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Anelay of St Johns, B.
Arran, E.
Ashcroft, L.
Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon, L.
Astor of Hever, L.
Attlee, E.
Barker, B.
Beaumont of Whitley, L.
Bell, L.
Blaker, L.
Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury, B.
Boothroyd, B.
Bowness, L.
Bradshaw, L.
Bridgeman, V.
Brittan of Spennithorne, L.
Brooke of Sutton Mandeville, L.
Brougham and Vaux, L.
Bruce-Lockhart, L.
Burnett, L.
Caithness, E.
Campbell of Alloway, L.
Cathcart, E.
Chadlington, L.
Chidgey, L.
Cope of Berkeley, L. [Teller]
Cotter, L.
Crathorne, L.
Crickhowell, L.
Darcy de Knayth, B.
Dean of Harptree, L.
Dholakia, L.
Dixon-Smith, L.
Dundee, E.
Dykes, L.
Eccles, V.
Eccles of Moulton, B.
Eden of Winton, L.
Elliott of Morpeth, L.
Elton, L.
Falkland, V.
Fearn, L.
Feldman, L.
Flather, B.
Fookes, B.
Fowler, L.
Freeman, L.
Fritchie, B.
Gardner of Parkes, B.
Garel-Jones, L.
Glasgow, E.
Glentoran, L.
Goodhart, L.
Goodlad, L.
Greaves, L.
Greenway, L.
Hamwee, B.
Hanham, B.
Hanningfield, L.
Harris of Peckham, L.
Harris of Richmond, B.
Hayhoe, L.
Henley, L.
Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, L.
Hooper, B.
Howe, E.
Howe of Aberavon, L.
Howe of Idlicote, B.
Hunt of Wirral, L.
Hurd of Westwell, L.
Inglewood, L.
Jenkin of Roding, L.
Jones of Cheltenham, L.
Jopling, L.
Kalms, L.
Kimball, L.
Kingsland, L.
Laing of Dunphail, L.
Lamont of Lerwick, L.
Lane of Horsell, L.
Lee of Trafford, L.
Lester of Herne Hill, L.
Lindsay, E.
Listowel, E.
Liverpool, E.
Livsey of Talgarth, L.
Luke, L.
Lyell, L.
MacGregor of Pulham Market, L.
Mackay of Clashfern, L.
Mackie of Benshie, L.
McNally, L.
Maddock, B.
Maginnis of Drumglass, L.
Mar and Kellie, E.
Marlesford, L.
Mayhew of Twysden, L.
Michie of Gallanach, B.
Miller of Chilthorne Domer, B.


19 Jun 2007 : Column 123

Miller of Hendon, B.
Monson, L.
Montrose, D.
Morris of Bolton, B.
Neuberger, B.
Nicholson of Winterbourne, B.
Noakes, B.
Northover, B.
Norton of Louth, L.
O'Cathain, B.
Onslow, E.
Oppenheim-Barnes, B.
Palumbo, L.
Park of Monmouth, B.
Patten, L.
Pearson of Rannoch, L.
Pilkington of Oxenford, L.
Platt of Writtle, B.
Powell of Bayswater, L.
Quinton, L.
Razzall, L.
Reay, L.
Redesdale, L.
Rennard, L.
Roberts of Conwy, L.
Roberts of Llandudno, L.
Rodgers of Quarry Bank, L.
Rogan, L.
Roper, L.
Rotherwick, L.
Russell-Johnston, L.
Saatchi, L.
Seccombe, B.
Selborne, E.
Selkirk of Douglas, L.
Selsdon, L.
Sharman, L.
Sharp of Guildford, B.
Sharples, B.
Sheikh, L.
Shephard of Northwold, B.
Smith of Clifton, L.
Soulsby of Swaffham Prior, L.
Steel of Aikwood, L.
Steinberg, L.
Stewartby, L.
Stoddart of Swindon, L.
Swinfen, L.
Taverne, L.
Taylor of Holbeach, L.
Tenby, V.
Teverson, L.
Thomas of Walliswood, B.
Thomas of Winchester, B.
Tonge, B.
Tope, L.
Tordoff, L.
Trenchard, V.
Trumpington, B.
Tugendhat, L.
Ullswater, V.
Vallance of Tummel, L.
Verma, B.
Vinson, L.
Waddington, L.
Wakeham, L.
Walker of Worcester, L.
Wallace of Saltaire, L.
Walpole, L.
Wilcox, B.
Williams of Crosby, B.
Willoughby de Broke, L.
Windlesham, L.
Wolfson, L.
Young of Hornsey, B.

