House of Lords - European Union - Fifty-Third Report

Select Committee on European Union Fifty-Third Report

Chapter 2: Current attitudes towards enlargement

26. Perhaps the single biggest obstacle to future enlargements is inadequate public support in Western Europe, combined with a hostile or ambiguous stance taken by many political leaders in the Member States. Little attempt has been made to explain the benefits that enlargement has brought. A number of EU politicians, including from traditionally pro-enlargement countries such as Germany and the Netherlands, have called for a halt to enlargement once Bulgaria, Romania and maybe Croatia have joined. Some argue that there should be a "pause" in enlargement until the EU has reached a new institutional settlement and has regained momentum for internal integration. Others want enlargement to stop altogether, with the EU offering other applicants a closer association through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) or a "privileged partnership". Some argue in favour of the EU admitting the countries of the Western Balkans but argue against Turkish membership. Many of those who support Turkish accession do so more on the basis of pacta sunt servanda than out of real conviction. The lack of positive leadership and communication exacerbates public scepticism towards enlargement.

RECENT SURVEY EVIDENCE

27. According to a Eurobarometer poll conducted between March and May 2006, there are still more people in the EU who support future enlargements than people who oppose it. However, the gap between supporters and opponents is small and narrowing: 45 per cent were in favour and 42 per cent were against enlargement in the spring of 2006. This compares with 49 per cent in favour and 39 per cent against in the previous survey conducted in the autumn of 2005.[6]

28. The new Member States that joined in 2004 are more supportive of future enlargements than the old EU-15. In the EU-10, 66 per cent support enlargement,[7] whereas in the EU-15 it is only 41 per cent. Among the EU-15, there were absolute majorities in favour of enlargement only in three countries (Denmark, Greece and Spain) and relative majorities in another five (Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Sweden and the UK). In Germany, France and Austria more than 60 per cent of those polled said they opposed future enlargement. Similar levels of opposition were found in Finland and Luxembourg.

29. Curiously, when asked more generally about their attitudes towards enlargement as a policy, Europeans were quite positive: 55 per cent of the people polled across the EU-25 considered enlargement as something positive[8]. However, there is a clear difference between perceptions of the political and economic impact. According to the Commission's special Eurobarometer on enlargement published in July 2006, a clear majority of people in the EU think that enlargement has been good for the EU politically. Typically between 62 and 67 per cent of those polled thought that enlargement has helped to reunite the European continent, has strengthened the EU's position in the world, and has been good for European democracy and the protection of human rights.

30. However, this generally positive assessment weakens when EU citizens are asked who specifically would benefit from future enlargements. More than 50 per cent think that Turkish EU membership would be primarily in the interest of Turkey, and only 7 per cent thought the EU as a whole would be the main beneficiary. The balance is similar for the countries of the Western Balkans (45 per cent versus 9 per cent).[9]

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES ARE THE MAIN CONCERN

31. Witnesses from Germany and France reported that the main concerns of citizens in these countries with regard to enlargement were related to economic insecurity and employment (Q 332, Q 340, Q 418). Similarly, successive Eurobarometer surveys have found that economics is uppermost in the minds of EU citizens when they evaluate EU policies. When asked what they consider helpful for strengthening the Union and their own sense of attachment to it, many more people mentioned "comparable living standards" and a "European welfare system" than "a European constitution".[10] More than 40 per cent of Europeans say unemployment is their prime concern, with most of them being rather pessimistic about job market trends in their country.[11] More than half of EU citizens want the EU to do more to create and protect jobs, and to safeguard social security.

32. The Commission's enlargement survey also found that more people want to be better informed about the economic consequences of enlargement (38 per cent) than about any other impact that enlargement may have, including immigration, crime, political integration or values.

33. Perceptions of the economic and social impact of enlargement are less positive than those of the political impact. Some 40 per cent of EU citizens think that enlargement has been bad economically for their country, and for the EU as a whole. In Germany, Greece and Finland, the share is closer to 50 per cent. Similarly, well over half of all Germans, French and Austrians think that enlargement lowers the standard of living in the EU.[12]

34. Most importantly, many Western Europeans think that enlargement increases their risk of becoming unemployed. In 2003 (before eastward enlargement), 43 per cent of the people in the EU-15 feared that enlargement would lead to increased unemployment in their country. In 2006, the share had risen to 63 per cent. In Germany, the country that had received by far the biggest inflow of Eastern European workers before enlargement, the share rose from 56 per cent in 2003 to 80 per cent in 2006.[13] In France and Austria, around three-quarters of the people fear that enlargement threatens their jobs. People in these two countries are also much less convinced about other potential benefits of enlargement, such as cheaper goods for consumers or an increase in the EU's influence in the world.

