Select Committee on European Union Thirty-Fourth Report


CHAPTER 3: Building the EU-Africa Partnership

Background to EU-Africa relations

55.  The first Summit between Africa and the European Union was held in Cairo in April 2000. It was the first time that Africa as a whole had sat at the table with the EU and represented an attempt to build on the regional groupings of the ACP and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to develop a strategic, pan-African partnership covering the whole continent. The EU promoted this regional integration as an important step towards Africa's integration into the global economy.

56.  The Cairo plan of action, adopted at the Summit, outlined the main aims of Africa-EU dialogue as follows:

57.  A second Summit was due to be held in Lisbon in April 2003. However, it was indefinitely postponed, largely due to disagreements over the position of Zimbabwe. EU Member States will not allow President Mugabe to enter the EU area,[52] and argue that other African states should do more to condemn his actions. African heads of state are unwilling to agree to an EU-Africa Summit at which not all African states can be represented. We examine the prospects for a second Summit in Chapter Eight, but it was clear in 2003 that there was no way around the impasse.

58.  A 2003 EC Communication by the Commission, "The EU-Africa Dialogue", explored options to continue the dialogue outside the EU-Africa Summit process.[53] It outlined mechanisms for more flexible, simplified, direct and political dialogue between Africa and Europe. Potential lines of action for strengthening institutional linkages between the EU and the AU identified in the Communication included:

  • at senior official level;
  • in bi-regional working parties;
  • between the AU and the EU Heads of Mission based in Addis Ababa;
  • between the Brussels-based African Heads of Mission; and
  • between the AU/EU Commissions.

59.  The Communication was also important for its recognition that the existence of different agreements between the EU and the various regions of Africa (such as Cotonou, Euro-Med and the TDCA) did not make it easy to respond to pan-African initiatives nor to support regional activities that took place across African regions. The Commission agreed that it needed to "consider practical measures that would build bridges between the different agreements … This could apply to the area of trade, to procurement rules … and to the programming of aid."[54] As will be seen in Chapter Four, the Commission's aim of coherent policies towards the whole of Africa will not prove simple to realise. But this Communication was an important first step in accepting the need for a coherent strategy towards Africa.

60.  Prior to the Commission's Communication there had been two Ministerial Troika[55] meetings (in October 2001 and December 2002).[56] Both meetings had envisaged that a second Summit would take place in Lisbon in April 2003 as planned at the original Summit. The Troika meetings since then have often reiterated the need for a solution regarding Zimbabwe, but have increasingly moved away from reliance on the possibility of a second Summit to focus on substantive issues such as peace and security, governance, regional integration and development.[57]

61.  Since 2000 the Ministerial Troika meetings have been the highest level of dialogue between the EU and the AU, but there has also been a significant level of co-operation at lower levels, as envisaged in the Commission's earlier Communication. The Commission itself has been the leading proponent of this co-operation holding regular meetings with counterparts within the AU Commission, at the level of both Commissioners themselves and officials.[58] Tim Williams, Head of the Pan-Africa Policy Unit FCO, considered that "an interesting synergy" had arisen between the two Commissions in terms of the developmental support which each was giving to the other, (Q 1) and informal discussions with the United Kingdom Permanent Representation in Brussels confirmed that a significant relationship between the two had developed.

62.  Dialogue at all levels has ensured that EU policy towards Africa has been developed in consultation with Africans, particularly with the AU but also with other interlocutors. This has greatly enhanced the EU's understanding of the challenges facing Africa and the support which the EU is able to offer. However, James Mackie of the European Centre for Development Policy Management considered that the Commission-to-Commission dialogue has been by far the most effective; there is still scope for improvement in terms of dialogue between the two Parliaments, and amongst civil society. (Q 177)

63.  In the absence of a second EU-Africa Summit, the dialogue and co-operation which has taken place at all levels between the EU and AU has been a positive development and its continuation will be essential to the implementation of the EU Strategy for Africa. Dialogue needs to be pursued more widely outside the level of the two Commissions and the Ministerial Troikas.

The EU's interlocutors in Africa

64.  The EU Strategy for Africa commits EU Member States to "Develop this strategy, in partnership with the African Union, NEPAD and other African partners".[59] This next section briefly describes these partners and the role they play in bringing together different African nations.

THE AFRICAN UNION

65.  The primary African interlocutor for the EU is the African Union (AU).[60] The Sirte Declaration[61] in 1999 called for its establishment to replace the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The Constitutive Act of the AU was adopted in 2000[62] and came into force in 2001. The 2002 AU Summit in Durban, South Africa, launched the AU and convened the First Assembly of the Heads of States of the African Union.

