its own
publicity on the need for military action and its subsequent outcome.
This leaves Parliament relatively weakened. The situation may
change, if Parliament had the task of prior approval.
There are also situations where the deployment
of military force is confined to peace time operations such as
in aid of the civil authorities. This may include times of national
emergency where the safety of life and health of the nation required
military assistance. [29]This
may include instances where the application of military aid is
on peacekeeping duties associated with the United Nations or in
disaster relief. Common to any military deployment is the requirements
of supply and this must be approved by Parliament. [30]It
is instructive to follow Treasury Guidance on circumstances where
resources need to be committed before the relevant legislation
comes into force and safeguards are required. In particular there
are strict rules for the use of the Contingencies Fund to provide
urgent finance. It is noteworthy that:
Use of the Contingencies Fund to finance expenditure
which, either as a matter of law or constitutional propriety,
requires specific legislation is, however, highly exceptional.
[31]
The general rule is that the Contingencies Fund
cannot be drawn upon for any purpose for which the statutory authority
of Parliament is required until legislation has been given a second
reading. There is explicit assumption that parliament should be
informed and that covering expenditure is the approval of Parliament.
Consistent with the use of public funds is the need for Parliamentary
approval. The example of the Contingencies Fund provides a good
model of a workable arrangement that fits the requirements of
emergency powers while maintaining the cover of parliamentary
approval. This includes circumstances where there is the need
for prior approval and other instances where retrospective approval
is needed. The two circumstances apply to the question of parliamentary
approval for the use of military force. Thus, if the Contingencies
model was used, the use of military force would either be given
prior parliamentary approval, or in exceptional circumstances,
retrospective approval, provided that at the time of use of force,
it was confidently expected that eventual Parliamentary approval
would be given. This would place executive powers under a statutory
regime that is likely to be much stricter than current arrangements.
It is important that if there is to be a statutory scheme replacing
the existing prerogative that its scope is not narrowly defined
to only the declaration of war. As noted above the declaration
of war is rarely used today, that placing it on a legislative
basis would have little practical effect as successive governments
have followed the trend of not declaring war.
The Overseas Experience32[32]
There are some useful points of comparison that
emerge from the experience of other countries, not least, is the
ability for government's to wage undeclared wars. There are a
limited number of countries, whose Parliament's have oversight
powers concerning military operations, including peace operations.
[33]Even
when a declaration of war is to be formally authorised by Parliament,
it appears that in many instances the practical effect is limited.
France is a good example of this point. Article 35 of the Constitution
1958 provides that a declaration of war is authorised by Parliament.
However, in cases of peace keeping activities, and in line with
multi-national agreements, the deployment of the military is engaged
outside the formal requirements of Parliamentary authority. This
leaves the Head of State in many circumstances with overarching
authority.
The United States Constitution has divided powers
between the Congress the power to declare war and the President,
as Commander in Chief to take action in self-defence and lead
the armed forces. The United States appears to follow the current
trend of waging undeclared wars. Examples are from the period
of the war in Korea, later the war in Vietnam and more recently,
wars are waged but not declared. The War Powers Resolution[34]
was initiated during the Nixon period and passed both houses of
Congress after much controversy. The Resolution stipulates that
Congress must be consulted and written notification given within
48 hours of action. This is subject to formal approval of up to
60 days, and if approval is not forthcoming then troops are supposed
to be withdrawn within a further 30 days. The aim is to provide
a link between President, as Commander in Chief and Congress who
has constitutional authority to wage war. The ability of the President
to wage war successfully without first declaring war seems not
to have been limited in practice by the War Powers Resolution,
a Resolution that is claimed by some to be unconstitutional. [35]This
leaves the law in an unsatisfactory state.
In Germany there is no explicit requirement
that the Bundestag should authorise the deployment of troops,
and there is considerable support for legislation requiring that
this should be the case. It would appear that the problems faced
in bringing in such legislation are similar to the United Kingdom's
situation. These are, the difficulty of providing adequate parliamentary
oversight, the problem of ensuring that urgent deployment of military
force is met while maintaining the authority of Parliament to
give approval and the difficulty of monitoring military operations
consistent with security. In Italy there is no constitutional
provision requiring Parliamentary authorisation. The Executive
has responsibility for military action and international policy
making. However, in January 2001 there was a resolution of the
Chamber of Deputies concerning parliamentary procedure for taking
decisions. This is in the context of Italy's Article 11, a repudiation
of war clause in the Constitution similar to Article 9 of the
Constitution of Japan 1946.
