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5.15 pm

Lord Teverson: My Lords, I was not and am not a member of the sub-committee, but I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Renton, on a most interesting and informative document. As has been mentioned by both noble Lords who have spoken, if you bring together the subjects of the European Union, European competence and the nuclear issue you have a toxic conversation and debate on your hands.

Although it was not the case for members of the sub-committee, if I were reading the report as a member of the public, I would come away with the feeling that it was the Commission making its first big push, its land grab, on nuclear and atomic issues. As the House is well aware, one of the original areas of the European communities was the EURATOM treaty, which was signed 50 years ago this year. Perhaps for good or perhaps for worse, it is unlike the treaty of Rome in that it has not been modified on numerous occasions and stands very much as it is. The Commission is its secretariat. Even under the proposals for a European constitution that was supposed to rationalise the European Union in many ways, the EURATOM Treaty would intriguingly have still remained separate and remained there.

Under the treaty, the Commission, as secretariat, already has a number of powers. One of the major areas for the signing and creation of that treaty was atomic and nuclear safety. That is a legitimate area, and one that Britain signed up for in 1973. Under Articles 40 to 44 of the EURATOM Treaty, the Commission gets involved in a number of specific procedures. Under Article 41, as many members of the committee will be aware, there are areas of strict notification about nuclear facilities, not just about their establishment but about changes and decommissioning. For better or for worse, the Commission already has some 150 inspectors who are able to inspect nuclear facilities throughout the European Union and who do so within the United Kingdom.

As the report relates, the European Union and the Commission were very involved in negotiations with accession countries in eastern Europe, and we can probably say quite rightly so because the 15 member states of the European Union at that time had

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leverage over applicant nations during the negotiation and accession process. During that time, some six nuclear power stations in Lithuania, Bulgaria and Slovakia were closed down under that agreement because their safety standards were not felt to be sufficient. The track record of the European Union goes beyond that. In the Tacis programme, which came to a close at the end of 2006, the European Union spent some €1.3 billion on ensuring nuclear and atomic safety in the Russian Federation and the Russian near-abroad. In all those areas, the European Union is already heavily involved in atomic and nuclear issues by treaty.

As the noble Lord, Lord Renton, said, we had a major move forward on energy policy—which will, no doubt, be debated strongly at the Council of Ministers and in national parliaments—with the announcement last week of the strategy for energy. Few European citizens, or their member states and national parliaments, would say that the European Union should not be involved in the area of energy security and sustainability, or that of emissions and climate change. Those are two of the pillars; the third, of energy efficiency and competition, is one that some of us might argue is a member state issue, being one of those included in the single market. So, we already have a high level of European involvement in all those areas.

Now, is that valid? My own view is that it certainly is, in certain areas. As an individual and a private citizen, I would say, “Yes, I am very concerned to ensure that nuclear incidents do not happen on the European continent”, as clearly, that would affect trans-national boundaries, as nuclear pollution knows no such boundaries. I would say that it is right during the accession of states, when it is also the right time to ensure that security at nuclear plants is all right. The leverage is less once those negotiations have taken place. I also feel strongly that there should be a European energy policy.

What does that mean for this report and these two directives? Certainly, it does not mean that the European Union—or the European Commission in particular—should be able to delve down and get over-involved in nuclear safety or nuclear waste disposal. What do we look for in the criteria to see whether involvement is valid? A number of them have been mentioned in the report.

First, there is a clear issue of added value. If the European Union is to get involved here, there has to be some added value—but where? It could be in finding solutions in some areas. The waste disposal area could be one, since the report showed well that, Finland apart, no member states—the 26 others in the European Union—have found a way forward in practice or policy decisions to solve the issues of long-term nuclear waste disposal. It could be in enforceability; if we felt that we should be able to enforce standards more than at present, then directives or regulations from the European Commission could give us a legal base to do so.

Otherwise, value could be added in the areas of safety or trust. The noble Lord, Lord Renton of Mount Harry, mentioned in his opening speech the

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widespread distrust of the nuclear industry and nuclear power, which particularly struck me in the report. It is possible that if the European Union had more enforceable powers, or a controlling purview of that area, then that public trust might increase. That is debatable, but added value could perhaps happen there.