BOX 6

The Organs of the African Union

The Assembly is the supreme organ of the AU, comprising heads of state and government or accredited representatives of AU member states. The Assembly's functions include: determining the common policies of the AU; considering requests for membership and establishing any organ of the AU; adopting the AU budget; and directing the Executive Council on the management of conflicts and other emergencies.


The Executive Council is responsible to the Assembly and is composed of ministers or authorities designated by the governments of member states.


The Permanent Representatives Committee is responsible for preparing the work of the Executive Council. It is composed of permanent representatives of AU member states.


The principle AU organ for peace and security is the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which is designed to serve as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The Protocol Relating to the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union entered into force on 26 December 2003. Article 5 of the Protocol defines the Council's composition: 15 elected Members; 10 to serve for two years; and 5 for three years. Article 5(2) of the AU Constitutive Act defines other bodies to support the work of the PSC, including a Panel of the Wise (POW), a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), an African Standby Force (ASF), a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) and a Military Staffs Committee (MSC).


The Pan-African Parliament is intended to promote the participation of African peoples in governance, development and economic integration at the continental level.


The Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) performs an advisory function. It is composed of different social and professional groups of AU Member States.


A Court of Justice of the AU is to be established, to be merged with the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights.


The AU Financial Institutions comprise the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund and the African Investment Bank.

The Commission plays a central role in the day-to-day management of the AU, elaborating draft common positions of the AU, preparing strategic plans and studies for the consideration of the Executive Council, and co-ordinating AU programmes and policies with those of the RECs. The Commission comprises the Chairperson, the Deputy Chairperson, eight Commissioners and additional staff members. Each Commissioner is responsible for a portfolio, arranged as follows:


Peace and security—conflict prevention, management and resolution, and combating terrorism;


Political affairs—human rights, democracy, good governance, electoral institutions, civil society, humanitarian affairs, refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons;


Infrastructure and energy—energy, transport, communications, infrastructure and tourism;


Social affairs—health, children, drug control, population, migration, labour and employment, sports and culture;

Human resources, science and technology—education, information technology communication, youth, human resources, science and technology;


Trade and industry—trade, industry, customs and immigration matters;


Rural economy and agriculture—rural economy, agriculture and food security, livestock, environment, water and natural resources and desertification; and


Economic affairs—economic integration, monetary affairs, private sector development, investment and resource mobilization.


66.  The AU was intended to speed up the process of African integration in order to enable it to play a greater role in the global economy and to address continental social, economic and political problems. It describes itself as founded on a common vision of a united and strong Africa, built on a partnership between governments and all segments of civil society. The principal aims of the AU include:

  • the promotion of peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of the AU's development and integration agenda;
  • the promotion of democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance;
  • the promotion and protection of human rights;
  • the promotion of sustainable development in the economic, social and cultural spheres, as well as the integration of African economies;
  • the co-ordination and harmonisation of the policies between existing and future Regional Economic Communities (RECs).

67.  The primary organs of the AU were designed partly to mirror those of the EU; thus there is a Council, a Commission and a Parliament. However, there remain significant differences between the two, not least the fact that the Council has no significant secretariat therefore policy-making is primarily the responsibility of the Commission (with political approval being granted by the Council). In addition, the roles of the Parliament and Court of Justice are as yet underdeveloped in comparison to the EU. It is therefore important to remember that the AU does not make decisions in the same manner as the EU and has a very different relationship with its member states. Box 6 provides a brief overview of the relevant organs.

THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT (NEPAD)

68.  A second major African interlocutor is the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), adopted at the July 2001 OAU Summit in Lusaka, Zambia,[63] although subsequently subsumed within the AU.

69.  NEPAD is designed to present a comprehensive and integrated development plan for Africa, addressing major African social, economic and political concerns. It represents a commitment by African leaders to African peoples and the international community to achieve sustainable growth and to promote Africa's integration into the global economy. NEPAD cites peace, security, democracy and good governance as preconditions for sustainable development and promotes a system of voluntary peer review and adherence to codes and standards of conduct.

