UK policy and the international
negotiations on climate change
175. We note that the compliance mechanisms in
the Kyoto Protocol are very weak and even counter-productive.
We heard from several witnesses that the Kyoto targets themselves
were going to make little difference to rates of warming (para
122).
176. We consider that the "beyond Kyoto"
negotiations, which start this year, will have to take a far more
innovatory approach than simply assuming that the Kyoto targets
will be tightened (para 123).
177. The US has repeatedly stressed the role
of technological change in securing greenhouse gas emission reductions.
While the Kyoto Protocol should, in principle, encourage technological
change, we are not convinced that it has sufficient focus on this
central issue (para 132).
178. We argue that the present "more of
the same" approach, relying exclusively on targets for emissions
reductions, may not tackle the global warming threat. We urge
the Government to help broaden the debate through its membership
and current presidency of the G8 and using its position of being
internationally respected in the scientific world (para 133).
179. It could be argued that it is late in the
day to be suggesting a significant change of focus in the climate
negotiations. But we fear that the "more of the same"
approach, focusing on emissions targets, will fail
(para 136).
180. Climate adaptation should become one of
the mainstream elements of investment decisions, particularly
with respect to infrastructure, housing, coastal development and
international development assistance (para 137).
181. We urge a thorough review of the Climate
Change Levy regime, with the aim of moving as fast as possible
to replacing it by a carbon tax (para 140).
182. There appears to be growing support for
the idea that Kyoto-plus should focus on technology and R &
D (para 141).
183. The International Energy Agency has estimated
that the R & D expenditure needed, if carbon-free energy is
to become economically viable through the use of solar photovoltaics,
biomass and carbon sequestration, is around $400 billion. The
IEA programme would cost about the same now as the 1963-73 US
Apollo programme that put man on the moon cost then1% of
world GNP. Such an R & D programme would be a true global
public good: one in which everyone would have a share of the benefits.
This is an illustration of what international negotiators might
now consideran agreement on technology and its diffusion
(para 142).
184. The important issue is to wean the international
negotiators away from excessive reliance on the "targets
and penalties" approach embodied in Kyoto. Hence there should
be urgent progress towards thinking about wholly different , and
more promising, approaches based on a careful analysis of the
incentives that countries have to agree to any measures adopted
(para 143).