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I will deal immediately with one of the many important questions that the noble Lord, Lord Elton, raised; about the clearance of mines in Afghanistan. We did not lay mines, which was one of the key ethical questions, but we have made a significant contribution to clearing the mines that were laid during the invasion by the Soviet Union in 1979, as well as the cluster munitions that were used. I have seen the work of our forces. I went on an exercise that they were conducting in training Colombian military forces. That is a country with more mines per capita of its population than anywhere else in the world. I saw at first hand how much risk people take and the huge expertise that they bring to bear. It is a huge testimony to them.

The use of cluster munitions was brought into sharp focus by the conflict that took place in Lebanon and Israel last summer. Since then, this Chamber has addressed the humanitarian consequences of these weapons and their military utility. In the spirit of that last remark, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Astor of Hever, that I, too, feel very much for those who have suffered during de-mining work as happened in the case of his regiment. I am sure that all of us will feel for those who suffered in that way. Today, I will set out what the United Kingdom Government have done at national and international level since the start of the international campaign for a ban on cluster weapons.

The House is well aware that this area requires us to balance two different but important aims. First, we need to take account of our humanitarian concerns; we want to reduce the harm that some types of cluster munitions can cause to innocent civilians and do all that we can to control the use of all cluster munitions. Secondly, we need to look at what our Armed Forces require to carry out the difficult and dangerous jobs that they pursue. I am on the same page as the noble Lord, Lord Astor of Hever, in that regard. Our obligation to them cannot simply be set aside. It would be quite unacceptable if they were put at avoidable risk.

I understand the point made by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leicester, but I believe that he sets a test that we could never pass. In using high explosives—bombs or explosives of all kinds—we run the considerable risk of hurting wholly innocent people. I hate that that happens, and I doubt that anyone in this House would ever be casual about that consequence. But it was not wrong to stop the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo by using high explosive weapons. I cannot believe that it was the wrong thing to do, even if there was a terrible cost, because of the vital humanitarian objective that Muslims should not die simply because they are Muslims, at the hands of people who hate Muslims. That is an ethical position as well.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Low, that I recognise the difficulty of striking these balances, as he put it. It is also invaluable to hear him say that we should take great care to listen to the knowledge that is imparted by those who are disabled by the explosion of previously unexploded ordnance.

The Government are fully seized of the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions. That is why we are firmly committed to a legally binding instrument that prohibits the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians. In response to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Garden, I doubt that there is a clear definition generally, but I use this definition to guide me in trying to address these matters. I take “smart” to mean weapons that can be aimed accurately and not dispersed in any way inaccurately, or weapons that will self-destruct if they are dispersed. “Dumb” weapons, of course, meet neither of those basic criteria.

We are working hard with international partners to get to that definition and to solve that problem. We have removed from our service our dumb cluster munitions and we urge all other countries to take similar action. I do not believe that they can be in any doubt about our position. This year's human rights report from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office will include a section on the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions. My noble friend Lord Dubs also raised the humanitarian issues involved in clearing up cluster munitions, as did the noble Lord, Lord Astor of Hever.

On Israel's use of cluster munitions, we have taken practical steps. DfID has committed £2.5 million to work in this area. But, ultimately, I have to acknowledge the point made in this House. There has to be very real pressure on the Government of Israel to disclose all the information that they have and to assist in every way that they can to resolve the problem that was created—a problem that I cannot, as I have said on other occasions, describe as proportionate.

On Serbia, I have also seen the letter mentioned by my noble friend Lord Dubs. I assure him that I will push for the most rapid completion of the NATO exercise that I can achieve, if that is helpful.

The impact of munitions on children was mentioned a number of times in this debate. There are no comprehensive figures, but for the information of the House, in Lebanon, the latest figures from March 2007 show that 15 adults have been killed and 110 injured, and seven children have been killed and 60 injured. I do not want to make any particular point about the accuracy of the figures or the assertions; one adult or child is too many, but the reality is that when these weapons go off they have a devastating impact.

Given the nature of this debate, my next comments will not be welcome to everyone, although I know that the Official Opposition and the Government are in the same position. It is important to set out how the United Kingdom will use its remaining cluster munitions. I note the estimate given by the noble Lord, Lord Garden, of the number provided to many of us by NGOs. Of course, the actual figures are classified and I shall not produce them in this House. At present, we expect the Army’s extended range bomblet shell with its M85 submunition to remain in service until approximately the middle of the next decade, although that date is subject to change.