The second principle needed, apart from added value, is one of member-state choice. It is very important that although an energy policy across the Union would be correct to have carbon emissions targets—and, perhaps, certain renewables targets—it should in no way be able to specify the individual mix within member states. The decisions, particularly on nuclear power, must be made only by individual member states. I cannot think of anything that would destroy any harmony within the Union more quickly than trying to impose nuclear energy on countries such as Ireland or Austria.

A third principle stressed in the report relates to bureaucracy. When a system is functioning reasonably, as at the moment, we certainly do not want an additional and completely parallel one of inspections and checking security. Those are three of the principles, but I think that there is also a fourth. We should not underestimate the distrust there is of the nuclear industry, nor should we belittle the fear of its secrecy or of major incidents that can affect us all. We all know about Three-Mile Island and Chernobyl. I remember that in the mid-1990s one of the main reasons for Ireland electing its first Green MEPs to the European Parliament was the fear of toxicity in the Irish Sea and the performance of the Sellafield plant. This has had a major effect and caused distrust among citizens of other member states, and we might have the same problem with other countries as well.

So how do we move forward from this situation? I believe strongly that the European Union should have an energy policy, particularly in the areas of sustainability and energy security, although we are in a slightly different position in the UK in relation to security because of our reliance on gas from eastern Europe.

There is a plus to be said for enforceability, although I might stand uniquely in the House in this regard. Let me explain why I think enforceability can be important. First, we have huge leverage in eastern Europe while we are negotiating with potential new accession states. That leverage disappears once they become members.

One of the outcomes of the strong emphasis on lower carbon emissions is that all member states are now looking for ways to generate non-fossil fuel power. As we know, the take-up of renewables is slow and takes some time, and so there is an emphasis, if not on new nuclear build, on extending the life of existing nuclear plants. Indeed, Sweden has already extended the life of its plants by some 10 years and is looking to see whether that could be extended further to 20 years. So, from that point of view, there will be an increasing question mark from the community and individuals over whether the decisions that member states have taken to get round other problems and

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other targets are safe. As the European Union moves further eastwards, as it is likely to do over the next 10 or 20 years, there will still be an issue around the nuclear power stations of the former Soviet Union. So, for all those reasons, we should consider enforceability; it could be important.

Where do we go from here? My view is that we should have an energy policy, which could be at a European level, and that enforceability is desirable, but only very much as a last stage.

There may be a particular issue over the potentially increased bureaucracy of an inspection regime but, again, parts of the EURATOM Treaty already ensure that civil nuclear material is not transferred to the military. There is a regime under which the International Atomic Energy Authority works with member states and the European Commission to ensure that standards are fulfilled. It is exactly the kind of model that we can apply to this situation.

I would be very concerned if the European Commission made a major move into this area but it does have a contribution to make. In the area of waste disposal, we are so far away from finding and implementing the right solution that the EU will have little influence over it. The security issues are important. Measures which give the public confidence in the industry are also important, and the European Union and the European Commission can play a role in that area. The irony is that I remain quite sceptical about European nuclear power, certainly until disposable mechanisms and security issues can be resolved. If the European Union had a role in increasing public confidence and providing some level of enforceability, then, ironically, nuclear power would probably become more acceptable to the citizens of Europe.

5.29 pm

Lord Lewis of Newnham: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Renton of Mount Harry, for the excellent way in which he chaired Sub-Committee D. It was a real joy to be present and to see the way in which he was able to guide us through what was often rather deep water. He did so with great efficiency. I also pay tribute to the Clerk, Suzanne Todd, who made a very effective summary and report of the very complex deliberations that were involved in the inquiry. Initially, we were fortunate to have the expert advice of Professor Richard Clegg of the Dalton Nuclear Institute, whose experience in nuclear energy matters was very extensive and significant to the study.

As the noble Lord, Lord Renton, said, this is a changing area. To me it is remarkable just how much has happened within the past six months and how much will happen in the next six months. To get the matter into reality, we are dealing with a problem that has been around for decades and the solutions will not be clear for decades to come.