TABLE 1

Percentage of people who agree that enlargement…

	is a positive thing.	increases problems in the job market.	has made many products cheaper.	improves the EU's influence in the world.
EU-25	55	63	34	61
Poland	73	45	37	76
Slovakia	68	50	36	71
Sweden	66	59	69	70
Czech Rep	64	49	43	73
Ireland	62	66	44	63
Netherlands	61	62	20	63
Denmark	60	51	53	61
Hungary	59	54	47	54
Italy	59	58	37	63
Spain	55	46	38	56
Germany	52	80	30	60
UK	49	64	36	55
France	42	72	21	50
Austria	40	75	32	43

Source: Eurobarometer, 'The future of Europe', May 2006.

35. The immigration of workers from the new Member States—where wages are much lower than in most of the EU-15—appears to be the main reason for concern. Well over half of all EU-citizens think that the 2004 enlargement was followed by significant migration flows. Only one-quarter do not associate the last round of accessions with important migration flows. Concerns about the immigration of low-cost workers also apply to future enlargements: 80 per cent or more of Germans, Dutch and Austrians are convinced the future enlargements will result in an increasing inflow of workers from future member states.[14]

36. Economic concerns were also behind much of the opposition to the Constitutional Treaty. Surveys conducted after the French and Dutch referendums showed that voters were not opposed to EU integration or enlargement per se. Only a small number cited the loss of national sovereignty or the prospect of future accession as their main reason for voting No. But many French and Dutch voters were concerned about the nature of the integration process, which they perceived as too free market oriented.[15] They thought that the parallel process of market opening and accepting new, low-wage countries was causing job losses and eroding social protection in their countries. Even though survey evidence does not show enlargement as a major reason why French voters rejected the Treaty, the French elite is convinced that enlargement played a key part in the French Non (Q 419).

PREFERENCES FOR CERTAIN CANDIDATES

37. One possible reason why support for enlargement was stronger in the past is that past candidates looked rather similar to the existing members of the Union. Whenever this was not the case, there was an anxious debate about the changing nature of the EU. The people in the founding Member States—Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries—have always appeared uncomfortable with candidates that seemed noticeably different, be it in economic, political or cultural terms. Thus, the Mediterranean enlargements of the 1980s (Greece, Portugal and Spain) encountered a lot more opposition than the accession of the Nordic countries and Austria during the 1990s. For the people in the EU's founding Member States, the European project was about bringing "together people who were similar, who looked and felt like each other, did things together and defended the common interest" (Q 419). The addition of countries that are politically or culturally dissimilar is therefore seen as problematic.

38. For many West Europeans, the accession of the Central and Eastern European countries was more acceptable than that of Bulgaria and Romania. Looking forward, EU citizens are clearly more comfortable with the prospect of Norway and Switzerland joining the EU than with letting in countries from the Balkans or the former Soviet Union both of which groups of countries are perceived as poor, politically unstable and ridden by problems of organised crime. Moreover, since these countries are perceived as different—politically, economically and culturally—the "we" feeling that drove the 2004 enlargement is now largely absent (Q 368).

39. It is Turkey that encounters most popular opposition among EU citizens, be it because of its size, its relatively low income levels, the fact that it is a predominantly Muslim country or because they question whether it is really a part of Europe. A majority of people in the EU-25 are opposed to Turkey's accession, with opposition in Austria, France and Germany reaching 70 per cent or more. Fewer than one-third of the people in the EU-25 support Turkish membership[16] (more is said on the reasons for this lack of support in Chapter 6).

TABLE 2

Percentage of people in the EU—25 who support the accession of…

	For	against	undecided
Switzerland	77	13	10
Norway	77	12	11
Iceland	68	18	14
Croatia	51	35	14
Bulgaria	48	37	15
Romania	43	42	15
Ukraine	42	43	15
Macedonia	41	42	17
Bosnia	40	43	17
Serbia	39	44	17
Albania	33	50	17
Turkey	31	55	14

Source: Standard Eurobarometer, December 2005.

