APPENDIX 8: VISIT TO SWEDEN
31 January-2 February 2005
Members visiting Sweden were: Lord Broers, Lord Paul
and Baroness Perry of Southwark (Chairman). In attendance: Professor
Roland Clift (Specialist Adviser), Dr Christopher Johnson (Clerk).
Monday 31 January, Stockholm; Ministry for Sustainable
Development
The Committee was welcomed to the Ministry for Sustainable
Development by Mr Bo Diczfalusy, Director General of Energy Issues,
and heard a series of presentations from Mr Diczfalusy and others.
Mr Diczfalusy began by noting that the new Ministry
for Sustainable Development was still being organised, having
been created in late 2004. It was one of ten Government Ministries,
and had taken on elements of the responsibilities of the Ministries
of Environment, Industry and Finance. There were two ministers,
and it would employ around 200 people—Swedish central government
ministries were typically small. The concept underlying the new
ministry was that of a "green welfare state".
Patterns of energy use had been fairly stable for
30 years, though with an expansion in the use of electricity generated
at nuclear power stations at the expense of oil in the 1970s,
and more recently an expansion in district heating. About half
of electricity generation was from hydro, while oil was now used
only for transport. Biofuels were increasingly used for heating.
Sweden began from a position of relatively low carbon
emissions, which it had achieved partly by the use of fossil-free
sources for electricity, but also through energy efficient industry,
high thermal standards in buildings, and the use of carbon taxes
and other economic instruments. Energy policy was underpinned
by guidelines agreed by the three major parties in 1997, and confirmed
in 2002, which established principles of security of supply, competitiveness,
health and environment. They also committed Sweden to the phasing
out of nuclear power; efficiency of energy use; the promotion
of renewables; and more use of CHP for district heating.
Sweden's climate strategy was currently under review.
The long-term target was for emissions in 2050 to be not more
than 4.5 tonnes carbon per capita, and Sweden planned a reduction
in carbon emissions of 4 percent by 2010 (well ahead of its Kyoto
obligations). The main instruments designed to reach these targets
were EU Emissions Trading, green certificates and eco-taxes, and
long-term agreements covering energy-intensive industries. On
efficiency, the emphasis was on information and education, technological
procurement and market transformation, along with reliance on
local and regional initiatives.
Ms Kerstin Wennerstrand, Head of Section, Division
for Eco-management, Industrial Co-operation and Building, focused
on the need for balance between the various technical requirements
for construction. Those covered by the Construction Products Directive
fell into six categories: stability, fire safety, hygiene, security,
noise protection, and energy economy. To these categories Sweden
had added another three: fitness for use, accessibility and economical
management of water and refuse.
Control was achieved at various levels. Acts of Parliament
were backed up by Government decrees. At a lower level building
regulations were set by the Board of Housing. These had since
1978 required a drop in annual energy consumption for a 75 m2
apartment from 18,000 to 8,500 kWh for space heating and
from 240 to 113 kWh/m2 for hot water. However, energy
consumption was currently increasing in Sweden, in part thanks
to a fashion for larger windows.
There were also requirements for ventilation, in
response to increases in asthma and allergies.
Mr Lars Roth, Head of Section at the Ministry for
Sustainable Development, described the Local Investment Programmes
for ecological sustainability. A grant system had been established
in 1998, targeted mainly at municipalities. Programmes funded
in 1998-2002 would continue to run until around 2006. About 212
programmes were running, supporting some 1,800 individual projects.
Central government grants met 30 percent of the costs—the
rest was raised by municipalities, in partnership with local industry.
Energy savings, on the basis of 104 completed programmes, were
projected to be of the order of 1.7 TWh/year.
The Local Investment Programme had now been renamed
the Climate Investment Programme, with an exclusive focus on climate
change.
Mr Bengt Nyman, a Government Adviser, said that he
had been appointed to chair an inquiry into implementation of
the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive, which would take
effect from 1 January 2006. The Government was aiming to introduce
an implementing bill in June, with a view to enactment before
the end of the year. The National Board of Housing, Building and
Planning would be responsible for supervision of the new regime,
and would appoint an Advisory Board to follow up on implementation.
The Directive focused on consumers, introducing an
obligation to present information on energy performance for buyers
and tenants in a standardised manner. Implementation would require
a significant training programme, which would take place during
the introductory phase of 2006-08. Although there were enough
expert inspectors to cope with the current market there was a
need for additional training to meet new challenges, particularly
the drawing together of the many strands that came together in
the Directive. This should be possible by 2009.