The report is concerned with two aspects of nuclear policy: the safety and inspection of nuclear sites and the effective disposal of nuclear waste. Under the present system, nuclear safety and the management of nuclear waste is the responsibility of national

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Governments. The guidelines, the peer review of nuclear sites and the disposal procedures are organised through the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency. It was apparent that there has been very strong support from all the witnesses with whom we discussed the role and function of that organisation. It has a very high standing indeed.

Some of the underlying interests in the nuclear programme are, very naturally, the worries over the security of future energy supplies, particularly in light of the situation with Russia at the moment. The problems with greenhouse gases and climate change are related to the production of energy from fossil fuels, whereas nuclear is seen as a source of energy that does not involve the production of greenhouse gases. However, it is important to realise that there are significant environmental problems associated with the emissions produced in the initial construction of nuclear plants. That is very heavy indeed in carbon dioxide emissions, which may correspond to years of emissions from alternative sources. Any future programme of nuclear construction should include an assessment of the emissions involved in the construction of the plant and the timescale of operation of the plant to neutralise those emissions. I think one may come up with some rather surprising figures when one looks at that problem.

Most of the European reactors are considered to be old, the average lifetime being about 22 years. That is leading to a serious debate on the replacement of these reactors, as has been mentioned. That was a major contributory factor in the EU timing and formulation of the present directives. After the Chernobyl disaster there was a general recognition that nuclear safety was a trans-boundary problem and it is understandable that the EU has pressed for involvement with nuclear safety. The main users of nuclear power—eight of the 25 member states—rejected the first proposals from the EU and even a second proposal was rejected by seven of them. Those were the states primarily concerned with the production of nuclear energy. It would be very interesting to know how the other 17 states viewed the directive. Perhaps the Minister could inform us. As far as I know, we were not able to decide on that point. The states that opposed the directive made it clear that they did not wish their national responsibility for safety to be compromised; they felt that the directive was merely placing another layer of bureaucracy in the system. They expressed complete confidence with the present IAEA arrangements for safety inspection. I shall return to that point in a moment.

As the noble Lord, Lord Renton said, the Council of Europe has set up a working party on nuclear safety (WPNS) which seeks a solution to this problem. I believe it was scheduled to report by the end of 2006. Perhaps the Minister could inform us how this proposal is progressing. My feeling is that all indicators are against there being any change in the attitude of the dissenting members towards EU interaction.

The second aspect of the EU proposals is the position over the disposal of nuclear waste. Quite honestly this problem has been tasking the industry

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for many years. The initial suggestion by NIREX of deep burial in suitable geological sites was rejected a number of years ago, mainly from public reaction. A relook at this question by the House of Lords Committee on Science and Technology came to a similar solution but made an added proviso that the sites would be available for constant monitoring and inspection.

Perhaps it is important to recognise the amount of nuclear waste for disposal, which is the accumulated waste over the past 50 years. This is a relatively small amount of material. The high-energy waste, for instance, could be confined within a room of about 11 cubic metres; in other words something about the size of the Moses Room would contain 50 years of very high-energy nuclear waste.

The committee found in its visit to Finland that the deep disposal method was the accepted procedure and in fact this is the projected method of disposal by the majority of the nuclear nations. In the EU Belgium, France, Germany and Sweden, and outside it Switzerland, Japan and the USA, have chosen this as their method of disposal.

Quite recently an excellent report by the government Committee on Radioactive Waste Management favoured an interim storage of the waste followed by deep geological disposal with the added possibility of future recovery of the waste if a more appropriate procedure for disposal or recovery became available.

Thus all three UK studies have favoured the deep geological burial of waste as the best solution for the problem. The government body CoRWM conducted extensive consultation with the public and emphasised in its recommendations—it made a number of recommendations, but turn to Recommendation 14—very strong interaction and involvement of the community in any decisions on the site of long-term waste facilities. The Government have welcomed the CoRWM report and accept,

“that geological disposal coupled with safe and secure interim storage is the way forward for the long-term management of the UK's higher activity wastes".