THE REFERENDUM "THREAT"

40. Voter sentiment matters more than ever at a time when the EU has entered a new age of populism. The EU referendums on the Constitutional Treaty (and also those on accession held in the new Member States) have set an important precedent. In the past, decisions about EU integration and enlargement were usually made at the governmental and parliamentary level. In future more EU countries may find it difficult to agree to EU treaty change or further enlargements without consulting electorates in a popular vote[17].

41. In 2005, France inserted a clause into its constitution that requires future governments to hold a referendum on every future accession after Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia have joined. French voters appear to be mainly concerned about Turkish accession, and some witnesses from France were sanguine that the accession treaties of Macedonia and other Western Balkan countries would be approved in a referendum (Q 460). Others cautioned however that a negative vote cannot be entirely ruled out on the accession treaty of one or more of the Western Balkan countries, because French voters may think that enlargement has already gone too far (Q 196) or because they are expressing their frustration on an unrelated question, for example dissatisfaction with their current government (Q 312).

42. Similarly, the former Austrian government of Wolfgang Schüssel has promised to hold a referendum on Turkish accession—although this is so far a political promise and not legally binding. Paul Luif of the Austrian Institute of International Affairs pointed out that it would be very difficult to predict the outcome of a referendum to be held in a decade or more, if at all. He also alerted us to the fact that Austria's opposition to Turkish accession varies considerably depending on what kind of questions the public are asked (p 180). While only 10 per cent of Austrians express support for Turkish accession in Eurobarometer polls, national polls show that 58 per cent of Austrians expect Turkey to be ready for membership at some point. Only 32 per cent ruled out Turkey ever qualifying for membership.

43. In the recent past, the commitment of one EU government to put an important decision to the people has tended to be followed by demands in other EU countries to do the same. This was true for both the referendums held on accession in the new Member States and the referendums on the Constitutional Treaty. It is therefore not inconceivable that when France (and perhaps Austria) do hold referendums on future accessions, other countries will follow suit.

44. Several of those who appeared before us over the course of this inquiry pointed out that the prospect of referendums in one or more of the current EU Member States has changed the nature of the accession process. In the past, a country could be virtually certain that once it had fulfilled the EU's accession criteria it would be allowed to join the Union. In the new environment, however, there is a risk that at the end of prolonged and arduous membership negotiations a country may be refused entry because of a negative vote on its accession treaty in one of the existing Member States. The threat of a negative referendum outcome, however remote, weakens the attractiveness of the accession process and diminishes the leverage that the EU has over candidates and potential candidates. It is also possible that countries which are planning to hold a referendum on the entry of a candidate will be more demanding with regard to the terms of accession. However, even in the absence of referendums, there is a risk that the conclusion of a Turkish accession might founder through rejection in one or more EU parliaments (Q 404).

45. In countries such as Germany, which does not have provisions for referendums in its constitution, there is a movement towards greater parliamentary involvement in the accession process. The German Bundestag is dissatisfied with the current situation under which parliament only gets involved in enlargement once the accession treaty has been signed. At this late stage, the question of the accession of a particular country becomes reduced to yes or no. It is very difficult for parliament to reject an accession treaty that has been laboriously negotiated, accepted by the candidate country, and the governments of all existing Member States. Therefore, the Bundestag has proposed that the German government seek its approval before the start of new accession negotiations (Q 366, Q 400).

HOW ENGRAINED ARE ANTI-ENLARGEMENT ATTITUDES?

46. Although there is a general trend towards less support for enlargement, these attitudes appear to be partly related to ignorance about enlargement and partly to other considerations, such as the state of the European Union's economies, personal economic circumstances or general attitudes towards the European Union. In other words, it is by no means certain that the current trend of growing scepticism towards enlargement will continue and cannot be reversed.

47. Many of those interviewed for this inquiry lamented a "communication failure" on the part of the European Union; most importantly on the part of Member States' governments. It appears that most of the Member States' governments have failed to communicate the positive aspects of recent enlargements and have thus left the field open to populist fears about immigration, low-cost competition and crime to dominate the public debate (Q 54, Q 87).