NOT CONTENTS
Adams of Craigielea, B.
Adonis, L.
Ahmed, L.
Amos, B. [Lord President.]
Anderson of Swansea, L.
Andrews, B.
Archer of Sandwell, L.
Ashton of Upholland, B.
Barnett, L.
Bassam of Brighton, L.
Berkeley, L.
Bernstein of Craigweil, L.
Bhattacharyya, L.
Billingham, B.
Bilston, L.
Borrie, L.
Boston of Faversham, L.
Boyd of Duncansby, L.
Bragg, L.
Brooke of Alverthorpe, L.
Brookman, L.
Brooks of Tremorfa, L.
Burlison, L.
Campbell-Savours, L.
Carey of Clifton, L.
Carter of Coles, L.
Clark of Windermere, L.
Clarke of Hampstead, L.
Clinton-Davis, L.
Cohen of Pimlico, B.
Corbett of Castle Vale, L.
Coussins, B.
Crawley, B.
David, B.
Davidson of Glen Clova, L.
Davies of Coity, L.
Davies of Oldham, L. [Teller]
Dean of Thornton-le-Fylde, B.
Desai, L.
Drayson, L.
D'Souza, B.
Dubs, L.
Elder, L.
Elystan-Morgan, L.
Evans of Parkside, L.
Evans of Temple Guiting, L.
Farrington of Ribbleton, B.
Faulkner of Worcester, L.
Filkin, L.
Ford, B.
Foster of Bishop Auckland, L.
Foulkes of Cumnock, L.
Fyfe of Fairfield, L.
Gale, B.
Gavron, L.
Gibson of Market Rasen, B.
Gilbert, L.
Golding, B.
Goldsmith, L.
Gordon of Strathblane, L.
Gould of Brookwood, L.
Gould of Potternewton, B.
Graham of Edmonton, L.
Griffiths of Burry Port, L.
Grocott, L. [Teller]
Harrison, L.
Hart of Chilton, L.
Haskel, L.
Haworth, L.
Henig, B.


19 Jun 2007 : Column 124

Hilton of Eggardon, B.
Hollis of Heigham, B.
Howarth of Breckland, B.
Howarth of Newport, L.
Howells of St. Davids, B.
Howie of Troon, L.
Hoyle, L.
Hughes of Woodside, L.
Hunt of Kings Heath, L.
Hylton, L.
Inge, L.
Irvine of Lairg, L.
Janner of Braunstone, L.
Jay of Paddington, B.
Joffe, L.
Jones, L.
Jones of Whitchurch, B.
Jordan, L.
Judd, L.
King of West Bromwich, L.
Kingsmill, B.
Kinnock, L.
Kirkhill, L.
Layard, L.
Lea of Crondall, L.
Leitch, L.
Lipsey, L.
Lofthouse of Pontefract, L.
Low of Dalston, L.
McDonagh, B.
Macdonald of Tradeston, L.
McIntosh of Hudnall, B.
MacKenzie of Culkein, L.
Mackenzie of Framwellgate, L.
McKenzie of Luton, L.
Mason of Barnsley, L.
Massey of Darwen, B.
Meacher, B.
Mitchell, L.
Montgomery of Alamein, V.
Moonie, L.
Morgan of Drefelin, B.
Morris of Aberavon, L.
Morris of Handsworth, L.
Morris of Manchester, L.
O'Neill of Clackmannan, L.
Ouseley, L.
Patel of Blackburn, L.
Pendry, L.
Prys-Davies, L.
Puttnam, L.
Ramsay of Cartvale, B.
Rendell of Babergh, B.
Richard, L.
Rooker, L.
Rosser, L.
Rowlands, L.
Royall of Blaisdon, B.
Sawyer, L.
Scotland of Asthal, B.
Sewel, L.
Simon, V.
Smith of Leigh, L.
Snape, L.
Soley, L.
Southwark, Bp.
Sutherland of Houndwood, L.
Symons of Vernham Dean, B.
Taylor of Blackburn, L.
Taylor of Bolton, B.
Temple-Morris, L.
Thomas of Macclesfield, L.
Thornton, B.
Tomlinson, L.
Truscott, L.
Tunnicliffe, L.
Turner of Camden, B.
Uddin, B.
Valentine, B.
Walton of Detchant, L.
Warwick of Undercliffe, B.
Watson of Invergowrie, L.
Whitaker, B.
Whitty, L.
Wilkins, B.
Williams of Elvel, L.
Williamson of Horton, L.
Winston, L.
Woolmer of Leeds, L.

Resolved in the affirmative, and amendment agreed to accordingly.