So there seems to be a general acceptance of this deep geological burial solution, but it is important to recognise that there is going to be a problem over storage before burial. This may be for many years for the most active waste. The more active wastes are mainly in the form of liquids. These cannot be vitrified, which seems to be the method that is being suggested for use in burial. This is because of the energy produced by the radiation, which can lead to the heating or boiling of the liquids. This waste, as we have said, constitutes a relatively small amount of the total, but it does provide a problem which involves storage rather than burial for quite a number of years.

It will be decades before the waste is buried and perhaps it is important to recognise with the amount of research being carried out in material science concerning the possible ways of containing these materials that present procedures will probably not be the ones that are used in the burial method.

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One of the most important points is going to be selling the sites to the public. In addition to the geological limitations, there will be a sensitivity on the part of many if not all in the local community to the siting of such a deposit, and it is significant that the Government appear to be very sensitive to the suggestions by CoRWM for public involvement. In fact, the Government have agreed that they will take the,

“lead in identifying the process and criteria to be used”,

in deciding the storage facilities. However, the responsibility for the implementation of the geological disposal has been given to the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, with a relatively short timescale, to my mind, in which to produce an outline proposal. Perhaps the Minister could comment on this programme.

I have sympathy with the suggestions of Friends of the Earth on the long-term management and packaging of wastes. Indeed, one of the recommendations in our report is that the EU should have some concern in the matter.

We should put this in perspective. The increasing demand for energy is not unique to Europe; it is a global problem. There will be impacts in countries such as China and India, as well as Brazil, South Africa and other Asian countries. Nuclear energy is at least a partial solution to these problems. This emphasises the point that both the disposal and safety of nuclear waste are an international, not just a European, problem.

The present inspection and control system is operated by the IAEA on a global scale and, as I said, appears to be satisfactory as far as the industry is concerned. However, as has been pointed out, the nuclear reactors in Lithuania, which were relatively new, have been rejected as a condition of accession to the Union. This decision was taken on the advice of the EU committee WENRA, to which I think the noble Lord, Lord Renton, referred. WENRA declined to give evidence to our committee.

WENRA’s decision appears to impact on the effectiveness of the use of the IAEA as an inspection procedure. Here we have something that was agreed but then rejected on a second look by the European Union. This has severe implications for the reliability of future building programmes throughout the world, if they are to be viewed by the IAEA. I would appreciate the Minister’s comments on the reasons for WENRA’s rejection of the Lithuanian reactors and on the long-term implications for the standing of the IAEA as the arbiter of nuclear construction and safety.

5.42 pm

Lord Inglewood: My Lords, as a speaker in this debate who is neither on the Front Bench nor a member of Sub-Committee D, I should start by explaining that the debate caught my eye because I had the good fortune to have been elected to represent the county of Cumbria, where I live, in the European Parliament for 10 years. As a result, I had perforce to take an interest in nuclear issues in that context and

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so became slightly more familiar than most with the EURATOM aspect of the European Union’s activities. I, too, join in the accolades that are being paid to my noble friend Lord Renton. Not having been a member of the committee, I can hardly claim first-hand experience of his great virtues, but I know that that is his reputation on these Benches.

The report has resonance with current proposals in this country to resolve the issues that relate to the long-term disposal of nuclear waste and to pick up where the ill-fated initiatives of the 1990s came to grief. Before making some more general points, I should like to make two specific points that relate to waste disposal in this country.

As the report points out, it is clearly a good idea to establish any possible repository for the long-term storage of nuclear waste in an area where it is accepted from choice. But in taking that approach we need to be clear that, whatever is done, the views of any host community today should not be the overriding consideration, even if the geological conditions are acceptable. Future generations cannot express a view now and it will be they who will experience the consequences of what we decide in our generation.

I think it important that the state should take an objective view about these matters before making a final decision. I do not believe it is good governance for the state to maintain, in coming to a conclusion, that certain volunteers have come forward and, despite knowing in their heart of hearts that what is proposed may not be the right thing, to simply stand by and watch people sell their heritage for a mess of potage.

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