The label required by the Directive would be known
in Sweden as an "Energy Declaration". The owner of a
building would be responsible for having an Energy Declaration,
prepared by an accredited Energy Expert. This would be displayed
at the entrance of all public buildings—which would include
those privately owned buildings which were intended for public
use (in other words where the public gathered, for instance in
cinemas, libraries, or private schools, but probably not supermarkets).
Mr Sven-Olov Ericson, Deputy Director of the Energy
Issues Unit, addressed district heating (DH), noting that Sweden's
history of DH schemes went back more than 50 years. The technology
was simple, but with heavy initial capital costs. It allowed the
use of waste industrial heat and energy from waste, and these
factors, combined with a drive towards energy efficiency and co-generation
of heat and power, encouraged the early development of DH in Sweden.
By using Combined Heat and Power (CHP) some 20-30 percent of primary
fuel could be saved, compared with the separate generation of
heat and electricity. In the 1960s and 70s, air quality in urban
areas became an increasingly important factor, and DH had played
an important part in reducing the quantity of sulphur in the air
in Stockholm by 98 percent.
A key feature of DH was the fact that low-cost fuel,
such as the by-products of the wood industry, could be used. The
emissions could then be filtered economically. In contrast, at
domestic level filtration was not economically feasible, so only
high-quality purpose-made biomass fuels could be used. The cost
of such cheap biofuels was around €1.4c/kWh, compared with
around €3.0c/kWh for electricity generation.
The waste heat from nuclear power generation was
not used in DH. This was partly because of the geographical remoteness
of nuclear plant, and also because the heat could not be taken
from nuclear generators in useful quantities without serious loss
of power output. In contrast, heat from coal-fired plant was readily
used in DH. On normal days water was pumped into the DH networks
at around 100ºC, and returned at around 60ºC—the
relatively low temperatures allowed high electrical output to
be maintained. High temperature steam was not used in Swedish
DH.
DH was more efficient than small-scale heat generation—system
losses were typically of the order of 10 percent. Other countries
had experienced much higher losses—the key was insulation
and efficiency. DH was mainly used by the residential, commercial
and service sectors, which took heat from the system by means
of heat exchangers.
Sweden's goal was to increase DH capacity by 20 percent.
Biofuels were the largest contributor (some 60 percent), having
replaced oil, which was the major fuel in the 1980s. Within biofuels,
wood waste was the major fuel, with a small contribution from
peat (though this would be hit by emissions trading). The total
amount of peat used was only some 25 percent of the amount created
annually. Energy crops such as short rotation coppice were a small
contributor. Sweden was looking at the recovery of organic domestic
waste, and had a permissive attitude to the use of non-separated
organic industrial waste (such as crushed pallets). Mixed waste
was also burnt, with about 90 percent recovery of heat for DH
systems.
Mr Arne Andersson, of the Ministry for Sustainable
Development and the Swedish Energy Agency, addressed energy efficiency
in the housing sector. The focus was on technology procurement—the
"art of buying what is not available". The steps in
the process were, first, to define a need; then to identify the
technical potential for a solution and a supplier capable of providing
it; to establish a strong group of buyers, who would want a better
solution than was currently available; and then to bring these
parties together, so as to develop a dialogue between buyers and
suppliers. The key was to identify buyers, creating a market demand.
The focus as far as the product was concerned should be on functionality,
but allowing space for innovation.
Once a winner in a procurement process had been identified,
there was a prize ceremony, publicity, and guaranteed delivery
to the buyers. It was essential for follow up with information
campaigns to achieve wider acceptance. There might have to be
an initial subsidy to get a product started.
Tuesday 1 February, Gothenburg; Lindås Housing
Development
In the morning the Committee visited the Lindås
passive housing development, in company with the architect, Mr
Hans Eek. The development is about 20 km outside Gothenburg, on
what used to be farmland, now owned by the city. Most residents
commute to Gothenburg by car.
Mr Eek said that he had first begun to work on ecological
design in the 1970s. The Swedish building code, which had mentioned
energy efficiency as early as the 1930s, was the toughest in the
world following its revision in 1975, requiring 21 cm of mineral
wool insulation in external walls, 30 cm in roofs, and triple-glazed
windows.
Mr Eek admitted that his early projects had been
over-complicated and unsuccessful, with an over-reliance on mechanical
devices. He had learnt from these experiences in the 1970s and
80s, as well as from a passive house in Arizona, which had demonstrated
that designs for passive housing had to be varied according to
the environment. In Sweden the priority was to find ways to take
in heat, not to disperse heat. Heat was lost from houses in three
ways: by means of hot water entering the sewage system; by transmission
(walls and windows); by ventilation. Transmission losses could
be minimised by good insulation, and by good windows and doors—the
key was to control ventilation, making the house air-tight, and
then ventilating by means of a heat exchanger.