Iran: HMS “Cornwall”

4.59 pm

The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Drayson): My Lords, with the leave of the House, I shall now repeat a Statement made in another place by my right honourable friend the Defence Secretary. The Statement is as follows:

“On 16 April, I announced that the Chief of the Defence Staff had appointed Lieutenant-General Sir Rob Fulton of the Royal Marines, currently the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Gibraltar, to lead an inquiry into the operational circumstances surrounding the seizure of 15 of our personnel on 23 March. I also announced an independent review of the media handling of the incident and its aftermath, and subsequently confirmed that this review would be led by Mr Tony Hall, chief executive of the Royal Opera House and formerly the BBC’s director of news and current affairs.

19 Jun 2007 : Column 125

“I am grateful to General Fulton and Tony Hall, both of whom have completed their respective reports to tight deadlines with all the professionalism and candour that was expected of them. I am now informing the House of their findings, as I undertook to do. “I begin by stressing that these two reports are very different in nature and therefore require different handling. Mr Hall’s review is a public document, which today is placed in the Library of the House and published on the MoD website. As I made clear in April, General Fulton’s report is classified because it addresses issues of operational and tactical significance which cannot be discussed in public without increasing the risks to our forces. Nevertheless, these events and the issues they raise are legitimate subjects of parliamentary and public concern. It was to balance these factors that I decided that I would give a broad outline of General Fulton's findings to this House, but that the full report would be given to the Defence Select Committee. This has been done; I leave it to the chairman and members of that committee to comment today as they see fit. “General Fulton highlights the complex and dynamic nature of the northern Persian Gulf as an operating environment. We are there as part of a coalition maritime force carrying out a variety of demanding tasks against a backdrop of wider and rapidly evolving international issues. His report is impressively thorough. It has looked at every aspect of this incident, and others that may hold valuable lessons. In order to complete the report he has carried out lengthy interviews with all the people involved and at every level of the chain of command. Members of this House urged that specific areas be looked at, and I would like to address some of those points to the extent that I can, consistent with the constraints of operational security I mentioned earlier.“General Fulton considered the events on the Shatt al-Arab waterway in June 2004. He concluded that while there were some broad similarities in the circumstances, the events themselves were different and the requisite lessons of the time were learnt and applied. He also considered the rules of engagement and confirmed that they were entirely appropriate for the task and remain so today. “His report is clear that this event was not the result of equipment or resource issues including helicopter availability, the size and suitability of the ‘Cornwall’ or the size and armament of the boats available to the boarding party. The coalition force commander in the Gulf has reiterated that he is content with the capabilities deployed by the UK but, as ever, we keep this under review. He confirmed that the presence of the BBC on HMS ‘Cornwall’ was not a factor in any of the operational decisions taken on 23 March. “But there were shortcomings, which General Fulton has identified in his report. This was a coalition operation—Members will not need me to

19 Jun 2007 : Column 126

spell out the merits of that—but clearly there is a cost in terms of added complexity. Despite that, it is vital that the procedures we all share can adapt rapidly to changes in this complex, strategic environment. General Fulton's report has identified some faults in that respect, and we are addressing them with our coalition partners. “General Fulton has also identified some specific national shortcomings. The central lesson is that we must improve our ability to identify and assess the risks that this complex environment generates, and to train and posture our forces accordingly. He noted the need for improvements in a range of areas: in the handling of intelligence; in communications; in doctrine; and in training, both individual and collective. “On training in particular he notes, and this is worth repeating, that the Royal Navy’s generic training for operations remains world class. By the time a Royal Navy ship deploys on operations, it is well prepared for a wide range of potential roles. But the report does identify a need to improve some training specific to particular tasks, including boarding. Furthermore, it recommends that in future we deploy specialist rather than composite teams for boarding operations, a recommendation we have already acted on. General Fulton also recommends that we ensure that we learn quickly from the experience of other nations operating in the area and get better at sharing information with them.“Above all, General Fulton’s report concludes that the events of 23 March were the result not of a single gross failing or individual human error, but of the coming together of a series of vulnerabilities—many relatively small when viewed in isolation—which together placed our personnel in a position that could be exploited through a deliberate act by an unpredictable foreign power. His conclusions suggest that there is no case for disciplinary action against any of the individuals involved, but his report does emphasise that many of those individuals could have done more to prevent what happened. In that respect, it identifies some failings, both collective and individual, which the Royal Navy's chain of command will consider and deal with.“General Fulton recommends a range of actions to address the shortcomings he has identified. An action plan has been drawn up. A number of measures have already been taken, allowing us to recommence boarding operations in April, and further measures are under way. The Defence Select Committee has been briefed on the action plan but, as I indicated at the start, there is a limit to how much I can say to the House. I can say that I, together with the Chiefs of Staff, am content that General Fulton’s report and the resulting action plan will ensure that our people are properly prepared for future operations.“Let me now turn to the Hall review, and say at the outset that we accept all its recommendations. In my Statement to this House on 16 April, I made clear that the intention of this review was not to embark on a witch hunt focused on apportioning blame for the decision to allow media payments to