48. However, government officials in Germany also pointed out to us that it was extremely difficult to get the press to report enlargement in a positive fashion because for the media "bad news is good news" (Q 346). The problem is that it is much easier to illustrate the negative consequences of enlargement, which afflict individuals or narrow groups, than the positive consequences, which happen at the macro level. People sympathise with the plight of a German plumber or abattoir worker who lost their job because of low-cost competition but they do not grasp the fact that total German exports have increased as a result of enlargement (Q 332). However, even the corporate sector, which has gained significantly from the business opportunities provided by enlargement, is often reluctant to report on these successes because the companies "cannot complain to the government that they need benefits somewhere else" (Q 332). Witnesses argued that it would still take a long time before the public had a better overview of how enlargement has impacted on the EU and its economy. They advised that governments should work more closely with the media, and that information about enlargement should already be provided in schools (Q 347).

49. Only 30 per cent of the people in the EU-25 perceive themselves as being well-informed about enlargement while 68 per cent say they are not well informed. Worryingly, the share of those thinking they are well informed is falling in most Western European countries. The survey also detected a correlation between the level of information people have about enlargement and their support for the process.[18] It is also particularly striking that in those countries that have big majorities against enlargement, the people feel they know much more about problems associated with enlargement than the potential benefits. In France, for example, only 10 per cent say they are well informed about the benefits of enlargement while 54 per cent think they know about the problems associated with the process.

50. Much public opposition to future enlargements stems from misunderstandings about the impact of past enlargements, in particular the accession of the Central and Eastern European countries in 2004. As subsequent chapters explain, this impact has been positive. The governments of the existing Member States, supported by the European Commission, must make significant efforts to explain the impact of enlargement to Europe's citizens, including issues such as migration, the link between enlargement and globalisation and the need to find a way of living harmoniously with different religious communities.

51. Attitudes towards enlargement cannot be considered in isolation. It appears that support for enlargement is inversely related to economic prospects in the Union. Eurobarometer surveys show that support for enlargement peaked in 2001, when EU growth was still robust, and then declined gradually as the EU economy stagnated. Perhaps not surprisingly, those countries that are least enthusiastic about enlargement are also those most gloomy about their present economic situation. For example, in Germany, where opposition to enlargement is high, three-quarters of those polled list unemployment as the main challenge facing their country and only a third see globalisation as an opportunity. Although Austria has much lower unemployment rates, worries about employment are still much more pronounced than in most other EU countries. In France, pessimism about the EU's ability to cope with enlargement is part of a wider feeling of 'malaise' about the country's economic future.

52. The eastward enlargement took place at a time when other developments considerably added to economic uncertainties in Western Europe, most notably globalisation (the integration of China and other emerging economic powers into the world trading system); German reunification (which depressed the German economy that had traditionally been the motor for growth for much of Europe); and social changes (population ageing, the rise in long-term unemployment and the breakdown of traditional family structures, which required difficult reforms of traditionally generous social welfare systems in many Western European countries). For European citizens, it has been difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle the various sources of the rise in economic uncertainty that they have experienced since the early 1990s.[19]

53. Growing scepticism towards enlargement has come against the background of a wider questioning of the benefits of EU membership. The proportion of those who consider EU membership to be "a good thing" has been falling in all large Member States, and at the end of 2005 stood at just 50 per cent in the EU-15. Similarly, the share of people in Western Europe who thought that their country has not benefited from being a member of the Union has been growing. In traditionally pro-EU countries such as Germany and Austria (the two countries most affected by enlargement) there are now as many people who think their country does not gain from membership as in euro sceptic Britain.

54. Michel Rocard MEP argues that there is link between enlargement and declining support for the EU more generally: since the EU failed to implement the reforms needed to function effectively with a membership of 25, its legitimacy has been decreasing (p 191). Sylvie Goulard, Lecturer at the College of Europe, argued that the backlash against enlargement was related to the EU's tendency to see enlargement as a foreign policy tool and disregard the impact it has on the EU's internal functioning, its economy and its citizens' sense of identity (Q 311).

TABLE 3

Do you think your country has benefited from EU membership? (Results given as a percentage of those asked who felt EU membership had been positive for their country)

	Spring 2004*	Autumn 2004	Spring 2005	Autumn 2005	Spring 2006
Belgium	58	72	69	65	66
Spain	69	70	69	69	71
France	46	54	53	51	50
Germany	39	49	50	46	46
Austria	38	43	41	35	39
UK	30	39	40	37	42
Sweden	27	36	36	32	43
Hungary	58	48	47	41	52
Poland	50	55	62	63	64
Czech Rep	46	42	56	55	62
Estonia	41	56	58	56	66

Source: Eurobarometer.