70.  African heads of state attending the 38th (and final) Summit of the OAU in Durban in July 2002 agreed a NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Good Governance.[64] The Durban meeting also approved the NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).[65]

BOX 7

NEPAD Structures

NEPAD is a programme of the AU intended to meet its development aims. The highest authority of the NEPAD implementation process is the AU Summit. NEPAD's Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSIC) comprises three states for every REC and reports to the AU Summit on an annual basis. The Steering Committee of NEPAD comprises the personal representatives of the NEPAD heads of state and government and oversees projects and programme development. The NEPAD secretariat co-ordinates implementation of projects and programmes approved by the HSIC.


The NEPAD strategic framework document arises from a mandate given to the five initiating heads of state (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa) by the OAU to develop an integrated socio-economic development framework for Africa. The 37th Summit of the OAU in July 2001 formally adopted the strategic framework document.


NEPAD'S key priority areas for action are:


  • operationalising the African Peer Review Mechanism;

  • facilitating and supporting implementation of the short-term regional infrastructure programmes covering Transport Energy, Water and Sanitation;

  • facilitating implementation of the food security and agricultural development program in all sub-regions;

  • facilitating the preparation of a co-ordinated African position on market access, debt relief and ODA reforms; and
  • monitoring and intervening as appropriate to ensure that the MDGs in the areas of health and education are met.

71.  There are a number of challenges facing NEPAD: its internal organisation, financing, institutional capacity and relation to African people have all been cited as problematic. However, its biggest challenge is that of expectations. The UN regards NEPAD as the framework for achieving the MDGs whilst the EU Strategy for Africa itself emphasises the role of NEPAD in its section on governance. One of the EU's challenges will be to assist in building the capacity of NEPAD to meet these challenges.

BOX 8

The Institutional Relationship between the AU and NEPAD

At the first NEPAD Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue, held in South Africa on 22-23 October 2004, opening statements made by Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal underlined the importance of a close relationship between NEPAD and the AU, emphasising that NEPAD is the socio-economic development programme of the AU.[66]


The plan to integrate NEPAD into the AU as a specialised agency in 2006 demonstrates the desire that the two institutions should work closely together as complementary pan-African institutions to promote peace and security, good governance and development in Africa.


Promoting good governance is a guiding principle for both institutions. AU resources that can support its governance function include a political mandate as part of the AU Constitutive Act;[67] the role of the RECs as regional building blocks for the work of the AU; and dedicated organs that incorporate input from citizens, such as ECOSOCC and the Pan-African Parliament. NEPAD's primary mechanism for promoting good governance is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).[68]


However, there has been some tension between the AU and NEPAD. Critics have observed that the divergent approaches adopted by officials from each institution in presenting initiatives to African governments and civil society groups have given an impression that the AU and NEPAD are competing for supremacy in promoting democratisation and economic integration in Africa. The decision to integrate NEPAD formally into the AU by 2006 should help to mitigate rivalry between the two institutions.[69]


72.  Myles Wickstead, former Head of the Secretariat for the Commission for Africa, noted some tension between NEPAD based in South Africa and the AU based in Addis Ababa over what should be the key priorities to support the overall development of Africa. (Q 78) Bob Dewar, the United Kingdom's Permanent Representative to the AU, acknowledged this friction, but drew attention to commitments made at the Khartoum AU Summit to integrate NEPAD fully into the AU over the next two to three years. (Q 343)

73.  There is a clear need for NEPAD and the AU to work together and agree who will do what, where. Prior to integration of the two organisations it will be also important to determine where money can best be spent in order to avoid unnecessary duplication.

SUB-REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS

74.  The AU sub-divides the continent into five distinct sub-regions: West Africa, East Africa, Southern Africa, Central Africa, and Northern Africa. These are known as the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). However, the existing sub-regional organisations and other inter-state bodies do not always tally with official AU REC demarcations, creating confusion and some competition which does little to help to foster continental cohesion. In addition, there is poor interaction and some rivalry between sub-regions and the AU, not least as resource constraints limit sub-regional organisations' capacity to communicate with Addis Ababa.

BOX 9

African sub-regional organisations

Economic Community of West African States


The treaty for an Economic Community of West African States (Treaty of Lagos) was signed by 15 West African countries on 28 May 1975. The original primary objective of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was to promote regional integration in economic, social and cultural activities. It later developed a peace and security dimension as it became clear that regional instability was a severe impediment to achieving its other ambitions.


The Southern African Development Community (SADC)


The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is the regional body for Southern Africa. It was officially instituted in the early 1990s, having evolved from a more informal regional process which began with the establishment of the Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC) in the early 1980s. SADC's stated main aims are to promote development and economic growth, alleviate poverty and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration.