The houses at Lindås were some four times as
airtight as required by Swedish building regulations. Insulation
was 43 cm thick in walls, 50 cm in the roof, and 30 cm under the
floors. The houses were constructed in such a way as to create
a continuous layer of insulation, avoiding heat bridges. The windows
were wood-framed and triple-glazed, with krypton gas filling,
and U-values of 0.85. The extra cost of these windows (as against
those normally required by Swedish building standards) was around
15,000-20,000 SEK (some £1,200-1,500). Similar windows were
available in the United Kingdom.
Other additional costs included the heat exchanger
(some 10,000 SEK), the extra insulation (15-20,000 SEK), producing
a total additional cost (as against required Swedish building
standards) of some 40-50,000 SEK (roughly £3,000-3,800).
This was offset by the fact that no heating system had been installed,
making the buildings no more expensive to construct than conventional
equivalents.
The houses each had one air inlet, where fresh air
was passed through a heat-exchanger to warm it; it was then circulated
around the house. Each house had three chimneys, one providing
an outlet from the heat exchanger, the other two providing outlets
for sewage and kitchen air, which were kept separate from incoming
air. Overall 85 percent of exit heat was recovered via the heat
exchanger.
The houses at Lindås were arranged so as to
collect passive solar energy. Large windows faced south, taking
in warmth in winter, but with roof overhangs and balconies to
shade them in summer. Windows to the north were small, and illuminated
rooms where less light is needed, such as bathrooms, kitchens,
etc. Roof windows let light into the centre of the houses.
The average total heat output from occupants and
appliances had been calculated at 11.72 kWh per day—equivalent
to 500W continuous output. In the display house this was simulated
by one electric heater. On a cold, frosty day (after several days
of extremely cold weather) the display house was comfortably warm
inside.
City Hall, Gothenburg
In the afternoon the Committee were welcomed to the
City Hall by Ms Anneli Hulthén (Municipal Commissioner),
for a meeting with Mr Göran Leander (Bostads AB Poseidon),
Mr Bengt-Göran Dahlman (Technical Director of Göteborg
Energi AB), and Ms Ulla Påhlman (Information Officer).
In the course of a preliminary discussion, Anneli
Hulthén confirmed that the city of Gothenburg sought to
integrate transport and planning. Cars were not discouraged as
such, though a congestion charge was being considered. The main
problem was commuters driving in from outside the city—a
problem which would be eased when the current railway line, which
terminated in the city centre, was extended. The planning board
also sought to maintain green areas while providing the housing
that was needed.
The municipality owned the energy company, Göteborg
Energi, and this allowed the city to shape an energy strategy.
However, there were those who advocated sale, which would provide
a one-off windfall.
Göran Leander said that Poseidon owned 23,500
apartments, making it the largest housing company in Gothenburg.
It also administered 1.5 million m2 of green areas.
The company's environmental concerns fell under four headings:
energy consumption, handling of hazardous substances, the quality
of the indoor environment, and waste management.
On the indoor environment, Poseidon had developed
"p-labelling"—a certification scheme (administered
by a state-run agency), the results of which were displayed in
public areas. "P-labelling" encompassed a range of factors:
temperature, air quality, moisture, hot water, radon, light, noise,
and electrical or magnetic fields. On waste, it was estimated
that 38 percent of waste was recyclable, and 33 percent biodegradable.
That left 29 percent "residual" waste, such as plastic
packaging, which was burnt. Providing facilities for tenants to
sort waste reduced handling costs by half.
Attention was focused in three areas: investment
(e.g. in metering equipment), operation and follow-up (e.g. the
collection of data).
Poseidon had invested in a computer system (known
as POSITIV). The system monitored demand, matched supply to demand,
and noted peculiarities or unexpected fluctuations in demand.
The temperature in every apartment block could be regulated from
the central office.
As a result energy consumption had fallen from 186
kWh/m2 in 2000 to 157 kWh/m2 in 2004. This represented
a cost difference of 25 million SEK, compared to a capital investment
in POSITIV of 100 million SEK (around £8 million). It was
calculated that this saving was equivalent to a reduction in CO2
emissions by around 1,900 tonnes per year. Over this period average
temperatures in early December across the estate had varied only
between 21.1 and 21.4 ºC.
Information was the key to controlling energy use.
At present monitoring was at the level of apartment blocks. The
next challenge was to make tenants more aware of and better equipped
to manage their personal consumption of energy. The cost of heating
represented about 12-15 percent of total rent—around 100
SEK (roughly £8) per square metre per year.
