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Children: Adoption

3.21 pm

Lord Renton of Mount Harry asked Her Majesty’s Government:

Whether during their consultation on the sexual orientation regulations they have assessed the extent to which matters of conscience can be divorced from the issue of adoption of children.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Communities and Local Government (Baroness Andrews): My Lords, we have held an extensive formal consultation, and the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government have listened to strongly held views from all sides on adoption agencies and the new sexual orientation regulations. The Prime Minister said on Monday that,

“there is no place in our society for discrimination ... And ... there can be no exemptions for faith-based adoption agencies offering publicly-funded services from regulations which prevent discrimination”.

In the interests of vulnerable children, the regulations will, however, include a transition period which will give adoption agencies time to adapt their methods of operation.

Lord Renton of Mount Harry: My Lords, while thanking the noble Baroness for that Answer, I confess that I find the decision by the Prime Minister very odd. Was not the Education Secretary, Alan Johnson, clearly wrong in saying that this decision was the right outcome for it puts the interest of children first? Is not the case, in fact, that the interest of same-sex couples—for whom I have every respect—has been put first? One has to expect and understand that there is much more chance of an adoption working if the child goes to a family where there is a male and female parent, a possible mother and father. Would it not make much more sense to leave things as they are and allow any adoption agency that does not process applications from same-sex couples to refer them to an agency that does? Is that not what happens and will happen in Scotland?

Baroness Andrews: My Lords, when this House debated the adoption Bill in 2002, it was on the knowledge and presumption that children need

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loving, stable family homes, which includes gay and lesbian couples. As the Prime Minister has said, the arrangement made this week is very much in the interests of the children, who have been paramount in the continuing, complex discussions. It would not have been in the interests of any child for any agency to close. We know how well the Catholic Church cares for children. We are confident that the agencies will want to engage constructively with us to secure in the transition processes being set up the interests of those most vulnerable children. We have the assurance of Cardinal Murphy-O’Connor that he is more than prepared to work constructively with us on that, which will secure the interests of those children and the widest pool of adopters for children under the rule of law.

Lord Soley: My Lords, can the Minister reassure me that we will stick solidly by the principle of the best needs of the child? I have known for a fact for many decades, never mind years, that children have been placed with gay couples, very often where the child, for whatever reason, has a good relationship with that couple. I would be very alarmed by the recent debate if I was led to believe that church agencies or any other agencies had over-ruled that on grounds of individual conscience about sexuality and sexual orientation which over-rode the principle of the needs of the child. That is the first cause, which over-rides individual conscience. A gay relationship can in many respects be far better than unstable heterosexual relationships. It depends on the needs of the child and the quality of the relationship. That is what should guide us. Does the Minister agree?

Baroness Andrews: Yes, my Lords. Again, I turn to the Prime Minister’s statement, which says that,

“this is a package which has the interests of children, and particularly the most vulnerable, at its heart”.

The assessment process for placing children for adoption is extremely rigorous and thorough and the judgment is based on the suitability of the adoptive parents to provide a loving and stable home for the child, no matter what their domestic arrangements and circumstances.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: My Lords, Members on these Benches welcome the Prime Minister’s statement. Does the Minister recall that when the Human Rights Act was passed, instead of giving church organisations the blanket immunity which they sought, it instead provides that the courts have to pay particular regard to the right to freedom of conscience and religion as exercised by a religious organisation,

“itself, or by its members collectively”?

Does the Minister agree that the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2006, which we recently approved, balance fairly the duty of public authorities such as publicly funded Catholic adoption agencies not to practise sexual orientation discrimination in providing their public services with freedom of conscience and religion? Perhaps I may also ask—slightly

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cheekily, but not entirely so—whether, when senior clerics accuse Ministers and other politicians of arrogance, they could be asked,

“Why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother’s eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own?”.

Baroness Andrews: My Lords, I do not think I can contest anything the noble Lord has said on the basis of either experience or judgment. The debate on this issue has been extremely important, and I note that the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury has asked for a wider debate; that is perfectly reasonable. Our debate has not diminished the place of religious conviction in our society at all, but it has upheld the rule of law.

Lord St John of Fawsley: My Lords, does the noble Baroness agree that when eminent churchmen such as Cardinal Murphy-O’Connor and the most reverend Primate speak out, they have a perfect right to do so and they should be listened to with respect? Further, is she aware that throughout the tangled web of English family law there is one golden thread always to be seen, and that is that the interests of the child must be paramount? Can she assure the House that that has been, is and will be the policy of the Government?

Baroness Andrews: My Lords, I can certainly give that assurance, and I quote the Cardinal himself in recognising that this is exactly what the Government intend to do:

“We note and welcome ... the Government’s expressed desire that the experience and excellent work of our agencies is not lost, especially for the benefit of needy children”.