East Africa


East Africa does not have a sub-regional organization that brings together all states in the sub-region, reflecting some of the problems of attempting to rationalise African sub-regions according to the AU's official demarcation of REC's. The East African Community (EAC) comprises Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania and is one of the oldest and most viable regional organisations in eastern Africa, but it is restricted by its narrow membership. The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) stretches from North to Southern Africa. Consequently, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which consists of several countries from the Horn to East Africa, is often seen as the most appropriate forum for dealing with regional issues.


Arab Maghreb Union


On 17 February 1989 at the Maghred Summit held in Marrakech, Morocco, the five Heads of State signed the Treaty establishing the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). AMU Member States comprise Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. The AMU has not met at the level of heads of state since April 1994, hamstrung by the dispute over the status of Western Sahara.


Economic Community of Central African States


The membership of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) overlaps with the membership of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC). Central Africa has struggled to produce a meaningful response to the severe peace and security problems within its region.


75.  Certain African sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS have made considerable efforts in a number of areas, notably in peace and security and peacekeeping. ECOWAS has deployed a number of peacekeeping operations within its region whilst both ECOWAS and the Eastern African region have made significant progress towards developing their peacekeeping capacities to support the AU African Standby Force (ASF).

76.  A number of problems relate to African sub-regional organisations, however. There is a great discrepancy in capacity from region to region—though all sub-regions struggle for resources. For instance, ECOWAS is comparatively well-developed in the area of peace and security, including in comparison to the AU. In central Africa, however, there is very little sub-regional capacity in any area. In addition to this, internal political difficulties between some states, particularly within the Northern and Southern African regions, hamper sub-regional cohesion. Furthermore, a number of countries belong to two or more sub-regional organisations and there needs to be some rationalisation. (Q 81)

77.  However, the sub-regional organisations are a reminder of the diversity that exists within Africa, even at the regional level. There is no "inconsistency between having strong, competent bodies and a strong, competent African Union as well." (Q 81) The EU should continue to make every effort to engage with the sub-regional organisations as well as with the AU.

THE ACP-EC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (COTONOU AGREEMENT)

78.  The Cotonou Agreement stresses the significance of political dialogue, of peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution, of respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, of good governance, and of a participatory approach to ensure the involvement of civil society and links between ACP and EU actors.

79.  Cotonou provides for three joint institutions for EU-ACP co-operation: first, the Council of Ministers, which meets annually and is responsible for initiating political dialogue, adopts political guidelines and takes decisions required for the implementation of the Agreement's provisions; second, the Committee of Ambassadors[70] which is designed to assist the Council of Ministers; third, the Joint Parliamentary Assembly which acts in an advisory capacity.

80.  The dialogue process under the Cotonou Agreement is well developed and, although not forming a direct model for dialogue with the AU and sub-regional organisations, there are lessons to be learnt from the process, particularly in relation to governance.

Development of the Strategy for Africa

81.  The June 2005 European Council invited the Council of Ministers to draw up a long-term global strategy towards Africa, in the light of the UN Summit outcomes, with a view to adoption at the European Council in December 2005.[71] The June conclusions welcomed "the increase in dialogue and co-operation between the EU and all the African Countries, made possible by the affirmation of the African Union (AU) as the political framework able to put forwards African responses to the challenges of development" and sought "to continue supporting the development of the African continent in compliance with the principles of equality and African ownership."[72]

82.  In accordance with this request the Commission produced a Communication entitled 'EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African Pact to Accelerate Africa's Development'.[73] As the title suggests, the Commission's priority was Africa's development needs, in particular achievement of the MDGs. However, the Communication recognised that certain pre-requisites were necessary to achieve the MDGs, notably peace and security, and good and effective governance. The Commission Communication examined in detail how these pre-requisites might be met.

83.  In terms of co-ordination of EU policies the Commission considered three approaches to the EU-Africa strategy:

  • A retention of the current approach where each Member State and the Commission autonomously developed and implemented their own policies and strategies towards all African sectors, countries and organisations. It was felt that this would mean that the EU-Africa policy would remain fragmented or create duplications.
  • A centralised policy which would require common guidelines for all EU Member States and the Commission in all areas. The main risks here would be (a) the difficulty of reaching unanimous agreement in such detail for all sectors concerned; and (b) the loss of specific added value by certain actors in specific sectors or regions.
  • A balanced approach between a complete merging of aid policies and the absence of strategic co-ordination, based on the experience gained and lessons learnt from the EU's long-standing relationship with Africa.[74]

The Commission considered that the third option would give the best possible outcome in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and consistency.