Bengt-Göran Dahlman said that Poseidon was his
largest single customer, though there were many smaller customers,
for whom Göteborg Energi could monitor energy use. He reconciled
the apparent contradiction of an energy company encouraging reductions
in energy consumption by arguing that it was in the company's
interest to encourage optimal energy use—although admitting
that this approach derived from the company's owner, the City
of Gothenburg. In addition, reduced demand meant a reduced need
for investment.
District heating (DH) in Gothenburg covered an area
with a radius of 20-30 km, and the total length of the network
was around 700 km. The limit on the potential distance from generator
to consumer was in practice economic, not technical—energy
losses within the Gothenburg system were only 7-8 percent. The
DH network was connected via heat exchangers to individual buildings,
and was itself a closed loop with very little leakage. The water
was pure, with no additives.
Pipes were steel, insulated and encased in plastic.
Internal diameters could be as much as 1.1 metres. Pipes ran through
pre-existing tunnels in places.
In 2002 the company bought 2,205 GWh of heat from
outside sources, and itself produced 1,879 GWh of heat. 3,738
GWh were delivered to customers, and losses were 346 GWh. The
54 percent of bought-in heat was:
- Waste incineration (24 percent);
- Waste heat from two oil refineries
(30 percent).
Heat generated by the company itself was derived
from:
- Waste heat from co-generation
(CHP);
- Sewage water;
- Natural gas;
- Oil (just 2 percent).
DH had evolved after the Second World War for two
main reasons: a shortage of electricity, and poor air quality
as a result of the proliferation of small coal-fired boilers.
In the 1960s-70s, with the expansion of nuclear power, there had
been resistance to CHP from major power companies, who had assumed
that all energy would come from nuclear. However, the City of
Gothenburg had maintained its focus on DH, which had at that time
been made up of a series of islands powered by oil-fired generators.
By 1980 the high price of oil and low electricity prices had undercut
the CHP market, but instead of moving over the electrical heating
Gothenburg had decided to exploit waste heat, energy from waste,
heat pumps and sewage heat. This was the basis for uniting the
various islands into a single network. Since then coal, oil and,
increasingly, biofuels had been used.
Emissions had fallen as a result of these policies,
enormously in the case of sulphur and NOx, in the case of CO2,
from 600,000 tonnes to 250,000 tonnes per annum. The goal was
for DH to be wholly derived from waste heat, with zero primary
fuel input. In summer there was excess heat production, but this
could be used to produce cooling if required.
The Northern European electrical system was now very
interconnected, with overall consumption rising (currently around
400 TWh per annum). The fuel mix was largely nuclear and hydro,
though there were coal-fired generators in Denmark and Germany.
Losses from the inefficiencies of this system were estimated at
200 TWh, compared with Sweden's total demand for heat of 100 TWh.
There was thus an enormous resource being wasted, and one of the
priorities should be to bring generating capacity closer to urban
areas so that this resource could be exploited. He did not believe
that nuclear power stations were needed in Sweden, as much of
the electricity generated was currently used for electrical space
heating.
Göteborg Energi was now investing in a gas-fired
CCGT plant, which from an input of around 600 MW natural gas would
generate electrical output of 270-300 MW and heat output of 230-250
MW. This would reduce dependence on the electricity grid, as well
as reducing emissions emanating from coal-fired power stations
in Denmark and Germany. In the short term the use of biomass fuel
would be less environmentally friendly, as it would lead to a
lower electrical output and continuing dependence on the grid.
However, in the longer term natural gas was not a viable solution,
and the development of gasification techniques to allow the use
of biomass fuel in co-generation should be a priority. Natural
gas should be seen as the bridge from the current fuel mix (coal,
oil, nuclear) to a future reliance on biomass.
In terms of liberalisation, it had been the case
that some decades ago DH contracts had tended to require customers
to remove alternative sources of energy from properties. DH was
now more open to competition, and while the sharing of individual
DH networks did not offer any benefits, customers were free to
turn to other local energy sources such as electricity.
Wednesday 2 February, Gothenburg; Meeting with
Professor Thomas Kåberger
The Committee heard a presentation from Professor
Thomas Kåberger of Chalmers University, regarding his evaluation
of the Local Investment Programme (LIP).
The LIP had evolved in the late 1990s, as a means
of encouraging investment in technologies contributing to sustainable
development, particularly in the construction sector. The intention
was to use Government investment to stimulate construction sector
investment. The problem with the scheme was that the goals and
responsibilities were more diverse than was normal for such Government
schemes. It was also hard to evaluate results, and this had been
the subject of his own research.