I can tell the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mayhew, that the estimated failure rate is 2.3 per cent. But I have always accepted that there are liable to be proven differences between systematic testing—and such testing yielded that figure—and the figures generated by real conditions. If I may say so, that is a problem with bombs in general—they do not all perform. The figures for air-dropped bombs of all kinds tend to be rather worse than that. The noble Lord, Lord Garden, also asked about the failure rate in real conditions. It is very hard for obvious reasons to make an accurate estimation, although it would be valuable to continue working towards doing so. My noble friend Lord Dubs raised a number of points which he also raised in his Bill.

Our force commanders are very clear about what we are doing. Opinion in this House is very important, I never deny that, but I do not believe that the House can ignore the advice of our military commanders. I understand that my noble friend Lady Turner is among those who hold a strongly opposing view, but I do not think that any government can seriously say that they are not going to listen to the detailed advice of their military commanders. For those reasons, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, that although I completely accept that he brings great knowledge to this matter, I suspect that he would be among the first to tell us that we should also listen to the advice of those who command our forces. The United Kingdom has concluded that these weapons have a real and significant military value when, and only when, they are used in compliance with both international humanitarian law and the United Kingdom’s own rigorous targeting guidelines.

My noble and learned friend Lord Archer asked several questions about these very important points. He asked why we had not yet ratified Protocol v. A number of administrative procedures still need to be completed before ratification; for example, resolving the contingent liability funding to fulfil the provisions of Protocol v. These relate to the unexploded remnants of war. We are taking steps to address these and we are ready to abide, and do already abide, by the spirit of the protocol, not least because the UK was among the first states originally calling for the humanitarian benefits of this instrument. Therefore, of course, we will want to get to the conclusion as fast as possible.

The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, asked whether cluster munitions could ever be a proportionate response. The use of all weapons, including cluster munitions, must be discriminate, proportionate, necessary and military objectives only may be attacked. Other feasible precautions can be taken about the choice of weapon and the means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding and minimising civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects. That whole principle of proportionality must guide the entire process which we use.

We must be clear about the nature of the circumstances which may require our Armed Forces to use these weapons. The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, asked about the basis on which military command advice is given. We are advised—I accept this advice—that there are certain, compelling circumstances when the British Armed Forces may need to use such munitions in conflict, including for force protection. In certain conflict situations, our Armed Forces need to be able to destroy, suppress or neutralise dispersed enemy armour, other combat forces or military facilities in a defined footprint of terrain.

Lord Archer of Sandwell: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for giving way, but if the Government accept that the number of civilian casualties must be proportionate, how can we know, with weapons of this kind, how many civilian casualties there will be in a particular case?

Lord Triesman: My Lords, as my noble and learned friend knows, we know as much about it as when we drop bombs from the air on areas in which civilians may be located. Always when you have civilian populations in a conflict area, the reality is that people will unfortunately be injured.

Lord Garden: My Lords, can the Minister explore that point a little more? Surely the essence of what we are talking about is the difference between precision bombs which hit a point and aerial weapons which disperse bombs over a wider area. These are different sorts of weapons.

Lord Triesman: My Lords, I understand that, but those who watched the bombing in Kosovo and Bosnia will have seen that large numbers of bombs were dropped from aircraft in patterns. If that does not have a fundamentally damaging and disruptive effect if there are civilians in the area, candidly, it is hard for me to understand what does.

The noble Lord, Lord Elton, stated as a key issue that there would need to be major arguments in favour of using cluster munitions for them to be deployed, especially that of having an effect over a defined area without devastating the surrounding environment. Of course, it is easy to make play of the words “environment” and “devastation” in these circumstances, and I understand why he did so, but the alternative to cluster bombing—this relates to the point that I was just asked about—may require a greater number of high explosive munitions to be used. These would destroy the enemy but they also cause widespread harm to the surroundings and civilians. Munitions of that kind, even dating from World War Two, are still having to be disarmed.

In essence, sometimes, and used under careful guidelines, the military advice is that cluster munitions may in fact be less destructive than other weapons. These military requirements mean that we cannot at this stage commit to a total ban of cluster munitions. To do so would leave our Armed Forces with an unacceptable operational capability gap and in some circumstances would jeopardise protection.

The noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, raised some very important points in this regard. Of course, we want to win people’s hearts and minds, even in these circumstances. It is true that people want to be free of violence and the risk of attack. That is the balance I have tried to describe. But one thing is clear to me—that we must in all these circumstances be able also to protect our forces. That is the balance.