84.  The Commission Communication was followed by a paper by the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, which concerned the peace and security aspects of the global strategy for Africa and the contribution that the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) could make. It was intended to complement the Commission's Communication but emphasised the importance of peace and security, governance and increased political dialogue with African partners. It also stressed the need for the EU to make a long-term commitment to Africa.

85.  The General Affairs and External Relations Council of November 2005 considered these two papers and concluded that a comprehensive Strategy "encompassing security, development and human rights which covers all African countries"[75] should be presented to the December European Council. The Council conclusions detailed the commitments to be found in the eventual Strategy under the headings of peace and security, human rights, governance, economic growth and regional integration and trade, environment, development assistance, investing in people, migration and follow-up.

86.  As holder of the EU Presidency for the second half of 2005, the United Kingdom Government was tasked with the preparation of the eventual Strategy. We took evidence from the Secretary of State for International Development during this preparation period. He noted that the Strategy would be "much shorter, much more concise" than the original Commission proposal. He also argued that:

"it is based on some very important principles: playing to the strengths of individual Member States, recognising that the Commission has got things that it does particularly well, but what it does in individual countries is going to depend on circumstances so there needs to be flexibility." (Q 48)

87.  The eventual Strategy which was agreed by the European Council was indeed far shorter and more concise than the Commission Communication, and even than the Council Conclusions agreed in November. The United Kingdom Presidency's aim was to highlight the most important areas leaving issues surrounding implementation to be agreed through consultation with African partners.

Development of the joint implementation matrix

88.  On 2 December 2005, the fifth Ministerial Meeting of the African and EU Troikas met in Bamako. At the meeting, Ministers welcomed the draft EU Strategy for Africa and agreed to develop an action plan for its implantation. Senior officials were mandated to submit recommendations for such an action plan to the next ministerial Troika.[76] The African side also presented a matrix for monitoring the dialogue and it was agreed that a joint matrix would be considered at the next meeting.

89.  It was not clear whether these two initiatives were originally intended to come together, but, following the adoption of the EU Strategy at the December European Council, this appears to have happened. A joint implementation matrix of commitments arising from the Africa-EU dialogue was presented to an AU-EU experts' meeting in Addis Ababa from 13-14 February 2006.

90.  The matrix covers issues of peace and security, governance, trade and integration and key development issues. It takes a tabular form, assessing what efforts the AU and EU have made to implement commitments and what progress has been made, and identifying ways forward.

91.  Bob Dewar described the matrix as symbolic of the new, joint way that Africa and the EU are trying to work. Implementation of commitments is a high priority for the Africans, including those made in 2005. The matrix is also very detailed in terms of specific actions to achieve implementation. The matrix represents the first time commitments by both Africa and the EU have been put into one document, in place of separate EU and African programmes for action. It was negotiated between the Troikas in Addis and through the wider Brussels machinery. (Q 355)

92.  At the EU-African Troika meeting in Vienna on 8 May[77] the joint implementation matrix was endorsed. The matrix is considered by ministers to be a living document which will be updated and followed-up at least every three months.

Monitoring and review

93.  Monitoring and reviewing the EU's delivery on commitments made in its Strategy for Africa is crucial to effective implementation. The Strategy itself commits the EU to "review progress on its implementation at the December 2006 European Council, and at least every two years thereafter", pledging that Ministers of EU Member States "will discuss and oversee the development of detailed delivery and monitoring plans for this purpose, based on timelines and indicators proposed jointly by the Commission and Council Secretariat."[78]

94.  The EU could be criticized for having little appetite for agreeing genuine benchmarks to review the effectiveness of the Strategy. Accordingly, the issue of how often the Strategy should be reviewed is critical.

95.  Representatives of the Belgian government argued that a review every 12 months would provide a much better framework for ensuring effective implementation. (Q 211)

96.  The joint implementation matrix can also be used to develop a schedule for implementation, in terms of clarifying exactly who is doing what in the EU in terms of the implementation of the Strategy, and when the work of the different bodies and institutions will be delivered.

97.  The Vienna meeting on 8 May requested the Troika Ambassadors to table progress reports on the matrix at the bi-annual Troika meetings and to host their first meeting on the matrix in June 2006.[79] The EU side also committed itself to progressively include in the matrix information on EU Member States' bilateral aid activities at pan-African level. This will assist in determining how bilateral aid can be used to fulfil the commitments made in the EU Strategy and help all sides to have a clearer view of the overall funding situation.

