Memorandum by General Sir Michael Rose
1. Armed conflict becomes legitimate only
when it is supported by the majority of the people of a country
and there is a clear moral basis for engaging in conflict. The
two elements are not necessarily conditional upon each other.
2. Winning wars needs total and concerted
commitment by all parties. Disharmony between the people, the
government and the armed forces is likely to result in a lack
of commitment by one party or another,—something that inevitably
will make success more difficult to achieve.
3. A full and clear justification for engaging
in conflict,—an undertaking that will necessarily put people's
lives at risk,—is part of the social and contract between
the people, the government and the armed forces. Without a full,
credible and clear justification, trust will be destroyed, and
this will adversely affect the level of commitment and morale.
There is therefore great benefit to be gained by a government
a full and proper justification of its actions prior to engaging
in armed conflict.
4. It would be enormously advantageous to
members of the armed forces for such a formal and legal justification
to be made by the government before entering into armed conflict.
There can be no more debilitating effect on the morale of members
of the armed forces for them to know that their country does not
support the mission or that the case for war is based on doubtful
moral or legal arguments. A proper justification should always
be a sine qua non for engaging in conflict.
5. A formal requirement for prior parliamentary
authorisation for entering into conflict situations can therefore
only be of benefit to members of the armed forces. They would
have the reassurance that they would not be asked to sacrifice
their lives in a cause that was not fully supported by Parliament
and the people of this country. There will, however, be cases
when for security reasons such prior authorisation may not be
sensible or indeed possible. There should therefore be some blanket
authority to the government given for special cases,—but
these should always be brought before Parliament post facto for
scrutiny. There is already, I believe, such a mechanism in place
for scrutinising the work of the Security Services.
6. "Mission creep" is not only
inevitable but it is also in some cases necessary to cope with
changing strategic circumstances. However, each major shift in
the rules of engagement and troops levels should be formally justified,
if only post facto.
7. It would certainly put soldiers in a
difficult position both legally and morally if they were ordered
to undertake a mission when Parliamentary approval had expressly
not been given. If time was short and a deployment had to take
place without such Parliamentary authorisation, then there would
have to be an immediate assurance given that this would be obtained
post facto as soon as possible.
8. If use of force has already been authorised
by the UN, further national consent should only be needed if a
major change in the UN rules of engagement or nature of the deployment
was being considered. For example, a peacekeeping force could
not be ordered to engage in war fighting (other than for reasons
of self defence) without authorisation of a national parliament.
9. One final caveat: too much micro management
by Parliament would certainly reduce the effectiveness of our
armed forces when deployed on operations. Therefore the requirement
for prior legal authorisation must not be translated into the
tactical management of an operation.
6 March 2006
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