The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, asked what we are trying to do next and how we shall proceed. We are trying on the international stage to secure an effective treaty on cluster bombs, just as we did with landmines. That task was also drawn to our attention by the noble Baroness, Lady Howe of Idlicote. As many in the Chamber are aware, these negotiations are evolving. Some countries, led by Norway, have become sufficiently frustrated by the lack of progress in the United Nations process in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, that they have set up an alternative procedure, the Oslo process. I understand that frustration but, equally, I understand that a treaty must be universal if it is to be wholly successful. That means that the major users and producers of cluster bombs must feel that they also have a stake in the outcome.

A process and agreement that omits these vital countries will of course have a far more limited humanitarian impact. That is why we are active within the CCW and contribute to the work of the Group of Governmental Experts to build consensus among its 102 states parties for a negotiating mandate in 2007 to address humanitarian concerns related to these weapons

That said, I share the House’s hope that the Oslo process, in which we are closely involved, will feed into and inspire the work of the UN’s CCW process. We will work with both with this aim firmly in mind.

At last year’s review conference of the CCW, when all efforts to secure a negotiating mandate were blocked, the United Kingdom took a lead and secured support for a discussion mandate to address this issue. Consequently, the Group of Governmental Experts was set up to report on the application and implementation of international humanitarian law and technical issues and to report back within 12 months. This is a prerequisite for any negotiations on a new instrument within the CCW. I share the view of the noble Lord, Lord Low, that we shall need to have access to the very best data and to make clear distinctions between types of weapons. That is part of the work of the group of experts.

Our immediate aim is to secure a recommendation from the chair of the Group of Governmental Experts for a negotiating mandate at a forthcoming meeting in June. We will then work to build support for this ahead of the November meeting of states parties.

There is a diverse range of CCW states, including some of the major users—

Lord Hannay of Chiswick: My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way. I understand where he is coming from and his very firm view, supported by the Opposition Bench, that the Government cannot at this stage accept that M85 should be discarded. But will he address the rather important point that in all these international negotiations there will be a point at which we will either say that we ask others to accept our view that they are okay, or alternatively we will accept that this is a first step only and that we are not prepared to go beyond that? I should like to hear from him that we will not try to persuade others of our view that these weapons are acceptable because that is a very strongly disputed point. I am not saying that we will not hold to that view ourselves but this could be quite important because what we surely want to do is to end up with an international legal instrument which is capable of being extended as circumstances require.

Lord Triesman: My Lords, I am grateful for that question. We will of course adhere to the view that I have described to the House. It would be difficult for other countries not to understand our reasons and purposes, not as a matter of advocacy but just as knowledge of what we are doing. In a few moments, in context, I will return to the point about process, to which I undertake to reply.

The work with the CCW states, if it can be achieved, would be a very big prize. We are engaged in two processes. That is why we are participating energetically in the Oslo process, and we support the Oslo declaration, along with around 50 other countries, many of which are also CCW states. We will also be involved in the follow-up meeting to Oslo in Lima next week, in which we will discuss elements of the future instrument. I assure my noble friend Lady Turner that we will be taking a full part. Like the UN Secretary-General, we believe that the Oslo process should be “mutually reinforcing and complementary”—those were his words—to the CCW, and should provide an inspiration to the states of the CCW to fulfil the aim of the new instrument.

That brings me back to the point that the noble Lords, Lord Hannay and Lord Garden, asked me about. When we are working with our international partners to achieve our aim of a new instrument that prohibits those cluster munitions that pose unacceptable harm, we have to see it as a process that is bound to have to reflect the changes that take place over time. The decisions that have been taken recently by the Government reflect just that engagement with the process. It would be foolish for anyone to assert that we had arrived at a final point and that whatever weapons systems that we now believe to be critical to our well-being will always be so. I wholly accept that but, like all processes, we will need to include those people who are responsible for our defence advice in the understanding of the complexities as each stage moves forward. Otherwise, there would not only be a lack of international consensus, but there would be no consensus in the United Kingdom either.