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the returning detainees. Like the Fulton report, the Hall review itself confirms that it would be wrong and counterproductive to focus on finding individuals to blame for these events. What was needed was a calm and dispassionate assessment of what happened in order to learn the lessons and to improve the ability of the MoD and the services to handle similar events in future.“Tony Hall makes it plain that, on the question of whether payment should have been made for individual stories, there was a,

‘collective failure of judgment or an abstention of judgment’,

within the department. In my earlier Statement to Parliament I accepted this failing as my responsibility and apologised to the House.“I welcome the report’s clear recommendation that media payments to serving military or civilian personnel for talking about their work should simply not be allowed. This confirms my announcement on 9 April of an interim ban on acceptance of media payments. Urgent work is now under way to make detailed amendments to service and MoD regulations and guidance to reflect this conclusion. The report also identifies that further work is needed to establish a clearer policy on the naming of individuals and their families in cases of this kind. This work is also already under way.“But the report also identifies some broader themes. Perhaps most crucial is the huge change over the past 25 years in the context in which media coverage of operations takes place. Media access has increased significantly, and the issues they pursue have changed and that brings its own problems. The focus on the individual, for example, inevitably clashes with the service ethos of “group first”, and the desire to present instantaneous news from the heart of the action can conflict with the need for operational security. This means that while it is clearly in the interests of both the MoD and the media to co-operate, tensions exist. We need to manage those tensions better, and we need to rebuild confidence between the MoD and the media. But the report is also clear that we need to help the media develop a better understanding of defence issues so that they can be set in context. “The report recommends that, for the future, the lead for the media handling of such episodes should lie clearly with the MoD rather than a front-line command or a single service. It also recommends some strengthening of what the report notes is a relatively small central press office. “The report also makes a number of recommendations on the need for clearer decision-making processes. I accept them entirely. Unequivocal understanding of who should sanction what is essential. The recent capability review, published in March, also highlights this, and in response we have already been looking at how we can clarify responsibilities and improve accountability within the department.“I hope it is clear that we have sought wherever possible to learn the lessons from this difficult episode, both operationally and in terms of the media handling, and to be open and accountable in

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doing so. We have had two reviews, one independently led and today put into the public domain, and the second of necessity classified but shared with the Defence Committee to ensure proper parliamentary accountability. Both are very thorough and professional. Both offer clear, detailed recommendations, all of which we accept, and many of which are already well in hand. Both are focused on the future, determined to help us ensure we do not make these mistakes again. The Chief of the Defence Staff and my Permanent Secretary will take the lead in implementing the reports and their recommendations, and I expect the great majority to be implemented by the end of this year, many of them sooner than that.“I will end by saying that I know that we have the best Armed Forces in the world. They are respected everywhere for their bravery, professionalism and ability to deliver results. Some have argued that this incident has dented their hard won reputation; I do not believe this to be true. Their reputation is more durable than that. These reports will help us maintain and enhance that reputation. I intend to ensure we succeed”.

My Lords, that concludes the Statement.

5.13 pm

Lord Astor of Hever: My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. I also thank him for organising, with the assistance of the noble Baroness, Lady Dean, an extensive briefing by General Fulton, with the CDS and the Permanent Secretary in attendance, for a small group from the House of Lords Defence Group. We were impressed by the thoroughness of the general’s inquiry and the robust and encouraging way that the CDS handled our questions. There is no doubt that lessons have been learnt. Will the Minister confirm that the recommendations of the Fulton report will be implemented and properly funded? How will he keep the House informed of the progress of the implementation and the funding of the recommendations?

We should not lose sight of the fact that 14 young men and one woman were put in a perilous situation. Their capture was hugely embarrassing for the Royal Navy, the Government and the whole country, and could have become a fatal and complex hostage situation. Unfortunately, the Government made a bad situation much worse by granting permission for service personnel to sell their stories to the tabloids. That reduced the Royal Navy to a laughing stock; and the subsequent rescinding of that decision made the Navy look even more ridiculous.

We must not allow the Royal Navy to take all the blame for the two issues under consideration in the Statement. We should not forget the excellence of the Royal Navy. As the Statement makes clear, its training is world-class. Many young women and men come from overseas to benefit from that training.