55. The latest Eurobarometer poll taken in the spring of 2006 showed a noticeable improvement in support for the EU in a number of member-states, including Austria and the UK as well as some of the new member countries. The turnaround suggests that attitudes towards the Union—and its policies—remain fluid. Witnesses thought that an economic upswing in the big eurozone countries—coupled with a gradual better understanding of the positive impact of enlargement—could lead to a more positive public attitude towards future accessions. However, this was going to be a medium or long-term process (Q 336).

56. Representatives from the German states of Brandenburg and Bayern (both of which have long borders with new Member States and high unemployment along these borders) reported that enlargement-related fears were already subsiding in Germany. Fears of higher unemployment and an increase in cross-border crimes had not materialised. On the contrary, Brandenburg's economy had gained from dynamic economic growth in neighbouring Poland while crime that involved Eastern Europeans had fallen because of the improved co-operation between German and Polish police-forces and prosecutors. As a result, people in Germany were slowly re-evaluating their attitudes towards future enlargements. (Q 340, Q 341).

57. Similarly, our witnesses in Paris reported that initial negative attitudes towards enlargement were changing as businesses report their successes in Central and Eastern Europe and the economy recovers. Dominique Moisi[20] thought that French opinion towards enlargement could change radically once the country had a new, younger leadership and a new sense of purpose and optimism. However, he warned that the French attitude towards Turkey would always remain "totally emotional" (Q 444).

58. A thorough reading of Eurobarometer's special survey on enlargement also indicates that attitudes towards enlargement are not firmly held. The Commission's pollsters deliberately asked people about the same enlargement-related issues from different angles, using both negative and positive statements. The fact that EU citizens agreed or disagreed with the same or similar statement depending on how it was phrased suggests that attitudes towards enlargement are not deeply entrenched. Similarly, although Eurobarometer polls show that a majority of German citizens are against future enlargement, the picture changes drastically if the question is posed differently. Asked whether they would support enlargement if the process was slowed down and all EU conditions were strictly adhered to, over 70 per cent of Germans were in favour of enlargement (Q 366).

59. Attitudes towards enlargement remain fluid, are influenced by non-enlargement related developments (such as economic growth) and are partly related to lack of information about enlargement. A concerted effort on the part of EU politicians and other opinion formers could help to increase public support for enlargement.

6 Eurobarometer, 'Standard Eurobarometer' Number 65, July 2006 and Number 64 December 2005. Back

7 Sabina Woelkner, Desk Officer-Konrad Adenauer Akademie, (Q 373) pointed out that support for further enlargement in the new Member States was not particularly solid. It was not based on knowledge about the potential candidates or strategic considerations but on cultural and historical ties with neighbouring countries. Therefore the new members mainly supported the accession of Ukraine and Moldova but not of Turkey. Back

8 Eurobarometer, 'The future of Europe', Special survey, May 2006. Back

9 Eurobarometer, 'Attitudes towards European Union Enlargement', July 2006. Back

10 Eurobarometer, 'The future of Europe', Special survey, May 2006. Back

11 Eurobarometer, 'Standard Eurobarometer', December 2005. Curiously, West Europeans are much more upbeat about their personal economic and job prospects than about the prospects for their country. Back

12 Eurobarometer, 'Attitudes towards European Union Enlargement', July 2006. Back

13 Eurobarometer and EOS Gallup, 'The enlargement of the European Union', Flash Eurobarometer 140, 2004 and 'The future of Europe, Special survey, May 2006. Back

14 Eurobarometer, 'Attitudes towards European Union Enlargement', July 2006. Back

15 EU-Consent, 'EU-25 Watch No 2', Survey among the 25 Member States, January 2006. Back

16 The share of people supporting the accession of each of the candidate and potential candidates was higher in the special Eurobarometer "Attitudes towards Europeans Union Enlargement" where the question about the desirability of a particular candidate specifically pointed to the necessity of complying with all the conditions set by the EU as a premise of membership. Back

17 Mark Leonard, 'Democracy in Europe: How the EU can survive in an age of referendum', CER essay, March 2006. Back