I greatly appreciate the efforts of the Norwegian Government, as well as those of everyone who has supported the Oslo declaration, not least the noble Lord, Lord Elton, in introducing this debate, and my noble friend Lord Dubs in the introduction of his Bill. I am grateful to the Government of Peru for hosting the next Oslo process meeting. The Oslo process is an excellent one. It is leading discussion, it is going in the right ethical direction and it is very good in so many respects; but it is also limited because of those who are not taking part in it. The CCW process is critical and is likely to prove the decisive process, because that is where the players, without whom this effort will almost certainly fail, are located. That is why we will work in both processes. If we are successful in our work on the Oslo process and the links that it has to the CCW process, it will strengthen the United Nations’ prestige in limiting weapons of this kind. Our efforts may not bear fruit in the CCW, and that may mean that the Oslo process becomes the only means through which we can secure our aims, but we are determined to press along this route. In today’s debate, whatever the differences have been about some weapons, there has been a clear belief that the process must be continued and seen through to a proper conclusion.

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Lord Elton: My Lords, I am deeply indebted to everyone who has spoken in the debate. I rather deplore our tradition that everyone must start by congratulating the person who has been lucky enough to win the ballot. It uses valuable time, and there is nothing very clever about winning the ballot. I was very lucky to get it on this day, and it could well have been the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. I acknowledge, as I should have done at the start, that he would certainly have conducted this debate at least as well and probably better than I did. He has a better track record on fighting cluster munitions than I as yet have, but I regard myself as a rival in that regard, and I will try not to start addressing him as my noble friend.

I, too, acknowledge the pioneering, courageous and skilled work of Landmine Action, a non-government voluntary body. I should have declared an interest, and I will have to put it in the office, that it paid the expenses of my visit to Oslo and will do so for my visit to Peru. I leave it to your Lordships to judge whether that has coloured my judgment; I assure noble Lords that it has not.

My noble friend on the Front Bench pointed out that of the 49 who went to Oslo, Poland, Romania and Japan have not signed up. I therefore, against Poland and Romania, take from a long list France, Germany, Italy and Spain, all in Europe, who did so. My noble friend mentioned Japan; I mention Canada and Austria. We can play these cards out as if it is a party game. The list is long, distinguished and growing. It is perhaps worth saying that of the 34 nations which make these beastly things, sell them to others and approve of their use, 15 have now signed up to the Oslo accord. So it was a very significant development and is one to take note of and to be exploited in a way in which I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, is more skilled than anyone in doing.

It has been suggested that we should approach a total ban by stages. Certainly, there should be effective regulation of how these things are used. The use in Lebanon was utterly disgraceful and inhumane. In discussions outside this Chamber, I am constantly told that commanders are not allowed to use them in built-up areas, and yet I have seen film of these things in use in Nis, a considerable city in the Balkans, as well as a commander who saturated a village in the Lebanon. So those rules do not actually work. In the haste, fear, anger and fog of war, rules get bent or ignored. The only thing that works is not providing weapons that are not fit for purpose. It must cause the Government to waver, whatever their current commanders are saying, that we have written testimony from one field marshal that this type of weapon is counterproductive and causes you to lose the war even if you have won the battle, and we have an air marshal and a general saying that they serve no useful military purpose either. Having talked to pretty senior military people and commanders in the British forces, I do not get a sense of the depth of tenacity to this weapon that the Minister’s reply suggested exists. I suspect that the postcode of the advice is somewhere near Whitehall rather than somewhere near NATO headquarters.

We come to the basic issue of why these things are unacceptable; apart from the military matters, which we can go on arguing about for some time, it is because they kill unacceptable numbers of civilians, of whom an unacceptably high proportion are children. We have had a notional figure of 30,000 casualties so far, and rising. That arises from two things. First, I concentrated in my opening remarks on the failure of the failsafe system, and I have heard no answer yet to the evidence that the United Nations produced from Lebanon on the failure rate, or to the video that I saw. There is the other aspect. These are area weapons; they do not attack targets. They attack areas in which the target either is or is supposed to be.

The noble Baroness is looking anxious; we have until eight minutes past two, but I have nearly concluded. What is wrong with these weapons is that they do not pinpoint a target. The noble Lord, Lord Garden, asked what is coming next along the production line. It is called Bonus, and it has two or three accurate, individually targeted weapons that can recognise the difference between a tank and a tractor. I ask the noble Lord to do two things. First, I ask him to expedite and assist in every way that he can the Oslo process, as well as the United Nations process. Secondly, I ask him to get the boffins on with developing something that does the job that these things fail to do, knocks out the enemy and does not turn whole nations again us. With some reluctance, I beg leave to withdraw the Motion for Papers.

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