The total LIP budget over four years had been 6.2
billion SEK (approximately £500 million, or some £50
per head of population). The municipalities had been charged with
developing local programmes, involving local interests and businesses.
The objectives of such programmes had been broad—to increase
employment and to build towards sustainability. Individual projects
were to be non-profit-making and technologically novel. Some 55
percent of municipalities had received grants, representing in
each case some 20-30 percent of project costs.
In terms of overall impact, projects completed hitherto
had achieved a 10 percent reduction in CO2 and SO2
emissions, and a small (0.5 percent) reduction in NOx emissions,
at a cost equivalent to approximately £10 per tonne CO2.
However, it was difficult to measure the efficiency of this investment,
as there was no fixed cost attaching to carbon emissions. In terms
of employment, projects had delivered jobs at a cost of approximately
284,000 SEK per man year, or 1.7 million SEK (about £130,000)
for each permanent job.
Evaluating this impact had been challenging: there
were seven environmental goals, and a range of different agencies
and actors. The database of the Environment Agency had been used,
and efficiency indicators calculated to quantify emissions reductions.
Ten municipalities had been visited in order to assess reporting
practices and the economic sustainability of investments. One
project had been examined in detail. Professor Kåberger
was confident that the analysis had tended to over-estimate the
costs by ascribing total costs to specific reductions in CO2.
Indirect effects had been factored in. However, some municipalities
had calculated the impact on electricity consumption by reference
to the Nordic fuel mix, while others had calculated marginal savings
from the closure of specific coal or gas-fired plant.
There seemed to be two main reasons for this very
positive evaluation: successive selection and constructive evolution.
Successive selection had been inherent in the process, whereby
municipalities and the Environment Agency had at each stage rejected
less valid proposals. Even once subsidies had been granted not
all projects had been executed, as municipalities had not in every
case made budgetary provision. As a result only the most worthwhile
and best planned projects had been executed. Constructive evolution
was the term given to the process whereby projects were modified
and improved as they developed—there had been considerable
flexibility in this regard, as long as subsidy levels were not
increased.
The project that had been examined in detail concerned
the pulp and paper industry. This involved finding a use for difficult
biomass wastes, such as fibre sludge, to produce steam or heat.
This would in fact have been profitable without subsidy, with
a payback time of around four years.
In conclusion, despite its complexity, the LIP had
been a successful and efficient use of public money. The key had
been the stimulation of dialogue between municipalities and local
industry.
Visit to Angered
The Committee, accompanied by Dr Henrikke Baumann
of Chalmers University, was shown around the Angered housing
development by the architect, Mr Christer Nordström.
Angered was a late 1960s development of some 2,500 apartments
in all, of which 250 had been covered by the project. It was wholly
owned by the City of Gothenburg, and was one of the most deprived
housing developments in Sweden. There was very high unemployment,
a very high concentration of immigrants, and one third of flats
were empty. The redevelopment project had thus been designed to
improve not only the energy efficiency of the flats, but to contribute
to social renewal.
The refurbishment had been funded by the EU Commission,
and had cost about 5,300 SEK (around £400) per m2—about
a third the cost of a new building.
Very few of the residents paid rent, but the market
rate would be of the order of 4,000-5,000 SEK (£300-380)
per month, including heating and hot water. Heating was provided
free up to a certain temperature—if residents wanted a higher
temperature they paid. This meant that it was the responsibility
of the landlord to maintain a proper temperature of around 20-21ºC,
and it was therefore in the landlord's interest to achieve energy
efficiency savings.
Open passages at ground level, which had acted as
wind tunnels, had been closed off, and were now occupied by laundries
and communal greenhouses. Solar collectors on the roof provided
hot water, which was stored in the basement, where the laundries
had been formerly. Outside walls had insulated facades, which
drew down the heat from the solar collectors. In addition, all
roofs were insulated, and ventilation had been replaced by heat
exchangers. Some windows had been changed in their entirety, others
reglazed with heat-reflective panes—but all had been repainted
and resealed. South-facing balconies were now glazed, allowing
passive solar gain, and pre-heating the air for ventilation. This
glazing could be opened up in summer, but could not be closed
off to the outside air—the balconies were designed to be
cold in winter, so as to discourage occupants from installing
electric heaters and using them as sitting space.
The solar collectors provided around 30 percent of
hot water and heating—the rest was topped up from the Gothenburg
DH network. Demand had formerly been around 260 kWh/m2,
but had now fallen to 160 kWh/m2. Electricity demand
had fallen by 30 percent.
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