It may be concluded that any proposal to bring
prerogative powers to declare and wage war under a statutory framework
should be designed to be realistic so that Parliament's accountability,
role and function is practical and effective.
The position of Spain is interesting because
Article 63 of the Spanish Constitution (1978) gives authority
to the king to declare war and make peace. In practical terms
this is a decision which is taken by the Prime Minister without
the prior approval of Parliament. This was used to allow Spanish
troops to be used to support the US in Iraq. Since then the Government
has agreed that through a resolution that in future prior approval
will be sought for the use of troops abroad. It remains to be
seen to what extent future Government's will honour this commitment.
Conclusions
Placing the prerogative powers associated with
declaring war and using military force under statutory control
is an important step in the direction of improved accountability
and improving the role and standing of Parliament. There are different
levels of parliamentary participation including general debate
and oversight through select committees. The formal constitutional
position that the government can go to war without specific parliamentary
authority remains anomalous when technically the supply necessary
requires parliamentary approval. Linking the principle of parliamentary
authority over supply to the declaration of war suggests that
in terms of consistency there should be parliamentary approval
of the use of the military in connection with armed conflict.
It is opportune to settle arrangements that assert Parliament's
authority over the prerogative. It is also important that the
declaration of war is itself subject to clarification as to when
it may be used and when not. The commitment of military force,
whether for peace-keeping or in self defence should require prior
parliamentary approval. Using the model of the Contingencies Fund,
it would be possible to include prior approval and in certain
circumstances retrospective approval. This would cover those circumstances
where there is the need to deploy rapid response forces. The government
would be entitled to take proactive action provided they are assured
that parliamentary approval is likely at the earliest possible
opportunity.
24 October 2005
19 (1627 ) s St Tr 1 or otherwise known as The
Five Knights Case. Back
20
Prohibitions del Roy (1607) 12 Co Rep 63, The Case of Proclamations
(1611) 12 Co Rep 74. Back
21
See Public Administration, Select Committee, Taming the Prerogative:
Strengthening Ministerial Accountability to Parliament HC 422
Session 2003-4. The report includes a draft bill setting our proposed
codified powers over the Military. Back
22
Amin v Brown [2005] EWHC 1670, [2005] All ER D 380. Back
23
House of Commons, Standard Note, SN/1A/1218 Parliament and
the participation of British Forces in armed conflict. Back
24
See the National Service Act 1948. Back
25
Sections 52-4 under the Reserve Forces Act 1996. Back
26
The Reserve Forces (Safeguarding of Employment) Act 1985. Back
27
R. v Ministry of Defence ex p Smith [1996] QB 517 Lustig-Prean
v UK (1999) 29 EHRR 548. Back
28
Claire Taylor, The Armed Forces (Parliamentary Approval for
Participation in Armed Conflict) Bill 16 of 2005-6 House of
Commons Research Paper 05/56 (8th August 2005)pps. 8-12. Back
29
Examples in recent years include the foot and mouth outbreak,
fire coverage during the fireman's strike, the use of troops at
Heathrow airport. Back
30
See HM Treasury, Government Accounting 2000 with amendments
to 2004-5, London, 2000. Back
31
Ibid; para 2.310-11, 16. Back
32
There is a useful survey and analysis in: Standard Note SN/PC/3776
Richard Kelly, Parliamentary approval for participation in
armed conflict- some international comparisons. House of Commons,
Library, 13 October 2005, hereinafter Kelly's paper. Back
33
The countries that have such powers include the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Germany, Hungary , Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and
Sweden. Countries which do not have such powers include the United
Kingdom, USA, Belgium, France, Canada, Poland, Portugal, and Spain
(see Kelly's paper op. cit.) Back
34
First vetoed by President Nixon in 1973, but its constitutionality
has been questioned by successive Presidents. The War Powers Resolution
50 USC 1541-1548 (1994). Back
35
Eugene V Rostow, "Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers
Act" 50 Tex LRe. 833. I am very grateful for the advice of
my colleague Dan Joyner on the US situation. Back
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