I have some questions, because we must ensure that such an incident can never happen again. I fully understand that operational security must be of prime concern in the way that the issue is handled. HMS “Cornwall” was part of the Op TELIC command chain reporting to PJHQ, not to C in C Fleet. This

19 Jun 2007 : Column 129

was not just a naval issue. Should that arrangement now be changed, given that Op TELIC is more land-focused than concerned with maritime matters?

The Royal Navy operates within a multinational context in the Gulf; our coalition partners will be essential to the successful implementation of the report’s recommendations. Can the Minister confirm what steps within the coalition the Ministry of Defence will take to address the report? Is the Iraqi Navy now carrying out its own board and search operations in its waters? We have been training it for several years.

Why did HMS “Cornwall” not have the second Lynx for which it was set up? Was this the result of too few helicopters chasing too many commitments? Helicopters on ships are used for a whole series of different tasks. The priority must always be for operational tasks. Is there some merit in the MoD considering a second helicopter just for administration tasks?

The Hall report makes clear that the media fiasco should never have occurred in the first place—not least because the MoD received a warning of a possible media circus from the Press Complaints Commission and an offer of assistance from that body. Poor media handling of any crisis must not be allowed to happen ever again. What on earth could the Secretary of State have been thinking when he approved the sale of those stories? What effect could he have expected it to have on the parents of service men and women killed in Iraq and Afghanistan? What effect could he have expected it to have on service personnel recovering from serious injuries in hospital?

The Statement recommends strengthening the relatively small press office. Will the Government consider reinstating the single-service press officers? If a uniformed press officer had been in place, this sorry saga might have been prevented.

Finally, under normal circumstances, the noble Lord, Lord Garden, would be in his place to respond to the Statement. I ask the noble Lord, Lord Chidgey, to pass on our best wishes to the noble Lord, Lord Garden, and hope that we will see him back in his place very soon.

5.18 pm

Lord Chidgey: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Astor, for his final remarks. I know that he does not mean that he wants to see the back of me—at least, I hope not—but we will pass on the good wishes of the noble Lord and, I think, of many Members of this House. My noble friend Lord Garden is a very special person who adds a great deal to the operation of this House by his knowledge and personality. I will make a special point of ensuring that he is aware of the feeling expressed in the Chamber today.

I agree with just about every point that the noble Lord, Lord Astor, made on the issue. I should like to say how valuable the briefing given by General Fulton was. The Minister will understand if, in attempting to address the Statement, I inadvertently stray into operational and tactical areas, in which I know that he will be restricted in his replies. I will understand if

19 Jun 2007 : Column 130

he says that he cannot answer that question because I have been unable to keep on the straight and narrow.

Nevertheless, the Statement gives rise to a number of questions, particularly about the risk assessment and training aspects of our operations. Were the Government aware of the information gained by the Foreign Affairs Committee in another place through evidence taken in Iran not so long ago, which showed quite clearly that smuggling is a major part of commercial activity and the black economy in Iran and is largely outside the control of the military and the organs of law enforcement? Can the Minister confirm that the risk assessment of the operations is that the Iranian navy’s links with organised crime, which we understand has discreet support at the highest level of the Iranian political establishment, has implications for the way in which we operate in that area, bearing in mind that the Royal Navy has, among other things, an anti-smuggling role that would bite very severely into the organised crime that operates within the Iranian system?

On the question of Royal Navy personnel and the media, can the Minister tell us whether the new regulations banning the media from making payments to service personnel also cover attempts to make discreet payments to family members? If so, how is it envisaged that they will do so? This could be a major stumbling block, as we saw when the issue first arose. Can the Minister also say whether, as part of the training review, any assessments have been made of the need for front-line service personnel to receive training for their contacts with the media? It is all very well having a press office back in London to deal expertly with these issues, but if there are embedded media on the front-line, personnel will be exposed to all manner of issues when they deal with those contacts.

Finally, can the Minister say what effect the deployment of specialist rather than composite teams has had on boarding operations? What effect has it had on personnel levels, manning levels and the demands on personnel generally? Has it put pressure on the ability to man the ships? Has it put pressure on the personnel establishment, or has it been encompassed readily within the existing manning arrangements?

5.22 pm

Lord Drayson: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lords opposite for their comments on the briefing that we gave yesterday. As noble Lords have said, this set a precedent for this House, which reflects the deep expertise in defence in this House, which the Ministry of Defence completely recognises. I join noble Lords in sending the noble Lord, Lord Garden, my best wishes for a speedy recovery. I very much look forward to seeing him back in this House.

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