98.  We welcome the EU's commitment to including information on Member State bilateral aid within the joint implementation matrix.

99.  Close monitoring and review by the Council of Ministers of the commitments made in the EU Strategy for Africa are essential for its implementation. The Strategy and its implementation should be reviewed annually, with progress measured against the more specific commitments set in the joint implementation matrix.


52   Council Common Position 2004/161/CFSP of 19 February 2004 renewing restrictive measures against Zimbabwe; Council Common Position 2005/146/CFSP of 21 February 2005; Council Decision 2005/444/CFSP of 13 June 2005.  Back

53   Communication from the Commission to the Council: The EU-Africa dialogue COM(2003) 316 final. Back

54   Section Two: Treating Africa as One.  Back

55   For both the EU and the AU, the Troika is a body constituting the President of the Commission, the President of the Council and a high-ranking member of the Secretariat (in the EU's case this is Javier Solana, the High Representative for the CFSP). Back

56   Communiqué: Africa-Europe Ministerial Conference 11 October 2001, Council of the European Union 12762/01; Final Communiqué: Africa-Europe Ministerial Meeting 28 November 2002, Ouagadougou. Back

57   Final Communiqué: EU-Africa Dialogue Ministerial Troika Meeting 10 November 2003, Rome; Communiqué of the EU-Africa Ministerial 1 April 2004, Dublin; Communiqué: Africa-Europe Dialogue 4 December 2004, Addis Ababa; European Union-Africa Union Ministerial Meeting Final Communiqué 11 April 2005, Luxembourg; links to these documents can be found at:

Error! Bookmark not defined.

The latest two meetings were: Communiqué: EU-Africa Ministerial Meeting 2 December 2005, Bamako; and Final Communiqué: EU-Africa Ministerial Troika Meeting 8 May 2006, Vienna, Council of the European Union 9333/06. Back

58   Representatives of the Commission confirmed this during informal discussions in Brussels, March 2006.  Back

59   The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership Council of the European Union, Brussels 19 December 2005 15961/05, paragraph 9(b). Back

60   African Union home page: http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/index/index.htm. Back

61   Sirte Declaration Fourth Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government 8-9 September 1999 Sirte, Libya EAHG/Draft/Decl. (IV) Rev.1:

http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/oau/keydocs/Sirte_Declaration_1999.pdf Back

62   Constitutive Act of the African Union, Appendix Five. Back

63   New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), October 2001:

http://www.sarpn.org.za/NEPAD/Primary/NEPAD200110.pdf Back

64   The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance 18 June 2002: http://www.sarpn.org.za/NEPAD/july2002/declaration/declaration.pdf. Back

65   Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Thirty-eighth ordinary session of the Organization of African Unity, 8 July 2002, Durban, South Africa, Ahg/235 (xxxviii), Annex II, The New Partnership for Africa's Development, (NEPAD), The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM):

http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/summit_council/aprm.pdf. Back

66   Summary report of the first NEPAD multi-stakeholder dialogue, South Africa, 22-23 October 2004: http://www.uneca.org/unregionalconsultations/documents/report_multistakeholder.htm. Back

67   Constitutive Act of the African Union, Appendix Five. Back

68   See Chapter Six, paragraphs 234-252.  Back

69   The African Union and NEPAD, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa: http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/?id=202 Back

70   The Committee of Ambassadors comprises a permanent representative from each EU Member State, a Commission representative and a head of mission for each ACP state. Back

71   Presidency Conclusions Brussels, 16-17 June 2005, Council of the European Union 10255/1/05, paragraph 75. Back

72   Presidency Conclusions Brussels, 16-17 June 2005, Council of the European Union 10255/1/05, paragraphs 70 and 74. Back

73   Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee SEC (2005) 1255. Back

74   This balanced approach was also that which had been taken earlier in the year in the new European Consensus for Development (see Chapter Five, paragraphs 175-176).  Back

75   Council Conclusions General Affairs and External Relations Council, Brussels 22 November, 2005, Council of the European Union 14172/05. Back

76   Communiqué: EU-Africa Ministerial Meeting 2 December 2005, Bamako. Back

77   Final Communiqué: EU-Africa Ministerial Troika Meeting 8 May 2006, Vienna, Council of the European Union 9333/06.  Back

78   The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership Council of the European Union, Brussels, 19 December 2005 15961/05, paragraph 9(a). Back

79   It has not been possible to incorporate the results from this meeting into this Report.  Back


 
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