The paramount importance of the needs of the child is written throughout our legislation and is observed in our action in government. This is certainly the latest expression of it.

Lord Anderson of Swansea: My Lords, surely the principle of non-discrimination is important, but not absolute. With some good will, does she agree that there must be a way through this problem without the two-year deferment mentioned by my noble friend—by, for example, setting up a close twinning arrangement between the Roman Catholic agencies and other agencies which are prepared to follow the legislation? I speak not as a Roman Catholic, but as a Welsh nonconformist.

Baroness Andrews: My Lords, I understand the background of my noble friend. What has been agreed with the Catholic Church is that a process should be set up for the two-year transition period. An independent team has been appointed by the Prime Minister and will report directly to him. As he has said, no one wants to lose these excellent adoption services that help some of our most vulnerable children. The independent assessment team will look at all the practicalities of the transition period to ensure that the needs of these children and their adoptive parents within the process are secured during the transition period, and that they will continue to be met afterwards.

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That will include the requirement for any faith-based adoption agency that wishes to take advantage of the transitional arrangements to refer gay, lesbian and bisexual couples to agencies which are able to assist. Further, the independent panel will look at issues such as funding and partnerships as well.

Welfare Reform Bill

3.30 pm

Baroness Morgan of Drefelin: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion, standing on the Order Paper in the name of my noble friend Lord McKenzie of Luton, that the Bill be committed to a Grand Committee.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

Northern Ireland Arms Decommissioning Act 1997 (Amnesty Period) Order 2007

Police and Criminal Evidence (Amendment) (Northern Ireland) Order 2007

Street Works (Amendment) (Northern Ireland) Order 2007

District Electoral Areas Commissioner (Northern Ireland) (Amendment) Order 2006

Northern Ireland Assembly (Elections) (Amendment) Order 2007

Lord Rooker: My Lords, I beg to move the Motions standing in my name on the Order Paper.

Moved, That the draft orders laid before the House on 30 November, 4 December, 11 December 2006 and 8 January be approved [4th and 5th Reports from the Statutory Instruments Committee and considered in Grand Committee on 24 January].—(Lord Rooker.)

On Question, Motions agreed to.

Cluster Munitions (Prohibition) Bill [HL]

Lord Dubs: My Lords, I understand that no amendments have been set down to this Bill and that no noble Lord has indicated a wish to move a manuscript amendment or to speak in Committee. Therefore, unless any noble Lord objects, I beg to move that the order of commitment be discharged.

Moved, That the order of commitment be discharged.—(Lord Dubs.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

31 Jan 2007 : Column 238

Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Bill [HL]

3.31 pm

Report received.

Clause 1 [Independence of tribunal judiciary]:

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Constitutional Affairs (Baroness Ashton of Upholland) moved Amendment No. 1:

Clause 1 , page 1, line 9, leave out “the office of Senior President of Tribunals” and insert “an office listed in subsection (7B)”

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 2 to 4. Amendments Nos. 1 and 2 are designed to ensure that the guarantee of judicial independence set out in Clause 1 includes all the tribunals which are administered by the Lord Chancellor. As it currently stands, the guarantee in the Bill does not cover the employment tribunals in Scotland, nor does it cover the Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals Panel adjudicators appointed by Scottish Ministers under Section 5 of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995. These are the only tribunals administered by the Lord Chancellor that fall outside Schedule 14 to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. A further difficulty is that members of employment tribunals are not within Schedule 14 to the 2005 Act and so do not come within the guarantee in Clause 1 if they are not chairmen. These would be unfortunate anomalies if they were not remedied, and Amendments Nos. 1 and 2 do so.

Amendments Nos. 3 and 4 amend Clauses 4 and 5 in order to clarify which legally qualified members of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal are to be considered judges of a first tier tribunal and which are to be considered judges of the upper tribunal. As presently drafted, the Bill provides that all legally qualified members should be considered judges of the upper tribunal. The Government’s intention, which was reflected in the Bill that we published in draft last July, is that only the president or deputy president or a senior immigration judge would sit as a judge of the upper tribunal. All other AIT judges are to be part of the first tier tribunal only.

In the process of redrafting the Bill for introduction in your Lordships’ House, that visible distinction was lost, although the practical effect would have been no different. These amendments revert to what was contained in the draft Bill and provide clarity on the face of the Bill in respect of the AIT and the mapping of judicial office holders into the appropriate tier. I should add that the amendments do not in any way change the position of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, which remains outside the first tier and upper tribunal and will remain so unless and until the Home Secretary agrees to its transfer into the new tribunal structure. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Baroness Ashton of Upholland moved Amendment No. 2:

Clause 1 , page 1, line 12, at end insert—

“(7B) The offices are those of—

31 Jan 2007 : Column 239

(a) Senior President of Tribunals; (b) President of Employment Tribunals (Scotland); (c) Vice President of Employment Tribunals (Scotland); (d) member of a panel of chairmen of Employment Tribunals (Scotland); (e) member of a panel of members of employment tribunals that is not a panel of chairmen; (f) adjudicator appointed under section 5 of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995.””

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 4 [Judges and other members of the First-tier Tribunal]:

Baroness Ashton of Upholland moved Amendment No. 3:

Clause 4 , page 3, line 7, after “Tribunal,” insert—

“(ca) is a member of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal appointed under paragraph 2(1)(a) to (d) of Schedule 4 to the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (c. 41) (legally qualified members) and is not a judge of the Upper Tribunal,”

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 5 [Judges and other members of the Upper Tribunal]:

Baroness Ashton of Upholland moved Amendment No. 4:

Clause 5 , page 3, line 34, after “members)” insert “who—

(i) is the President or a Deputy President of that tribunal, or (ii) has the title Senior Immigration Judge but is neither the President nor a Deputy President of that tribunal,”

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 9 [Review of decision of First-tier Tribunal]:

Baroness Ashton of Upholland moved Amendment No. 5:

Clause 9 , page 6, line 10, at end insert—

“( ) Tribunal Procedure Rules may—

(a) provide that the First-tier Tribunal may not under subsection (1) review (whether of its own initiative or on application under subsection (2)(b)) a decision of a description specified for the purposes of this paragraph in Tribunal Procedure Rules; (b) provide that the First-tier Tribunal’s power under subsection (1) to review a decision of a description specified for the purposes of this paragraph in Tribunal Procedure Rules is exercisable only of the tribunal’s own initiative; (c) provide that an application under subsection (2)(b) that is of a description specified for the purposes of this paragraph in Tribunal Procedure Rules may be made only on grounds specified for the purposes of this paragraph in Tribunal Procedure Rules; (d) provide, in relation to a decision of a description specified for the purposes of this paragraph in Tribunal Procedure Rules, that the First-tier Tribunal’s power under subsection (1) to review the decision of its own initiative is exercisable only on grounds specified for the purposes of this paragraph in Tribunal Procedure Rules.”

31 Jan 2007 : Column 240

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, in moving Amendment No. 5 I shall also speak to Amendment No. 6. These amendments relate to Clauses 9 and 10, and make the powers of the first-tier and upper tribunals to review their own decisions subject to tribunal procedure rules. The tribunals committee will thus be able to restrict review where that is appropriate.

As I explained in Grand Committee to the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, when he moved his Amendment No. 38, the purpose of the review power is to enable the swift and easy correction of accidental errors without putting users to the trouble of an appeal. However, the noble Lord was concerned that the powers should be relatively narrow in their effect, and we have been thinking about whether, as currently drafted, they are rather wide. We have also thought further about whether there is any potential for abuse of the powers by vexatious or delaying litigants.

We have concluded that there needs to be provision for more specific criteria for exercise of the review power. The need may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, so we have concluded that the right way to approach this is to give the Tribunals Procedure Committee the power to set the criteria. With existing tribunals it is not unusual for legislation to allow criteria to be set in rules; the employment tribunals and the Special Educational Needs Tribunal are examples.

Amendments Nos. 5 and 6 therefore make the necessary adjustments to Clauses 9 and 10. They will allow tribunal rules to exclude from review decisions of a description specified in the rules, whether by the tribunal of its initiative or on abdication by the parties. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 10 [Review of decision of Upper Tribunal]:

Baroness Ashton of Upholland moved Amendment No. 6:

Clause 10 , page 7, line 5, at end insert—

“( ) Tribunal Procedure Rules may—

(a) provide that the Upper Tribunal may not under subsection (1) review (whether of its own initiative or on application under subsection (2)(b)) a decision of a description specified for the purposes of this paragraph in Tribunal Procedure Rules; (b) provide that the Upper Tribunal’s power under subsection (1) to review a decision of a description specified for the purposes of this paragraph in Tribunal Procedure Rules is exercisable only of the tribunal’s own initiative; (c) provide that an application under subsection (2)(b) that is of a description specified for the purposes of this paragraph in Tribunal Procedure Rules may be made only on grounds specified for the purposes of this paragraph in Tribunal Procedure Rules; (d) provide, in relation to a decision of a description specified for the purposes of this paragraph in Tribunal Procedure Rules, that the Upper Tribunal’s power under subsection (1) to review the decision of its own initiative is exercisable only on grounds specified for the purposes of this paragraph in Tribunal Procedure Rules.”

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 11 [Right to appeal to Upper Tribunal]:

31 Jan 2007 : Column 241

Lord Thomas of Gresford moved Amendment No. 7:

Clause 11 , page 7, line 29, leave out “any point of law” and insert—

“(a) any point of law, (b) any point of fact, or (c) points of law and fact,”

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